

# TEN YEARS OF MINUSTAH AND CCOPAB<sup>1</sup>

*benvenuto*

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## ABSTRACT

This article presents the view of the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB) about the 10 years of the Brazilian participation in the UN peace operation in Haiti (MINUSTAH). It addresses the evolution of the UN doctrine and the consequences in the use of new concepts by the Brazilian troop. It shows how CCOPAB, firstly known as Peace Operations Training Center (CIOpPaz), was created and how it was inserted in the context of preparing contingents which would be deployed in MINUSTAH. Also, how this process has been consolidated and developed over time. MINUSTAH is divided into chronological phases and the characteristics of each phase are summarized, presenting a perspective about the future of the mission. As a conclusion, it talks about lessons learned and best practices presented, emphasizing the political, military and strategic aspects involved in this scenario.

**Key words:** MINUSTAH – CCOPAB - Brazil

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The UN Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established in 2004 by Resolution 1542 of the Security Council (SC) of the United Nations. This attitude was needed as internal events in Haiti jeopardized peace and security at the regional level. MINUSTAH had the approval of the Haitian authorities. The resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII authorizes the use of deadly force to situations beyond legitimate self-defense and defense of others, highlighting the need to enforce the UN mandate and featuring a new generation of Peace Operations. These are called robust peace operations, which are also characterized by their multidimensional character, since they are composed of the military and police components and civil agencies from different backgrounds working in an integrated manner. This evolution was necessary due to the unsuccessful experience of the UN as in the genocides in Rwanda, Yugoslavia and Somalia. This evolution remains and the current UN mission in Congo (MONUSCO) is an example.

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The main theoretical background for these changes was the Brahimi Report (2000), Capstone Doctrine (2008) and New Horizon Report (2009). The Brahimi Report met the demand of change caused by the aforementioned genocides. The Capstone Doctrine consolidated, doctrinally, the conclusions reached by the Brahimi Report. And the New Horizon Report updated the Brahimi Report, focusing more intensively on the issue of protection of civilians. The current mission of MONUSCO already operates under this new perspective. That is, both the mandate and the means available to the Brazilian General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, Force Commander - who is the commander of the military component of the mission, provide unprecedented resources to accomplish the mission. Including the use of deadly force in this context.

Prior to MINUSTAH, the UN deployed in Haiti the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) from March to June 2004. The facts that contextualize this operation date back to the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2000, when President Aristide and his party claimed victory with the turnout of only 10% of voters. The opposition and the international community challenged the results and accused the Haitian government of manipulating the election. The opposition began to be oppressed by the Haitian National Police and by illegal armed groups. By the end of 2003, a new movement united the opposition and called for the resignation of the president. In the beginning of 2004, an armed conflict, led by former members of the Haitian Armed Forces, was initiated in the city of Gonaïves and on the following days, the rebellion spread to other cities. The movement of armed opposition threatened to march on the Haitian capital and, on February 29, Mr. Aristide fled the country. The President of the Supreme Court, in accordance with the constitutional provisions, was named acting president. On the night of February 29, the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations submitted the request of the acting president for international assistance, which included authorization for military troops to enter the country. As per request, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1529 (2004). A Multinational Interim Force (MIF), integrated by American, Canadian, Chilean and French troops, authorized by the Resolution, immediately began its deployment in Haiti. On April 30, 2004, the SC adopted Resolution 1542 (2004), creating MINUSTAH under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The initial military structure of MINUSTAH, to which the Brazilian troop was subordinated, consisted of the so-called Brigade Haiti. In 2005, this structure was reduced and our troops were composed by a Brazilian Battalion (BRABAT), which assimilated into its organization a Marines Company. In that same year, the contingent is increased by a Brazilian Engineering Company (BRAENGCOY). The Brigade Haiti would be extinguished,



and the Brazilian troop would be subordinated directly to the Force Commander. This downsizing happened, mainly, because the arrival of troops from other countries that would compose the Brigade did not take place, besides there was the need for a more agile chain of command<sup>3</sup>.

The year of 2005 also witnessed the creation of the Peacekeeping Operations Training Center (CIOpPaz, acronym in Portuguese)<sup>4</sup>. This military organization started supporting the preparation of the Army troops that would go to MINUSTAH and military personnel who would act individually in different UN missions. Thus, the training of these strengths aligns with the aspects advocated by the United Nations (UN) doctrine for peace operations.



Photo: Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Joint Center – Vila Militar – Rio de Janeiro

The transformation of CIOpPaz into the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB, acronym in Portuguese) in 2010 enabled the lessons, destined especially to the Army, to be seen as a reference in the Ministry of Defense and applied to the Brazilian Navy as well as to the Air Force troops from that moment on. The integration required for the deployment in Haiti was materialized with CCOPAB, since the three Armed Forces would be part of this new military organization. Apart from military personnel, police and civilian personnel have also received adequate training for peace operations and humanitarian demining<sup>5</sup>. The creation of CIOpPaz and its transformation into CCOPAB were determined by the evolution of the scenario in Haiti, especially by the 2010 earthquake. With the

<sup>3</sup>Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Luis Fabiano Mafra Negreiros, Operations Officer of the first contingent of the Army Infantry Battalion. CCOPAB, Vila Militar, May 06, 2014.

<sup>4</sup>Army Commander's Ordinance Nr 090, February 23, 2005.

<sup>5</sup>Ordinance Nr 952 MD, June 15, 2010.



growing volume of actions requested for the first Brazilian contingent, it was visualized the need of a Training Center to coordinate all preparation for the various troops who would be prepared for deployment in MINUSTAH. The dissemination of lessons learned and the standardization of the lesson prescribed by the UN have indicated this direction. And the 2010 earthquake, with all its complexity in terms of coordination of efforts between the Armed Forces, accelerated the process of integration and materialized CCOPAB with its links to the Ministry of Defense. This integration proved to be successful and could be attested by the fluidity of the experiences conveyed by different instructors of the Armed Forces that were included in the frames of this new organization.

At present, CCOPAB has a structure that seeks to meet, as best as possible, the training requirements for troop contingents and individuals to operate in an integrated manner with different organizational cultures when addressing complex crisis situations. In this sense, a Legal Advisory stands out in its composition. It has an intense participation in various courses for contingents and individuals, who will take part in the UN Peace Missions, in disciplines related to Conduct and Discipline, Rules of Engagement, International Law, International Humanitarian Law, military ethics and the like. A Doctrine Division to collect, process and deliver timely relevant content of doctrinal character that may be useful to CCOPAB in the trainings for Peace Operations and Humanitarian Demining<sup>6</sup> or in strengthening exchanges with other training centers. A Training Division to conduct educational activities geared towards Peace Operations and Humanitarian Demining, always emphasizing the binomial realism and security in the reproduction of multidimensional challenges to be faced in the field. A Translators and Interpreters Division, with the responsibility for optimizing the ability of interaction of the Center internationally by supporting several activities that need translations from/into the Portuguese, English, Spanish and French languages. An Assessment Division, with the capacity to manage the assessment processes of students and exercises developed at the Center. An Administrative and Logistics Division that provides logistical and administrative support to the planning and execution of the various activities of the Center. CCOPAB's annual calendar is designed to meet the preparation of military contingents and members of the Armed Forces and Police involved in Peace Operations. Thus, a Unit Commanders and Joint Staff Course (EPCOEM, acronym in Portuguese) and Subunit Commanders and Platoon Leaders Course (EPCOSUPEL, acronym in Portuguese) were created. These two courses are for the training of Engineer and Infantry

<sup>6</sup>Humanitarian Demining is specifically meant to assist the civilian population. In this aspect, it differs from traditional demining that operates in favor of the military units.

Banner

officers already assigned to carry out specific functions in their respective contingent. Upon completion of the courses, these officers are able to replicate the knowledge acquired to their troops. This cycle ends with a final exercise called UN Pre-Deployment Advanced Field Exercise (EAOP, acronym in Portuguese) coordinated by CCOPAB, in which the whole troop is assessed. A similar course and exercise are carried out to train members of the Brazilian Navy who take part in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Humanitarian Demining Course which aims to enable Engineer Officers to work as an International Supervisor in Humanitarian Demining missions. Civil- Military Coordination Course (CIMIC), in which civilians, military and police personnel are trained to operate in an integrated manner in peace operations. Journalist in Conflict Areas Course, in which the target audience, especially written and spoken media professionals, is prepared to execute their missions in hostile environments. The Center is also empowered to conduct workshops on topics related to peace operations, also including international representatives. After this introduction, we will address specifically the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH.

## 2. DEVELOPMENT

We can divide the experience of our troops in MINUSTAH in 4 chronological phases for didactical purposes and better understanding of the period of performance of the Brazilian troops:

### a. 1<sup>st</sup> Phase (from June 2004 to the 1<sup>st</sup> semester of 2005)

The first phase can be characterized by the outset of the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH in June 2004. Participation that was translated into the deployment of the Brigade Haiti, made up of troops from the Southern Military Command (CMS), which covers the states of *Rio Grande do Sul*, *Santa Catarina* and *Paraná*, materializing the actual deployment of the Brazilian Battalion, with a strength of approximately 1,200 military personnel, in that peace mission. The Brazilian Army has seven other Area Military Commands similar to CMS. Namely, Southeastern Military Command (CMSE), the Eastern Military Command (CML), the Western Military Command (CMO), the Central Plateau Military Command (CMP), the Amazon Military Command (CMA), the Northern Military Command (CMN) and Northeastern Military Command (CMNE). Marine troops are mainly concentrated in Rio de Janeiro.

During this time, the doctrinal peculiarities of the work under the aegis of the United Nations were highlighted. The correct understanding of the mission to be accomplished



passed necessarily by the understanding of the concept of Robust Peacekeeping Operation, already mentioned above, reinforcing the need to provide the troop with a better idea on the subject, especially the conditions for the use of deadly force. The Rules of Engagement<sup>5</sup> recommended were different from those used in other peacekeeping missions that Brazil participated, such as the missions in Mozambique and Angola in the 1990s, since now the actions of the troops were ruled under Chapter VII of the Charter of UN authorizing the use of deadly force beyond self-defense or of others. For example, road clearance or defense of UN facilities. Initially, this change led to questions about situations in which the use of deadly force would be employed. The first contingents suffered the impacts of this transformation, because the training received in Brazil did not emphasize this aspect<sup>7</sup>. The lessons learned were immediately applied by the then CIOpPaz in the training of the following troops. Thus, from the fourth contingent (2005) on, the courses directed to the Battalion commander and his staff (EPCOEM), to the Company and Platoon Commanders (EPCOSUPEL) and the final exercise with the whole troop - UN Pre-deployment Advanced Field Exercise (EAOP), reinforced, through case studies and controlled practices, new standards of performance required for the accomplishment of the mandate of MINUSTAH<sup>8</sup>. Up to the seventh contingent (2007), the instructors from CIOpPaz moved to the headquarters of the troop in order to impart the necessary knowledge to deploy in Haiti. From the eighth contingent on, EPCOEM and EPCOSUPEL were carried out at the headquarters of CIOpPaz, *Vila Militar*, Rio de Janeiro. In a system of rotation, just EAOP continued to be carried out in Military Command Areas already mentioned, which were responsible for logistics and operational support of the troop<sup>9</sup>.

Logistics also showed its peculiarities during the deployment of the contingent. The standardization expressed in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), a document signed by Brazil and the UN and that specifies the type of equipment, composition of forces and the type of support to troops, demonstrated the relevance of having specific knowledge about the United Nations logistics and reimbursement systems. This need would end up influencing the creation of a logistics and reimbursement course at CCOPAB.

<sup>7</sup>Fact mentioned by General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, 1st *Force Commander* of MINUSTAH, in his presentation at the Cycle of Strategic Studies at the Army General Staff and Command School, Praia Vermelha, Rio de Janeiro, June 03, 2014.

<sup>8</sup>Interview with Major Leandro Nery Alves Vargas, member of the first team of instructors of CIOpPaz. CCOPAB, Vila Militar, Sept 06, 2014.

<sup>9</sup> Same.

Thus, we can conclude that, during the 1<sup>st</sup> phase of MINUSTAH, the Brazilian contingent fulfilled the precursory task in that mission. It demonstrated Brazil's capacity to support a friendly nation in times of difficulties, but it highlighted the need for deeper knowledge of the peculiarities of the deployment of troops under the aegis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

b. 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase (from the 2<sup>nd</sup> semester of 2005 to the 1<sup>st</sup> semester of 2007)

The second phase encompasses the period when Brazilian troops accomplished, in its entirety, the military activities authorized by MINUSTAH mandate under Chapter VII, previously mentioned. Deadly force was used following the Rules of Engagement provided. In this period, we highlight the presence of General Santos Cruz as Force Commander. His performance was recognized by the UN, which can be evidenced by his appointment to the current post of military commander of the peace operation in Congo. This attitude has contributed to achieving a stable and secure environment.



Photo: Brazilian peacekeepers in Haiti (2004-...)

The Brazilian Engineering Company in Haiti, made up of approximately 250 soldiers, was deployed in 2005. Its preparation was carried out by the Department of Engineering and Construction of the Brazilian Army. This subunit<sup>8</sup> mainly carried out works that would give



more mobility to the troops, especially clearing roads and paving access roads of interest to the mission accomplishment. It received the assignment to support the military component of MINUSTAH as a whole, that is, its area of responsibility was the whole Haiti, highlighting the technical features of their employment, since the Infantry Battalions operate in a smaller front. The different missions assigned to the Infantry Battalion and Engineering Company reflected in their own preparation for deployment in Haiti. CIOpPaz / CCOPAB needed to adapt itself to this reality by forming groups of instructors required to meet the peculiarities of each mission.



Photo: Brazilian Engineering Company digging well in Haiti

The great challenge this time was to carry out the dismantling of armed gangs who acted in the operations area of the Infantry Battalion. This task proved crucial so that the Police and Civil components could increase their operations in Port-au-Prince. The Haitian National Police had neither human nor material resources for this confrontation. Thus, the military component of MINUSTAH was called in.

Therefore, the concept of the Use of Force to carry out the mandate was used to its full, that is, deadly force was used against the gangs. The conduct of the troops was fully aligned with that advocated by the Rules of Engagement and the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA)<sup>10</sup>, aligning the military necessity with the goals advocated by the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations. Other documents that guide this conduct are the Resolution of the Security Council itself, creating the Peace Operation, the Mission mandate - which will specify the tasks to be performed, the Force Commander's General Guidelines, the

<sup>10</sup>SOFA is an agreement signed between the UN and the country that receives the Peace Operation. It is specified what the military component of mission is authorized to do.



Rules of Engagement - which will detail at the tactical level the limits of the Use of Force, and the Standard Operational Procedures (SOP)<sup>11</sup>.

Among the techniques, tactics and procedures used, the highlight was the use of checkpoints, Search and Seizure Operations (OBA, acronym in Portuguese), cordon and search operations, besides the use of the concept of "Strong Point"<sup>12</sup>, duly adapted to the reality of Port-au-Prince. There was also the beginning of the deployment of specialized military personnel, carrying out specific tasks, in the Peacekeeping Operations Detachment (DOPaz, acronym in Portuguese) and Psychological Operations Detachment (DOP, acronym in Portuguese). Operation Iron Fist<sup>13</sup>, held in 2005, and Operations Blue House and "Jauru Sudamericano"<sup>14</sup>, in 2007, were three major actions accomplished, demonstrating the full scope of military activities used in the accomplishment of the mandate of MINUSTAH. In these operations, the techniques, tactics and procedures mentioned above were applied.

In this second phase, BRABAT was employed with the definition of a specific Operational Area of Responsibility. The unit received the region in which the center of the political power in Haiti was located, in the neighborhood of *Bel Air*, in which the headquarters of the government and parliament of the country were located. It also received the area of *Cité Soleil* which is considered the poorest portion of that capital.

Tracking all this effervescence, the Peacekeeping Operations Training Center was created in 2005. Initially, its core was composed of officers from the 3<sup>rd</sup> contingent, conveying the experience acquired on the ground to new members of that mission<sup>15</sup>.

The content available was also updated. The Standardized Generic Training Modules provided by UN DPKO<sup>16</sup> were adopted. This attitude provided the members of the Battalion with the knowledge advocated by that department, aligning the training given in Brazil with that required by the United Nations.

<sup>11</sup> See attached Glossary.

<sup>12</sup> Same.

<sup>13</sup> The Operation Iron Fist, in July 06, 2005, aimed at neutralizing the leader of the gang Emmanuel Terror Wilme in Cité Soleil. In this operation Wilme and six members of his gang died. The operation marked a tactical change of the UN peace forces, in which deadly force started to be used to execute the mission mandate. In this period the Force Commander of MINUSTAH was General Heleno Ribeiro. Source: *Estado de São Paulo* Newspaper, August 16, 2005, International section, p.A15.

<sup>14</sup> The purpose of Operations Blue House (Jan 24, 07) and *Jauru Sudamericano* (Feb 09, 07) was to consolidate the military occupation of *Cité Militaire*, taking over the strategic point called the "Blue House". The importance of this point would characterize the pacification in *Cité Militaire*, besides taking over Route National 1, access to Cité Soleil. The operations were successful and the Force Commander at that moment was General Santos Cruz. Source: Interview with General Santos Cruz to the *DefesaNet* correspondent, Kaiser Konrad, on Sept 07, in Haiti.

<sup>15</sup> See introduction of the article.

<sup>16</sup> Department of Peacekeeping Operations.



Documentary

The development of the firing instruction was also improved with the Haitian experience. CIOpPaz created and issued, authorized by the upper echelon, reflex action shooting modules, updating techniques and standardizing knowledge concerning the use of firearms in urban combat environment. This procedure of the then CIOpPaz contributed to adapt the locality combat techniques, taking into consideration the Rules of Engagement. These rules require the gradual use of deadly force; and it becomes necessary for their efficient implementation to be directly related to the level of training that the military person has to hit a target in either non-vital or vital points, depending on the threat level.

From 2006 on, the Battalion began to conduct the UN Pre-deployment Advanced Field Exercise (EAOP), with the use of military personnel with experience in Haiti working as the "Observer, Controller and Assessor" (OCA, acronym in Portuguese). This activity became the last training phase of the contingents. The dimension of this exercise is unique as it is practiced in the host city of preparation of the Infantry Battalion or of the Engineering Company - a real urban environment. It aims at assessing the preparation, the training and operational efficiency of the entire troop. This exercise is supported by scholars from several sectors, public organizations and media professionals within the training context. Similar situations troops may find in Haiti are created and their several levels should respond to them to carry out the mission given by the upper echelon.

Thus, we conclude that in the 2<sup>nd</sup> phase of MINUSTAH, the role performed by the Brazilian contingent started to influence the training for the mission. The adoption of a more proactive posture, backed by the Rules of Engagement, executing major operations and the beginning of joint work with the police component were assimilated and passed by CIOpPaz to subsequent contingents; thus, ensuring the efficiency of training depending on the tasks to be accomplished at the time of deployment on Haitian soil.

c. 3<sup>rd</sup> Phase (from the 2<sup>nd</sup> semester of 2007 to January 12, 2010)

The third phase refers to a period in which the interaction between the Military, Police and Civil components gained a prominent role in MINUSTAH, consistent with the doctrine advocated for this type of mission<sup>17</sup>. The training provided by CIOpPaz accompanied this evolution and new actors were invited to collaborate on the training of troops<sup>18</sup>, allowing prior

<sup>17</sup> The multidimensional character and the level of integration of the agents involved are the striking features and that was previously mentioned.

<sup>18</sup> NGOs' representatives who carry out works in Haiti were invited to present their lectures in the different courses at the Center. The Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) Course in Peace Operations, for example. The aim was to familiarize the military that would be employed in Haiti with the *modus operandi* of different civil



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knowledge of the peculiarities of some NGOs, of the work with the UN civilian staff and with police in the mission area, among others.

The Center has also initiated its support to the preparation of the Engineering Company in Haiti. Thus, the Center can support training in relation to the UN doctrine and to the techniques used by infantry troops for engineers, getting these military personnel used to the tasks they would carry out in Haiti.

During this period, the police component would be the first agent in solving the incidents that happened in the mission area. This decision reflected in the preparation of the contingents, since the Center needed to adapt the new instructions to the Rules of Engagement, riot control and the emphasis on less lethal weaponry and ammunition. Therefore, Checkpoints, Search and Seizure Operations (OBA) and Cordon and Search Operations would be accomplished in coordination with the police component of MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police, aligning, once again, the disciplines addressed at the Center with the reality lived in Port-au-Prince.

In this phase, the Center started to carry out centralized courses in its headquarters, in *Vila Militar, Deodoro*. There was the beginning of the Unit Commanders and Joint Staff Course (EPCOEM), the Subunit Commanders and Platoon Leaders Course (EPCOSUPEL) and the Civil-Military Coordination Course (CIMIC), providing better conditions for the training and consolidating the 'Training of Trainers' concept, that is, the commanders in different echelons. These commanders would begin to replicate the knowledge gained to their subordinates, which are decentralized in instruction poles at different headquarters.

The experience so far has provided subsidies for the creation of Instruction Notes and of the experimental Standardized-Program (SP) of the Peace Force (UN Infantry Battalion). This SP is going through a phase of revision and has been used by the Doctrine Division of CCOFAB. These materials have come to assist the contingents in the training of their troops, providing basis of knowledge about the mission and guiding the planning of instructions to be given to their strengths.

As a result of work undertaken in 2009, DPKO Certified the Pre-deployment Advanced Field Exercise (EAOP) implemented by the Center in the preparation of BRABAT and BRAENGCOY. This certification was a request made by the Center and presented by the Brazilian Permanent Mission at the UN. Thus, a team from DPKO in New York went to Rio

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agencies. The NGO Viva Rio was one of them. Officers who were deployed in Haiti began to participate as instructors of the different courses and exercises in the preparation phase of the troops.

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de Janeiro and attended EAOP which was held in the region of *Paracambi*. Considering the magnitude of the exercise and the results achieved by the troop, the certification was granted.

Thus, we may conclude that the 3<sup>rd</sup> phase of MINUSTAH showed great evolution of joint work among the police, military and civilian components. The training provided by CIOpPaz accompanied this development, at least, in three distinct ways: by centralizing the completion of the courses at its headquarters; providing new learning materials and getting recognition from UN DPKO to EAOP.

d. 4<sup>th</sup> Phase (January 12, 2010 up to the present)

Activities undertaken in response to the occurrence of an earthquake near Port-au-Prince, with 7.2 on the Richter scale<sup>19</sup> on January 12, 2010, inaugurated the 4<sup>th</sup> Phase of the current UN mission in Haiti.

The earthquake had a direct impact on MINUSTAH's command. The Mission Headquarters was destroyed. Several members of the mission staff and of the Brazilian contingent were killed. This fact decreased the capacity of command and control at the mission strategic level, showing the necessity of deployment of new strengths to maintain the operability of the peace mission and the support to the Haitian government.



Photo: UN HQ destroyed in Port Prince

As a response, the Brazilian government sent to that country: a detachment of firefighters specialized in rescues, another Infantry Battalion, and reinforcements to the

<sup>19</sup>It is estimated that approximately 250,000 people perished in this earthquake, 1.5 million were left homeless and 600,000 were displaced. Source: General Floriano Peixoto's lecture, Force Commander during the earthquake and Gen Keen, Commander of U.S. troops. Army Officers Advanced School (EsAO, acronym in Portuguese), *Vila Militar*, Rio de Janeiro, Sept 30, 2010.



Engineering Company and to the Marines Company. At that time, CIOpPaz was in charge of providing an Emergency Course to the officers of the new Battalion and to the reinforcements of the Engineering Company, making these military comfortable with the tasks that they would perform in Haiti.

During this period, there was a great necessity of interagency work. The UN needed to find practical solutions to coordinate the work of the different actors that arrived to give support. At a first moment, only the military structure, based especially in containers and less vulnerable to the earthquake effects, kept its capacity of command and control. The UN headquarters, more precisely the civilian branch, was completely destroyed and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and his deputy (substitute) had died. Therefore, the Force Commander, General Floriano Peixoto, would take over internally the command of the mission at its initial phase of the process of humanitarian aid, until the arrival of the new SRSG, Mr. Edmond Mulet. Soon General Keen, Commander of the US Forces, would get together with him. According to the two generals, facing the crisis, under the military point of view, presented 3 phases with the following objectives<sup>20</sup>:


Phase 1 - Response to the crisis (Jan-Apr 10)

- Support and conduct emergency operations;
- Guarantee security and public order; and
- Reassuming the capacity of the mission.

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
<sup>20</sup>General Floriano Peixoto's lecture, Force Commander during the earthquake and Gen Keen, Commander of U.S. troops. Army Officers Advanced School (EsAO, acronym in Portuguese), Vila Militar, Rio de Janeiro, Sept 30, 2010.

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Picture 1 - Source: General Floriano Peixoto and General Keen's lecture (see Glossary)

The picture above presents the structure that was adopted by MINUSTAH to face the crisis immediately after the earthquake. To conclude about the main lessons learned from the earthquake, it is necessary to compare it with the traditional structure of MINUSTAH.



Picture 2 - Source: Staff of MINUSTAH Force Commander

We notice in picture 1 a concentration of activities in the structure called Joint Operation Task Center (JOTC). Originally Joint Operations Center (JOC), it is a joint structure that coordinates the operations in a general way and that makes up, together with the



Joint Logistic Operations Center (JLOC) - logistics coordinator, and the Joint Military Analysis Center (JMAC) - information coordinator, a kind of Staff directly linked to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. These structures, all joint, that is, composed of civilian and military representatives of the different nuances, have the mission to advise in an integrated manner the highest authority of the peace operation. They are subordinated to none of these components (military, police or civilian) represented in picture 2. With the collapse of the chain of command provided in the organization of picture 2, the military commander, as already mentioned, took over the coordination of all the humanitarian aid that came to Haiti and used the existing JOC structure, changing it into an integrated coordination center and with a new name, Joint Operation Task Center. Everything would go through JOTC and the decisive process gained the agility that the moment required.

Another fact which deserves to be highlighted as lesson learned, in terms of humanitarian aid, was the important role that the UN Country Team must perform at critical moments of natural disasters. What is this structure? The UN establishes their agencies of humanitarian aid in fragile countries. These agencies operate regardless of the existence of a peace operation. When a peace operation is established, there is the coordinator of humanitarian aid of the mission - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In picture 2, it is the civil arm of MINUSTAH. Thus, we perceive an overlap of efforts, which could worsen in case of major disasters and in need of an integrated coordination. And that was exactly what happened in Haiti. Usually, the UN Country Team is already in the country long before and knows better the operational environment. The lesson learned with Haiti was the one that this structure must be valued<sup>21</sup>.

#### Phase 2 - Recovery (May-Dec 10)

- The same before, adding the electoral process support.

#### Phase 3 - Standardization (Jan - Dec 11)

- Support and conduct emergency recovery;
- Guarantee security. Law Enforcement and Human Rights;
- Strengthen the capacity of the State; and
- Support the electoral process.

<sup>21</sup>This conclusion was not presented by the generals during their lectures. However, it was already mentioned in different forums, for example, by Professor Dr. Antonio Jorge Ramalho, Director of Pandiá Calógeras Institute, of the Ministry of Defense, during the event commemorating the 10th anniversary of MINUSTAH. Research Nucleus of International Relations (NUPRI), USP, São Paulo, May 28, 2014.

And as strategic consequences after the earthquake, the same generals highlighted:

- Haiti will keep on resenting in the future political, social and economic capacity to lead unilaterally, with the earthquake consequences;
- The political situation will remain fragile;
- The polarization between the elite minority and the impoverished majority will deepen;
- Collectively, these factors may affect security in the country, mainly in Port-au-Prince and areas of high concentration of people;
- The role of international assistance for the reconstruction of the country will continue to be essential;
- The high probability of occurrence of tropical rains, hurricanes and the possibility of (an)other earthquake(s) require special attention when MINUSTAH and its partners provide immediate and integrated support; and
- The help of Brazil will remain central, both to bring concrete benefits to Haiti and to encourage and lead other countries in actions to rebuild the Haitian State.

In the current phase of MINUSTAH, there is already a strategy for the UN to leave Haiti. Indicators, such as the gradual downsizing of military personnel which is being implemented and the performance of the Haitian National Police as the first element of security in the country, already established by the Directive of the Force Commander, point to this direction. Five main courses of action are being considered by the UN for implementation in the time period of July 2015/July 2016<sup>22</sup>:

- (1) End of MINUSTAH mandate and the assignment of a UN special envoy to Haiti;
- (2) End of MINUSTAH mandate to establish a Special Political Mission with capacity to develop the Haitian National Police (HNP);
- (3) End of MINUSTAH mandate to establish a new peace mission with the reduced presence (without military force) and a broader political role;
- (4) End of MINUSTAH mandate to establish a new peace mission with the reduced presence of military force (strategic reserve) and a broader political role; and

<sup>22</sup>Source: Final Report of mission components of the Force Commander's Staff of MINUSTAH. CCOPAB, *Vila Militar*, June 03, 2014.



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- (5) MINUSTAH continued with a change in the mandate, reflecting a reduction beyond the objective of the ongoing consolidation process.

Thus, we may conclude that the 4<sup>th</sup> phase of MINUSTAH showed the necessity of civil-military cooperation to mitigate the effects of a big natural disaster. In the case of Brazil, it also highlighted logistical aspects that are necessary to quickly deploy troops. In this context, the training provided by CCOPAB gained new contours, covering activities ranging from strictly military tasks up to joint actions to support humanitarian aid. There is already a strategy to downsize the UN presence in Haiti. The decision on the best way to carry out this operation has not yet been taken, but the courses of action will soon be completed and none of them, by the primary data available so far, points out to a complete lack of UN representatives in the country.

### 3. CONCLUSION

The participation of Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH generated an evolution in the process of their training. The creation of CIOpPaz in 2005 was a direct consequence of the need for improvement in the preparation for deployment in peace operations, now under the aegis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The new features of the Mission mandate, reinforcing the need for gradual use of force up to deadly force to enforce the mandate, as well as the multidimensional nature of it, demanded a new methodology that was being developed and applied in the Center. This development has tactical, operational and strategic-political aspects.

In tactical terms, we can highlight the preparation of the contingents and military personnel assigned to individual missions in peace operations. The existence of a center devoted to this preparation enabled the compilation and implementation of the UN doctrine for peace operations, besides the assimilation and dissemination of lessons learned by different contingents. In the specific case of MINUSTAH, it was possible to realize the impact of these lessons on the performance of the troop that participated in pacification operations in *Cité Soleil* and *Cité Militaire*, for example. It also happened to the contingents which went to Haiti after the earthquake. All these new variables were incorporated to the courses that were being created according to the demands, as the course for Battalion Commanders and Staff officers and Subunit commanders and Platoon leaders besides the crowning of the troop training with a Pre-deployment Advanced Field Exercise, whose standard of excellence has been certified by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

(DPKO). And so this standard of excellence is maintained, it is necessary a constant assessment of the results obtained, having doctrinal and teaching developments. In this sense, the Doctrine, the Training and the newly created Assessment Divisions at CCOPAB must remain constantly updated and integrated with other internationally recognized Peace Operations Centers.

The operational aspect of the evolution of this center, which originally belonged to one armed force, the Brazilian Army, could be characterized by its transformation into the Peace Operations Joint Training Center in 2010. Despite the direct influence of the earthquake on the decision taken, the multidimensional features the latest generation of peace operations, pointing to the need for greater integration among all agents in the mission, already demanded this transformation. That is, the integration is desirable not only for the military with the police and civilians, and vice versa, but also among the military personnel themselves. This phenomenon is, nonetheless, cultural, to the extent that organizations tend to react against integration, which could mean the loss of a status quo acquired over a historical process<sup>23</sup>. Indicators about the role of CCOPAB on the growing integration among the Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations can be seen in the organizational chart of the Center, composed of officers and NCOs of the three Armed Forces. This composition induces a natural exchange of professional experiences acquired throughout their careers in general and, in particular, in peace operations. The role performed by CCOPAB in the preparation of the Brazilian Navy contingent that takes part in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is another indicator of this integration. As it is also the participation of officers from the Marines and the Brazilian Air Force in different courses and exercises applied in the Center. The integration reached organizations outside the Armed Forces, since police and civil agencies are represented in the group of CCOPAB instructors.

The political-strategic aspect of CCOPAB's participation could be characterized by the display of peacekeeping operations as an instrument of foreign policy of Brazil. And to the extent that the successful performance of our troops in Haiti finds international recognition, the Center, which has a considerable contribution in this process, tends to project the same way. In this sense, we can mention Minister Norberto Moretti's article, Former Chief of International Peace and Security Division of *Itamaraty*:

"[...] The Brazilian participation in Peacekeeping Operations is also justified by political and diplomatic reasons. The first is that Brazil's

<sup>23</sup> For more details on aspects of the organizational culture of the Brazilian Army, see Campos (2013).



contribution to peacekeeping missions demonstrates, in a practical way, the willingness and the ability to take our share of responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. This is essential to establish and expand our position as an influential actor in the world scenario"<sup>24</sup>

This statement given by Minister Moretti takes us to a scenario that may extrapolate our regional area and the participation of the Brazilian Navy in UNIFIL, Lebanon, is a present indicator. In relation to our participation in Haiti, Minister Moretti highlights the same article:

"[...] another important diplomatic foundation of our participation in peacekeeping operations is firmly committed to the security, political stability and socio-economic development in our region. Regional solidarity impels us to contribute effectively and significantly to peace missions in our geographical area. Therefore, our presence in the United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is emblematic."<sup>25</sup>

We can notice in this passage the importance that our diplomacy brings to the Brazilian presence in Haiti, in which Brazil is the biggest troop contributor, besides indicating the Force Commander of the mission permanently, it is natural that the Brazilian military and CCOPAB's projection is emphasized in forums and international institutions.

We can already notice that MINUSTAH is in the conclusion/modification phase of its mandate, missing only the decision of how it will be implemented. Its political, military and, why not include, psychosocial legacies can be tested throughout this article. And the creation of a Center of Peace Operations in Brazil, which has already reached the international recognition in such little time of existence, is highlighted in this aspect. It is expected that the closure of MINUSTAH does not mean a setback in our constant preparation for deployment in future peace operations. And CCOPAB, proving the need for constant evaluation, should be able to identify alternatives that justify maintaining its high standards of performance.

<sup>24</sup> MORETTI, Norberto. Peacekeeping Operations as an Instrument of Brazil's Foreign Policy. In: Integration Magazine. Informative Magazine, no 1, BRAZILIAN PEACE OPERATIONS JOINT TRAINING CENTER, Vila Militar, Rio de Janeiro: 2<sup>a</sup> Comunicação Agency, 2013, p 27.

<sup>25</sup> Same.

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IP 85-1 – Operações de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem.

## GLOSSARY

-Checkpoint: also known as Control Post (CP), can be static (SCP) or mobile (MCP). "A CP is garnished to allow control of the movement and inspection of vehicles and pedestrians, seeking the imposition of restrictive measures, orders and determinations or showing the presence of the Peace Operation to the parties in conflict." (Manual de Operações de Paz dos Grupamentos Operativos de Fuzileiros Navais - CGCFN – 1-8)

-Search and Seizure Operations: "the search and seizure operations intended to imprison members of the Adverse Force and seize their equipment, weapons, ammunition and other materials not allowed to the population and also restrict the freedom of action of the Adverse Force." (IP 85-1 – Operações de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem). This IP 85-1 originated C 85-1 Manual.

-Cordon Operation: "the cordon is the technique that offers the best opportunities for decisive results, but it is difficult to be planned and conducted and requires great superiority



of means. The planning, preparation and execution of a cordon aim to conduct a quick and thorough action that surprises the armed agents of the Adverse Force. In planning, priority should be given to actions that provide maximum security and surprise. " (IP 85-1)

-Sweeping Operation: "searching the areas to seek knowledge about the Adverse Force, restricting their freedom of movement and isolating it from its support to the population and imprisoning people and seizing material of the Adverse Force. It can be carried out in a rural or urban environment and is distinguished from actions of search and seizure by the objectives and the knowledge we have of the target. The search and seizure has well-defined objectives and is more targeted, while sweeping has more general goals and is more exploratory. "(IP 85-1)

-Strong Point (SP): "An SP (*Strong Point*) is a facility usually located in an area under the control of adverse force and with a limited capacity of barracks, allowing the troops to demonstrate the presence action and exercise control over a certain area. From an SP, the troops can launch on foot or motorized patrols to increase the action of presence in the region. Peripheral and internal security measures observed for the barracks should be established, within the availability of personnel and equipment, "((Manual de Operações de Paz dos Grupamentos Operativos de Fuzileiros Navais - CGCFN - 1-8)

-Standard Operating Procedures: "Material elaborated by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN for each Peace Operation and distributed to the contributing countries. It aims at standardizing, in the area of the peace mission, the operational, logistical, administrative, and communications procedures. Besides, it presents rules for the functioning of all mission sectors". (Manual de Operações de Paz do Ministério da Defesa – MD34-M-02)

-Force Commander (FC)

-U3 - Staff Operations Officer to the Force Commander

-COS - Chief of Staff to the Force Commander

-SRSG - Special Representative of the Secretary-General

-PDSRSG - Principal Deputy of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

-UNPol - United Nations Police

-OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

-Cluster - Structures created to select and arrange, by type, all humanitarian support that has come to Haiti.

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