CCOPAB
AND PEACE OPERATIONS

PERSPECTIVES, REFLECTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

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Magazine: CCOPAB and Peace Operations: Perspectives, Reflections and Lessons Learned

Production: Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center

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Year: 2015

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PREFACE

The main goal of the magazine *CCOPAB and Peace Operations: perspectives, reflections and lessons learned* is to disseminate the theme Peace Operations and CCOPAB's activities. Therefore, it has gathered in this issue a series of writings which addresses present themes and the respective experience of their authors when facing new challenges that present themselves to the contemporary Peace Operations.

In summary, the articles highlight the main themes presently being addressed by the United Nations, the education and training of the American Region personnel who take part in Peace Operations, the UN mission in Congo, the importance of training civilians to work in unstable contexts, the positive results reached by the Quick Impact Projects (QIP), the use of the Language Assistants in UN Peace Operations, CCOPAB's importance and experience with the Mobile Training Teams and the military operational preparation of Brazil and France.

With the compilation shown above, we hope to have reached the proposed objectives and that our magazine becomes a valuable tool for researchers and professionals who deal with the reality of Peace Operations. Therefore, we will try to update it with periodical issues. And as the name already mentions, it is a space for perspectives, reflections and lessons learned.


FRANCE
CROATIA
COSTA RICA

■ UNITED NATIONS: AN APPROACH TO THE MAIN CURRENTLY DISCUSSED TOPICS

Major Rodrigo Alves dos Santos[1]

ABSTRACT

This work analyzes the main topics addressed by the Security Council, General Assembly and United Nations Secretariat by reviewing the UN resolutions and articles. The changes due to the implementation of mandates of protection of civilians conducted the Peacekeeping Operations into giving special attention to the ones who are not directly involved in the conflict, implicating the UN to act offensively in order to prevent massacres against civilians. Within this context, the topic use of force would naturally suffer changes in relation to self-defense, reaching, nowadays, a robust manner in a way to neutralize threats against peace. In a more systematic manner, the speed in the implementation of peace operations is a primary factor to the success of the mission. The rapid deployment comprehends methods that could be used so that in a short period of time, Peace Operations would have conditions to be operating with trained and indoctrinated peacekeepers for the mission.

Key words: protection of civilians, use of force, peace operations, rapid deployment.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In 2015, the United Nations is celebrating 70 years of existence. It has been seven decades stimulating the nations to reach peace, in cooperation with sustainable development, in monitoring the accomplishment of the Human Rights and of fundamental freedom. Throughout this time, 69 peace missions were created from 1948 to 2013. Nowadays, there are 16 of them ongoing, and most of them are in Africa and the Middle East (UNITED NATIONS, 2015).

During this period, many challenges were faced by the Member States. Decisions needed to be taken, material and personnel resources should be made available to accomplish the missions and, still, many conflicts changed their characteristics. As a way to evaluate the world scenario and the measures adopted by the UN, studies are meant to arouse attention to topics that involve United Nations' activities. These studies cause a change in peacekeeping policy and in the strategic reform, besides changing doctrinal thoughts. In 2000, the Brahimi report, for example, observed that, to be efficient, UN peace operations should have enough resources and equipment, and operate under clear, coherent and feasible mandates. At a doctrinal level, Zeid report, approved by the General Assembly in 2005, introduced changes in conduct and discipline, imposing the zero tolerance policy to sexual exploitation and abuse, to be adopted by the peacekeepers.

Recently, in 2014, the Secretary General announced the establishment of a High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations. Names renowned for their experience will bring into light highly relevant topics to maintain world peace, among them: protection of civilians, use of force and rapid deployment.

Supporting the discussions of the main current topics, we will show the context relating to each topic, as well as the challenges met nowadays and some possible recommendations of international institutions.

2. PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Surely, protection of civilians is the primary priority of the present UN peace missions mandates. Defined by the United Nations as all necessary means, aimed at preventing or responding to physical violence threats against civilians. History presents us wars and conflicts in which the civilian population has suffered the pain of this contention both physically and mentally. In a recent past, specifically in the 90s, we saw massacres in Rwanda (region in Central Africa) and Srebrenica. These events led the UN to change the present peace operations mandates, giving special attention to ways of protecting civilians from the damages caused by internal conflicts (UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY, 2014). Nowadays, there are 11 missions with protection of civilians mandates. Since peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are the link between the belligerent parties and the civilian population, peacekeepers (PKO agents) are the ones in the front line protecting civilians from genocide. In this context, the UN tries to identify the best way to prepare peacekeepers to prevent those mass atrocities. With the implementation of these mandates of protection of civilians in peace operations, a few considerations can be analyzed, such as the legality of the peacekeeper's activities related to human rights and international humanitarian law, the backing in the use of force due to imminent threats against civilians, as well as the guidance given to the peacekeeper to distinguish combatants from civilians and in the identification of the circumstances in which he can detain a person.

Discussing this topic a bit further, it is important to consider the creation of specific preventive guidance during the preparation phase for missions and guidance in relation to the obligation of command and control, thus, making troop and police contributing countries accountable. In this sense, cases related to protection of civilians should be taken to the UN Headquarters to guarantee that they are examined and sent to the contributing countries in question.

Another possibility is that the orders of the missions with the protection of civilians mandate strengthen the technical capacity of the national institutions in protecting their population, avoiding that the mission stay longer than necessary. Measures adopted by the belligerent parties, when following UN guidance, are a great step toward governmental autonomy and, therefore, peace.

3. USE OF FORCE

At the same time in which the UN needs to adopt measures capable of protecting civilians in conflict contexts, the evolution of conflicts indicates a necessity to adapt the peace operations in relation to the use of force. The events previously mentioned in Rwanda and Srebrenica, besides the events in 1960 in Congo and in 1993 in Somalia, show that the deficiency in using the force may bring a traumatic consequence to the civilian population (SHEERAN, 2014).

The principles in which the use of force is employed only in self-defense have proved themselves inefficient in some situations. New concepts in the use of force needed to be implemented in peace operations. Traditional peace operations based on consent, impartiality and use of force only for self-defense is not the only way to use the force anymore.

Tactical robustness was the change adopted by the United Nations to deal with interstate conflicts in which only self-defense would not be able to protect human rights and guarantee humanitarian assistance.

Nowadays, MONUSCO has received the highest type of use of force with the intervention brigade. Due to insecurity caused and to the frequent attacks carried out by rebel groups of Eastern Congo, the brigade, one of the maneuver constituents of the Military Component, led by Brazilian General Santos Cruz, has the responsibility to neutralize armed groups, reducing threats towards the State, the Democratic Republic of Congo (SHEERAN, 2014).

However, this topic is very controversial due to the questioning of to what extent this new use of force will be the solution to the existing conflicts, or even, become the rule and not the exception in the creation of more robust and offensive mandates.

4. RAPID DEPLOYMENT

The necessity to improve the capacity to rapidly deploy is a challenge to the United Nations and is considered a very important issue by the Security Council. In 2004, the Under-Secretary-General Jean Marie Guéhenno reported that the resources, global mobilization and rapid timely deployment demand great world challenges. In areas of international post-conflict, the quick implementation is the most complicated process and usually delayed due to the demands of the process. The prerequisites usually include immediate availability and high-level training, well-equipped personnel and well-prepared logistics, according to the Contingent Owned Equipment Manual (UNITED NATIONS, 2011). Besides these demands, time is a preponderant and critical factor. The General Assembly has

endorsed in the 55th session the recommendations of the Brahimi report having 30 days to respond in case of traditional peace operations and 90 days in case of multidimensional (UNITED NATIONS, 2000). In order to help in the quick response of peace operations, a few initiatives were created:

UNSAS (United Nations Standby Arrangements System)

A database system that registers potential troop contributing countries that have specific operational capability, without any guarantee of real commitment. All pledges of troop availability for PKOs are conditional and must remain on standby in national bases. The decision to whether or not really implement the resources remains a national decision when requested by the United Nations.

FPUS (Formed Police Unit Standby)

Police troops capable to operate at short notice, in a determined region, according to determination of the Security Council.

SPC (Standing Police Capacity)

Specialized police officers capable of starting UN activities in the police component's mission and/or provide advice to the existing police component.

Premiums and financial incentives

Measures to motivate the participation of the Member States in the rapid deployment system.

GFSS (Global Field Support Strategy)

A system created by the UN Department of Field Support to guarantee the necessary logistics for a rapid and cheap deployment.

ERDC (Enhanced Rapidly Deployable Capacities)

System that studies manners to improve rapid deployment. It is done through the use of regional capacities, pre-negotiation of the

deployment of troops with contributing countries or the use of rapid deployment of troops of other closer peace operation.

EMHQ (Early Mission Headquarter).

Headquarters (HQ) with the necessary expertise to carry out rapid deployment missions.

Rapid deployment represents several challenges to reach its objective. Each conflict and each mandate are unique. Each mission has its particularities and challenges. Based on these challenges, Langille, in 2014, published through the International Peace Institute, in New York, an article with recommendation for some of these initiatives as a way to improve the methodology of quick response.

Recommendations:

1) UNSAS - Rename the rapid deployment level as the "emergency providers list." The designation of a "UN emergency response unit" might also inspire a higher level of commitment. Participation at this level should be regarded as a privilege, to be earned on the basis of merit, professionalism, and service. Providers deserve to be accorded recognition for their services;

2) Premiums and financial incentives - DPKO and DFS should continue to explore ways to acknowledge and reward service for emergency first responders and for rapid deployment in case of an emergency. Contributors meeting or deploying under specified UN response times merit additional commendations;

3) Enhanced Rapidly Deployable Capacities - DPKO should consider the expansion of a regional concept, with a UN reserve battalion that has high mobility and is capable of accomplishing three operations

in the same region. This can create an economical force multiplier and a robust capacity to limit each operation. A clause must be added to MOU for rapid deployment so that the battalion can be immediately deployed as a UN prerogative. Identify a group of Member States with experience as UN strategic reserve can help to balance improvisation and the probable rush that follows multiple crises;

4) Early UN HQ - A UN HQ early deployed in the mission deserves more considerations. A reserve and integrated HQ with capacity to hold 60 people, including a functional list of specialists available that can be immediately deployed could be created to speed up the rapid deployment, beginning of the mission and the HQ in the mission area. The members would be useful to complement the task force of the integrated mission, help with technical assessment missions, compose the core of an operational HQ, and guarantee a complete planning and an organization through the initial and most demanding phases of a PKO.

5. CONCLUSION

Taking into account the time of UN existence, the changes that have happened in the world at this period and the complexity involved in maintaining world peace, it is easy to notice the need of changes that will be able to adapt to the variables presented in the geopolitical context. Within this context, the use of force and the protection of civilians were taken to a more important level and reformulated according to the present moment. As it happened to the recommendation of a way to optimize the intervention of the United Nations with measures capable of carrying out rapid deployment in a conflict area in which each waiting day may represent the lives of innocent people.

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■ EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF THE AMERICAN REGION PERSONNEL WHO TAKE PART IN PEACE OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

A brief study of the contributions of American countries for UN Peace Operations and capacity-building of human resources are presented. During this approach of the training topic for peace operations developed by the countries of our American Region, facts and numbers, past and present, which determine the positioning of these nations individually are presented; however, in turn, their collective presence standing out, both in operations and in the training. All the contributing countries must ensure full capacity of their assets to accomplish the missions and to model, with this requisite, the notorious instrument that appropriate education, training and preparation of personnel at all levels and activities. Following a trend that consolidates gradually, this commitment towards an adequate personnel training is carried out in the national institutes of each country, which, in turn, are gathering to offer mutual support, sharing capacities and experience. It is in this context that the regional association that gathers the will and the actions of the training centers of the countries of our region will come out. As the main references to carry out this work, the author took into account, especially, the experiences acquired and documents produced in three international events which recently occurred, whose theme was education and training to take part in UN peace operations. The first of these events was the Specialists Workshop designated as "The new architecture of training for Peacekeeping", in Brindisi - UN Logistics Base, from 27 to 29 of April, 2015. The second was the Regional Conference of the Americas on Peacekeeping Operations called "Our commitment towards peace and

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international security" developed in Montevideo - Uruguay from 05 to 07 of May, 2015. The third was the Regional Conference on "United Nations Military Units Manuals for Peace Operations (UNMUM)", in Germany from 26 to 28 of June, 2014. During all the events, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) sponsored, organized and took part in them.

Key words: capacity-building, UN, peace operations, Latin America, personnel, training.

1. AMERICAN COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY-BUILDING

1.1 Approach of the theme

1.1.1 Facts and numbers

The American countries have had a long history of participation in United Nations peace operations, which dates back to the 60s, some of which were the earliest ones.

The first presence of Brazil and the United States of America has been since 1948 in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

Nowadays, 17 countries from the Americas (14% out of 121 Contributors) contribute with almost 5% of their uniformed personnel (military personnel 5.2% - police officers 1.6%).

Two countries from Latin America are in significant places in the group of the greatest 25 uniformed contributors: Uruguay (20th) with 1,455 and Brazil (24th) with 1,182.

The Latin American contributions are usually deploying military personnel in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

In May 2015, the total strength of the mission was of 5,408 uniformed personnel coming from 51 countries. The Latin American presence reached 2,908 (with 2,711 specialist military personnel and with 197 police officers), representing 53.7% of the Force, coming from 17 countries of the region (33% of the total).

There the police presence becomes important, more in terms of individual deployments; however, there is no Formed Police Unit (FPU).

The other Latin American presences in current peace operations are mainly registered in Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo - MONUSCO, Mali - MINUSMA and others), where countries such as Uruguay, Guatemala and El Salvador have contingents deployed (Uruguay 1,192, Guatemala 152 and El Salvador 91), providing a total of 2,199 uniformed personnel.

1.1.2 Capacities and contributions.

Conceptually and in practice, peace missions demand equipment and technology to carry out the operations, and they are accomplished by properly trained personnel. These material and human resources are provided by the Contributing Countries by means of contracts.

The countries in the American region provided to the United Nations almost all types of necessary capacities and services in each opportunity.

Some of these contributions offered and employed were: Infantry Units, Special Forces, Logistic Support, Transport, Hospitals Levels I and II, Air Reconnaissance, Transport and Evacuation Assets (fixed and

rotatory wings), Engineers, Military Police, Maritime and River Transport, Water Treatment, Demining and Explosive Disposal, etc.

The current global situation shows that capacity gaps are a constant characteristic of UN Peacekeeping Operations.

To that, we can add the difficulty to reach a timely response to obtain the timely use of assets even when resources are usually available.

Many big, difficult and complex missions, especially, in the Sub-Saharan Africa, UN peacekeeping operations still lack a great diversity of critical enablers, a condition that limits significantly the operation and execution capacity of the mandate.

At the same time, it seems that the personnel lack specialized knowledge in different areas, and these skills are necessary to efficiently apply the mandates.

The UN maintains dependence of all State Members, including American countries, to identify, prepare and deploy personnel with adequate abilities and experience to carry out several mandates.

Therefore, the necessity of specialized military and police contributions for UN peace operations is a constant concern.

At the same time, the demands that contemporary peace operations exercise in contributing countries become more difficult. More investments in levels of capability and readiness are needed.

The Contributing Countries and the UN Secretariat gathered an extraordinary compilation of lessons learned, guidance and compendiums of best practices. However, the need of a continuous dialogue, the reflection and improvement remain an imperative demanding commitment and response.

The countries of this American region concentrate a lot of

information due to the quantity and extension of their participation in operations.

For that, we can also add a rich diversity of perspectives that are generated within a common context of universality to all contributing countries; this experience comes from several countries which show their unique style of carrying out missions that are common to them all.

1.1.3 The geopolitical context

The roots, impact and possible solutions to conflicts extend and comprehend far beyond the geographical area in which they are produced.

The presence and activation of a multidimensional and multinational peacekeeping force reflects a shared global load, adding legitimacy and credibility to a peace mission.

In its most recent reports, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations still emphasizes the necessity to broaden the number of countries that contribute with contingents and police.

The High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations issued in June 2015 is clear, among other conclusions, on the importance of politics as a vital tool.

A long-lasting peace is reached through political solutions and not only with technical and military participations. The political solutions must guide all UN peace operations.

Nevertheless, the necessity of stronger and more committed associations is emphasized. It is necessary to have a more resistant global and regional structure for peace and international security in the

future. The United Nations must come up with a new perspective and help to allow others to do the same.

2. THE STRATEGIC SCENARIO IN THE AMERICAN REGION

2.1 Peace operations and political considerations.

The Americas, as a whole, can be considered as a territorial and human environment, in which international peace and security are still important over other destabilizing factors that led to different types of conflict.

During the last six decades, the precedents to local and regional problems that in relation to validity of peace have deserved the international attention and reaction were very few and of relative intensity. These peace operations deployed are the evidence of: 1 in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP- May 1965 to Oct 1966); 1 in Central America (ONUCA - Sept 1989 to Feb 1992); 1 in El Salvador (ONUSAL - Jul 1991 to Apr 1995); 1 in Guatemala (MINUGUA - Jan to May 1997); 5 in Haiti (MIPONUH - Dec 1997 to Mar 2000; UNMIH- Sept 1993 to Jun 1996; UNSMIH - March to July 1996; UNTMIH - Aug to Nov 1997; MINUSTAH - Jun 2004 to date).

The Latin American countries, in special, count with the internal political support to deploy their troops to UN peace missions, including, sometimes, missions in countries which are far from their immediate political and economic interests. These nations show a clear will and commitment to contribute for world peace and security through UN peace, with political and operational benefits as key booster factors for the contributing countries.

It is gradually observed the increase of the number of countries that are accepting this chain of thought and activation, such as Colombia and Mexico, current examples of national interest for such sensitive aspect in international relations.

Nevertheless, it is undeniable the international prestige that appears for being a UN peace mission contributor.

Other benefits that the TCC *status quo* grants include: wider opportunities to train military and police personnel, providing the real operational experience in several challenging environments; the possibility to test the capacity of interoperability with other countries; and, finally, the reimbursements and financial compensations, whose adequate use would help acquire new equipment and technology related to police and military operations.

Not questioning the political and institutional willingness to keep contributing to UN peace missions, the current issue in countries of the region is how and where to take part in this project to maximize the effectiveness of contributions.

Based on the concepts present in the Brahimi Report (2000), on the Capstone Doctrine (2008), on the project "New Horizon" (2009) and on the recent High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (June 2015), it is evident the need to strengthen the link between the UN and several other regional organizations, knowing that, among other positive results, financial support to peace operations would be favored, establishing the correspondent marks of responsibilities and standards for operations.

The American region has its own organizations (OAS, USAN, CARICOM etc.), which makes it permanent to express its corporative

willingness to contribute towards continental and international peace and security.

In this decade, the most evident demonstration of this willingness in action was the massive and diverse contribution of these countries, present in MINUSTAH.

Nowadays and also for the future, there are opportunities to make the most of the willingness and experience of Latin American TCCs, available for the expansion and renovation of the mission contributions, particularly in the Sub-Saharan Africa.

2.2 MINUSTAH, a singular history and the challenges of the immediate future.

In 2004, the fragile political situation, the serious security problems, the fragility of the institutions in charge of assuring the existing Law and internal order, as well as the gravity of violations of the human rights in Haiti called the attention of the UN, which considered that all those facts were serious and internationally risky.

About this concept, the Security Council issued Resolution 1529 (28 Feb 2004), determining the need of intervention and deciding on deploying a Multinational Interim Force (MIF).

Since then, the participation of the American countries was important and decisive, highlighting the roles of Canada and Chile, composing the US-led force.

In the mid-2004, MIF was replaced by MINUSTAH, as per SC Resolution 1425 (30 April 2004).

This new mission, now of "Stabilization", had, since the beginning,

predominantly American TCCs in the Mission Headquarters, Military Contingents (6,700 troops) and the Police (1,622 agents).

In the following phases of peacebuilding, including the situation of humanitarian emergency triggered by the 2010 earthquake and the following period of political and democratic system reconstruction, countries of the region were present and provided assistance.

The majority of Heads of Mission and UN SRSGs were of Latin American origin. For over a decade, the Commander of the Military Component was from Brazil, having as assistants Argentinian, Chilean and Uruguayan Commanders.

In 2010, the special assistance requested, due to the earthquake, the increase of human and material resources by means of SC Resolution 1908 (19 Jan 2010).

In terms of money, the military component was raised to 8,400 troops, reinforcing, particularly, the Engineering, Aerial and Sanitation Units, among others. The Police component got to a number of 3,711 agents.

In 2012, it was implemented the MINUSTAH Consolidation Plan, which was developed based on key objectives, coming from the observation along three years, when the priority was to reinforce security and the rule of law, the management of the elections and the modernization of the institutions.

This plan included a reduction of the military force of the mission, foreseeing a fundamental role for the UN police in order to work towards peacebuilding in Haiti, prioritizing the use of Formed Police Units (FPUs), Specialized Police Teams, and instructors for the formation of the Haitian National Police (HNP).

In the following SC resolutions (Res. 2119 of 10 October 2013 and Res. 2180 of 14 October 2014) the permanence of MINUSTAH is extended, keeping the reduction of uniformed personnel. At present, the authorized quantity of uniformed personnel reaches up to 2,370 troops and 2,601 police agents.

The continuity of this process of reduction makes us think that in the mid-2016, nearly 1,300 troops will have to remain in Haiti, keeping the formation of the Police component stable and constant.

Nowadays, this situation, arising from the "Subject MINUSTAH", seems to be a clear challenge for Latin American countries which wish to keep the same level of support in Haiti, and also, in other 15 missions all over the world.

Within this context, it will be necessary to demonstrate their capacities to set and adjust their commitment to support the changing needs of the existing missions, which today are incorporated, and then carry out future plannings to take part in operations which might come up in the future.

It will be necessary to start determining where and how those contributions could be made, their general and particular usage and what would be the necessary preparation.

It is important to take into account that as it is stated in the conclusion of the High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations Report (June 2015), UN missions shall be carried out according to the context and Peace Operations shall cover all the spectrum of possible and necessary responses.

A clear and permanent dialogue between Latin American countries and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and

the Department of Field Support (DFS) about the commitment and quality of Latin American contribution is fundamental to clarify the planning and expectation for the desired transition. That includes future individual or integrated participation of countries in desired regional contributions.

3. ASSOCIATIONS AND INTEGRATION OF EFFORTS TOWARDS PEACE

3.1 The Latin American process

Latin America led the provision of joint and binational contributions for UN peacekeeping, using creative emphasis to fulfill the demands of missions, as well as adjusting cost and shared risk mechanisms.

In this case, it is undeniable the reference to MINUSTAH, where we can find examples of these initiatives put into practice.

Some recent and present examples are of Chile and Ecuador, providing a Combined Engineering Company; of Brazil, incorporating some staff officers and platoons from Canada and Paraguay in its Infantry Battalion; Chile, having troops from El Salvador and from Honduras in its Battalion; Uruguay and Peru, forming a Combined Infantry Battalion.

Also, there are other initiatives being applied or simply waiting for the moment or deployment conditions. Cases of: Argentina and Peru, creating the Binational Engineering Company *Libertador José de San Martín*; Argentina and Chile, forming the *Task Force Cruz del Sur,* composed of two Mechanized Battalions, one Aerial Component having eight helicopters and one Naval Component having two patrol vessels. This Task Force was

set as a reserve capacity for the UN, conceived to be deployed in 90 days.

All these multinational projects demand willingness and work capacity to seek for the development and solutions for organizational and administrative aspects of Force structure and procedures.

This way, and in the highest level, this draft and execution of "integral and integrated solutions" constitute a diplomatic exercise between the nations involved.

Considering the critical demand of rapid deployment capacities, to enlarge and operationalize the Task Force model *Cruz del Sur* would be the reason for a greater exploration by other Latin American governments, being, in turn, an option of model to be copied by other regions and countries.

In relation to the presence of Latin American police contingents in peace operations, it is supported by the contributions of specialized elements deployed individually, not having any Formed Police Unit (FPU) with this origin.

The reason for such an insufficient presence is attributed to either the political character or security and internal order of the respective countries, which appear as a common factor in the region.

3.2 Global perspective

Extending practical associations, another potential way could be provided to fill in the critical gaps in UN peace missions.

The gaps in military capabilities are currently verified, particularly, in relation to the relative availability of formed units whose capacities and training status are ready to be deployed all the time, as well as in difficult

times when it is necessary to have a rapid deployment.

Still more complex is the activation of units with special capacities of assistance and support as transportation, engineering, logistics and medical support which are highly demanded in all UN peace missions.

Completing this critical framework, there are the Aerial Units of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircrafts for multiple transportation, evacuation, observation, reconnaissance and military operations, whose contributions are very necessary in all operations. For these capabilities, the high cost of service is determining.

Likewise, but less expensive, it is the situation set by the Maritime and Fluvial units, whose services are only needed in some missions.

Still in the process of political acceptance and determination of cost-effectiveness, we can mention the deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), whose current development status is critical and to summarize it here, it would also be long and partial.

By means of specific assistance from the UN as a global entity and/or providing additional equipment offered by the TCCs, this could help better the capacities and associations.

Additional exploration of the available lessons in the provision of joint contributions could also be applied in other regions.

Taking, again, as reference, the Report on the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (June 2015), we agree on the necessity of having stronger Associations. It is necessary to have a more resistant global and regional structure towards international peace and security for the future. The United Nations shall present one vision and help promote others.

The emphasis *ad hoc* as a response to crisis will not be enough in

the future and the UN shall present one vision and a plan for an expected stronger network of national and regional capabilities.

The peace associations also allow countries to strengthen their knowledge and action bonds, mainly, in the field of diplomatic relations and defense.

4. THE LIMITATIONS OF RESOURCE AS A LIMITING FACTOR OR OBSTACLE FOR CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

4.1 International and regional contexts

That is an unquestionable challenge faced by many Member States in the current world financial situation, somehow determining the shortage of resources especially sensitive to areas like security and defense.

Despite having the majority of UN missions in Africa, the Latin American contributions for peace missions in that country is an exception, not a rule.

Only three countries of our region have a significant number of deployed uniformed personnel: Uruguay (1,192 in MONUSCO), Guatemala (152 in MONUSCO) and El Salvador (90 in MINUSMA).

This limited participation is attributed to the geographical distance and, maybe, to the cultural distance as well, between our places of origin and the remote zones of deployment where, besides climate and geographical characteristics, the conditions are hardly ever like ours, causing functional problems to material and human resources deployed.

Linking these probable problems to the technical logistical and operational aspects, the limiting factor, particularly, interferes in the

provision and maintenance of supplies and equipment, causing a greater cost support.

Surely, there are experiences of other Member States that face similar logistic problems, such as countries from Asia (China, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan). The distinguishing factor, which is highly visible, is the great capacity that those nations have to make bigger contributions, simultaneously and in different parts of the world, thus being very little comparable realities.

The omission increases, due to the perception that African missions are bigger security risks for the mission personnel, if compared to MINUSTAH, without taking into account that, in reality, MINUSTAH is a particular case.

Uruguay, a Latin American country which has lessons learned and experiences in deploying troops in remote zones (Cambodia 1992-1993, Mozambique 1992-1994, Angola 1995-1997), is also the major American contributor to African missions. Certainly, in its capabilities, it could convey those experiences to other contributing nations of this region, particularly, presenting approved proposals about how costs of troops deployment in big distances could be reduced or how the same costs could be part of pertinent interests.

The presence of Latin American countries with military units in distant zones (Europe and Asia) is very relative, but being in Cyprus-UNFICYP (Argentina 265, Chile 14, Paraguay 14) and Lebanon-UNIFIL (Brazil 126, El Salvador 52).

For both cases of deployment, not very significant in distant zones in this region, there could also be a common reason of internal and

political character in our countries. This would come out when considering the existing distance, the effect those regional or international security problems would little influence these areas and realities of Americas.

On the other hand, to the States foreign policies, there would be a proposal of a representative participation of the willingness of countries, designating more specialized capacities than massive presence.

Finally, another proved fact is that to take part in peace operations, countries from this region would not receive any special support from other nations or powerful countries, in which there could be a closer relation due to old colonial bonds or of any other character.

4.2 Assessment of the current days and the way ahead

This reality of shortage of resources, coming out as a limiting factor or obstacle is common and interdependent to the UN and TCCs, as well as to those financial contributors.

It is necessary that the Security Council provides a strong political support for the process of creation of UN forces and encourages the participation of countries with smaller capacities to contribute with serviceable means for UN peacekeeping, in particular, the Security Council members themselves.

In turn, all Member States shall keep their commitment to international peace and security, making an effort so that all of them contribute, at a high or low level, getting more involved with the possibility of joint or combined contributions.

The administrative practices in the ambit of Member States representations and of UN HQ, nowadays, are more structured and less

prioritizing management towards urgent and needed results in mission areas.

In turn, the operations on the ground are considered very centralized in the HQs and branches, making it difficult the provision of resources and/or delaying the responses the units need to give to best accomplish the mandate.

It is recommended that authority and responsibility be aligned to obtain results on the ground, ensuring results and resources responsibilities.

The development and preparation of human resources, as well as obtaining and preparing the equipment, focusing on the ground and on the administrative procedures make it viable.

Within this context, there should be special attention on initial deployments and immediate effectiveness demanded by units on the ground, as well as the aptitude to provide adequate responses to crisis.

5. THE KNOWLEDGE TOOL

5.1 Education, formation, preparation and training as concepts and applications in peace operations.

Besides providing personnel and equipment, Member States are also responsible for ensuring that their troops arrive in the mission area after adequate technical and professional trainings**.**

Personnel coming from Latin American countries are trained by several national institutions in the region; some of them very old and experienced (CIOPE, Uruguay since 1982, renamed ENOPU,

CAECOPAZ, Argentina since 1995, among others).

All of them, as State institutions, represent the willingness and commitment of the respective nations to this sensitive aspect of personnel preparation for the challenge of being peacekeepers. It is included the participation of military, police and civilian personnel.

Associating and exchanging capacities and experience among institutes, and the provision of support with instructors and Mobile Training Teams have been developing a lot, though. These last modalities transcend continental borders, reaching areas in Europe, Africa and Asia.

In 2008, the Latin American countries which contribute with personnel and resources to peace operations/missions, aware that the capacity-building and training process for military, police and civilian personnel demands a integrated effort at regional level, decided to create the Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Operations Training Centers (ALCOPAZ).

Not less important is the support that, individually or collectively, the Latin American countries receive from the United States of America through the bilateral support in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).

Even though, the use of Distance Learning and Teaching systems as an element of assistance in the theoretical phases and a complement of the onsite instruction steps and exercises which are the activities that will allow a real assessment of the means adequacy are also going through budgetary and adjustment process.

The Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI) is ALCOPAZ's and training centers' associate, promoting this assistance through agreements favorable to the interests and necessities.

The countries in this region follow the efforts of the United Nations Secretariat to standardize the training programs and issue the certification of the training institutes, which is under the responsibility of the Integrated Training Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (ITS/DPKO). ITS/DPKO is also responsible for establishing norms, promoting development and providing guidance, aiding the respective contributing countries during the pre-deployment training phase.

In its frequent reports, the Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations insists on the necessity that UN guidance must be available in all UN official languages in order to promote to the community of peacekeeping timely access to material and tools, in all relevant training levels, as well as the relevant guiding documents.

In the case of contributing countries from this region and in relation to the operational capacities as a whole, we can verify that the use of languages (English and French) is a limiting factor that, in some cases, becomes a real obstacle to reach the necessary capacity of interoperability between the components of an operation.

The language barrier is even more transcendental to UNPOL members (UNPOL/IPO) since they need to work directly with local communities, the police force of the host country and governmental institutions.

Another aspect that demands attention to be improved is the institutional communication, which is still inadequate or inconsistent between the training institutions and the UN Secretariat, despite the efforts that have been made and the technological development of the communication available nowadays.

The materials and guidance that provide knowledge of specific conditions of each of the missions is a tool that the countries in the region requested DPKO as an absence that affects on the other way the adequate preparation of the personnel towards life conditions, situation and operational environment.

DPKO/ITS has been developing standardized material, dealing with different roles relating to some aspects of the different missions.

In turn, DPKO/OMA keeps a program to update the doctrinal and organizational aspects producing military guidelines and manuals.

Getting to establish and keep the channels of communication between DPKO (ITS and OMA) and the contributing country with their training centers would result in a direct benefit for the formation and training of personnel.

Complementing a technical link, whose main branch is the center or the regional association reaching all the associates, it could complement and enrich this knowledge net and the practice towards better instructions.

Yet, and in this general context, the contributions of learned experiences and lessons could be developed and systematized, developing and improving the respective webpages.

The videoconference sessions that can include all actors (DPKO & Training Centers) are another possibility that could be developed and it would provide significant gains.

5.2 Training the Police Personnel

The police capacities of high quality still depend on the UN peace missions, especially, in relation to the urgent operational priorities, such

as the specialized police teams and well trained formed police units. We also add the organized crime to this situation as a new challenge faced by peace missions.

For multiple reasons, some of them previously mentioned, Latin American police officers contribute forming only 2% of the total of police in UN peace missions; thus, there are a small number of personnel for this demanding type of activity.

In all countries of the region, the respective training centers provide roles for the presence of police personnel, participating as instructors and students, creating a fruitful personal and technical integration.

It is important to highlight that for UN peace operations, the pre-deployment training modules are applicable to all peacekeepers.

The specific professional capacity building is done inside the police organizations.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND ADVISORY

The most significant questions relating to regional nations and UN peace missions briefly presented and analyzed here were the American contribution for the operations, MINUSTAH in particular, the associations and integration of efforts towards peace and the formation and preparation of personnel deployed in missions.

From this presentation, there come ideas whose development would contribute to better the strategic planning towards the future and the importance the dialogue has for all parties involved.

The cornerstone would be contacting DPKO, consolidating political and institutional bonds with American countries to improve the

force creation plans, either for military or police personnel.

Haiti remains a clear priority for the region and the immediate structural changes are obvious and predictable, demanding constant dynamics.

The needs of MINUSTAH are gradually lying on police contributions, and at the same time, the military contributions have widely been reduced. The police have a new opportunity to carry out the contributions, but the internal political support, for sure, will be a transcendental obstacle.

About the situation in Haiti/MINUSTAH, there are a general shared understanding and challenges that affect the Latin American contributors in different levels. Nevertheless, undoubtedly, in a short period of time, the military presence will be reduced and kept in small numbers.

Then, we need to reach and keep an adequate coordination between DPKO/DFS and the TCCs of the region to appropriately prepare the forces and needed capacities to reach the end of the mission, in two years' time maximum.

The legacy this mission is leaving in this region is the confirmation that American countries got to a very successful regional association, integrating a peace operation to support another nation in the same region, being a model of integration in all aspects, and recognized in the international community.

Imagining that Latin America is interested in still participating and taking over new responsibilities, integrating future United Nations peace operations, including a possible greater collaboration and, particularly,

considering "MINUSTAH's case" with experiences which appeared there, it is convenient and undeniable to carry out an immediate study of the opportunities that come up and the probable courses of action to address each one of them. This task should be carried out by each contributing country and before the UN, but it is recommended that they explore the possibilities of gathering bilateral and regional efforts. Therefore, there comes an imperative that American countries should conceive and innovate their plans to reshape and suit their commitment towards international peace, in a more global scenario from now on, outside the region.

In this context and at a political-strategic level, the region must also claim to keep its presence among the high hierarchies responsible for carrying out different peace missions deployed (16 current missions in total).

Nowadays, there are three employees from American origin working as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG): one from Canada in MINURSO, one from Trinidad and Tobago in MINUSTAH and one from the USA in UNFICYP. As Military Force Commanders, there are only two, one is MINUSTAH and one in MONUSCO, and both are from Brazil. Amongst Police Commissioners, there is only one in MINUSTAH, and he is from Canada. Globally speaking, we can also conclude that most of these high authorities are presently working for MINUSTAH.

Obtaining significant quality and quantity of American personalities and employees in these distinctive functions would mean an incentive to those countries from which the authorities come, maybe also

producing a multiplying effect in the wills of those who define the ways to be followed by the theme peace operations.

The possible enterprises, from regional and subregional organizations (such as OAS, CARICOM, UNASUR, etc.) or others like "group of friends" associated by a common objective, could really favor the actions of the countries that contribute with Latin American contingents and police. Besides, that would contribute to improving the dialog and collaborations among UN authorities and American governments.

In relation to the capacities demanded by modern peace operations, and recognizing gaps that are common to all of its missions, the UN could potentially reduce these failures through contributions that TCCs could provide by creating binational and/or regional associations.

The American countries know their own capacities, competencies and individual experiences, as well as their proved ability to integrate binationally. This includes lessons to impart to other countries that might be interested, inside and outside the region.

Undoubtedly, these contributions could be enhanced and offered to the UN, using an updated matrix in compliance with the norms and contractual modalities (COE & MOU) in effect today and supported on a solid base of a decade of experience in MINUSTAH.

These future associations can be a re-edition of previous partnerships or innovation that could embrace new partners, including other incipient contributing countries. Expanding these practical associations, American countries could increase their contributions.

The capacities shown while contributing with specific facilitators (engineers, medical components, air units and maritime/fluvial units,

among others) would allow to continue offering these essential services to operations and its execution could be carried out individually by the countries or through binational associations.

The Task Force *Cruz del Sur* is a potential reality awaiting for its first deployment and must try this real deployment in the operations. Once this experience happens, which would allow several verifications; this "binational model" could generate the example and incentive the region needs.

The American countries should go on having national, bilateral and regional debates about their role in UN peace missions, far beyond Haiti and should, especially, develop stronger arguments to take part in missions deployed in Africa.

Far beyond the value that these actions by themselves would have for all the system, they would undoubtedly favor all the interests.

In capacity-building and training area, DPKO (ITS & OMA) could guarantee its communication with training institutions in the contributing countries in America to improve general preparation and obtain adequate level of readiness prior to deployment, in which there would be technological possibilities and direct contact between these parts. On their turn, the American governments should participate in extending the dialog, reflection and real activities such as joint training exercises, favoring the probable development of more associations for peacekeeping.

It is in this aspect that we find the most concrete reality of regional integration and ALCOPAZ is the institution that represents us, specially, in the academia, and moreover, showing positive repercussion that take

place in field operations.

Despite the peace forces from America have been well trained and experienced, it is clear the will and persistence in efforts to better prepare troops and individuals, especially for situations found in mission areas and with the particularities that each one presents.

In this environment, there is the utmost necessity to operate in an integrated manner with forces from different origin and it is assumed that the existence of the "operational doctrine" common to all contributing countries is the common support base to all. Here is the main goal of our countries which are aware of this important operational demand. Therefore, the interaction between the UN and the American Training Centers should be intensified, promoting more detailed information on the existing necessities and conditions of the several UN peace missions.

Recognizing that the formal relation is exclusive between the UN (DPKO and OMA) and the countries that contribute with troops and police, via their respective National Centers, the information can and should flow through the regional association. From this point on, ALCOPAZ, as a regional association, shows itself as the adequate environment to improve this communication, assuming it has the conditions to establish the necessary information and wider channels of communication.

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■ THE UN MISSION TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Conor Foley[1]

ABSTRACT

The article establishes standards to analyze the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with emphasis on the role performed by the Intervention Force Brigade. To achieve it, a historical analysis on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1999 is done. It describes the objectives of each phase and concludes on the new strategies applied by the Intervention Force Brigade in the Protection of Civilians' context.

Key words: MONUC, Protection of civilians and Intervention Force Brigade

1. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC) was established in August 1999 as a small, unarmed observer force to monitor a cease-fire signed between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), one rebel group and five regional States in Lusaka, Zambia.[2] The Lusaka Accord officially brought an end to the Second Congo War, which is sometimes referred to as the 'African world war' because it involved nine African nations and some twenty armed groups. It was also one of the world's deadliest recent conflicts, killing

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2 *UN Security Council Resolution 1258 of 6 August 1999.*

up to six million people, although the vast majority of deaths have been from conflict-related diseases, rather than direct violence.

President Mobutu's autocratic rule from 1965 faced increasing challenges by the early 1990s as economic decay and political repression mounted. Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, some two million Rwandese Hutus – including elements that had taken part in the genocide – fled to the neighbouring Kivu regions of Eastern Congo. Hutu Power militias began to launch cross-border attacks from the refugee camps and IDP camps inside Rwanda. The new Rwandan army responded by forcibly closing IDP camps, killing up to 20,000 people in the process.[3]

In mid-1996, the new Rwandan government sponsored a rebellion to overthrow Mobutu, who had close ties with the previous regime. Laurent Désiré Kabila, aided by Rwanda and Uganda, took the capital city of Kinshasa in 1997 and forcibly closed many refugee camps as well. Relations between President Kabila and his foreign backers deteriorated, however, and, in July 1998, nationwide fighting erupted as fresh Rwandan and Ugandan troops entered the country. The creation of a newly-formed group, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), was announced and Rwandan troops prepared to march on Kinshasa in its support. Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Namibian troops intervened on behalf of President Kabila, while the Hutu Power groups and Mai-Mai 'self-defence' militias also rallied to his support. The Rwandans and the RCD withdrew to

3 For further discussion see De Waal, Alex, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, London: James Currey, 1997, pp. 204-13; Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame, Sergio Vieira de Mello and the fight to save the world, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p.191-222; and Ian Martin, 'Hard choices after genocide' in Jonathan Moore, (ed) Hard Choices, moral dilemmas in humanitarian intervention, Maryland and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp.157-77. See more generally. Fiona Terry, Condemned to repeat? The paradox of humanitarian action, Ithaca: Cornell University, Press, 2002; Sadako Ogato, The turbulent decade: confronting the refugee crises of the 1990s, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2005. The support which UNHCR and a large number of humanitarian agencies initially gave to the 'killers in the camps' and then subsequently rapidly withdrew from remains a deeply controversial episode.

eastern DRC, while a new group, the Movement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC), sponsored by Uganda, took control of the northeast. Kabila was assassinated, in January 2001 and succeeded by his son Joseph.

Widespread fighting continued after the signing of the Lusaka Accord and the parties failed fully to implement its provisions. In January 2000 one of the mission's first reports warned that UN forces 'would not have the capacity to protect the civilian population from armed attack'.[4] The following month the Security Council increased the mission's strength and gave it a Protection of Civilians (POC) mandate using language similar to that agreed for UN mission to Sierra Leone the previous October.

The general understanding of the language adopted was that POC was not a main part of the mandate but that it would be needed under certain circumstances.[5] A mission report in early 2001 emphasized that UN forces could guard UN facilities, equipment and supplies but that they will 'not be able to extract other United Nations personnel at risk, or accompany humanitarian convoys, nor will they be able to extend protection to the local population'.[6] A new concept of operations (CONOPS) in October 2001 focused on monitoring and investigating ceasefire violations and encouraging disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration (DDRRR). Mission reports contained no specific references to POC either as a planning objective or military task and an underlying assumption seems to have been that the

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4 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2000/30 of 17 January 2000, para. 67

5 Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operation, OCHA/DPKO, United Nations, 2009, p.244.

6 Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/128 of 12 February 2001, para. 77. UN Security Council Resolution 1341 of 22 February 2001 actually reduced the number of troops deployed to guard UN military observers.

best protection of civilians would come from the overall success of the mission.

In May 2002, however, the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma militia troops in Kisangani massacred over 100 civilians in the process of suppressing a mutiny by some of their local commanders. MONUC had around 1,000 troops in the city, but failed to oppose the massacres forcefully or send patrols to deter abuses during what Human Rights Watch described as a 'wave of killings, rapes and looting'.[7] Attacks on civilians continued through 2002. A mission report in June 2002 insisted that, 'MONUC troops . . . are not equipped, trained or configured to intervene rapidly to assist those in need of protection',[8] while a special report of September contained no reference to POC.[9] However the following month's report warned that human rights violations had 'far surpassed the worst expectations', that their 'number and scale . . . is growing rapidly' and that 'the situation demands greater protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.'[10]

Rwandan troops officially withdrew from the DRC in October 2002, while Ugandan troops withdrew in May 2003. However, the latter withdrawal created a security vacuum in Bunia, which led to a series of massacres that killed hundreds and drove tens of thousands from their homes.[11] Two UN military observers were also killed in a nearby village

7 *Human Rights Watch, War crimes in Kisangani: the response of Rwandan-backed rebels to the May 2002 mutiny, HRW, August 2002.*

8 *Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/621 of 5 June 2002, para 71.*

9 *Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1005, 10 September 2002*

10 *Twelfth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1180 of 18 October 2002, para 49*

11 *International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing, Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo, Brussels: ICG, 7 July 2004; International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing, Back to the brink in the Congo, Brussels: ICG, 17 December 2004.*

and around 2,000 civilians sought refuge at the MONUC base.[12] A subsequent report by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) concluded that the troops stationed there did what they could within the extremely limited constraints of their capabilities and mandate.[13] An internal report by MONUC's first Force Commander stated more bluntly that:

> Faced with the band of killers who were sowing death and devastation in town, [the contingent] refused to react by opening fire after proper challenge and in accordance with the mandate to protect the population and in accordance with quite unambiguous rules of engagement. Instead, they persisted in only firing into the air, declaring that they could only act under Chapter VII and engage in combat with prior authority of [their parliament].[14]

The UN authorized the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), under European Union auspices in response.[15] The IEMF was well-armed and provided with air support, although it was only authorized to operate within Bunia, and massacres continued outside the town. It enforced a 'weapons-free zone' in Bunia and responded aggressively to provocations by the militia groups. Thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) were able to return home from June to August 2003. Responsibility for the security of the region was handed back to MONUC in September 2003, which gradually also began to patrol more remote villages.

12 Letter Dated 16 July 2004 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2004/573 of 16 July 2004. pp. 25–26. See also Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operation, OCHA/DPKO, United Nations, 2009, p.250-3. The total death toll was 663 civilians.

13 Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force. New York: Best Practices Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, October 2004, p.7.

14 End of Tour Report. 31 December 2003, pp. 8-10, cited in Holt and Taylor, 2009, pp.251-2

15 UN Security Council Resolution 1484, Adopted of 30 May 2003.

2. THE ITURI AND KIVUS BRIGADES

The UN responded to the perceived success of the IEMF operation by organizing an Ituri Brigade with heavy armaments, and combat helicopters and increasing MONUC's overall troop ceiling.[16] The situation in Ituri became the subject of considerable international legal attention[17] and MONUC also increased its civilian staff carrying out monitoring and reporting violations. Paradoxically, this may have emphasized MONUC's weaknesses, since comparable atrocities were also taking place in areas where MONUC had fewer resources. MONUC's more aggressive stance also provoked a reaction from the rebel groups and between December 2003 and March 2004 there were 20 attacks on its soldiers in Ituri alone.[18] This doubled to 40 attacks between September and December 2004. [19]

A Kivus Brigade was also formed to carry out high visibility patrols.[20] However, security in North and South Kivu deteriorated in late 2003 and early 2004 as clashes grew between RCD-Goma and the Congolese national army around Bukava. Although MONUC forces did succeed in briefly cantoning one rebel group and halting the advance of another, it subsequently put up no resistance when the rebels seized

16 *UN Security Council Resolution 1493, of 28 July 2003.*

17 *International Criminal Court, Press Release, 'Communications Received by the Office of the Prosecutor, 16 July 2003. 'The Office of the Prosecutor has selected the situation in Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo, as the most urgent situation to be followed' announcing its first ever investigation. See also DRC v Uganda, ICJ Report, 2005, paras 176 and 178-9 and 209-10, which focussed on the situation in Ituri.*

18 *Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2004/251 of 25 March 2004,*

19 *Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/1034 of 31 December 2004, para 11.*

20 *Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/251 of 25 March 2004. See also International Crisis Group, Maintaining Momentum in the Congo: The Ituri Problem, Brussels: ICG, 26 August 2004. Critics argued that civilians remained at risk when patrols withdrew from an area.*

Kavumu airport and Bukava itself in June 2004, again displacing tens of thousands of people.

A special mission report acknowledged that the events 'represented the most serious challenge to date' in its transition strategy.[21] The combined impact of the Bunia and Bukava crises seriously damaged MONUC's reputation and there were violent demonstrations against it in many parts of the country. International aid agencies also condemned the UN's inability to protect their staff and ensure the delivery of relief supplies. The mission's reputation suffered further due to revelations of sexual exploitation at an IDP camp in Bunia. A mission report again complained about the gap between the expectations created by the mandate and its capacity to fulfil them. The Security Council approved a modest increase in MONUC's size, and a new mandate, which gave greater emphasis to POC tasks listing them as second in priority only to deterring violence that might threaten the political process.[22]

A mission report of December 2004 stated that: 'MONUC, with its increased presence in the Kivus, will proactively support the FARDC [Congolese armed forces] in disarming FDLR [Hutu Power militia] and, in this connection, will use force to protect civilians.'[23] The following mission report noted 'a stronger emphasis has been put on bringing United Nations agencies and MONUC together in the development of common security arrangements and expanding humanitarian space.'[24]

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21 Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2004/650 of 16 August 2004, para 2.

22 UN Security Council Resolution 1565 of 1 October 2004.

23 Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/1034 of 31 December 2004, para 34.

24 Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2005/167 of 15 March 2005, para 81. It also stated that 'MONUC, under its mandate to protect civilians, will also strengthen its action to reduce acts of aggression against the civilian population'.

Almost 5,500 MONUC combat-capable troops were re-deployed to the Kivus and Ituri between October 2004 and February 2005 and undertook a number of military operations to 'enhance security', including by disarming and arresting militia members. In February 2005 an ambush by a militia group killed nine Bangladeshi soldiers on a routine patrol to protect an IDP camp.[25] MONUC troops responded with an operation that killed 50 - 60 militia members.[26] A subsequent UN Security Council resolution extended MONUC's mandate and stated that:

> MONUC is authorized to use all necessary means, within its capabilities and in the areas where its armed units are deployed, to deter any attempt at the use of force to threaten the political process and to ensure the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, from any armed group . . . in accordance with its mandate, MONUC may use cordon and search tactics to prevent attacks on civilians and disrupt the military capability of illegal armed groups that continue to use violence in those areas.[27]

MONUC adopted a new CONOPS in April 2005, which set out the envisaged approach in more detail.[28] A succession of mission reports over the next few years showed that POC was now being treated as a civil-military objective to be achieved through the neutralization of Congolese militias and 'foreign armed groups'. These did not, however, indicate that the UN considered itself to have become a party to the conflict. Mission reports stressed, for example, that while 'some Congolese and Member

25 *Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2005/167 of 15 March 2005, para 16.*
26 *Ibid., para 19*
27 *UN Security Council Resolution 1592 of 30 March 2005.*
28 *Divisional Commander's Initial Campaign Plan for Operations in DRC East. 4 April 2005 and Military Concept of Operations for MONUC, 2005, Annex C*

States continue to call on MONUC to forcibly disarm the foreign armed groups' this was not MONUC's responsibility.[29] The CONOPS also stated that: 'While MONUC can use force to protect civilians, and, in this connection, will do so against the foreign armed groups, the very nature of peacekeeping prohibits peacekeepers from engaging in targeted warfare.'[30]

Following the elections of 2006, which dominated much of MONUC's work for the period, the mission's strategic objectives were once again reviewed and a report in March 2007 stated that the focus of the mission should now be the protection of civilians and the extension of the authority of Congolese government throughout the country.[31] MONUC's strength was again increased, to just over 17,000 troops. The wording of the mandate suggested that POC be a top priority and this was confirmed in December when a subsequent resolution stated this explicitly.[32] The 'Protection of Civilians' began to appear as a specific section in mission reports from April 2008 onwards.

Major fighting broke out in North Kivu in August and September 2007 with MONUC troops taking direct action against rebel militia groups. Despite a peace agreement between the government and a number of militia groups in January 2008, the year was marked by fresh crises, which continued into 2009. Between July and November 2008 MONUC supported the Congolese armed forces in a major operation against one militia group, which retaliated by attacking civilians and looting villages. In September MONUC and the Congolese army launched another

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29 Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2004/1034 of 31 December 2004, para 34.

30 Military Concept of Operations for MONUC, 2005, Annex C, p. 14. On file with author

31 Twenty-third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2007/156 of 20 March 2007

32 Security Council resolution 1794 of 21 December 2007, para 5. 'The protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources'.

offensive, this time against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which had infiltrated from neighbouring Uganda.

In November 2008 clashes between the Mai Mai and the CNDP led to a massacre of more than 150 people in the town of Kiwanja despite the presence of MONUC troops who were within 1 km of where the killings took place.[33] According to Human Rights Watch the MONUC troops were well armed and equipped with 4 BMP-2 armoured vehicles. They sent a patrol roughly two hours after the CNDP had regained control of Kiwanja and begun summarily executing civilians. Although the patrol found bodies in the streets, 'No further action was taken by MONUC to stop the killings or to enhance protection for civilians in the town.'[34]

3. OPERATION KIMIA II AND HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE

The Security Council renewed MONUC's mandate in December 2008 and in the same month the Congolese government signed an agreement with Rwanda for a joint operation against the FDLR. The government also signed agreements with the CNDP and other smaller armed groups in the Kivus, who were granted amnesties and integrated into the Congolese armed forces. The CNDP's then Chief of Staff, Bosco Ntaganda, announced that he had replaced Laurent Nkunda as leader of the group on 5 January. Ntaganda had been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged crimes committed in Ituri in 2002 and 2003 and this indictment was unsealed in April 2008. However, no effort was made to arrest him and he assumed the rank of General in the Congolese armed forces.[35]

33 *Human Rights Watch, Killings in Kiwanja: The UN's Inability to Protect Civilians, New York: HRW, December 2008.*
34 *Ibid.*
35 *Human Rights Watch, 'ICC: Congolese Warlord to go to trial', New York: HRW, 9 June 2014;*

Around 4,000 Rwandan troops crossed into the DRC in January 2009 for a month long combined operation with the newly integrated Congolese armed forces.[36] The FDLR retaliated with massacres of the civilian population that killed 201 people, including 90 in a single village.[37] The LRA also launched a series of attacks between 24 December 2008 and 17 January 2009, in which they killed almost a thousand people and abducted 160 children.[38] In February 2009 it was reported that MONUC's previous Force Commander had resigned from office because he believed that the plan adopted the previous October to provide protection for civilians was 'divorced from reality'. [39]

In May and July 2009 the Congolese armed forces, with MONUC support, again launched a military operation against the FDLR, known as Kimia II.[40] MONUC assisted the operation through 'planning' and 'logistical support, including tactical helicopter lift, medical evacuation, fuel and rations.' [41] The mission 'also provided fire support to FARDC [Congolese armed forces] operations when deemed essential by MONUC commanders.' The mission report of this operation claimed that it had pushed the bulk of the FDLR away from population centers and mining sites and resulting in the repatriation of large groups of FDLR members

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Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: Arrest Bosco Ntaganda for ICC trial, New York: HRW, 13 April 2012; Human Rights Watch, 'You will be punished': Attacks on civilians in Eastern Congo New York: HRW, December 2009

36 Michael Deibert, The Democratic Republic of Congo, between hope and despair, London: Zed Books, 2013, pp.149-51

37 Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Hutu Militia Rampages Across North Kivu, IWPR, AR No. 212. 11 May 2009; Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: Brutal Rapes by Rebels and Army, HRW, 8 April 2009

38 Human Rights Watch, The Christmas Massacres: LRA Attacks on Civilians in Northern Congo, New York: HRW, February 2009. This states that the fatalities included at least 815 Congolese civilians and 50 Sudanese civilians

39 El País 'El informe del militar español que dirigió lãs tropas de la ONU en Congo.'. 8 February 2009.

40 For an overview see: Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2009/623, 4 December 2009.

41 Ibid., para 5

and their dependents to Rwanda. However, it acknowledged that:

> Despite the enhanced and innovative measures taken by MONUC to protect civilians, the operations also took a heavy toll on civilians, who were displaced and subjected to reprisal attacks by retreating armed groups. Furthermore, the actions of undisciplined and recently integrated FARDC elements seeking to settle old ethnic scores resulted in serious violations of international humanitarian law, including killings of civilians.

A Human Rights Watch report estimated that more than 1,400 civilians had been killed in North and South Kivu between January and September 2009. [42] Half the victims were killed by the FDLR and half by the Congolese and Rwandan armed forces and allied militia.[43] It also claimed that 7,500 women had been raped and 900,000 people forced from their homes during the course of the operations.[44] The MONUC mission report acknowledged that: 'international non-governmental organizations reported alleged or confirmed massacres and gross human rights violations committed by elements of FARDC against civilian populations. . . . some components of the United Nations system called for an immediate end to Kimia II and for the withdrawal of MONUC support for FARDC.'[45]

In October 2009 the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions described the results of the military operations that MONUC had supported as 'a disaster'.[46] He said that in many areas the Congolese

42 Human Rights Watch, 'You will be punished': Attacks on civilians in Eastern Congo New York: HRW, December 2009

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2009/623, 4 December 2009, para 9

46 Press statement by Professor Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions. Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5–15 October 2009, 15 October 2009, OHCHR website, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/docs/PressStatement_SumEx_DRC.pdf, accessed 19 November 2013

armed forces 'posed the greatest direct risk to security' and noted that 'the Security Council's mandate has transformed MONUC into a party to the conflict in the Kivus.'[47] In the same month the UN's Legal Counsel issued an internal memorandum, which stated that if the mission had reason to believe that the Congolese armed forces were committing violations of IHL, international human rights law or refugee law:

> MONUC may not lawfully continue to support that operation, but must cease its participation in it completely. ... MONUC may not lawfully provide logistic or "service" support to any FARDC [Congolese armed forces] operation if it has reason to believe that the FARDC units involved are violating any of those bodies of law. . . . . This follows directly from the Organization's obligations under customary international law and from the Charter to uphold, promote and encourage respect for human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law.[48]

This legal advice was endorsed by the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee, in June 2009, which prompted MONUC officials to develop what was to become known as a 'conditionality policy'.[49] On this basis it announced that it would be suspending military aid to units of the Congolese armed forces implicated in human rights violations a position endorsed by the Security Council in December 2009.[50] The Security Council further called on the Secretary General to 'establish an

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47 Ibid.

48 Confidential note, leaked by the New York Times, from the UN Office of Legal Affairs to Mr. Le Roy, Head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1 April 2009,para.10. Cited in Eighth report on responsibility of international organizations, A/CN.4/640, 14 March 2011, para 47

49 For a more detailed description see Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis 'Peace operations by proxy: implications for humanitarian action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces', International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 95 Number 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.539-59

50 Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2009/623, 4 December 2009, para 2; UN Security Council Resolution 1906 of 23 December 2009.

appropriate mechanism to regularly assess the implementation of this Policy'.[51] After consultations with humanitarian and human rights in the country a review mission from DPKO in the spring of 2010 subsequently recommended that the 'conditionality policy' be extended to other UN missions and that it should bind all UN missions, offices, agencies, funds and programmes in their dealings with non-UN security forces. [52]

In late 2010, the UN Policy Committee decided that the conditionality policy should apply globally and system-wide, and launched an internal inter-agency process led by DPKO and OHCHR, which was to result in the adoption of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces (HRDDP) in July 2011.[53] This was publicly endorsed by the Security Council in March 2013.[54]

The HRDDP requires UN missions to carry out early risk assessments when considering whether to give support to or undertake joint operations with national forces to 'take fully into account the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk to civilians, including, in particular, women, children and displaced persons and civilian objects'.[55] Missions are required to regularly monitor the compliance of these forces with IHL and international human rights law and actively intervene to draw attention to violations while ensuring that its own forces lead by example.[56]

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51 UN Security Council Resolution 1906 of 23 December 2009, para 23

52 Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis 'Peace operations by proxy: implications for humanitarian action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces', International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 95 Number 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.539-59

53 UN Secretary-General, Decision No. 2011/18, 13 July 2011.

54 Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, UN Doc. A/67/775–S/2013/110, 5 March 2013

55 See, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 2100, adopted on 25 April 2013, para. 26. MINUSMA take fully into account the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk to civilians, including, in particular, women, children and displaced persons and civilian objects in the performance of its mandate ...where undertaken jointly with the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

56 Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces UN Doc. A/67/775–S/2013/110, 5 March 2013

It has been noted that the debate about human rights conditionality 'remains largely theoretical due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms and judicial remedies.'[57] However, the HRDDP shows that, first of all, the UN does consider itself legally bound by the positive and negative provisions of international human rights law and, secondly, that it is possible to create effective monitoring mechanisms to track compliance with them.

4. PROTECTION STRATEGIES AND THE FORCE INTERVENTION BRIGADE

In January 2010 MONUC and UNHCR published a UN system-wide strategy for the protection of civilians.[58] This built on previous strategy documents and lessons learned reports from both the field and DPKO headquarters, which as well as attempting to define 'protection' also marked the first attempts by a UN mission as a whole to define what it understood by and how it intended to implement its POC mandate. 'Protection' was defined as:

> all activities aimed at ensuring the safety and physical integrity of civilian populations, particularly children, women, and other vulnerable groups, including IDPs; preventing the perpetration of war crimes and other deliberated acts of violence against civilians; securing humanitarian access; and ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual, in accordance with relevant national and international bodies of law, i.e. human rights law and international humanitarian law.[59]

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57 Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis 'Peace operations by proxy: implications for humanitarian action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces', International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 95 Number 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.539-59

58 UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) & UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 'UN System-Wide Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', January 2010

59 Ibid., para 15

The strategy stressed, however, that it 'takes into account the need to reconcile and integrate MONUC's mandate to protect civilians with its mandate to support the operations of FARDC integrated brigades. It recognizes the primary responsibility of the State to protect its own citizens, and incorporates the various humanitarian, security and human rights dimensions of protection in DRC.'[60] It also noted that: 'MONUC does not have the operational capacity to position troops in every locality . . . and must maintain its ability to intervene decisively through a balance between concentration of forces to keep strategic and tactical reserves, and extensive deployments in priority areas to protect civilians at risk.'[61] The strategy asserted that 'sustainable protection' could only be achieved 'through the restoration of a functional justice system and civilian administration',[62] but that the mission 'may need to modulate its support to the FARDC based on the latter's behaviour and respect of IHL and human rights law'.[63]

The Congolese army and MONUC conducted another joint operation in January 2010, but MONUC claimed to have been more selective in its targets and mission reports stressed that there had been far more focus on holding re-captured territory and developing State institutions in them.[64] The mission also announced a number of initiatives to increase outreach to local communities, gather more information about potential threats and the development of a database to identify 'must-protect' areas.[65] Subsequent reports detailed the increased use of Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) Community Liaison Advisers (CLAs), Community Alert Mechanisms (CANs) and the formation of Mobile Operating Bases.

60 *Ibid., para 2*
61 *Ibid., para 12*
62 *Ibid.,para. 13*
63 *Ibid., para 21*
64 *Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2010/164, of 30 March 2010, para 2*
65 *Ibid., para 70*

The Security Council subsequently encouraged the further use of such 'innovative measures implemented by MONUSCO in the protection of civilians'. Taken together these measures indicate both a far more proactive interpretation of the mission's POC mandate, but also a different way of thinking about how to fulfil it, with an emphasis on civil rather than military strategy. Deploying forces with the aim of 'protecting civilians' rather than 'defeating the enemy' draws on some contemporary counter-insurgency theory,[66] but also on the type of robust community policing strategies used in 'pacification' operations such as those conducted in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro.[67]

In mid-2010 MONUC was transformed into MONUSCO, with a reference to 'stabilization' added to the mission's title intended to 'reflect the new phase reached in the country'.[68] Although attacks on civilians and human rights violations continued with regularity, mission reports became more optimistic from 2011. The capture and defections of significant FDLR commanders, coupled with the arrests of key leaders in Europe, reduced its active membership to a small rump. An increasing number of Mai Mai militia and rebel groups also reportedly opted for negotiated surrender and integration into the Congolese armed forces.

In April 2012, however, a new armed rebel group, comprised principally of former CNDP militia and led by Ntaganda, emerged, known as the M23. This claimed that the government had failed to respect the terms of this peace agreement, signed on 23 March 2009 and was failing to

66 *See, for example, David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: fighting small wars in the midst of a big one, London: Hurst & Co., 2009, which reflects on his experiences designing the 'surge' in Iraq in 2007 and subsequent similar operations in Afghanistan.*

67 *For a description see Conor Foley, Pelo telefone: rumours, truths and myths on the pacification of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro: Humanitarian Action in Situations Other than War, Pontificia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, March 2014*

68 *UN Security Council Resolution 1925, Adopted on 28 May 2010, para 1. See also MONUSCO website, background http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/background.shtml, accessed 19 November 2013*

take sufficient measures against the FDLR. A UN appointed investigative panel found considerable evidence to show that Rwanda had provided direct support to the rebellion.[69] On 20 November 2012 the rebels briefly seized control of Goma after it was abandoned by government troops. MONUSCO's peacekeepers did not attempt to prevent the rebels entering the town and some senior officials expressed uncertainty as to whether their Rules of Engagement (RoE) permitted the use of force to prevent the rebel advance if they were not directly threatening civilians at the time. No attempt was made to detain the rebel fighters either because of similar uncertainty about the legal situation.

On 2 December 2012, the M23 withdrew from the city following strong diplomatic pressure on Rwanda from other countries in the region. This was coordinated by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), strongly supported by the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The ICGLR had previously, largely at Rwanda's behest, called for the AU and UN to work together to establish 'a neutral International Force to eradicate M23, FDLR and all other Negative Forces in the Eastern DRC'.[70] The M23 rebellion gave added impetus to this demand, although the question of which countries troops should comprise its membership was controversial.

In March 2013, after consultations with the AU, SADC and ICGLR the UN Security Council authorized a Force Intervention Brigade to undertake military operations against armed groups in the DRC.[71] In

69 Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2012/843, 15 November 2012.

70 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the Security Situation in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)', Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 July 2012

71 UN Security Council Resolution 2098, 28 March 2013, para 12(b).

announcing its formation the UN stated that the Security Council had 'approved the creation of its first-ever "offensive" combat force, intended to carry out targeted operations to "neutralize and disarm" the notorious 23 March Movement (M23), as well as other Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups'.[72] In the same month, following a split within the rebel group, Ntaganda surrendered himself to the US Embassy in Rwanda and was taken into custody by the ICC. The M23 rebellion ended in November 2013 following heavy fighting in which the Intervention Brigade provided direct support to the Congolese armed forces, using artillery and attack helicopters, as well as taking defensive action to protect civilians in the area.[73] Around 6,000 rebels surrendered to MONUSCO and government forces.[74]

MONUSCO claims that the defeat of this rebellion had also led to overtures from 'several armed groups in North Kivu . . . seeking to either surrender or negotiate'.[75] Nevertheless, it noted almost 10,000 security related incidents, threatening civilians, within the terms of the mission's mandate, in October and November 2013,[76] including scores of killings, rapes and abductions, some of which were carried out by members of the

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72 'UN News, 'United Nations, "'Intervention Brigade' Authorized as Security Council Grants Mandate Renewal for United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo', 28 March 2013, http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm, accessed 5 May 2015

73 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, S/2013/757, 17 December 2013, paras 17-20 and 37-40.

74 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2014/450, 30 June 2014, para 88

75 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, S/2013/757, 17 December 2013, para 22

76 Ibid., para 36. 'In October and November, the United Nations protection cluster recorded 9,515 incidents in North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale provinces, where six joint protection teams were deployed to assess the situation and identify protection needs. During October and November, MONUSCO received 504 protection alerts, 359 of them in North Kivu, through community alert networks. In response, MONUSCO deployed quick reaction forces and sent investigative patrols or, where appropriate, referred the alerts to national security forces.'

Congolese armed forces.[77] OHCHR also accused the Congolese armed forces of components of torture, mistreating M23detainees, killing civilians looting and burning villages and carrying out mass rapes and other sexual violence.[78] Attacks on civilians have continued and the UN continues to face criticism for failing to prevent them.[79]

In March 2014, the Security Council extended MONUSCO's mandate by another year and included the Intervention Brigade within it, 'on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice'.[80] The word 'imminent' was also removed from its POC mandate.[81] With the M3 rebellion defeated the Intervention Brigade, which is under the same force commander as MONUSCO as a whole, is turning its attention to other armed groups.[82] Some have praised the Intervention Brigade's robust mandate, [83] while others have warned that it sets a dangerous precedent of

77 *Ibid., paras 47-53*

78 *UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and MONUSCO, Report of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office on Human Rights Violations Perpetrated by Soldiers of the Congolese Armed Forces and Combatants of the M23 in Goma and Sake, North Kivu Province, and in and around Minova, South Kivu Province, from 15 November to 2 December 2012, May 13, 2013, pp. 9–10,*

79 *Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: Army, UN Failed To Stop Massacre, New York: HRW, July 3, 2014. This reported that despite being alerted to a massacre in Mutarule on June 6, 2014, while killings were underway, the commander of a nearby MONUSCO contingent stated that he had been told by his national superiors to merely clarify the situation and gather more information rather than directly intervene. See also UN News Centre, 'DR Congo: UN boosts force in east after gruesome massacre of civilians', 16 December 2013. In December 2013 UN troops found the bodies of 21 civilians who had been brutally slaughtered by unknown attackers. The victims were killed with machetes or knives, and the youngest among the dead was only a few months old while three girls are reported to have been raped before being beheaded.*

80 *UN Security Council Resolution 2147, of 28 March 2014 and 2211 of 26 March 2015. This gave an authorized troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 formed police units. See also UN Security Council Resolutions 2198 (2015), 2147 (2014), 2136 (2014) and 2211 (2015). The overall troop ceiling level has been maintained although in 2015 the number of deployed troops was reduced by 2,000.*

81 *Ibid., para 4 (a) (i): 'Ensure, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence, including through active patrolling, paying particular attention to civilians gathered in displaced and refugee camps, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, in the context of violence emerging from any of the parties engaged in the conflict, and mitigate the risk to civilians before, during and after any military operation.'*

82 *UN News, 'Secretary-General Appoints Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz of Brazil Force Commander for UN Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo', 17 May 2013, http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sga1407.doc.htm, accessed 5 May 2016*

83 *Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, UN Doc A/68/787, 7*

UN missions becoming an active party to conflicts and so changing from peacekeeping to war-fighting.[84]

March 2014, para 28

84 Sheeran, Scott, and Case Stephanie, The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues for the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, New York: International Peace Institute, November 2014. See also , Jeremie Labbe and Arthur Boutellis, 'Peace operations by proxy: implications for humanitarian action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces', International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 95 Number 891/892 Autumn/Winter 2013, pp.539-60.

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UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and MONUSCO, *Report of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office on Human Rights Violations Perpetrated by Soldiers of the Congolese Armed Forces and Combatants of the M23 in Goma and Sake, North Kivu Province, and in and around Minova, South Kivu Province, from 15 November to 2 December 2012*, May 13, 2013


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■ TRAINING CIVILIANS TO WORK IN UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENTS

Col José Ricardo Vendramin Nunes[1]

ABSTRACT

This article aims at developing ideas about the complexities of contemporary conflicts. It establishes a relation between the conflicts and the need to prepare civilians to act within these contexts. It concludes on the desirable characteristics for a future course which fulfill those demands.

Key words: Conflicts; civilians; training

1. THE CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT

The initial section of this article aims at spreading ideas about the current complexities of the ongoing conflict areas, either in the framework of the UN Security Council legitimate intervention or in a situation of violence perpetrated by the State itself or by any armed group; situations in which the civilian personnel performing peace process related activities or providing support to the local population need to face in order to accomplish their tasks.

Nowadays, it is extremely hard to characterize and classify conflicts

1 *CCOPAB Commander*

according to the classic view of International Humanitarian Law. The present forms of violence have challenged the International Committee of the Red Cross when it comes to keeping and updating the parameters supporting the protection of civilians and of non-combatants in conflict regions.

The present conflict areas are found in a large spectrum of possibilities and motivations, with the existence or, many times, the coexistence of State actors that usually attempt to respect the rules and of non-State actors that often and deliberately violate the rules a way to become relevant and visible. Recent examples include extremely violent and law-breaking transnational groups.

In fact, the world seems to be more and more dangerous and the unstable areas are seemingly more in need of respecting the basic rules of human protection. Recent events, still ongoing in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq, almost daily, provide evidence of the vulnerability of civilians, either as humanitarian or development workers, journalists, experts on civil affairs, politics, human rights or legal issues, and any other type of consultants.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a worldwide known institution, after researching and analyzing almost 600 peace operations from 2000 to 2010, expressed in its yearbooks that the current conflict can be somewhat taken as a subproduct of international multipolarity, which, lamentably, has created more competition than cooperation. This fact brings additional consequences to the current conflicts, since the solutions, many times, suffer interference from conflicting interests of external actors. In Syria, the situation is a typical example in which instability is potentialized by external factors.

The United Nations, in turn, making efforts towards peace, follow

the decisions made by the Security Council which, occasionally, produce peace missions in volatile environments, with a low level of local consent and significant risks for peacekeepers of all categories, including civilians in the organization, either the hired ones or the volunteers, and members of international non-governmental organizations. Also, we can cite civil actors from bilateral cooperations of several categories such as agriculture, health, environment, urban violence reduction and many others.

Operational environments in conflict areas are usually constituted by a specific microcosmos, with a multitude of agents having distinct interests and mandates, operating in different levels of instability. At the end, irrespective of the sort of international organization in the host country or of the bilateral relation which might exist, working in unstable contexts require a clear understanding of the environment, focusing on the present threats and local vulnerabilities, as well as the improvement of personal aptitudes.

Environments like that require people with qualifications, capacities and general/specific competencies so that they can, individually or in groups, effectively accomplish their professional duties, while preserving their health and keeping themselves safe.

It is not necessary to go further to understand that the presence of civilians in both national and international contexts, individually working in unstable environments, undoubtedly creates demands for the accurate and intense preparation and training.

2. TRAINING CIVILIANS TO WORK IN UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENTS

Before discussing the training of civilians, I would like to set a

difference between preparation and training. In a simple military view, maybe applicable to this context, preparation means gathering all sorts of needs for the work in unstable environments as well as adequately supplying the demands according to a logic and gradable plan.

In this view, preparation is comprised of establishing guidance, norms and standards, selecting human resources, specially the leadership, obtaining and distributing equipment and supplies, as well as planning and training individuals and teams to work in volatile environments. This way, training is a vital part of preparation, but it is not the only necessary activity before being deployed in a country with significant levels of violence and instability.

Training civilians is not a novelty and it is part of the routine in several international organizations like the UN, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and in many other state and private companies; besides having governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations which offer courses and exercises to enable civilians to be deployed in unstable areas. A significant number of countries train their civilians to work in unstable contexts for bilateral cooperations and assistance programs.

In relation to our geographical area, it is noticed that there is no great training availability despite having a solid demand. Not continuously but for a long time, Brazil has officially sent civilian teams to work in conflict areas as a part of assistance programs and international cooperations. Accordingly, non-governmental organizations and Brazilian trade companies send civilians abroad with different purposes.

Brazil has already deployed electoral observers and monitors, technicians from governmental agencies, from the Brazilian Corporation of Agricultural Research (EMBRAPA, acronym in Portuguese), from the

Social Service of the Industrial Sector (SESI, acronym in Portuguese) and many others; some of them were deployed abroad very regularly. These personnel, in general, are not sufficiently trained in terms of security, health and cultural aspects before being deployed. This article does not intend to discuss the characteristics of a potential audience; in fact, the audience already exists.

There is a large number of advantages for carrying out an adequate preparation before being deployed in a new geographical area of work, mainly if this is a risky area with significant obstacles to the accomplishment of tasks.

Besides the aforementioned aspects, a well-conceived and result-focused training will certainly help people acquire knowledge, abilities and attitudes to overcome challenges in the deployment area. Not only is it true for the operational side or for the professional task accomplishment, but also for the logistics side, when it comes to equipment preparation, gathering of supplies and procedure adjustments.

Thinking about the infrequently true premise - civilian personnel specialized in professional fields as the judicial, electoral, developmental, humanitarian, and many others, in general, may not be prepared with tools and knowledge to work in a dangerous zone - what necessary qualifications and essential competencies should they have or develop?

An initial observation, which seems obvious to me, is the fact that any training should focus on the performance needs. The task to be carried out by the individual will provide the elements to plan the training.

A survey on the needs for training will account for the objectives, performance deficiencies, time, available resources, and many others. It is the same as saying that the more complex the functions are, the more elaborate the trainings should be.

That makes me believe we could distinguish two different sets of desirable knowledge, abilities and attitudes for the deployment of personnel in unstable environments. These sets should necessarily be the objects of training before the deployment in a conflict area, but it is important to understand there is much more to be learned as the professional arrives in the mission area and starts working.

A first set is the one of essential aspects to work in hostile environments such as first-aid, understanding the political and cultural context, communication, navigation, driving skills, negotiation, risk analysis, self-protection and some others. These are subjects they all should know, irrespective of their function and professional level; for they will help the civilian personnel survive and operate at the desired minimum levels, at least.

A second set may include non-essential topics for survival, but they are of great functional importance and go deep in the specific reality of the deployment area. To illustrate this, we can cite the training for an electoral observer to be sent to a peace mission area in order to monitor the elections. He or she must understand the electoral organization of the host country, relevant documentation and electoral codes, mechanisms to set and run elections, planning, support structures, actors involved in the preparation and execution of elections etc., all in the universe of the international organization and host country.

Briefly approaching the training methodology, it is almost an international consensus in the field of teaching, the adoption of teaching techniques for adults which involve working in different scenarios and case studies, along with practical activities for the development of abilities and attitudes regarding the survival in hostile environments and the operational efficiency at work.

3. AN INITIAL VIEW OF A POTENTIAL COURSE FOR CIVILIAN EXPERTS

Initially, it is relevant to register that CCOPAB, whose mission is defined in the National Defense Strategy, can also enable civilians to work in UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian demining. It is observed, however, that the participation of civilians in courses related to unstable contexts is somehow reduced and the course syllabus does not focus on the participants needs.

Courses offered by CCOPAB as the UN civil-military coordination course and the UN logistics and reimbursement course, for example, can occasionally be useful for civilian experts; yet, they were created for a military audience who usually carry professional abilities acquired through time, and vital for risky environments. Besides, in the courses, some subjects are not of civilian interests.

Maybe, at the moment, it's useful to analyze, in general, the factors which influence the conception of a possible course designed for civilians, and then talk about its possibilities and limitations.

At first, it is important to observe that the acquisition of abilities and the development of attitudes take considerable time. When the subjects are related to survival techniques and working in unstable contexts, the process demands more time due to the great need of practice and repetition. Think about the necessary time to be proficient in first aid, for example; it is an essential knowledge field for activities in dangerous areas.

Thus, it is undoubtedly necessary to adjust course duration to parameters which result in the minimum competencies to be acquired by the participant.

Another factor to be taken into account is the potential diversity of the audience. It is expected that professionals of several backgrounds attend a course like this, which brings us the necessity to level the participants' previous knowledge. The content to be provided to all of them could be carried out through e-learning; prior to the onsite phase. Leveling knowledge, if well conceived and dimensioned, could be successfully carried out for some theoretical parts of the syllabus.

A third point is related to whether or not knowing the host country where the unstable context is present. Generic training is advisable for an audience that does not have information about the place and moment to be deployed. Specific training is appropriate for situations in which the decision to go to a risky area is already taken. In a brief way, without any deep analysis, a future pilot course for civilians would probably have the characteristics of a generic training.

This way, a course like that, *a priori*, should carry out a basic general preparation in order to work in unstable areas. If destination is previously known, the course can offer specific preparation for the mission or the mission area, lasting for longer, or including that in a previous phase.

Backing to the two sets of knowledge previously mentioned, the potential course could be divided into two phases. One phase could focus on demonstrations followed by short practices on individual training special techniques. Another phase could encompass case studies and scenarios; it should be guided towards theoretical knowledge acquisition regarding planning, international environments etc. This last phase should take e-learning techniques into account.

Courses like this would also have a short practical integrated exercise at the end. In other words, the moment the knowledge, abilities and attitudes are already set, the course provides a practical test to check

if participants have the minimum desired capabilities to work in unstable environments.

An integrating exercise seeks to cover different subjects in the same scenario, posing intense and quick response challenges, which may be solved individually or in groups. It must be thought as the last opportunity for the participant to feel prepared, and it should provide conditions to enhance self-confidence.

In its first editions, this sort of course would probably focus on diffusing critical information, but would also expect to achieve the desirable deployment of former participants in real unstable contexts.

There are many possibilities and they may go much beyond fulfilling national demands, when gaining visibility and relevance, which, consequently, attract international participants. In spite of potential difficulties, apparently able to be solved, it can certainly be said that a training course for civilians would successfully accomplish its objective.

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■ QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS: THE EXPERIENCE OF MINUSTAH'S MILITARY COMPONENT[2*]

Henrique Siniciato Terra Garbino[3**]

ABSTRACT

Quick impact projects (QIPs) are by definition rapid, simple and cheap projects. QIPs have been implemented since 1992 during several United Nations (UN) missions, either with the objective to provide humanitarian aid or to "win the hearts and minds" of local people, mainly to contribute to the missions credibility. This paper analyzes the implementation of QIPs by the Military Component (MC) of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). It was observed that, although not possible to quantitatively measure the consequences of QIPs, and with some reservations, their efficiency could be verified specially in the promotion of the mission credibility; enhancing security for military operations; and finally, facilitating the implementation of the mission mandate. It is concluded that the implementation of QIPs by MINUSTAH's MC, based on the implementation process adopted and the needs faced by MINUSTAH, is valuable and should be used as one amongst the several tools of the stabilization process.

Key words: quick impact projects; peacekeeping; MINUSTAH; military component.

2 * *This study was adapted from the author's undergraduate monograph [Quick impact projects and the development of Haiti, 2010] and the article [Quick impact projects: credibility, security, intelligence and development, 2011].*

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1. INTRODUCTION

Quick impact projects (QIPs) were created and implemented for the first time during a United Nations (UN) action in Nicaragua, in 1991. In general, these projects consisted of basic infrastructure, rapid implementation and planning, low budget and small scale (e.g. improving roads conditions, education and health centers rehabilitation and water wells drilling). The objectives aimed at that occasion were to deliver the population's immediate necessities, implementing QIPs in humanitarian aid for those communities (UN, 2004c; 2013a).

Due to the projects' high visibility, QIPs were included in the overall stabilization strategy throughout United Nations peacekeeping operations, as a means to improve the missions' credibility amongst affected communities (UN, 2000a). The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH[4]) has been implementing quick impact projects since 2004, both through its civilian and military components and other external actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local authorities (UN, 2015a).

The aim of this paper is to analyze the experience on QIPs implementation by MINUSTAH's Military Component (MC), from 2004 to 2015, when the QIPs stopped being implemented by the military due to the drawdown process. This paper was carried out through a documentary research and bibliographic review on the implementation of quick impact projects by the UN in general and by MINUSTAH in particular; along with interviews and questionnaires answered by United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) officers and Civil Affairs officials who were serving or had served in Haiti.

4 *French acronym for Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti.*

Quick impact projects represent a specific and well-defined set of projects, which can be described by some humanitarian agencies along the lines of "hearts and minds activities" or "community support projects" (UN, 2014a, p. 207). Unlike similar activities or projects that can be independently carried out by military units, and which are strongly criticized by the humanitarian community, QIPs must undergo an imperative civilian evaluation and supervision.

Likewise, the projects are funded by a particular budget and conform to an integrated framework, thus limiting political or national influence on their implementation. Perhaps more significantly, military units generally do not carry out the projects themselves, but rather through a commercial contractor. Troops may directly provide, *inter alia*, area security, escorts, military engineering, or logistical support (UK, 2006).

Therefore, the observation of QIPs represents a good opportunity to evaluate the conduction of humanitarian and development aid project by the military and under standardized civilian oversight.

2. BRIEF HISTORY

Quick impact projects were created in 1991 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Nicaragua. Those projects presented two basic features: communitarian participation and small scale and rapid implementation infrastructure works, with a single resource allocation. The main target of these humanitarian aid projects was to alleviate the immediate necessities of the returnees and displaced persons in Nicaragua (UN, 2004c; 2013a).

Those features were well accepted by United Nations donors and

widely disseminated by the UNHCR, thus becoming the backbone for the reintegration practices of the 1990s. Then, over time, QIPs evolved from small communitarian works to a middle ground between relief of basic and immediate necessities and long-term development (UN, 2003).

Furthermore, quick impact projects have shown high visibility to common local people, generating immediate effects and increasing the local populations' confidence in UN missions. Officially, in the renowned "Brahimi Report"[5], QIPs' objectives commuted as they became yet another tool in the peace process, and no longer just humanitarian aid (UN, 2000a).

The close relationship between QIPs and the maintenance of peace and stability was asserted in the report, issued in 2000. It recommended that all peacekeeping operations should have the ability to demonstrate a difference in people's lives and help establish the credibility of the mission, especially during its first stages. Quick impact projects' funding was, however, extended beyond those initial stages (UN, 2000a; 2000b; 2004a; 2004b; 2013a), thus providing for the implementation of QIPs throughout peacekeeping missions.

In response to the General Assembly (GA) Resolution A/RES/60/266 (UN, 2006a) and in line with the GA's general guidelines on QIPs (UN, 2007b), the UN Secretariat issued through its Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS) a policy directive on quick impact projects in 2007 (UN, 2007c; 2013a). Subsidiary guidelines on QIPs were also issued in 2009 (UN, 2009a; 2013a) and the most recent official regulation on QIPs (UN, 2013a) was published in 2013, after a thorough revision in 2011.

5 *A/55/305-S/2000/809: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (UN, 2000a).*

2.1 DPKO/DFS Policy

The DPKO/DFS policy on quick impact projects defines them as "small-scale, rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the population. Those projects are used by UN peacekeeping operations to establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate implementation" (UN, 2013a, p. 3). Correspondingly, projects should be publicized during implementation and upon successful completion (UN, 2013a).

Quick impact projects may cover a wide range of activities, varying on the area of focus and encompassed communities, which includes amongst others: "limited infrastructure related projects, the provision of equipment, short-term employment-generating projects, non-recurrent training activities, and the holding of confidence-building or similar fora" (UN, 2013a, p. 4).

The policy states that quick impact projects are not carried out as humanitarian aid or development assistance in the long term; neither are they programmable resources which can be counted on to implement mandated tasks (UN, 2013a). Although they might complement these activities, their main goal is to assist the peace process, building the so-called "public trust" (UN, 2007c).

The projects shall be conceived and selected conforming to the following criteria, including through strengthening local actors' – such as local authorities or NGOs – capacities and credibility: (1) contribution to promoting acceptance of mandated tasks amongst the population or supporting the mission's credibility by demonstrating progress where confidence is lacking; (2) contribution to building confidence in, or support for, the peace process, including by demonstrating the early dividends of

peace and stability to the concerned population; and (3) contribution to improving the environment for effective mandate implementation in support of the mission, including through assistance for the populations' immediate needs (UN, 2013a).

Under its latest definition, QIPs should be highly visible, small-scale and low-cost projects designed to benefit the population within a short time frame, with a maximum budget for individual projects of USD 50,000.00 and an implementation time not exceeding six months. The projects are supposed to be of a non-recurrent nature and should not place unanticipated financial burdens or unattainable material requirements on the beneficiaries. Along the same lines, they should be sensitive to potential risks to the population, including risk of conflict and environmental damage (UN, 2013a).

Quick impact projects should be selected in a transparent and impartial manner, and done in consultation with local authorities and with the participation of local communities, when appropriate; accordingly, relevant UN actors should be consulted, in order not to duplicate United Nations Country Team's (UNCT) and other actors' efforts. Finally, QIPs must be sensitive to gender, ethnicity, age and vulnerability considerations, following the principle of *primum non norece*[6] in their implementation (UN, 2013a).

Whereas the policy establishes that the implementation of quick impact projects rests ultimately under the overall authority of the Head of the Mission, "QIPs may be executed by the mission, UN agencies, other international organizations, non-governmental organizations, [...] local organizations, local authorities, government and state institutions" (UN,

6 Usually translated as "above all, do no harm", the principle states that, given an existing problem, it may be better not to intervene, or even to do nothing, than to risk causing more harm than good. It reminds that one must consider the possible harm that any intervention might do (SMITH, 2005).

2013a, p. 6). All those actors, including the mission's military component, do not necessarily need, however, to carry out the project by themselves. The actor implementing a given quick impact project may identify and arrange commercial contractors to directly provide either goods or services for the project (UN, 2013a).

Lastly, the DPKO/DFS policy on QIPs stresses that missions should elaborate their own specific guidelines, taking into account the "priorities for geographic and thematic focus, [...] the unique nature and mandate of the mission," the mission's overall "plan and broader strategies for community outreach" (UN, 2013a, p. 4).

3. MINUSTAH'S APPROACH

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti was established on April 30, 2004, to restore order in Haiti after a contentious period that included the ouster of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The mission had as main objectives to stabilize the country, pacify and disarm guerrillas and rebel groups, to promote free and informed elections and support the economic and institutional development of Haiti (UN, 2004h).

As a tool to achieve its mandate, MINUSTAH has funded QIPs in order to "contribute in building a secure and stable environment and enhance national ownership and the trust of the Haitian population" (UN, 2014b, p. 6). The mission has also recognized the limited ability of quick impact projects to substantially alter the situation in Haiti, but stated their significant improvement in security and in the establishment of a minimal environment for concrete changes in the country (UN, 2009b).

3.1 **The conditions faced**

Haiti is the poorest country in the Americas: most of its population lives below the poverty line, depends on the agricultural sector and remains vulnerable to economic instability and to damages caused by frequent natural disasters. Almost every job in Haiti is informal and most people cannot provide basic dietary requirements or potable water to their families, as well as sanitation and electricity (USA, 2015b).

As a result of a historical institutional absence in the country, coupled with high levels of government corruption, incapacity and inefficiency, Haitian public institutions suffer from severe lack of credibility amongst the population. As stated in the Secretary-General's reports on MINUSTAH, virtually, every sector of the government is viewed with suspicion by Haitians, a feeling extended to the United Nations and other international actors (UN, 2004e; 2004g; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d; 2006d; 2007d; 2008b).

Currently, the security situation in Haiti is generally stable, even though some crimes and public unrest have been rising in numbers, due to the political turmoil caused by the indefiniteness of the next governmental elections. Prison breaks, kidnappings, rapes and homicides, often resulting from gang-related violence, have increased and remained concentrated in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. The majority of violent public protests, mostly small in size (under 1,000 people), has been managed by the national police without much operational support from MINUSTAH (UN, 2015b).

The absence of an effective and efficient State presence in law and order reinforces the climate of impunity, which increases the incidence of crimes (UN, 2004e).

3.2 Security Council Resolutions

The United Nations Security Council Resolutions on MINUSTAH initially requested the international community a long-term effort for Haiti's development, underscoring that the socioeconomic development and poverty reduction were a key factor in the stabilization of peace and security in the country (UN, 2004h; 2004i; 2005e).

Quick impact projects were first mentioned in Resolution 1608 (2005), in a request made by the Security Council for MINUSTAH to strengthen its capacity to implement QIPs, in coordination with the various agents of development aid, in order to enhance efficiency and maximize results (UN, 2005f).

Alongside, MINUSTAH was, in the same resolution, incited to urgently establish a strategy of proactive communications and public relations, to inform the population of the importance of the mission and the role it performed in Haiti (UN, 2005f).

Resolutions 1702 (2006) and 1743 (2007) recognized QIPs' importance, emphasizing the implementation of visible projects that generated jobs and rendered basic social services. It was in Resolution 1743 that the urgency to meet, in the short term, the population's basic needs was highlighted, along with the constant concern in long-term development (UN, 2006e; 2007e).

The latest Security Council resolution on MINUSTAH, S/RES/2180 (2014), reaffirming the importance of QIPs in the provision of a secure and stable environment, requests the mission to:

> [...] continue to implement quick-impact projects that contribute in building a secure and stable environment and enhance national ownership and the trust of the Haitian population

> towards MINUSTAH, particularly in the priority areas identified by the Mission's leadership and consistent with the Government of Haiti's priorities as appropriate (UN, 2014b, p. 6).

3.3 Implementing quick impact projects

The implementation of quick impact projects funded by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti follows a detailed project cycle. The cycle is divided in four phases, namely: identification and review; selection and approval; implementation, monitoring and closure; and evaluation and reporting (UN, 2009b).

The identification and review phase starts with the project identification by a mission component or other implementing partner (IP). A project proposal should be then prepared according to a fixed template and sent to the QIPs Management Team (QMT). The QMT shall ensure that the minimum requirements are met, including through site visits, legal attestation, engineering clearance and sketch evaluation. Afterwards, the management team submits a list of valid proposed QIPs to the Office of the Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (OPDSRSG), the Director of the Civil Affairs office and the QIPs coordinator (UN, 2009b). Beginning the selection and approval phase, the OPDSRSG reviews the list and makes due recommendations. The Project Review Committee approves the proposals and assigns a monitoring staff for each project (UN, 2009b).

Next comes the implementation, monitoring and closure phase, when the QMT prepares a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and an Implementing Partner Agreement Form (IPAF). These documents are signed by the IP, the Chief Regional Office and the assigned monitoring staff, and then sent to the Quick Impact Projects Trust Fund Unit (QIPTF).

The Director or Chief of Mission Support signs the MOU and releases up to 80% of the funds (UN, 2009b).

The QMT confirms the IP actual receipt of funds, and then the implementing partner may begin the implementation of the given project. The assigned monitoring staff conducts site visits, reviews projects, collects invoices and other relevant documents and prepares progress reports. These documents are reviewed by the QMT and forwarded to the QIPTF for the release of remaining funds and project closure. Lastly, during the evaluation and reporting phase, the QMT and the QIPs coordinator prepare reviews and reports, so that funds can be reallocated, if necessary (UN, 2009b).

According to Cassini[7], the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti has funded 1,635 quick impact projects throughout the country, with a total budget of roughly USD 42 million, since 2004[8]. The vast majority of them – around 80% – allowed for the rehabilitation or construction of basic infrastructure, as well as the provision of equipment for public services, the improvement of access to water and environmental protection. Virtually the rest of the projects targeted income generation and social mobilization, mainly through civic education, electoral district, public campaigns and capacity building programmes (UN, 2015a).

3.4 The aftershock

The earthquake of January 2010 was perhaps the worst natural disaster in the history of Haiti. The Government of Haiti estimated that approximately 230,000 persons died, 300,000 were injured and 1,000,000 were displaced. It is also estimated that around 250,000 homes and 30,000

7 *Juliana Cassini. Quick Impact Projects Coordinator, Office of Civil Affairs, MINUSTAH, in 2015.*

8 *Between July 2004 and September 2015.*

commercial buildings collapsed or were seriously damaged (HAITI, 2010a; 2010b; RENOIS, 2010).

In face of this event and for a special period, the normal limit budget for one individual project of USD 25,000.00 was raised to USD 100,000.00. The overall fund for QIPs more than doubled during the period. For such projects, the implementation period was increased to six months and consisted of basic and essential infrastructure works, as reported by José Lós Reis[9] (GARBINO, 2011).

Also due to the earthquake, the priorities of QIPs were discussed and revised. The regional offices requested priority in the areas of drainage and reinforcement of canals in preparation for the hurricane season, construction of community centres resistant to earthquakes and hurricanes, water supply, reconstruction of public spaces and buildings and improvements in living conditions of many homeless people. According to Carmen Echeverria[10] (GARBINO, 2011), all reconstruction should have conformed to the standards of anti-seismic construction, based on the need and opportunity to "build back better" (UN, 2010b, p. 4).

Ten months following the earthquake, a cholera outbreak struck the country. The outbreak is still ongoing and is considered the worst epidemic of cholera in recent history. Hundreds of thousands have been infected in Haiti and thousands more have died (USA, 2015a).

Thereafter, one in every five quick impact projects was devoted to the fight against cholera, as well as improving the environment and disaster prevention. These projects consisted of support to health services (e.g., rehabilitation or construction of medical centres, provision of medical equipment); improving access to potable water (e.g., protection

9 Lieutenant Colonel (Brazilian Army) José Augusto Bognoni Lós Reis. Deputy Chief of the Civil-Military Coordination Branch, Military Component, MINUSTAH, in 2010.

10 Carmen Elena Echeverria. Quick Impact Projects Coordinator, Office of Civil Affairs, MINUSTAH, in 2010.

of water sources and gullies, clearing canals, construction of reservoirs, rehabilitation of urban distribution systems); and, finally, the construction of latrines (UN, 2015a).

4. THE MILITARY COMPONENT

When implemented by the military, quick impact projects fall under the military function of United Nations Civil-Military Coordination, which "contributes to facilitating the interface between the military and civilian components of an integrated mission, as well as with the humanitarian and development actors in the mission area, in order to support UN mission objectives" (UN, 2010a, p. 2; 2014a, p. 15).

4.1 United Nations Civil-Military Coordination

As one amongst the wide array of UN-CIMIC activities, QIPs must also comply with the United Nations Civil-Military Coordination core principles and tasks. In short, UN-CIMIC is designed to support tactical and operational interaction between the military component and all other civilian actors (police included) present in the area of operations (UN, 2010a; 2014a).

Such interaction seeks to create an enabling environment for the implementation of the mission's mandated tasks in an effective and efficient manner, by establishing synergy, minimizing duplication of efforts and maximizing the comparative advantage of the involved actors (UN, 2010a; 2014a).

UN-CIMIC is implemented through its two core tasks: civil-military liaison and information-sharing; and civil assistance. Liaison

and information-sharing is carried out in order to provide support in the management of civil-military interaction, in assistance of the military component's efforts to implement the overall mission mandate (UN, 2010a; 2014a).

Civil assistance, in turn, may refer to mission or community support. Whereas the former is understood as the function undertaken by the military in support of the missions' components, UNCT and other actors, as requested by humanitarian and development agents; the latter concerns the interaction between the military component and local civilian population and authorities (UN, 2010a; 2014a).

In order to avoid misconceptions, distinction must be made between UN-CIMIC and other related military concepts and techniques. First of all, UN-CIMIC is not a military doctrine *per se*. It is a broad concept and understanding under which a myriad of actions can be undertaken, as long as they comply with the aforementioned principles and tasks (UN, 2014a).

Secondly, UN-CIMIC is not public relations. The focus of civil-military coordination in United Nations peacekeeping operations is in "civilianizing" and "localizing" (UN, 2014a), i.e., to reduce dependency on the peacekeeping force and capacity building. In this sense, the intention to "win the hearts and minds" of the population is discouraged (UN, 2008a):

> A public-relations application of CIMIC is often counterproductive because it is short-term and limited in effect [...]. In addition to the dangers and risks it could present to partners, this [...] approach can: one, reinforce, rather than reduce, local dependency on the force for services for which the military is inappropriate and cannot sustain (therefore setting the population up for disappointment in

> the force); and two, it could lead the force inadvertently in taking sides in the conflict, thus compromising the core peacekeeping principle of impartiality (UN, 2014a, p. 47).

Third, United Nations Civil-Military Coordination must not be understood as military intelligence. The mere suspicion of the perceived concept of intelligence – usually related to covert actions or spying – may harm the process of confidence building. UN-CIMIC is, as set in one of its core tasks, information sharing, gathering and assessment (UN, 2014a).

4.2 Quick impact projects as tactical tools

MINUSTAH's Military Component issued, in October 2013, the latest Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for UN-CIMIC Officers (UN, 2013b), intended to provide guidelines and a framework to staff officers and all military personnel involved in UN-CIMIC activities. In accordance with the 2013 DPKO/DFS policy (UN, 2013a), the SOPs briefly present the general concepts concerning the implementation of quick impact projects, emphasizing their nature and scope:

The objective of QIPs is to build confidence in the mission, the mandate or the peace process. While QIPs should always benefit the population, they are not intended to be humanitarian or long-term development support. However, good coordination with development and humanitarian actors is essential to ensure that projects do not duplicate or undermine their work (UN, 2013b, p. 31).

Quick impact projects increase force visibility, promotes situational awareness, information-gathering and acceptance by locals. These gains echo in overall security by facilitating mandate implementation. Moreover, they allocate an additional constructive task to the military (UN, 2004b; 2014a).

Government institutions or NGOs carried out most of the quick impact projects, while QIPs performed by military personnel in Haiti represent a little more than 5% of the total. According to Katzfey[11] and Cassini, MINUSTAH MC has implemented 91 quick impact projects since 2004, with a budget of approximately USD 1,800,000.00. Due to the military component drawdown, however, the current Force Commander directive is, while finishing ongoing QIPs, not to request any new quick impact project.

5. PROS AND CONS

QIPs have been implemented by the military component since 2004 and, as stated in reports issued by the United Nations, their effects have been generally positive. According to Victor Núñez[12], the evaluation of subjective outcomes, such as gains in credibility, security and intelligence, is difficult to precisely define, since there is no scientific method to determine whether those gains occurred as a result of a QIP or not (GARBINO, 2011).

For the military, their objective is to facilitate the mandate – i.e. to ensure a secure and stable environment. However, considering the situation in which MINUSTAH is inserted, a number of factors recommends the implementation of QIPs, as explained below.

5.1 Rapid, simple and cheap

Although socioeconomic recovery in the long run is a priority amongst the objectives of MINUSTAH (UN, 2004f), the need for efforts in the short term persists. The condition of misery in which most Haitians

11 Major (US Army) Peter J. Katzfey. Deputy Chief of the Civil-Military Coordination Branch, MC, MINUSTAH, in 2015.

12 Lieutenant Colonel (Argentine Air Force) Victor Manuel Núñez. Chief of the Civil-Military Coordination Branch, MC, MINUSTAH, in 2010.

live, coupled with the periodic incidence of natural disasters in the country, makes the need for immediate assistance constant. Thus, quick impact projects carried out as emergency infrastructure works will also be for long needed.

Though not constituting major projects, their contribution is still considerable. In a report issued by the Security Council, for example, it is highlighted the vital importance of QIPs in the rehabilitation of emergency infrastructure after storms (UN, 2008b). Along the same lines, since the earthquake of January 12, 2010, there has been a great need to carry out small but essential works, which can be run on quick impact projects, such as unblocking roads or debris clearing. QIPs also contribute to the minimal infrastructure of specific communities, training local labour force and income generation.

Nonetheless, by the very definition of QIPs, namely projects that are quick to implement with few resources, they were often based on inadequate planning, failing in the identification of the project, in the participation and consultation of the community and in selecting partners, resulting in low technical and managerial standards (UN, 2003).

Quick impact projects funded by MINUSTAH shall hold a maximum budget of USD 25,000.00, to be implemented in a period up to three months. However, the whole selection process may eventually take longer. Considering the rotation of most troops every six months, the contingent applying for a QIP is not always the one that implements it, thus compromising a timely and effective project implementation and management (GARBINO, 2011). Some unit commanders have even expressly chosen not to implement QIPs during their tour of duty in Haiti, due to the long selection and approval process (CERQUEIRA, 2014).

5.2 Hearts and minds

As previously discussed, the lack of confidence in various government sectors is a major problem faced in Haiti. According to the United Nations Secretary-General, the distrust in State institutions is affecting the credibility and efficiency of the Government of Haiti (UN, 2005b). This problem extends itself to MINUSTAH and other international organizations. Accordingly, MINUSTAH was given the role to support Haitian institutions' credibility through the implementation of quick impact projects (UN, 2006d).

Quick impact projects, highly visible and of immediate impact on the supported communities, influence, directly and positively, the credibility of institutions. According to Echeverria, experience suggests that people are much more cooperative when they see the outcome of QIPs (GARBINO, 2011). The Secretary-General has duly referred to quick impact projects as providers of the "peace dividend" to the Haitian population (UN, 2007d, p. 14).

QIPs are also used aiming foreign donors, as a "panel" of the activities carried out by MINUSTAH, as explicitly states the report: "[...] generosity of donors will need to find tangible expression on the ground through labour-intensive projects that can help restore public confidence in the peace-building process" (UN, 2005d, p. 13).

The military, in any case, should pay attention to the perils when implementing humanitarian and development projects with the sole purpose of "winning the hearts and minds" of the population (UN, 2008a; 2010a; 2013a; 2014a). The main concern of this approach would be in diverting the purpose of a specific group, once used as an instrument of political power, to perform humanitarian service. It may confuse the identity

of both agents, military and humanitarian, before belligerent parties and threaten the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality (UK, 2006). Furthermore, this approach usually reinforces local dependency on the military in the long term, which may turn into general discontentment when troops no longer provide the required services (UN, 2014a).

Quick impact projects, however, substantially differs from this approach. First, troops do not directly implement QIPs but rather do it through local contractors; neither are they delivered as humanitarian aid. Second, the projects should be – by definition – of a non-recurrent nature. Finally, once approved by MINUSTAH's Civil Affairs office, QIPs are included in the overall civilian effort.

5.3 Enhanced security

Quick impact projects implemented by the military are run in conjunction with several other actions, such as overt patrols or slum raids. Therefore, it is not possible to ascribe to the isolated QIP an improvement in security. However, it was observed that these gains do occur and, in the regions where QIPs were implemented, troops performed their role in safer conditions (GARBINO, 2011).

Indeed the mere presence of unarmed military personnel, carrying out projects in benefit of local people addressed the idea of security and confidence (GARBINO, 2011). Similarly, a report from the Secretary-General describes the implementation of QIPs aiming UN personnel safety and security: "The provision of quick-impact projects continues to make a crucial difference, including by fostering public support for MINUSTAH

and the implementation of its mandate and by promoting the safety and security of its personnel" (UN, 2007d, p. 17).

QIPs can be implemented with concurrent purposes. A project of street cleaning, for example, can have as consequences the generation of income for local people and confidence-building, in addition to clearing the way for military vehicles. Street lighting projects also directly foster public security by reducing the criminality rates and support night patrols. Quick impact projects in these cases act as facilitators for military operations, while addressing the communities' needs.

In recent years, quick impact projects have been increasingly implemented in direct support for good governance, restoration and strengthening the rule of law and public safety. In this sense, a number of public buildings, including police stations and courts, were built, rehabilitated or equipped by QIPs (UN, 2015a). Another purpose of these projects, especially those with extensive use of local labor, is to offer an alternative to criminality for violence-affected communities (UN, 2007d).

5.4 Information gathering

As described in a Secretary-General report, MINUSTAH has limited access to reliable tactical intelligence, having to rely mostly on the information provided by the Haitian National Police or volunteer informers amongst local residents (UN, 2006d).

Quick impact projects are usually held in densely populated areas, often employ local labour-contracted work and attract a large number of local observers. Hence, QIPs can function as major vectors of information. Info obtained in these situations, for example, was crucial to point out the heads of local gangs in Haiti (GARBINO, 2011).

Troops implementing community support projects may be oriented to obtain valuable information, incorporating elements of intelligence teams, especially for data gathering. In addition, these activities may also be seized in psychological operations (GARBINO, 2011).

However, the information collected under these conditions must be approached with caution. Oftentimes, the data consisted of merely rumours, unfounded comments or false reports, produced in exchange for any benefit whatsoever. These data do not normally go through processes of technical analysis and can lead to erroneous conclusions (GARBINO, 2011).

5.5 Stability and development

Until 2004, quick impact projects were in general proved as unsustainable, not acting effectively as a bridge between rehabilitation and development (e.g., schools and health facilities rehabilitated in QIPs did not operate due to the shortage of teachers, nurses, books or medicines). Since they were conceived decentralized and in small scale, QIPs had isolated and limited impacts, not expressing an integrated development strategy (UN, 2003).

The lessons learned on the field, in an attempt to solve these problems, point to the need of inserting the project into a general development programme, considering the incurred costs, community involvement and its sustainability in the long term (UN, 2003; 2004c). Unless QIPs are part of an integrated strategy for rehabilitation, reconstruction and reintegration and designed with the participation of the community, their impacts are likely to be insufficient, isolated and brief (UN, 2004d).

Thus, implementation must be coordinated with NGOs and specific civilian agencies for each kind of project. This also applies to coordination within the UN system, with its various agencies, funds, programmes, offices and departments that can assist specific activities in their areas of expertise. According to the reports of the Secretary-General on Haiti[13], this coordination takes place at various levels with the UNCT, the Government of Haiti and NGOs. The establishment of a general plan of development is, therefore, facilitated, making it possible to combine efforts in one direction.

Quick impact projects developed by MINUSTAH are, since their identification and selection, conducted in coordination with the concerned communities (UN, 2004e; 2004g; 2005a; 2006b; 2006c; 2006d; 2007d; 2008b; 2008c). Local people can participate in various forms in the preparation and implementation of QIPs, in most cases as beneficiaries of the projects or as hired labour, or even in the selection and identification of needs and priorities of the community through local leaders.

The implementation of QIPs by the military, as well as every CIMIC action, is held in coordination between the Office of Civil Affairs and the United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Branch, from the military component of the mission (UN, 2013b).

As reported by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, "the quick-impact projects carried out by MINUSTAH are a good example of immediate support, often benefiting the municipalities" (UN, 2007a, p. 10). The fundamental characteristic of QIPs, the rapid implementation, often derives from poor and quick situation assessment and planning. Occasionally, quick impact projects have shown to be less effective and unsustainable in the long term (UN, 2004d).

13 UN, 2004e; 2004f; 2004g; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d; 2006b; 2006c; 2006d; 2007d; 2008b; 2008c; 2009c; 2009d; 2010b.

However, it can be said that Haiti has been experiencing a vicious cycle of insecurity. On the one hand, the precarious social and economic conditions, under which the major part of the Haitian population lives, favour discontentment and the consequent increase in crime and violence (UN, 2004e). On the other, the insecurity caused by the absence of the state, together with the diverse operating armed groups in the country, hinders the performance of normal economic activities and prevents institutions to act or even invest their capital in favour of Haitian development (UN, 2006d).

For such reasons MINUSTAH should devote its efforts in both directions, since while political and security progress is crucial, many humanitarian and development needs must be immediately addressed to consolidate lasting stability (UN, 2006d).

Socioeconomic development, local ownership and self-sustainability should clearly be aimed in the long term. However, as explained earlier, immediate requirements are also essential to the stabilization process. Quick impact projects can be implemented on these two fronts, contributing to increase the credibility of institutions, the improvement of security and, consequently, the stabilization process. Simultaneously, they may also meet the needs of short-term relief.

6. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Quick impact projects have been thoroughly recommended by a series of UN official reports, guidelines and directives during the last decade. When implemented by the military, they have proved to be generally effective and efficient, reflecting operational gains as well

as real benefits for the considered population. Their direct effects to socioeconomic development are, nonetheless, minimal and limited to isolated improvements in some communities. QIPs indirectly contribute to development as a tool for the country stabilization.

They can be implemented in different situations, with the objectives of "winning the hearts and minds" of the population, increasing the credibility of national and international institutions and MINUSTAH itself, improving the security and information-gathering, besides providing emergency relief, training and employing local labour, demonstrating the "peace dividends" and subjectively contributing to the creation of the mentality and hope for improvement.

However, considering quick impact projects implemented by the military, the process is not quick at all. The bureaucratic process, especially the identification and review and selection and approval phases, poses as the chief obstacle to military troops implementing QIPs in Haiti.

Quick impact projects implemented by the military are unique in nature, once they are funded, selected and monitored by the mission's civilian component – thus becoming less dependent from political influence. Furthermore, the military direct participation is minimal when implementing QIPs, being restricted to security or logistical support. All these features account for a more independent and impartial approach of military delivery of humanitarian and development aid.

Mission leadership should consider simplifying the bureaucratic procedures and seize the welcoming opportunity to fully incorporate the military component in the quick impact projects implementation strategy, as an additional tool in the stabilization process at all levels.

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■ THE USE OF THE LANGUAGE ASSISTANT IN UN PEACE MISSIONS - BENEFITS AND RISKS

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ABSTRACT

Whenever we think about peace missions, we are redirected to negotiations in current conflict situations which are embedded in the modern world. These negotiations are carried out in risky conditions and facing great challenges. It is obvious that communication directly interferes in the success of the missions. Thus, this article aims at discussing the risks and benefits as part of the use of language assistants (LAs) in UN peace missions, describing the desired profile of this relevant service provider, and thinking over mistakes and successful actions when making use of LAs on the ground.

Key words: Language assistant, UN, peace operations, profile, risks and benefits.

1. INTRODUCTION

According to Fontoura (2009), in the current world, which is marked by many conflicts in different regions, Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs)

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established by the United Nations (UN) constitute the most eloquent expression of solidary commitment of the international community with the promotion of peace and security. Their origin dates back to the period between 1919-1939, but peace operations were not included in the UN Charter written in 1945, gradually evolving in the institution. PKOs represent a response to the transformations and challenges in a globalized world, in which ethnical, religious, social, political and ideological tensions are multiplied and strengthened.

In the immediate post World War II, the collective security system set by the UN Charter could not be applied. Thus, taking difficulties into account, the UN developed peace operations as a valuable instrument to be present in conflicted areas in order to stimulate the parties involved to resolve their disputes by pacific means, preferably, through dialogue and negotiation as its base; this way, creating favorable conditions to overcome the differences without resorting on force. Henceforth, there was a need to establish an effective form of communication between the troops or military observers sent to conflict areas and the local population, either composed of oppressors or oppressed people. It was necessary to listen and understand, and only then to make oneself understood, to negotiate, and finally, to settle the disputes.

As per Edwards (2002), when we think about peace negotiations carried out by the UN, we are automatically redirected to international accords signed between leaders from several nations. These negotiations, as a general rule, are highly visible[2] and use professional negotiators, including professional[3] and highly-trained interpreters. Normally, this

2 The visibility here identified is due to the fact that this sort of negotiation is widely broadcast by the media - TV channels, websites, newspapers etc., reaching an enormous parcel of the world population.

3 It is important to highlight that not all people who provide the service of interpretation have formally studied for that or have experience which validates the service. In general, in PKOs, this is a service provided by locals who simply learned a little of a foreign language.

kind of negotiation takes place far away from the ground, maybe at a hotel or at a military base, or even at the UN headquarters, for example.

Picture 01 - UN Security Council meeting to decide over international peace and security issues.

Negotiations on the ground, however, between military personnel and civilians, within the context of contemporary peace missions, i.e., in risky situations and big challenges, using local language assistants, set another level of negotiation; getting to the extent that without communication, there will not be negotiation. It is obvious that communication directly interferes in the success of the mission.

Civilians working as language intermediaries, i.e., language assistants, within the context of troop deployment, are divided into two groups: one that represents civilians coming from the troop contributing country (TCC); and another represented by local civilians, hired by, the

military component or by the Mission itself in the host country. The latter has been working for the mission for a long time, no matter the rotations of the troops or civilians, or even changes made in the scope of the mission. They belong to the local society (KELLY; BAKER, 2013).

IN MINUSTAH[4], for example, the language assistants sign a labor contract for a predefined period of time[5], which might or not be renewed by the Mission. In general, they receive an average wage of US$1,200 for their services. Their assessment, which might allow them to renew the contract, is usually carried out by the immediate supervisors, that is, people who they directly work with. After the assessments are completed, they are sent to the Personnel Section of the Mission HQ[6]where the person in charge will analyze them.

Picture 02 - Military observer together with a language assistant, negotiating on the ground.

4 *United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.*
5 *Generally, labor contracts of the language assistants last for a year.*
6 *Mission Headquarters or main base in the host country.*

Due to the difficulties related to communications in the theaters of operations, it became important the use of local people who knew how to speak another language, mostly English, so that communication between the military personnel/civilians with the oppressors or the oppressed, in a certain region of the world, could be established appropriately. These citizens, who had the skills of speaking the local language and another one of international importance, were defined by the UN as language assistants (LAs), for they assisted military and civilian personnel deployed in peace operations in the process of conflict resolution, towards world peace.

2. DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Working language choices in un peace missions.

The operational security of a mission is directly affected either by using the local language or not. It is extremely important to understand the culture of a country or region in which there is a conflict in order to reach the final goal. When it comes to culture, we have to talk about languages, for it is part of the axis identity-language-culture - a base for the formation of the characteristics of a certain people.

According to this statement, human rights operations in Haiti, as a matter of principles, made an effort to use the local language as a co-working language of the mission. All missions should do the same if the local language is not one of the UN working languages[7].

7 *This imperative for human rights operations on the ground.*

Picture 03 - The six UN official working languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish).

The working language choice in ONUSAL[8] (El Salvador), for example, were English and Spanish. The same way, the mission in Rwanda incorporated the use of English, French (the language of the elite) and Kinyarwanda (language spoken by the vast majority). In the case of Haiti, Haitian Creole is the language of the majority; yet, there is a small wealthy portion of the population that speaks French as well.

It is clear that military and civilian personnel deployed in conflict areas, integrating several mission sectors, should have a basic knowledge of the local language to show and have the respect of the local population.

All actors on the ground should know how to adequately use interpreters in the mission. The use of the interpreter is necessary when accurate and sensitive information is conveyed or requested. As the level of stress increases, the person's ability to express himself/herself in a foreign language drastically decreases. This way, it is prudent, in special sensitive circumstances, to use the interpreter in order to minimize potential misunderstandings.

An interpreter must be capable of translating into two directions - from his/her language into the foreign language and from the foreign

8 *UN Observer Mission in El Salvador.*

language into his/her own language, without using any dictionaries. Let's consider henceforth only the use of the language assistant in missions.

2.2 Language assistants: what for? What are the benefits?

If we analyze several UN peace missions, deployed in different regions of the world, we understand that the role of the language assistants is of a cultural intermediary between the counterparts whose native and foreign languages are not the same. It is important to highlight that whenever possible, a local citizen, belonging to a certain ethnical group or community, should be used to convey sensitive messages, thus helping solve potential communication problems. Normally, the process of interpretation used by the language assistants follow two basic patterns: consecutive and simultaneous (whispered).

Consecutive interpretation is, in general, used in negotiations, where the language assistant needs to wait for the speaker to complete his message to only then retransmit all the information to the counterpart. Professional interpreters would usually take notes of what is said, using a personal set of symbols, to only then reproduce the information. As we are dealing with language assistants, we can foresee potential problems: missing or changing significant parts of the information.

In whispered simultaneous interpretation, the language assistant needs to listen, decode, recode and convey the message in real time, nonstop. There is no room for long delays or time to think about a word, for it would imply missing the uttered content.

It is important to know that language assistants do not have a formal training in the field of translation or interpretation. According to the

UN specialized training materials[9], these are local citizens, professionally untrained in interpretation and that works as the ambassadors of the troops, military observers and civilians, in the country where the conflict broke out.

Why to use them if they are not professionals? Simply because there are not professional interpreters on the ground working with very specific pairs of languages/dialects as those found in mission areas; also, because these individuals know the local culture very well. They act as if they were the spokesperson of the peacekeeper or the civilian deployed in the mission; they can give suggestions on how to better deal with the local population, from different traditions and culture, identifying, yet, the nuances and subtleties that could be easily overlooked by peacekeepers.

Due to the difficulties they already have faced, many peacekeepers have understood that there are many-faceted differences between cultures. They have realized that being accompanied by local representatives who knew the customs and the local language well, they were somehow demonstrating respect for the people, and thus gaining advantage in the process of communication. Welcoming behavior and goodwill are very important characteristics once one does not speak a language well.

9 *In UN Specializes Training Materials for Military Experts on Mission (UN STM-MEoM-2.2).*

Furthermore, the knowledge language assistants accumulate as the years go by is of great relevance for military and civilian personnel arriving in the mission area. For the military personnel deployed in conflict areas, the link between the local community leader and the newly-arrived soldier will be the language assistant, who will familiarize them with the important points of contact (POC) in a certain mission area. Thus, LAs become very significant during contingent, civilian personnel and MILOBs rotations. They somehow help prepare the area for those arriving, establishing bridges between local POCs and personnel leaving the mission area.

2.3 The expected profile of the language assistant in UN Peace Missions

The communication in another country may be correct[10] or full of mistakes, corroborating to the success or failure of an important peace mission. The work of the language assistants is exactly to build communication bridges between the counterparts, allowing the adequate process of peace accord negotiations. Language assistants who work with UN military observers (UNMO) play a vital role in this process, whose working conditions are mostly dangerous and constantly changing. These same conditions require that language assistants demonstrate skills as courage and persuasion. Together with unarmed military observers on the ground, they are part of a team.

The primary prerequisites for a successful use of a LA are proficiency and linguistic competence and, still, attitudes free of prejudice. Needless to say that the potential language assistant must be bilingual when it comes to the source and target languages.

It is important to have adequate selection process and oral interview

10 *The term "correct" refers to adequate means which help establish communication on the ground.*

with the potential LAs so that their assessments cover general knowledge and aptitude for interpretation.

Likewise, the potential LA must demonstrate competence to work accurately and fast. Another factor would be finding candidates to this position that would not have any sort of cultural or religious hindrance because it would, above all, affect the final quality of the interpretation and the mission as a whole. Maybe, this is one of the most difficult prerequisites to be filled out.

The LAs employed in UNPROFOR[11] I and II, in the former Yugoslavia, were local citizens classified in categories[12] according to their previous experience. As per the expected, they had a certain degree of education, but had no previous training on interpretation or translation.

11 *United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia.*
12 *The positions would vary between GSL-2 and GSL-5, as standardized by the UN and the mission.*

As per the document VA Nr UNMISS-GS-13-116, of 04 November 2013, issued by UNMISS[13], it is observed that the mission in South Sudan established, based on the UN directives, the criteria for the candidature of Sudanese to the position of language assistants offered in the mission. It is important to highlight that women, equally qualified, would be prioritized during the selection process, due to other UN documents[14].

To illustrate this topic, let us see below the descriptions of the tasks to be accomplished by LAs, supervised by UNPOL[15] and MLO[16] in UNMISS. They are:

1. To provide interpretation service at meetings and conferences between UN representatives and local leaders, using the language pair Arabic < > English or from a local dialect into English, and vice-versa;

2. To provide sight translation and written translation of relevant documents for UNMISS mandate;

3. To coordinate and schedule meetings, preparing minutes, if requested;

4. To prepare and draft correspondences in Arabic and English;

5. To maintain filing and archiving systems of relevant material pertaining to the office work;

6. To provide comprehensive and timely administrative support;

7. To integrate UN long and short range patrols; and

13 *United Nations Mission in South Sudan.*
14 *DPKO Under-Secretary General's Policy Statement on Gender Mainstreaming.*
15 *United Nations Police.*
16 *Military Liaison Officer.*

8. To perform any other duties as required.

The execution of the aforementioned activities is reinforced by the analysis of the competencies LA candidates have to show. Let us see below the UN predefined core competencies:

1. Professionalism[17];
2. Client orientation[18];
3. Communication[19];
4. Teamwork[20]; and
5. Planning and organization[21].

As an attempt to establish a quality standard for the candidates to the positions of LA, they are required to have qualifications as:

1. Education - High School or University Diplomas. Specialized training institution in translation/interpretation is an asset;
2. At least four (4) years of experience and a high level of demonstrated analytical and problem-solving skills. Experience with UN/NGO or other International bodies is an added asset.
3. Languages skills - Fluency in written and spoken English and Arabic. Knowledge of Dinka[22] is essential; and

17 *Ability to work independently without supervision, remain calm in stressful situations.*
18 *Demonstrated ability to develop and maintain effective work relationships with supervisors and colleagues.*
19 *Ability to write in a clear and concise manner and to communicate effectively orally.*
20 *Good interpersonal skills. Ability to work in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity. Still, it covers client orientation as well.*
21 *Ability to plan own work, to work effectively under stress and to priorities and juggle multiple tasks with tight deadlines.*
22 *Language spoken by an ethnic group of South Sudan, inhabiting the Bahr el Ghazal region of the Nile basin, Jonglei and parts of southern Kordufan and Upper Nile regions.*

4. Other skills - a valid Drivers license is highly desirable.

Picture 06 - Military observers together with a language assistant on a patrol in South Sudan.

If we analyze the profile of a language assistant to be deployed on the ground, specifically in South Sudan, we shall notice that there is a large gap between the ideal and reality. Talking to former peace mission members who had worked with LAs, it is clear that the use of the language assistant is far below the competencies requested in the job offering for LAs in UNMISS. By having a close view of the work and knowing the historical background of local inhabitants, usually playing the role of LAs, we can notice that, many times, the LA only has a high school degree, never worked with translation/interpretation, learned how to speak poor English, which does not mean mastering the language to work as a translator/interpreter. Moreover, they do not have competencies as organizational planning or teamwork. Apart from other problems[23] which happen during the use of

23 *Lack of commitment, discretion, reliability, frequent late arrivals and unreasonable absences.*

the LA in peace missions, it is evident that their use shall bring some risks to the accomplishment of the mission by military and civilian personnel involved in the peacekeeping process in a conflict area.

2.4 The risks of using language assistants in UN Peace Missions

Due to the political and social tensions, negotiations in peace missions are much more complex than those in normal circumstances. It is generally characterized by rumors, unreliability, prejudices, negative stereotypes etc. The negotiator will need to communicate with people from another culture, without sharing the same language pattern, facing stressful situations, in which people get upset easily. So, there is a lot of responsibility and reliability embedded in the role of the person in charge of supporting communication: the linguistic intermediary.

When working with non-professional interpreters during peace missions, there is a personal risk of reprisals and the added stress of working in dangerous areas. Besides, risks of blurring the images of the personnel working with conflict resolution, of the military, civilian personnel and troop contributing country (TCC), and finally the image of the mission as a whole are equally present. Without mentioning those side effects coming from the non-observance of principles as neutrality and impartiality. We can also mention other risks as religious convictions, ideological and political beliefs, ethnicity, motivation, involvement, confidentiality and poor communication skills.

In missions, for example, there might be an episode in which the LA takes notes during an interview with the local community leader and the military observer. If this piece of information relates to a sensitive issue, it is possible that those notes might be confiscated when the LA and the

military observer go through a checkpoint, on their way back to the base[24].

Picture 07 - Military observer interviewing a local citizen supported by the LA.

It is, then, extremely important to know that notes taken by LAs must be handed to the military or civilian personnel in charge, and, if possible, immediately destroyed in order to avoid further complications for the individuals involved and for the mission itself.

Another relevant aspect is to observe the reliability and discretion of the language assistant. It is important to bear in mind that the language assistant is a local that provides translation/interpretation services for the mission. As the LA is a local, it is then necessary that the information cell of the mission have previous knowledge about the LA's life, as well as a close control of his/her actions when providing the service. Any gap in communication here shall cause the mission to have a major or minor

24 In the issue involving Bosnians and Serbs, in the former Yugoslavia, there are reports on may episodes like the aforementioned. To illustrate that there is one case in which a UN negotiator notes on several ongoing field negotiations were confiscated at a road block/checkpoint.

problem, which might not always be corrected. Classified information shall not be discussed as LAs are present, ensuring the security of the mission and of the language assistant himself/herself.

Picture 08 - Language assistant wearing a helmet and a jacket, as the military personnel, for safety reasons.

Here is a real incident that occurred in MONUSCO a few years ago to a UN team, and that could be useful to display here as a "Lessons learned" when it comes to working with Language assistant (LA). A Team composed of civil affairs and MILOBS officers was to trying to make an inquiry about an ambush where some people had been robbed and some of them killed. The UN Team was tasked to find out any relevant information about this drama and decided to meet with the toughest rebel group stationed in the area. UN-Team leader was speaking in English, the 1st LA was translating in Arabic, the 2nd LA was retranslating in a local dialect and the 3rd one was translating in the local language spoken by the rebel group. The UN Team started progressively, with greetings and small

talks. After one hour of socialization, the Team leader put the question on the table for which they came. "You are the strongest group in the area. For sure, you can help us by telling us who perpetrated the crime". After the three LAs finished their translation, the atmosphere suddenly changed, no more smiles, closed expressions on their faces. To top it all, the Team leader felt the cold barrel cold of a gun behind his head. After one long minute of frozen situation, the chief of the rebels started to laugh and to talk with the others. As he knew a little bit of Arabic, he pointed out that the 1st LA mistranslated the UN sayings; instead of the original meaning, he translated: "I know you did perpetrate the crime". (UN CIMIC – STM, 2014).

Picture 09 - Military observers and LA on a patrol in Sudan.

Based on the previous paragraph, it is possible to have two hypotheses: either the language assistant failed during the process of translation/interpretation for not mastering both working languages or

the LA refrained from impartiality, which is a must, and then decided to value-judge the situation by blaming the rebels for the crime. It is equally important that users of the service of interpretation, provided by the language assistants in peace missions, always talk to the LAs, establishing criteria and *modus operandi* to be followed during the events in order to avoid potential collateral damage, which might result in an unexpectedly dangerous situation.

Episodes like this one in MONUSCO could be extended in concept and possibilities, making us think over the probable causes of events as the genocide in Rwanda or the massacre in Wali Kali, in the borderline of Congo and Rwanda. Both atrocities may have as probable causes the inability of the troops, military personnel or civilians deployed in conflict areas to speak the local language/dialect, and, consequently, to inappropriately use the language assistant as bridges of communication between different languages and cultures. Were the locals employed as LAs in that particular situation impartial? Did they have good knowledge of the working languages? Were they basically trained to work in the field of translation/interpretation? These are questions whose answers could even help avoid or prevent those failures from happening in the history of mankind and peace missions.

Many of the LAs used in peace missions all over the world went through traumatic experiences, either in direct or indirect situations. Persecution, torture, physical or psychological terrorism, and exile are some of the psychological scars which might be visible as family difficulties or as an increase in the level of stress. Due to these problems, many LAs would not be a safe choice to support the well accomplishment of the mission or the mandate, since they would be biased by their basic needs and their natural instinct of survival.

It is vital that the actors on the ground, including the language assistants, be free from any sort of prejudice, preconceived ideas. To illustrate that we can cite the case in which MILOBs on the ground refused the service of a certain LA, given the fact that he belonged to a family which was claiming a piece of land - cause of the conflict between the counterparts. That was a right and crucial decision to help them with the conflict resolution.

3. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is evident that the language assistant assigned to carry out the tasks of a translator and interpreter in peace missions, or in any other mission, needs to have a specific preparation on this unique field of Applied Linguistics.[25] In the world history, when it comes to providing the service of translation and interpretation, it is observed that many peace accords were signed due to the provision of good linguistic services; yet, conflicts broke out and situations worsened because of bad translation and interpretation services. An interpretation mistake during a peace process negotiation may severely create a big unease among the parties involved, either solving or keeping the problem. Losses may be irreversible and damages irreparable, either in the human, material or institutional aspect.

Thus, it is easy to fully agree with Tassini (2012) and Guillet (2012) that translators and interpreters can never be prepared overnight. Inexperience allied to good will cannot account for all the necessary technical aspects for the provision of an adequate linguistic support. The experience with working language pairs, different culture as well as knowledge of the world has a great influence on the formation of this type of professional, and it takes time to do so.

25 *In DUBOIS, J. Dicionário de linguística. São Paulo: Cultrix, 1978.*

Translating is not simply the elementary operation of searching for lexical correspondents. Much more of a complex and subtle art, it shall harmonize those of others, which are so delicate - those of reading and writing (SILVEIRA, 2004). For many, it seems that the translator's job is very easy or does not demand much attention because it's secondary; however, it proved to be essential for conflict resolutions. It is present, almost always, in the phases of negotiation/mediation, as well as in surveys, interviews, situation monitoring etc.

To Kelly and Zetzsche (2012), there is no greater intellectual challenge than building meaning bridges between several different languages, yet, preserving their linguistic and cultural identities.

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■ IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT OF MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS (MTTs)

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ABSTRACT

This article intends to show the concept of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), as well as to present it as an ongoing and implemented project, carried out by the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB). Existing models were compared to the Brazilian experience. The lessons learned by CCOPAB in Angola were summarized.

Key words: Mobile training teams (MTTs), CCOPAB, peace operations.

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of mobile training teams (MTTs) is not new. Actually, mobile training teams have been successfully used by several countries as a support tool and international cooperation which enable a greater international insertion and advance in a positive agenda.

We may mention as accomplished examples of long-term programs (five years and over) carried out by the United States of America (ACOTA, Program by the Department of Defense and GPOI, Program by the Department of State), in which training teams are deployed in host countries which express their desire to receive conventional military training (ACOTA Program) or training based on United Nations material (GPOI Program) both to be deployed to UN Peacekeeping Operations

(PKOs). These programs involve several modalities of support which may count on the presence of permanent instructors in the supported country, the improvement of the infrastructure of the training centers and the employment of MTTs. Canada also has a broad cooperation program with dozens of countries by employing MTTs, as well as a considerable number of European countries which have established bilateral agreements with African nations. [12]

Despite the greatness of these programs, of the great human and finance resources assigned, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is reticent about the existing programs since they might be either due to disguising the difficulty of national interests or for not adopting DPKO's guidelines and training material in full. Moreover, according to DPKO, trained units and individuals in these programs do not always present the performance anticipated in the execution of the peace mission, lowering credibility from these activities.

The present project intends to enable the employment of MTTs as a mechanism of Brazilian cooperation to the training of military, police and civilian personnel from friendly nations based on the guidance, thematics, methodology and curriculum offered by DPKO to the UN Member States. Having the possibility to enable the project, CCOPAB would be the institution which would prepare and manage this type of activity, using its human resources and expertise on the subject.

If well-selected and prepared by CCOPAB, and guided by the echelons within the chain of command of the Armed Forces and Ministry of Defense and in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MTTs

1 African Contingence Operations Training and Assistance. Available at; <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/203841.htm>. Accessed on: 10 fev. 2014.

2 Global Peace Operations Initiative. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/>. Access on: 10 fev. 2014.

may become a valuable asset to approach and have positive influence over friendly nations. Brazil is an acknowledged actor in the international community for its independent and sympathetic positions. In the United Nations, the country is relevant due to the contributions with contingents to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and with military and police personnel individually deployed in a significant number of UN peace missions. That is all translated into credibility and legitimacy which favor and open its way to employing MTTs.

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS (MTTs)

The organization and structure of an MTT would naturally be the study object related to the training necessity presented by the friendly nation and the determinations and guidance to be received by higher echelons, including selecting the target friendly nations of this initiative.

However, for planning, and based on the activities of the implemented MTTs by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of DPKO, a proposal to compose a team considers the presence of the three military forces reinforced, or not, by police and civilian members, summing up to 4 members:

- MTT leader (also instructor): A Lieutenant Colonel or Major who has already studied at the Army General and Staff College (the equivalent to the Brazilian Navy and Air Force);
- Instructor: A Major or Captain who has already taken the course at the Officers Advanced School (the equivalent to the

Brazilian Navy or Air Force);

- Instructor: A Captain who has taken the course at the Officers Advanced School (or Lieutenant (Navy));
- Finance Officer (also instructor): A Captain (or Lieutenant (Navy));
- Remarks. 1) Female representatives add value to the MTTs; 2) members of the team should be available to take part in the MTTs for over six months.
- In relation to the capacity of the MTTs members, the following aspects are to be taken into account:
- Minimum of three years of experience as an instructor, having worked at least one year as instructor/facilitator on peacekeeping subjects from DPKO, preferably at CCOPAB;
- Have deep knowledge of the United Nations training materials: 1) basic training modules, especially of the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM); and 2) Specialized Training Materials (STM) for military observers, HQ Staff Officers of the Military Component, police officers, civil-military coordination officers of the Military Component HQ and Mission Staff HQ, collective training of the infantry battalion staff and in protection of civilians at operational and tactical levels;
- Have been at least one year deployed in UN peace operations;
- Be fluent in English (a second language such as Spanish is desirable);
- Have carried out UN mandatory individual courses especially the ones related to security and gender, which are usually

demanded from all members of UN missions.

CCOPAB will have to go through a readjustment process of its Learning/Teaching General Planning (PGE, acronym in Portuguese) to follow possible demands created by agreements between Brazil and friendly nations. The Center is able to send up to 2 (two) MTTs during the present year. In case this project is approved, the 2015 PGE may include more activities.

Instructors and monitors from the Armed Forces or from other State organisms and agencies may be part of the MTTs according to the nature of the training. In that case, CCOPAB will present to the Ministry of Defense, via chain of command, the support needed and will train these external instructors to be part of the MTTs.

3. POSSIBILITIES OF AN MTT

MTTs might have several formats, always using DPKO's didactical materials and methodology platform:

- Support to create courses, curricula development, teaching techniques and assessment processes;
- Training of national and regional instructors to multiply knowledge;
- Setting up field exercises;
- Training technical guidance and capacity-building.

Photo 1: CCOPAB's MTT for Staff Officer's Course in Colombia

The length of training to be given must vary according to the instruction needs and the availability of time and students' capacity. To have an idea of planning, for example, it is reasonable to affirm that DPKO's basic training (CPTM) may be executed within a week and that the specialized training for military observers and Staff officers can be done within 2 (two) weeks.

To optimize MTTs activity, it is always interesting to gather the audience in a central point of the host country. The cost-benefit of an MTT will normally be higher if the regional audience can be gathered in a host country.



Photo 2: CCOPAB's MTT in Colombia

The employment of the MTTs can also be inserted as a complement to other teaching activities carried out at CCOPAB, so that international students who take part in courses at the Center be a link between their training national systems and the MTTs.

On the other hand, sending an MTT may promote the increasing interest in the courses and events which are carried out by CCOPAB and its higher structures.

4. BRIEF ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE FRIENDLY NATIONS TO RECEIVE MTTs

From a strict technical point of view and with the existing knowledge about the training status and performance of police and troop contributing countries for UN peace operations, and also considering

what is stated in the Guidelines for the Brazilian Army Activities in the International Area (DAEBAI, acronym in Portuguese) and the National Defense Strategy, the following aspects are suggested:

- Latin America: Guatemala and Paraguay (in which there are already Brazilian instruction missions), Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador; possibly, Colombia in a near future in case the peace agreement presently ongoing thrives;
- Africa: Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Liberia, Sierra Leona, Cameroon and Togo;
- Asia/Oceania: East Timor.

As the executing unit, it is obvious to affirm that CCOPAB is not to select the countries. This is the functional responsibility of the Ministries of Defense and of Foreign Affairs, but CCOPAB would express its suggestions according to the technical analysis of training.

5. SUSTAINABILITY

CCOPAB envisages the MTTs as a permanent activity, part of the PGE, and a key activity to update knowledge, compile and analyze best practices and limited production of articles related to doctrine, preparation of personnel and international projection.

The Center is able to promote adjustments that are necessary to adequate the employment of MTTs, counting on guidance and planning of higher organisms. Besides possible unusual demands, the MTTs, as CCOPAB's permanent activity, can be planned a year before their execution, and will not be an obstacle to PGE's core (training of

contingents, military observers and HQ Staff Officers of a Military Component). In summary, from this Center's perspective, the activity is sustainable.

Ideally, however, it would be vital to understand MTTs as part of an effort for international cooperation which does not always produce immediate results, and depending on the target country and/or on the audience to be trained, it sometimes requires repetition and follow-up. Diplomatic and social communication actions are usually essential factors for the MTT's success.

Bearing in mind possible friendly nations with low logistic-administrative capacity, trilateral cooperation can also be explored if a third country (neither Brazil nor the MTT receiving country) bears the costs of international transport, accommodation and food for the students, while Brazil is fully responsible for the deployment of its MTT. As previously stated, the political-strategic assessment will be ideally carried out by the related ministries.

An average estimate of costs to deploy an MTT, according to the composition suggested in item 2 (ORGANIZATION OF THE MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS (MTTs)) for a week, including air ticket in economy class and daily allowance for food and accommodation would be around USD 14,000.00 (fourteen thousand dollars) in Latin America and USD 19,000.00 (nineteen thousand dollars) in Africa. When showing interest for the MTT concept, the Ministry of Defense has held up the possibility of paying for the deployment of at least two MTTs in 2014. Subsequent advances, from 2015, however, could indicate the possibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bearing the costs via the Brazilian Agency of Cooperation.

5. CCOPAB's EXPERIENCE IN ANGOLA

The Angolan Armed Forces are structuring themselves to send, in a near future, military personnel to operate in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO). As per the proposal to implement a MTT, CCOPAB sent to Angola, in December 2014, a team to deliver a course on Mine Action in Peacekeeping Operations and, in May 2015, another team to deliver the Platoon Leaders and Subunit Commanders Course (EPCOSUPEL, acronym in Portuguese). Recently, CCOPAB has sent another team to Angola in order to deliver the Unit Commanders and Staff Officers Course (EPCOEM, acronym in Portuguese), contributing to the process of preparation of the Angolan military personnel. Therefore, it was vital the transmission of knowledge and experience from the Brazilian military personnel to the Angolans during that course, making the Brazilian experience and CCOPAB's knowledge as part of the Angolan training for future UN PKOs.

It was a very important experience to all EMT/CCOPAB's members. Being in contact with military personnel from another nation on such an important and current theme such as UN PKO, as instructors and knowledge multipliers, was of great professional value.

Photos: CCOPAB's MTT in Angola giving the Introduction Course on Mine Action in PKO

The intellectual preparation of the Mobile Training Team was favored since the military personnel were already familiarized with the subjects to be given during the course and for having had experience in Peacekeeping Operations under the aegis of the United Nations. The mission was facilitated since Portuguese is spoken in Angola.

The military personnel of the Angolan Armed Forces have a high opinion of Brazil and, in particular, of the Brazilian Army. The importance, the attention and the support to the activities developed by CCOPAB's Mobile Training Team at all moments while in Angolan territory characterized such fact.

7. CONCLUSION

In the last global analyses report of training led by DPKO, in 2013, it is clear a general deficiency in training, especially, of the knowledge related to the UN basic training modules, CPTM. This deficiency is critical for the civilians, but also significant for police and military personnel. UN stimulates the Member States, capable and with experience in DPKO-led peace missions, to promote understanding to support troop and individual contributing countries, as well as to support those with potential and interest to become contributors.

Brazil is surely relevant to DPKO, has fair credibility and legitimacy and can become recognized as an active promoter of UN peace operations doctrine, with advantages coming from international projection.

The MTTs can become an efficient means to disseminate of a competent and positive image of the country and it also becomes an element of real importance to a number of friendly friends in DPKO-led training and preparation for peace missions. The results obtained by CCOPAB's MTT in

Angola corroborated to this conclusion. Other variables can be added to this process, such as the participation of MTTs of non speaking Portuguese countries or the constitution of a binational team. And under these conditions, new lessons can be absorbed and implemented.

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■ PRESENTATION OF THE OPERATIONAL PREPARATION OF BRAZIL AND FRANCE

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to present the general principles of the operational preparation, the way they are defined in the Brazilian and French Armies, in relation to their own structures and challenges, the ones each country goes through or might go through, concerning the deployments in national territory or in the theaters of operations abroad, as well as within peace missions contexts.

Key words: Operational preparation, training, deployment and formation

1. PREAMBLE

Brazil and France has had an old friendship that has changed its level due to the construction of an ambitious strategic partnership, launched in 2006, by Presidents Lula and Chirac.

Concerning Defense and Security, among countless projects in common, France has assigned an officer in August 2013, as a technical adviser, to work at the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB); thus, reinforcing the cooperation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, in which both countries participate actively.

In addition to the regular annual cooperation plans jointly signed by

the Armed Forces of the two countries, this type of technical cooperation, which perpetuates in time, promotes a better interoperability and also allows reinforcement in the acculturation between the two armies.

Through the presence of a French officer at CCOPAB, unit which has a joint nature, but which has the Brazilian Army as the leader of the activities, it is interesting, nowadays, to put into perspective the different processes of land operational preparation due to the missions the two countries carry out regularly.

First of all, it is necessary to have this process in mind, analyzed by a professional army on France's side and an army of conscription in Brazil, with different structures and missions.

2. THE STRUCTURES OF THE TWO ARMIES

2.1. The structures of the Brazilian Army

Nowadays the Brazilian Army has a strength of approximately 200 thousand military personnel. It is necessary to point out that, in average, the combat units are composed of 2/3 (two thirds) of its strength of professional soldiers, and, the last third, of conscripts.

The Brazilian Army develops capabilities to serve three conditions simultaneously: guarantee the defense of the territory; power projection to ensure vital interests; and fulfillment of the demands of foreign policy in favor of security, international peace and regional integration.

The Land Force also contributes to the guarantee of national sovereignty, of the constitutional powers, of law and order, safeguarding national interests and cooperation with national development and social well-being.

2.2. The structures of the French Army

The French Army employs 115,000 soldiers. All soldiers are now considered professionals, due to the suspension of conscription in France in 1996.

The missions of the French Army are numerous in relation to general security and public service in French territory (internal, in the city and overseas missions) and takes part in operations to support the population (natural disasters).

Abroad, the French Army guarantees security and the evacuation of the French and of Europeans, in case the environment becomes unsafe. The Land Force stabilizes the theaters of operations and aids civilian populations. Furthermore, the Land Force follows, militarily, the legit governments with the reestablishment and, later, guaranteeing a satisfactory security level, in relation to international agreements.

3. THE OPERATIONAL CONTRACTS

3.1. The brazilian operational contracts

Brazil, proud and autonomous country, exercises exclusive sovereignty over its territory, its territorial sea and its air space, without delegating to others the responsibility for its defense and security. Therefore, it invests in a military capacity of deterrence that allows it to react not only against conventional external threats, but also against contemporary risks, such as terrorism, transnational organized crime, piracy and cyber attacks.

Launched in 2008, the National Strategy of Defense defines hypotheses of deployment (HE, acronym in Portuguese), which may be understood by the anticipation of a possible deployment of the Armed

Forced in a certain situation or area of strategic interest for national defense. There are four types of HE: in peace, in crisis, during and after armed conflict/war.

During peace, the military organizations will be articulated to conciliate the fulfillment of the hypotheses of deployment with the necessity to optimize its maintenance costs and to promote the accomplishment of training in specific operational environments. Permanent intelligence activities to follow the situation and the actors, who may become potential threats to the State and to promote anticipated alert before the possibility of those threats becoming true, will be developed. The intelligence activities must obey the safeguards and controls that protect rights and constitutional guarantees.

During crisis, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, after consulting with the National Defense Council, can activate a crisis management structure, with the participation of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and of the Navy, Army and Air Force Commands, as well as representatives of other Ministries, if necessary. The Armed Forces can be deployed alone or jointly and will happen in compliance with the issued guidelines.

Intelligence activities will be intensified. Political measures related to crisis management will still be adopted, in parallel with military actions. Before the possibility of a crisis evolves into armed conflict, the following measures, among others, can be triggered:

- The activation of Operational Commands as arranged in the Defense Military Structure;
- The adjudication of forces belonging to the organizational structures of the three forces to the activated Operational Commands;

- The update and implementation, by the activated Operational Command, of the field plans produced during peace;
- The recompletion of the structures;
- The activation of Defense Zones, area which can be manned by active or reserve troops, including the ones from *Tiros de Guerra*[1], to defend the interior of the country in case of an armed conflict; and
- The decreeing of National Mobilization, if necessary.

During armed conflict/war, the triggering of the military campaign stipulated in the Campaign Plan produced and, by its end, the progressive demobilization of the resources which are no longer necessary.

3.2. The French operational contracts

In France, the 2013 White Paper defines the three hypotheses of engagement (HE) of the land forces, making it able to face different threats.

The first hypothesis of engagement is called operational situation of reference, which can be considered as the military routine to ensure deterrence, protection and prevention missions, as well as crisis management (from 2 to 3 theaters of operations, 6,000 to 7,000 personnel).

The second hypothesis of engagement is related to the protection of the territory, over which the Army must be able to deploy up to 10,000 soldiers. This was the hypothesis applied by the Land Forces

1 ***Tiro de Guerra (TG) is*** *a military institution of the Brazilian Army responsible for training soldiers and or corporals (reserves) for the Army. The TGs are structured so the conscript can have military instruction and work or study at the same time.*
The organization of a TG is an agreement between local city halls and the Military Region Command. The Army provides the instructors (usually sergeants or warrant officers), uniforms and equipment, whereas the city administration provides the facilities. That is why the mayor usually becomes the director of the TG. Nowadays, there are more than 200 TGs distributed throughout almost all the Brazilian territory.

after the attacks of January 2015.

At last, besides the missions carried out according to the two first HE, the last one concerns a bigger engagement in terms of intervention, which anticipates an employment in coalition within six months and for an intensive engagement of six months, corresponding to two brigades, as well as means of command and of associated support (up to 21 thousand personnel).

Finally, the hypotheses of engagement work as *matrioshkas*, Russian dolls in the form of a cocoon: the first hypothesis is included in the second, and this one, on its turn, is inside the third (and most global) hypothesis.

4. THE OPERATIONAL PREPARATION

4.1. The operational preparation of the Brazilian land forces

The operational preparation of the Brazilian Army is divided in two phases, in 12 months: the operational preparation and the collective preparation, at the pace of two incorporations every year (December and August).

Due to the organization of the Brazilian Army, being based in conscription, the formation and training cycle is based on an annual preparation and training process. In certain situations, for economic or operational reasons, it can either be biennial or triennial. Likewise, the annual preparation cycle will be adapted to the types of units (operational or support, Army Police, *Batalhão de Guardas* - a type of Infantry Battalion, etc.).

The individual part is divided into two phases: The Basic and Capacity-Building Individual Instruction.

The collective preparation is also developed annually, biennially, or even triennially, for the same reasons as the individual preparation. The aim of such preparation is to make a combat tool out of the Land Force in accordance with the Brazilian Army strategic objective. It is based in simulations and field exercises.

It is articulated in two main phases:

The Basic Training Period concerns the operational preparation up to battalion level, and is divided in organic, complete or specific (e.g.: UN mission) preparations. Each unit is responsible for the training and for the control of its subordinate unit, up to brigade level.

Afterwards, there is the Advanced Training Period. It concerns the big exercises of the Land Force (planning and deployment), which is developed in field or map exercises, having the simulation as an aid. The Land Operations Command (COTER, acronym in Portuguese) is responsible for the organization and control.

In relation to the preparation of the contingents assigned to participate in PKOs, COTER guides and coordinates the preparation of the Brazilian Army troops assigned to such missions, having CCOPAB's aid and through the designated brigade.

During the specific preparation, there is the delivery of the instruction modules recommended by the United Nations - Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM) - during the courses related to the mission and the basic and advanced pre-deployment field exercises.

The mobilization to the preparation must happen during the previous semester. The mobilization involves material and human resources (pre-selection of personnel, physical and medical exams and psychological evaluation), according to the Specific Preparation Troops' Guidelines for Peace Missions from COTER.

4.2. The operational preparation of the French land forces

In France, coordinated by the Land Forces Command (CFT, acronym in French), the operational preparation (PO, acronym in Portuguese) of the units is organized in five big phases, distributed in a cycle of 24 months. This cycle is repeated a second time for a global reference of 48 months, in which a course of operational preparation, which allows the units to acquire the bases to face all types of situations, is defined. Having this rhythm as a basis for five steps, the PO is organized around a decentralized preparation and, afterwards, centralized as it must respond to a general preparation and, afterwards, specific (eg.: PKO).

The brigades are responsible for the efficiency of the regiments by means of the Land Forces Command. Therefore, they must have in mind the units already deployed, the general operational preparation (decentralized and afterwards, centralized) and specific, being ready before deployment. The decentralized phase is put under the responsibility of the commandant of a military organization, directly controlled by the brigade to which it belongs. It is defined as the acquisition and mastery of collective know-how up to basic unit level (a company=around 100 soldiers) and a tactical staff; however, making efforts at platoon levels (3 to 4 by subunit, each one composed of 30 to 40 military personnel).

The decentralized preparation will be developed in the area of formation, but also in the collective places of instruction and training, with the possibility of making use of the empty terrain.

The pre-deployment prior to deployment is the last phase of the pyramid of the operational preparation. It prepares soldiers and units to operate in face of all situations they might face during their mission, including the toughest and most complex combat phases.

A more important phase which precedes engagement, the pre-

deployment, before deployment, completes the general operational preparation. Within this picture, it is a custom-made preparation. All the personnel carry out this pre-deployment before deployment, responding to the necessities of the theater under which it is projected.

The pre-deployment before deployment is organized in three steps: a period of decentralized individual preparation (usually carried out in the garrison), a period of decentralized collective preparation (based on repetition - drills) of collective know-how not only in the field but also in specialized training centers and a period of centralized collective preparation during which the units and their staff will be evaluated. An example of pre-deployment is the Lebanon case in UNIFIL, in which France deploys a battalion (Force Commander Reserve). Since France does not have a center dedicated to PKOs, the preparation is under the responsibility of the regiment assigned and of its brigade under the control of the Land Forces Command.

It is necessary to add that the exploration of lessons learned allows a continuous adaptation of the operational preparation, both for the general and the specific.

If the simulation never substitutes the real training, it cooperates in a crucial manner for the maintenance of the operational level. Nowadays, this type of tool is vital.

CONCLUSION

In Brazil, as well as in France, the aim of the operational preparation is to offer the political and military authorities well-prepared soldiers, to respond to the demands of both countries either in national territory or in external theaters of operations, such as a peace mission.

In such an uncertain world and due to restriction of resources faced by both countries, the quality of the respective operational preparation process is essential, in order to respond to all types of threats.

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