


# CCOPAB AND PEACE OPERATIONS

BRAZILIAN ARMY COMMAND  
FIRST ARMY DIVISION  
BRAZILIAN PEACE OPERATIONS JOINT TRAINING CENTER

V.1 - N.2 - 2016 - ISSN: 2525-5282



## PERSPECTIVES, REFLECTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED



CCOPAB

Brazilian Peace Operations  
Joint Training Center  
SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO







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**CENTRO CONJUNTO  
DE OPERAÇÕES  
DE PAZ DO BRASIL  
SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO**

## **PERSPECTIVES, REFLECTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED**



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**Brazilian Peace Operations  
Joint Training Center  
SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO**

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## Contents

The Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership <i>Army Reserve Major General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz</i>	07
Ethics in armed conflicts some principles developed by the French army <i>Lieutenant Colonel Eric Mouëzy</i>	23
Assessment and Certification of the Brazilian Troops Deployed to Haiti <i>Major Leonardo Duarte do Nascimento</i>	37
Mine Action and the Brazilian participation in Humanitarian Demining missions <i>Major Anderson Félix Geraldo</i>	53
The Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center and its Mobile Training Teams: an exquisite Brazilian tool for alignment with the United Nations in South-South Cooperation activities <i>Major Herbert de Souza Lemos</i> <i>Major Vinícius Cordeiro Ramirez</i>	73
BRAENGCOY's Peacekeeping Operations Basic Course in the context of the preparation cycle <i>Major Eric Monios</i>	89
High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) <i>Army Reserve Major General Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto</i>	99
The Brazilian military performance in MINUSTAH: strategies to confront gangs in Haiti <i>Juliana Sandi Pinheiro</i>	131





## Preface

This second edition of CCOPAB's Magazine and Peace Operations: perspectives, reflections and lessons learned seeks to be in full accordance with the main goal of the very first edition, that is, share the Peace Operations activities carried out by the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB). The authors still have the challenging task to present the new features of the current peace operations.

In a nutshell, the articles underscore The Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership, Ethics in armed conflicts some principles developed by the French army, Assessment and Certification of the Brazilian Troops deployed to Haiti, Mine Action and the Brazilian participation in Humanitarian Demining missions, The Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center and its Mobile Training Teams: an exquisite Brazilian tool for alignment with the United Nations in South-South Cooperation activities, BRAENGCOY's Peacekeeping Operations Basic Course in the context of the preparation cycle, High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), The Brazilian military performance in MINUSTAH: strategies to confront gangs in Haiti.

Based on the articles aforementioned, CCOPAB expects to keep its contribution to the spread of peace operations related topics among the different levels – Strategic, Operational and Tactic. Moreover, we will continually be looking forward to reaching excellence in the publications that are yet to come.

ARMY RESERVE MAJOR GENERAL LUIZ  
GUILHERME PAUL CRUZ  
Director of the UN Office for PeaceKeeping  
Strategic Partnership (OPSP)





# The Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership

*Army Reserve Major General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz*

**ABSTRACT:** The United Nations deploy Peacekeeping Missions in many regions of the world. Thousands of military, police officers and civilian experts work in challenging operational environments. Only with Member States commitment to participate with determined well trained and equipped troops and police, it is possible to deliver the Security Council Mandates. The UN General Assembly has created the Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships of DPKO to better be able to deliver the Mandates. The Office checks the Missions uniformed components and makes recommendations to the USGs DPKO and DFS to correct systemic issues and improve troop and police performance. The main systemic issues are related to knowledge and understanding of the Mandate and rules and regulations, leadership, integration, mission support and compliance.

**KEY WORDS:** United Nations, Peacekeeping, DPKO, Systemic Issues

The United Nations peacekeeping operations deploy a number of uniformed personnel<sup>1</sup> as the complexity of their given mandates

Picture 1:  
Security Council meeting



has increased. They are expected to operate in dynamic and challenging environments, and are frequently exposed to risks, which require strong coordination and the consistent application of established standards.

Meeting these demands requires strategic and operational engagement at all levels across both DPKO/DFS Headquarters and field missions to ensure that:

<sup>1</sup> On June 2016 - 87,245 military were deployed as contingents, 1,757 as military experts and 13,079 police officers.



- Concepts of operation (CONOPS), Rules of Engagement (ROE) / Directives on the Use of Force (DUF), mission support plans and other key directives are appropriate to support the implementation of mandate tasks;
- Plans, information gathering and operational activities are integrated;
- Standards are evenly and consistently applied;
- Timely and appropriate troop and police contributions are generated and deployed to field missions;
- Personnel are properly trained;
- Equipment and logistics requirements are met;
- Adequate medical capabilities are established;
- Necessary welfare measures in place; and
- Safety and security provisions are enhanced.

A breakdown in any one of these areas or failure to address systemic issues could reduce the field mission's ability to deliver the given mandate.

Situations in peacekeeping have demonstrated the need for a capacity in DPKO-DFS to conduct reviews to identify gaps that have an impact on the delivery of the mandate by United Nations peacekeeping operations and provide recommendations on systemic issues with a view to improve mandate implementation.

By conducting both comprehensive and targeted reviews, in line with existing DPKO and DFS directives and standards, the OPSP shall make recommendations to address gaps, systemic issues and emerging challenges affecting the implementation of mandate tasks for uniformed personnel. Such reviews shall



Picture 2 - MONUSCO Commanders meeting



analyse and provide recommendations on, inter alia: military or/and police concepts of operations implementation; guidance (e.g. rules of engagement/use of force) and standards; troop-to-task determinations; force/police generation processes; overall equipment needs; adequacy of support provided to uniformed personnel; welfare needs to uniformed components; training requirements of uniformed personnel and lessons learned identified and disseminated to military and police personnel.

OPSP recommendations are directed to both USGs DPKO/DFS for approval. By analysing gaps that affect the implementation of mandated tasks and making recommendations to address systemic issues, the Director of OPSP ensures that the USGs have holistic, comprehensive, coherent and objective views of all factors contributing to the ability of uniformed personnel to implement the mandates of current operations. Once endorsed, those recommendations are implemented by field missions and both Departments' Divisions and Offices.



The Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership was established by decision of the General Assembly on 2013 and tasked to:

- Strengthen peacekeeping partnership by assisting in identifying gaps that have an impact on the delivery of mandates by United Nations peacekeeping missions, by making recommendations on systemic issues relating to UN peacekeeping operations;
- Making recommendations to ensure the safety, security and welfare, and the Organization's provision of adequate support service to uniformed personnel;
- Working closely with troop and police-contributing countries and senior leadership, both in the field and at Headquarters; and
- Making recommendations to incorporate lessons learned and best practices from peacekeeping missions into existing or

Picture 3 - UNMISS Bentiu POC Site





future peacekeeping operations.

## Methodology and conducting review



Picture 4 - UNIFIL Blue Line night patrol



The mission reviews are conducted in close collaboration and coordination with relevant TCCs/PCCs, as well as the mission's senior leadership – in particular Force Commander and Police Commissioner, and DPKO/DFS leadership.

Once the mission subject to review is identified, the Office develops a term of reference, conducts a desk review, receives briefings from relevant offices at UNHQ and consults with field missions' TCCs/PCCs to seek their input, as necessary.

The review addresses operational, logistics and coordination issues related to the effectiveness of missions' military and police components' ability to support mandate implementation.



Mission leadership is debriefed by Review Team before departing from the mission area.

The review recommendations,





once approved, are used by DPKO/DFS leadership to take corrective actions, including through adjustments to HQ guidance and support to the field, and communication with TCCs/PCCs. OPSP also monitors the implementation of its recommendations.

Member States, particularly troop and police contributing countries, have been consulted about the terms of reference of each field visit. Further, they have been informed about findings of each review conduct by OPSP.

### **Systemic issues affecting peacekeeping operations**

OPSP has already done nine mission reviews and two target reviews. It has been more than 240 recommendations that contributed to update key documents and develop measures ranging from troop pre-deployment training to protection measures, through better integration of information and planning processes.

Addressing these systemic issues with a view to resolving them would significantly improve mission's military and police components' performance implementing Security Council mandate tasks.

DPKO and DFS are committed to develop efficient and efficacy solutions to solve most of the issues. The Secretariat trusts TCCs/PCCs commitment to present solutions under their responsibility. Further, there is an entire cooperation network to develop capabilities as necessary.

Reviews have highlighted five cross-cutting areas affecting missions, namely AWARENESS & UNDERSTANDING, INTEGRATION, LEADERSHIP, COMPLIANCE and SUPPORT.



## Awareness & Understanding

Some contingents and staff lack clarity of the mission's mandate and of their expected contribution to mandate implementation. In other words, they may work without a clear understanding of their purpose and are, therefore, unable to align their tasks towards mandate implementation.

This is a systemic issue which must and can be addressed, starting with enhanced mission-specific pre-deployment training, and enhanced guidance from UNHQ and Mission leadership.

There is a framework of rules, regulations and guidance that rules peacekeeping operations. Therefore, it is required an additional pre-deployment training effort, particularly commanders and staff officers, to be updated on doctrine in order to better interact with mission's components.

## Integration

Integration is imperative to success in UN peacekeeping. Yet the multi-dimensional character of UN peacekeeping presents natural challenges to the integration of effort that is required. Adding to this,

Picture 6 - MONUSCO attack helicopters





there are the diverse cultural and professional backgrounds of our contributed troops and police.

At times, the lack of integration starts with the leadership of the Mission itself and directly impacts on the work of subordinate staff and units. This ultimately leads mission components operating in ‘stove pipes’ and results in disjointed or uneven actions across the various components and negatively impacts mandate implementation.

## Leadership

The UN makes efforts to educate its leadership through a number of programs, including Senior Mission Leadership Courses, Senior Leadership Induction Programmes and OMA mentoring programs. However, we do not always have the chance of deploying leaders who have benefitted from these programmes prior to their deployment.

Solid Mission leadership will work as an integrated team, drawing on their own experiences in cooperation and coordination with their larger team for the good of the mission. The challenge is that appointed leadership may lack experience in working in a multidimensional PK environment that is comprised of civilians, military and police, each having very distinct cultures. This can lead to a situation where

Picture 7 - MINUSMA patrol in Tabenkort/Mali





there is a lack of understanding among the various components of each other's roles and responsibilities. Adding to this challenge, many of our senior Military and Police commanders, deployed to the UN for the first time, often lack an understanding of the UN culture, its policies, and rules and procedures.

## Support

OPSP considers a range of support to uniformed personnel, including UNHQ support to the missions, capitals' support to contingents, host government's support to the mission and in-Mission support arrangements.

The UN system is by design very dependent on cooperation among the key stakeholders and relies on workable support arrangements, in particular those from our TCCs and PCCs. UN provides support in accordance with agreed LOAs and MOUs and should not be expected to be able to bridge gaps as a result of non-compliance.

Unfortunately, we have often come across gaps in these

Picture 8 - MINUSTAH warehouse





arrangements, in particular as regards COE, self-sustainment, and welfare.

The UN supports uniformed personnel units with accommodation, energy, fuel, water, limited transportation, and communications. Nevertheless, this capacity is limited by budget resources, rules and regulations that make Mission Support accountable to the Controller.

The UN logistics system cannot provide the required support for a large number of parallel deployments. A phased approach based on clear priorities is required to ensure sustainment of operations in most mission areas. OPSP has recommended corrective measures to avoid or reduce deployments that are overstretched and an obstacle for mandate implementation.

## Compliance

The UN has a strong policy and guidance foundation, which is interpreted at mission level by key strategic and operational documents including policies, directives, guidelines and standard operating procedures (SOP).

OPSP focuses in part on measuring the level of policy compliance in our field missions, as well as on assessing whether strategic and operational guidance are current and aligned with missions' mandates and strategic priorities.

For uniformed components, compliance begins with a Member State's acceptance of an offer to become a TCC or a PCC. After that, a MOU, where personnel, COE, and logistic requirements and responsibilities are discriminated, is signed.





A peacekeeping deployment must follow an acceptance of adhering to the Mission Concept, Military and Police CONOPS, ROEs, SURs, COE requirements, MOU etc. Any caveats must be known and accepted by the UN (DPKO, DFS and the Mission) prior to a deployment. Only

Picture 9 - CHIBATT - MINUSTAH



then will it be possible for a Mission to operate with a desired level of flexibility and be proactive in mandate implementation.

It is important for the UN that TCCs make good use of our guidance material, directives, SOPs, manuals and key operational documents as they plan for and conducts pre-deployment training of Staff Officers, MILOBs and formed units. However, any orientation towards the UN peacekeeping environment should always be built

Picture 10 - INDOBATT - UNIFIL





on good soldiering skills. At times we have observed major gaps in both areas, which have resulted in unnecessary or additional risks to mandate implementation and to the safety and security of personnel. We have observed shortcomings at all levels. For staff working in a force or sector headquarters there are minimum standards that must be adhered to if these headquarters are to be fully functional.

The training of Staff for a Force and a Sector Headquarter must include basic staff skills and, at least ensure that staff is familiar with UN Mission essential documents, requirements and working procedures. Further, in-mission training, it must address requirements for integrated mission planning to ensure that the multidimensional PK missions can function.

Also contingents should deploy with adequate skills to ensure that they can meet the requirements of the UN in the field. They must be professional homogeneous units and fully competent in their speciality. On top that, they must meet the UN standards for peacekeeping. DPKO – OMA has recently presented a units manual series (Infantry, Recce, Military Police, Aviation, Engineer, Special Forces, Logistics, Transportation, Riverine, HQ Staff) that direct them on peacekeeping operations.

## Impact

As a decision on meeting OPSP recommendations,

USGs DPKO/DFs have already determined corrective measures in attention to reports' recommendations. They are together with the 2015 High Level Report on Peace Operation.

A new Force Generation is now in place and more pledges are expected from Member-States, as well as better standards' compliance.



Many countries are also being benefitted from equipment and training support initiatives of developed nations.

Missions improved their command and control measures, as well as safety and security. The procedures dealing with troop security continue being improved and implemented with greater emphasis.

Better capacity to obtain intelligence and analysis allows timely

Picture 11 - UNMISS JUBA POC site



information to make prompt response to constant crises.

Greater attention is being given to conduct and discipline issues. Chain of command actions improvement and strict implementation of UN policy on the subject has allowed more accountability on perpetrators of misconduct and improve relations with the local population.

The Office will continue to develop its efforts to cooperate with improving the performance of military and police in peacekeeping missions.

Picture 12 - Command and control centre - UNIFIL



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# Ethics in armed conflicts some principles developed by the French army

*Lieutenant Colonel Eric Mouëzy*

**ABSTRACT:** This article aims to present some principles developed by the French Army at the light of Ethics in Armed Conflicts. We approach the principle of strategic autonomy, in which the French policy on security and defense is based. Sovereignty-related aspects and international compromises made by France are also highlighted. Special attention to the International Organizations, especially the UN, is given.

**KEYWORDS:** Ethics - French Army - Armed Conflict - UN

The French policy of security and defense is based on the principle of “strategic autonomy”, which is a sovereignty approach in the decision to intervene. However, France has supported a number of external and international commitments that guide its action.

First of all, in an international level, these commitments are covered by the system of security and global legal order. According to the UN Charter, a country’s armed action should:

- refer to Article 51 of the Charter, which allows State Members to implement the necessary means to their or their allies defense while the Security Council hasn’t decided to restore the international peace and security.
- result from a Security Council resolution, which states that France is a permanent member.



France also contracted defensive alliances. It is a member of two multilateral defensive alliances with countries that share the same values:

- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which founded the Atlantic Alliance, since 1949:
- the Western European Union (WEU), since 1948.

It is also engaged in building European Union defense capabilities. The Franco-German Brigade and the rapid reaction force of the European Union are a representation.

France has also concluded several bilateral defense agreements with the States, especially in francophone Africa, in its independence. Therefore, it is closely linked to many of these countries and participates in the training of security forces in the form of cooperation missions or pre-positioned forces.

These bilateral agreements cover solidarity and defense clauses in case of external aggression and can lead France to be part of a lasting conflict, as in the case of the border conflict between Chad and Libya.

France currently keeps pre-positioned forces in 5 African countries (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, United Arab Emirates and Djibouti) for the execution of defense agreements.

Besides this fundamental principle, French armed forces are, whenever possible, committed to any intervention abroad within the framework of an agreement or mandate of an international authority.

However, if its national interests and bilateral commitments demand, there is the intention of keeping the capacity of acting alone.

Through these agreements and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, France is required to make a significant



contribution to military actions in favor of peace and international law under a UN mandate.

An evolution of the military forces way of acting in the different countries involved in conflicts has been observed as war zones are notably increasing in the last few decades. In fact, many reprehensible acts were attributed, in combat zones, to forces on the ground where the guerrilla and counter-guerrilla occupy an increasingly important place.

Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Libya are frequently mentioned in retaliation to prejudice, massacres, abuse, torture, inhuman treatment of prisoners and violation of international conventions or civilians.

If confirmed, this rough way of action in the field, which is widely reported by the media, would naturally tarnish the image of nations involved in peacekeeping operations.

This observation questions the respect for “ethics” and “moral” of the military actions.

That is why it is pertinent to question the reasons for the change in the behavior of the democracies of the armies regarding the use of force. Three factors are suitable to explain this “new” behavior that would “justify the use of all means” contrary to the human rights principles:

The location of wars that frequently take place in an urban environment. Nowadays, in fact, many conflicts occur in the cities and the structures used by the combatants are often close to sensitive places such as hospitals or schools (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan). The population is often used as human shield or as weapon before an opposing force (Palestine, Ivory Coast, Afghanistan, Syria). This procedure induces an increased risk of collateral victims.



The nature of the threat has also evolved substantially. There is no longer confrontation between two distinct armies as in the past. The threat comes in organized militias (Syria and Iraq), mobile guerrillas leading to rapid (Mali) or terrorist actions (Afghanistan) against “regular” forces. This new situation easily destabilizes the combatants who are not prepared.

The difficulty to control the actions on the ground of units against the population. In fact, the dispersion of units, sometimes fragmented to the lowest tactical level, does not allow the control or knowledge of the company’s activities. Troops may face interpersonal or hard difficulties to manage situations especially when an enemy is integrated and mixed with a vulnerable population.

How to deal with these new challenges and not tarnish the work of a force?

Respecting the Rules of International Law, France chose to act with simple levers to highlight its commitment to transparency and responsibility of the soldier. This increase of sense of military ethics in war is a challenge. Its objective is to show the human values which characterize France.

The French army wanted to change its behavior and methods of operation in order to better manage this evolution by organizing its actions around three items that would reinforce the sense of ethics in the armed forces:

- Education;
- Criminalization;
- Modernization.

By acting on these factors, France would guide its activities and provide modern means for its troops to limit the risks of inappropriate



behavior in an operation. Avoiding an incident that could tarnish any action of a force is a command priority. In fact, the accomplishment of the mission is worthless if it is related to reprehensive actions.

In order to prevent any irregularity, it is necessary to educate the soldiers so they can assimilate the values to be respected. This work must be done from enlistment and continue throughout the training, by the application of a doctrine of force employment.

This is to assert common values that the soldier must acquire to be part of the group. For this purpose, the French Army published a soldier's code (Code du Soldat) that summarizes the principles that the army expects to fix and to be enforced by its troops. It is a document that consists in 11 easy to remember articles, which provide the professional combatant the rules and principles of life to be applied at any time and place.

In a context of hardened operational commitments, the Code du Soldat has its importance. It is a course of action to implement four main principles:

- accomplish its mission with professional excellence and domain of force;
- keep military communities union alive with discipline and brotherhood of weapons;
- serve France and the universal values in which it is recognized; and
- cultivate strong bonds with the national community.

Everyone shall know the Code du Soldat, regardless its rank.

These values are presented in the training and controlled during the course check.





1. In the service of France, the soldier is fully devoted at all times and in all places.
2. He accomplishes its mission with the will to win and, if necessary, at the risk of his own life.
3. Mastering his own strength, he respects the opponent and is careful to spare civilians.
4. He obeys orders, in compliance with laws, customs of war and international conventions.
5. He demonstrates initiative and adapts to all circumstances.
6. The professional soldier maintains his intellectual and physical abilities and develops his competence and moral strength.
7. Member of a united and fraternal team, he acts with honor, honesty and loyalty.
8. Alert to others and determined to overcome difficulties, he seeks for the cohesion and dynamism of his unit.
9. He is aware of global societies and respects their differences.
10. He reservedly expresses himself to have no effect on the neutrality of armies in philosophical, political, and religious issues.
11. Proud of his commitment, he is always and in all places an ambassador of his regiment, of the Army and of France.

The Right to Life is a principle that is also put as a priority by the evolution of the social and cultural context. With the statement, echoed by the media the respect for human life is a fundamental principle. The respect for the civilian population and the rights of the enemy combatant are clearly described in the code.



This idea is developed through a policy of training military personnel to the dilemmas and ethical requirements of the profession of arms as well as to the principles of the ethics of war. Since 1998, the Special Military School of Saint-Cyr provides specific instructions on military ethics and conduct to the army cadets based on national (the Constitution, the general regulations of the Military Penal Code, the Code of Military Justice) and international reference texts (the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide). An internal reflection work from the Army staff led to the production of a Green Book. This book is about the fundamentals and principles of the profession of arms to provide the bases, especially philosophical and ethical, to the professional soldier. These bases can give meaning to their action and inspire their behavior. It occupies an important place in the initial and continuous training of officers, sub-officers and privates. Without questioning the work or the mission, the soldier is responsible and aware of his actions in the field. He knows the rights and duties because his training evolves all levels of knowledge and respect for international rules, law and commitment to the UN.

Training is a crucial factor in the soldier's education. In fact, he must learn how to dominate in the field and make proper and proportional decisions in each situation. This ability to choose the correct posture cannot be improvised. Before a difficult situation, military personnel need to be well-grounded in order to make a decision according to the rules of engagement.

Therefore, military personnel (from all ranks) are constantly training, during training stages as well as for a specific mission, in an environment as similar to reality as possible. Friends, enemies, wounded, civilians and non-governmental organizations are represented in order to familiarize them with as many parameters



as possible. In the decision making, individually or as part of a group, to manage the events imposed in each action. In order to encourage and make soldiers take into account all the parameters surrounding them, each incident is related to setbacks, safety and management of wounded or civilians. The debriefing is to make them understand what was right and wrong in their reaction, their orders and choice of action.

Throughout the preparation for a specific mission, the soldier is also conditioned to live in a new environment. The geopolitics, human presentation are included in the learning and should not be neglected. Likewise, knowing the local way of life and the culture of social groups is fundamental to prevent behavior misconduct that could generate unexpected consequences. A significant effort was made regarding the relationship with the population and the need to respect women and children.

Finally, on the other hand, there is also the need to explain to the military personnel that they are part of a family. This connection allows them to exist in the group and identify themselves to it. Hence, when they do something, they represent the community they are part of. This feeling of belonging to a structure individually influences their daily attitude.

In the same way, knowing that their hierarchy defines support and the availability of communication structures for the families so that they can be in touch with are important for their emotional stability. This contact with the families is essential so that the combatant is aware of his participation in the group and has the spirit free for the mission. Reliant on its superiors and unit, the soldier naturally adheres to the mission and his judgment is less altered in the daily routine.



Training, preparation and providing the soldiers good conditions to serve are simple actions that reduce risks of professional, individual or collective misconduct in the mission. The soldier's ethics is expressed by the notion of "controlled force", which is the ability to assume physical and moral ascendancy, but controlled according to the founding values of the Republic, human rights and international conventions.

Fear is the principle of wisdom. It is necessary to establish a system of deterrence and repression, as well as of reward, that fits the action of the military. It is important to define individual and collective responsibility of actions carried out in the field. Thus, the increasing regularization of the military activity, resulting in penalizing national and international regularization of reprehensible behavior, is a way of ensuring respect for ethics during war or peacekeeping operations. From an increasing level, these sanctions are adequate and proportional to the crime.

The sanctions have an importance on the behavior of the soldiers. Limiting their actions and punishing them when they transgress lines. Military sanction is an internal level that is not negligible. In fact, repercussions on the renewal of the contract or progress are significant. Used in a progressive manner, as long as there is a conduct distance, it allows channeling most people (the early return of a mission is an example). These rules must be known and its consequences explained to each one so that pedagogical virtue can yield results. Similarly, the reward of individual or collective acts must be presented previously, in order to value those who act in accordance with military guidelines and ethics.

The rules of engagement have become a central concept of the soldier's training. The military personnel must be the master of their action in all circumstances.



This action is performed in the individual level through the establishment of a criminal liability of the shooters in the use of their weapons. During the training, they learn to shoot only when the target is clearly identified. In order to control their reflexes, civilian and military targets are mixed. According to French and international rules of law, they are responsible for their actions, which cannot be covered by the overall mission picture. This responsibility of the shooters is an effective way of controlling the management of the actions of shots made on the ground and teaches the military personnel to use their weapons in certain circumstances.

A way of making the soldier reflect is the idea of passing before a national or international court and its penalties. In fact, this measure, outside the military environment, is more and more common and publicized. For the soldier, consequences are double because it will necessarily have a military punishment adapted to the civil sanction. This additional step is important because it increases the perception that there is no impunity and that the military authority does not cover abuses. It is necessary that every soldier feels that by investing in the knowledge of this right, national or international, he joins to one of the foundations of the military institution and that the respect for these rules is a guarantee to be benefited from the legal protection of the French State.

It is extremely important to make the soldier understand that he is criminally responsible for his acts. It is true that military personnel become aware and measure their actions when the sense of impunity is broken. It must be clear to them that if they do not follow the rules imposed in the operation they will be punished at the same level of the offense.

The evolution of the threat also requires an adaption of the means



employed in missions. The will to reduce the number of casualties among the civilian population is the main parameter to be respected. It is a particularly sensitive parameter to western democracies when it comes to the use of military force. It contains an essential dimension, which is one of the fundamentals of ethics.

Therefore, it is necessary to know better, to identify its objectives and treat them precisely.

It is highly important for the soldier to know the environment in which he operates well. It is not possible to face a threat if it is not well known. In the same way, it is important to respect and protect the population lifestyle from excesses. The military personnel are asked to live in harmony with the outside world and its environment, always taking the necessary precautions for safety. Knowing the location allows soldiers to learn all the changes and prevents them from being in a reactive mode before a problem occurs. Danger prevention is not always possible, but a good knowledge of local characters is a great way to solve conflicts and peacefully remedy any tension that could arise.

If it is impossible to integrate with the environment we live in, it is much harder to build ties with an enemy. Thus, France makes a significant effort on the intelligence units that must provide the necessary information before carrying out an action. The knowledge of the field and of the present forces in it limits the risk of collateral victims or objective errors. This field domain provides a tactical advantage for the troop. Human intelligence is practiced at all levels during the training and the collected information is verified before being sent to the combatants in the field. The technical means that are put into practice are also strengthened and modernized in order to facilitate the collection, accuracy and speed of dissemination of the information collected.





It is also necessary to know what is happening far from our positions, in order to be able to act at distance over clearly identified objectives, limiting the risks for the nearby population. France has invested in remote observation means that allow locating and identifying a threat in case it needs to be destroyed. These means, reconnaissance aircraft, drones or satellites, are widely used to quickly and accurately perform the attacks that should avoid civilian casualties. In fact, the identified objectives can be monitored and treated only from the moment they leave the areas where civilian population is (Afghanistan, Syria, Mali). However, opponents know these modern means. They tend to protect themselves by moving on civilian trains (buses, weddings) or occupying highly targeted houses in case of attack (schools, hospitals, markets). Then, soldiers must be aware of the technical information and be ready to attack at the first opportunity.

The knowledge of the environment and the modernization of the intelligence can limit or prevent dangers for the civilian population. By making decisions with accurate information, but also by anticipating the actions of opponents or filming their actions, France has the means to better understand the situation on the ground and complete its mission reducing the risks for the civilian population. The recovery information allows the command to make decisions in advance. Not being in a reaction situation greatly reduces the risk of collateral damage.

The system implemented by France shows its determination to strengthen internal and external control of the behavior of soldiers in conflicts. This is reflected mainly by a particular focus on the issue of civilian casualties, making a controlled use of force, but also by the desire to limit bad behavior. Although modernizing



procedures is the means of acquiring more easily the time to move, which allows better management of the situation on the field, there is no single solution.

In fact, it is impossible to completely control people working in peacekeeping operations. Stress, shock or inappropriate behaviors can arise any time without the barriers placed to stop individual action.

Individual and group work is an important parameter to be considered by a nation in order to avoid its challenge for an ethics-related problem.

Is it really possible to have a clean war?

Are face-to-face behavior problems with the civilian population avoidable?

As reality shows (Syria and Iraq), it seems like these goals are not always reached, even by the most powerful armies.

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# Assessment and Certification of the Brazilian Troops Deployed to Haiti

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**ABSTRACT:** This work has been developed in order to show the methodology that was applied by the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB, acronym in Portuguese), regarding the assessment and certification of Brazilian Contingents deployed in Haiti, as well as the outcomes of the research on the effects of the training of the 23rd Brazilian Contingent in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The assessment and certification procedures carried out by CCOPAB were described in this study and the outcome of the questionnaire answered by officers, warrant officers and sergeants, who compose the Brazilian Battalion and the Engineering Company in Haiti, was also presented. By means of the outcomes, it has been concluded that the methodology substantially contributes to the fulfillment of the mission of MINUSTAH.

**KEY WORDS:** Training. Assessment. Certification. Methodology.

## Introduction

The importance of assessing a contingent to be deployed to a peace mission consists in the opportunity of checking in which performance level the military person and the fractions are. Thus, it is possible to point out to the evaluated members, the techniques, tactics and procedures that can be ratified or rectified to improve the training. For the brigade that directs the training, this task aims to present a precise diagnosis of the levels of preparation reached by the troops.

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Consequently, the relevance of the certification of the troops to be deployed consists in testifying that they have gone through a systematic training process that qualified them to be deployed according to a pre-established standard.

Therefore, this article aims to present the process of evaluation and certification carried out by Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB) during the phases of training and employment of the Brazilian troops deployed to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). It also aims to show the results of the training on the performance of the former students deployed to the 23<sup>rd</sup> Brazilian Contingent in Haiti. The goal of the article is to contribute to the creation of a doctrine of assessment and certification of Brazilian troops to deploy to peacekeeping missions.

### **Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center in the Preparation of the Brazilian Troops for MINUSTAH**

The Brazilian Peacekeeping Training Center (CIOpPaz) was created by the Army Commander's Ordinance nr 090 of 23 February 2005. It was in charge of carrying out the preparation of the military personnel for the deployment in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Contingent on. On 15



June 2010, Ordinance nr 952 - Ministry of Defense, of the same date, named the Brazilian Peacekeeping Training Center (CIOPaz) of the Brazilian Army, responsible for the preparation of military personnel and civilians from Brazil and from friendly nations to be sent to peace missions. This Military unit had its name changed to Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB).

CCOPAB currently has a structure that seeks to meet the requirements of preparation, so that troop contingents and individuals act in an integrated manner, though with different organizational cultures, when addressing complex situations of crisis. The Division of Assessment is in charge of managing the assessment processes and the certifications of the Courses and Exercises under the Center's responsibility.

CCOPAB's vision of future is to be an international reference in promoting the preparation of human resources with excellence for peace operations and humanitarian demining.

## **Courses and Exercises**

The preparation of military contingents to be deployed to MINUSTAH is under CCOPAB's responsibility. It follows an annual calendar in which there are courses scheduled to build the capacities of military personnel of the Brazilian Armed Forces to act in a mission under the aegis of the United Nations. The courses are: Unit Commanders and Joint Staff Course (EPCOEM, acronym in Portuguese); Subunit Commanders and Platoon Leaders Course (EPCOSUPEL, acronym in Portuguese); Logistics and Reimbursement Course (Est Log Reemb Op Paz, acronym in Portuguese); Civil-Military Coordination Course (CIMIC, acronym





in Portuguese); and Military Translators and Interpreters Course (ETIMIL, acronym in Portuguese).<sup>2</sup>

After concluding the courses at CCOPAB, officers and sergeants are able to replicate the acquired knowledge to their troops (2<sup>nd</sup> level course). To end this cycle, CCOPAB coordinates the UN Pre-deployment Advanced Field Exercise (EAOP, acronym in Portuguese) to test the whole troop. It evaluates the training and the professional efficiency of the contingents and certifies their aptitude for the deployment to MINUSTAH. The Exercise is carried out according to the UN training standards established by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

### **Levels of evaluation used by CCOPAB**

CCOPAB has implemented the evaluation methodology that is recommended by the UN. The evaluations were based on the Practical Guide to Peacekeeping Training Evaluation from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS) of the Integrated Training Service (ITS), published in 2015. According to this Guide, there are five levels of evaluation for the UN. They are:

- a) Level I - Reaction;
- b) Level II - Learning;
- c) Level III - Application;
- d) Level IV - Impact; and
- e) Level V - Return on investment.

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<sup>2</sup> For more details concerning CCOPAB courses, see: [www.ccopab.eb.mil.br](http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br)

The chart below presents a summary of the levels of evaluation employed by CCOPAB.

Table 1 - Summary

Level of evaluation	Aim	Tools	Remarks
I	Check the student's reaction towards the experience of the training carried out by CCOPAB.	Daily, partial and final surveys	Given during the courses
II	Ensure that the content was learnt and the aim of the training was accomplished. Focus on the topics of the Core Pre-deployment Training Material (CPTM).	Diagnostic Assessments (DA), Formative Assessments (FA), Summative Assessments (SA), practical exams and the results from the UN Pre-deployment Advanced Field Exercise	-Minimum final grade $\geq 5,0$ . -Minimum EAOP grade $\geq 7,0$ .
III	Check how the training has affected the students' behavior and performance at work.	Questionnaires to former students.	Applied in Haiti during the mission.
IV	Point out the impact of the training evaluating the consequences of the changes in behavior and performance.	Questionnaires to the former students' superiors.	Applied in Haiti during the mission.
V	Determine the profit of the investment made in the course.	Under analysis	-

In Level II, the students pass if their final grade is 5,0 (five) or higher, according to the Article 123 of the Learning and Evaluation Guidelines (NAA, acronym in Portuguese), as transcribed below<sup>3</sup>:

<sup>3</sup> Article 123 - Normas para a Avaliação da Aprendizagem do Exército Brasileiro (NAA), 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 2014.

“General conditions to pass or fail

Art. 123 The student passes when:

I - s/he gets a final grade of 5,0 or higher or is classified as ADEQUATE;

II - s/he gets a grade of 5,0 or higher, or is classified as ADEQUATE, respectively, in each subject;

II - s/he gets a grade of 5,0 or higher, or is classified as ADEQUATE, or considered APT, in the Final Exercises of the modules, if there are any; and

III - s/he passes the retake of the subject and in the interdisciplinary activity of the modules, if there are any”.

CCOPAB has reached the following results in the evaluations of Levels I and II.

Table 2 - Summary of the evaluation results in Levels I and II

Course	Has the course met all your expectations? (Level I)			Student's average (Level II)
	Strongly agree	Partially agree	Partially disagree	
EPCOEM	88%	12%	-	8,6
EPCOSUPEL	88%	10%	2%	7,8
Est Log Reemb Op Paz	80%	17%	3%	8,2
CIMIC	92%	8%	-	7,6
ETIMIL	92%	8%	-	7,1

Source: Done by the author (2016), from the questionnaire data

From analyzing the data of Table 2, it is seen that the Level I evaluation of the Brazilian contingent preparation course meets the students' expectations with more than 80% of complete agreement. The minimum average of the group results in the course was 7.1, which shows that the learning goals have been reached, as recommended by the Learning and Evaluation Guidelines of the Brazilian Army.



It can be concluded that the work on assessment implemented by CCOPAB in levels I, II, III and IV is in compliance with the Practical Guide to Peacekeeping Training Evaluation from DPKO. Regarding Level V, CCOPAB is studying how to measure the profit of the investment of the training.

### **The Evaluation and Certification in the UN Pre-Deployment Advanced Field Exercise**

The Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS)<sup>4</sup> recommends in its methodology that each Member State delivers a certification for the basic training. CCOPAB is the military unit which carries out this evaluation and certifies the preparation of the Brazilian troops. They are evaluated according to the Guidelines of Specific Troop Preparation in Peace Missions (BRABAT and BRAENGCOY), developed by the Land Operations Command (COTER, acronym in Portuguese)<sup>5</sup> for each contingent to be deployed and also following the Evaluation Plan of the UN Pre-deployment Advanced Field Exercise, developed by CCOPAB. The certification is given to the troops after the assessment in this Exercise (EAOP).

In EAOP, the Brazilian Battalion (BRABAT) and the Brazilian Engineering Company (BRAENGCOY) are given a fictitious Area of Responsibility (AOR), in which the troops develop and participate in various activities following a program. This schedule is composed of many events that simulate everyday situations of the troops.

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<sup>4</sup> *Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS)*. Available at: <https://cc.unlbr.org/UNSAS%20Documents/PCRS%20Overview%20Aug%202015.pdf>, accessed on 11 May, 2016.

<sup>5</sup> COTER is the Department of the Brazilian Army that is responsible for “guiding and coordinating the preparation and the employment of the Land Force, in compliance with the strategic policies and guidelines of the Army.”



During EAOP, BRABAT's and BRAENGCOY's evaluations are coordinated by CCOPAB and they are carried out by officers and sergeants who act as Observers, Controllers and Assessors (OCA). This team is composed of former contingent members to use their previous experience as much as possible in the preparation of the Brazilian troops for MINUSTAH. They carry out the After Action Review (AAR)<sup>6</sup>. In the AAR, the students are given feedback on the activity. The positive and negative aspects, the recommendations and opportunities of improvement are pointed out. The OCA's evaluate and are responsible for filling in the Evaluation Forms of the tasks.

The evaluation is based on the parameters in the Evaluation Forms, which are tools for the coordinators of the Field Exercise to measure the students' learning or to order them to characterize more clearly the performance level of the students (fractions and Staff cells).

The fraction or the Staff cell that reaches the minimum of 70% in the Evaluation Forms during EAOP is considered apt to the certification. This minimum grade was established by CCOPAB as it is considered the average of the grades between 6,000 and 7,999. They are, respectively, the inferior and superior limit of the reference that corresponds to "Good". Such grades are in compliance with the rules of the Department of Education and Culture of the Brazilian Army (DECEX, acronym in Portuguese). CCOPAB's command understands that, with this passing grade there is a higher level of demand from the troops to be deployed to a peace mission.<sup>7</sup>

The "Certificates of Apt for Deployment" are given to the ones .....

<sup>6</sup> Available at: <<http://www.defesanet.com.br/doutrina/noticia/20373/Operacao-Centauro-2015-%E2%80%93-Cel-Dos-Anjos-CAAdEx/>>, accessed on 19 May 2016.

<sup>7</sup> BRAZIL. Brazilian Army. Department of Education and Culture of the Brazilian Army. Instruções Reguladoras dos Critérios de Avaliação Educacional a serem seguidos pelos Estabelecimentos de Ensino e Organizações Militares subordinados ou vinculados (IR 60-34). Rio de Janeiro, RJ, 2006.



who successfully go through EAOP. These certificates are handed in a ceremony that closes the Field Exercise and the pre-deployment phase, which CCOPAB is responsible for.

### **Levels III and IV Evaluations of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Brazilian Contingent in MINUSTAH**

The evaluations of level III and IV are done in the employment phase of the troops. They are done when the troops have already been deployed to the mission for more than half of the time scheduled.

In order to accomplish these evaluations, two different questionnaires were given *in loco* (in Haiti) to the military of the Brazilian Battalion and of the Brazilian Engineering Company of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Brazilian Contingent, between 2 and 5 March 2016. The target-audience was composed of officers and sergeants who participated in any of the courses delivered in the Center and who were also present in EAOP. The survey had two objectives: the first was to point out the effect the training had on the former student during the mission (level III evaluation); the second, to determine the impact of the training on him/her, from the immediate superior's perspective (level IV evaluation). To develop this evaluation, studies of quantitative and qualitative nature were carried out.

#### **4.2.1 Results and Discussion**

##### **4.2.1.1 Level III Evaluation:**


From obtained answers, results are presented according to the graphs below.

The quantitative data of the level III evaluation show that most of the former students thought that the courses carried out at CCOPAB strongly contributed to the mission accomplishment (graph 1). They




Graphs 1, 2, and 3 - Questionnaire results of Level III evaluations (80 surveys).


Graph 1 - To what extent did the knowledge/abilities acquired during the course give you conditions to be efficient in your mission accomplishment?



Graph 2 - How often did you use these/this abilities/knowledge?



Graph 3 - Did the course aims meet your function needs?



### Qualitative Questions:

4 - What type of achievements were there throughout the mission due to the knowledge/abilities taught in the course? Could you give examples?

5 - Are there new abilities, tasks, actions or demands from the UN that you carry out, but were not mentioned in the course? If so, which do you think that should be included in the training?

6 - What procedures were changed/implemented in relation to the students throughout the course? What were the new procedures implemented?

7 - What type of obstacles did not allow the applicability of the abilities/knowledge you acquired?

8 - What best practices supported your performance when using the abilities/knowledge you learnt?

9 - If you have observed any opportunity to improve any of the aspects above, write them down below:

Source: Done by the author (2016), from the questionnaire data



also said that the knowledge acquired was often put into practice during the period covered by the survey (graph 2). To almost all the military personnel, the goals of the various courses met the needs of the performed functions (graph 3). The qualitative answers confirm the quantitative results, always reinforcing the importance of both the courses and EAOP for the accomplishment of the mission in MINUSTAH.


The qualitative research shows that the military personnel from more technical functions have fewer opportunities to take part in operational activities in Haiti. This fact did not let the results of the level III evaluation reach higher numbers in relation to the use of the knowledge in the mission. The same happens to the military personnel that were transferred from an operational to an administrative function during the mission.

#### 4.2.1.2 Level IV Evaluation:


From the answers, results are presented according to the graphs below.

Graph 4, 5 and 6 - Questionnaire results of Level IV evaluations (22 surveys).


Graph 4 - To what extent did the knowledge/abilities taught at CCOPAB during the course contribute to the mission accomplishment of your subordinates?



Graph 5 - How often did your subordinates use these/this abilities/knowledge?



Graph 6 - Did the course aims meet your subordinates' function needs?



### Qualitative Questions:

4 - What type of achievements were there throughout the mission due to the knowledge/abilities your subordinates were taught in the course? Could you give examples?

5 - Are there new abilities, tasks, actions or demands from the UN that your subordinates carry out, but were not mentioned in the course? If so, which do you think that should be included in the training?

6 - Did your subordinates show creativity, autonomy and development in functions related to the lessons taught in the course? Please, share additional comments.

7 - What procedures were changed/implemented during the current mission that you believe to be essential to be mentioned in the next course? Please, comment on the reasons.

8 - What type of obstacles did not allow the applicability of the abilities your subordinates learnt?

9 - What best practices supported your subordinates' performance when using the abilities/knowledge they learnt?

10 - What is your impression of these subordinates' performance in relation to the application of their knowledge in the preparation period?

11 - Other relevant comments.

Source: Done by the author (2016), from the questionnaire data



The quantitative data of level IV evaluation show that 86% of the former students' chiefs thought that the knowledge/abilities taught at CCOPAB during the courses strongly contributed to the mission accomplishment of their subordinates (graph 4) and their knowledge was frequently employed (graph 5). The aims of the various courses successfully met the subordinates' function needs (graph 6).

In the qualitative answers, the chiefs reinforce that their subordinates employed correctly the lessons they learned in the courses and they were able to advise them timely and wisely. The acquired knowledge generates safe and conscious actions, mainly in relation to the rules of engagement. There were some situations in Haiti that were identical to situations in EAOP, which reinforces that the training is coherent and very close to the reality.



The results observed in this section point out that the courses and EAOP strongly contributed to the military performance in the accomplishment of the mission. The aims of the courses and EAOP are to prepare the military personnel to perform their tasks in the contingents of MINUSTAH. Such fact is proved in the percentages found in the questionnaire of level III and confirmed in the results of the questionnaire of level IV.

## **Final Remarks**

CCOPAB carries out assessment and certification in compliance with the Practical Guide to Peacekeeping Training Evaluation and The United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS). This contributes to its vision of future to be internationally recognized as a Center of excellence in the preparation of the military personnel for peace missions.

The results of the evaluations of levels I and II, from CCOPAB's perspective, show that the preparatory courses of the Brazilian Contingent meet the students' expectations. The average of the students' performance shows that they have learned and the training goals have been reached, as recommended by the Learning and Evaluation Guidelines of the Brazilian Army.

The results of evaluations levels III and IV prove that the training carried out by CCOPAB fits the reality the students face in the mission. The training influences the students' performance positively while they are deployed.

It can be concluded that the methodology used by CCOPAB to prepare the Brazilian military strength presents plenty of good results



and contributes a lot to the accomplishment of the mission of the contingent in MINUSTAH. Consequently, it is very important to encourage research to create mechanisms to evaluate the return of the investment during the training (level V evaluation).

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# Mine action and the Brazilian participation in Humanitarian Demining missions

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**ABSTRACT:** This article aims to explain what Mine Action is and show the Brazilian participation in regional and international programs. It seeks to report the work carried out by the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB) for the professional preparation of Officers and NCOs from the Brazilian and friendly nations Armed Forces, so that they can all be monitors and supervisors in Humanitarian Demining missions under aegis of international organizations. It also underscores the strategic and political importance of the Brazilian participation in Mine Action programs all around the world, projecting Brazil in the international scenario by means of CCOPAB.

**KEYWORDS:** Mine Action, humanitarian demining, landmines.

## Introduction

A conflict may produce long-term effects for the population even after its end, due to the signature of a peace agreement or to end hostilities between parties; to illustrate that one can mention the landmines and the Explosive Remnants of War - ERW.

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Landmines are ammunition set to detonate by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and/or vehicle, being activated by its victims who can be either civilians or from the military. These mines can be classified as anti-personnel or anti-tank landmines. ERWs refer to all explosive ammo left behind on the ground after a conflict - an unexploded ordnance (UXO), for example.

*Or abandoned ammunition: Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO).*

The anti-personnel mines have been used since the 16<sup>th</sup> century; however, its systematic use in the attack and protection of areas involved in belligerent conflicts was boosted during World War II, as an obstacle for the sappers who wanted to deactivate the anti-tank mines. Checking the efficiency and the low cost of this sort of instrument of war, the use of anti-personnel mines was spread to all parts of the world and its hazardous effects caused a great humanitarian impact.

UXO are all explosive ammunition whose fuze was initiated, set, used or by any other means are still in conditions of use. They could have been set, launched, thrown or projected, remaining inert because of a bad operation or any other reason. Those explosives remain on the ground during and after the conflicts, a similar danger posed by landmines.

AXOs are explosive ammunition which were not used during the armed conflict; they were abandoned on the ground and the control became ineffective. ERW may include artillery grenades, grenades, mortars, rockets and cluster bombs<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup>Cluster bombs consist of a hollow shell that releases several explosive submunition or bomblets in the air, hitting a wide area. According to the model, the number of submunition may range from several dozens to more than 600. Cluster munition can be either air-dropped or ground-launched.



Picture 1 - Mine contamination worldwide



Source: International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2015)

In the 90s, due to humanitarian impacts, six non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Western Europe and in the USA started out an International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The final goal of ICBL is a world free of landmines and ERWs, so that civilians do not fear becoming victims of those

bombs. (TIBÚRCIO; MORAES, 2011).

ICBL reached its peak by having the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty - Ottawa Treaty signed, in which anti-personnel landmines were outlawed by the States parties that agreed on it. As per the Ottawa Treaty, all States parties shall prohibit the use, stockpiling, production or transfer of anti-personnel landmines, immediately after having it ratified by the respective Governments. It still requires states-parties to destroy their stockpiled APLs within four years and eliminate all APL holdings, including mines currently planted in the soil, within 10 years.

Picture 2 - Ottawa Treaty Signatories



Source: International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2015)

Still in the 90s, after the conflicts held in Central America, international humanitarian demining programs were created due to the efforts of national governments, the Organization of the American States (OAS), the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and the relevant participation of the Brazilian military.



## Mine Action

The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) are normative documents to avoid misinterpretation about mine action activities. Such norms contain several concepts and considerations to standardize procedures and raise the level of security in the activities. They were progressively formulated by means of a series of consulting activities, involving a great spectrum of mine action related organizations. They're periodically revised according to the changes that might come to improve the activities.

Mine Action is a system which aims to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of landmines in certain regions. The objective is to reduce the risk from landmines to a level where people can live safely; in which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination, and in which the victims' needs can be addressed. Mine action comprises five complementary activities: Mine Risk Education (MRE); victim assistance; stockpile destruction; advocacy against the use of Anti-Personnel Mines (APM) and Humanitarian Demining. (IMAS 04.10)

The United Nations support Mine Action in forty countries and three territories by means of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). In some cases, UN services are limited to a Mine Action

Picture 3 - Ottawa Treaty Nonsignatories



Source: United Nation Mine Action Service (2016)

complimentary activity like Mine Risk Education (MRE) or victim assistance. In other cases, it could be involved in all aspects, mainly focusing on Humanitarian Demining or stockpile destruction.



## Understanding humanitarian demining

Humanitarian Demining is only one of Mine Action activities, being responsible for clearing landmines and ERW, including technical survey, mapping, marking, elaboration of documents after demining, liaison with the local community, and, at last, land restitution. All the activities can be carried out by civil or military organizations trained to accomplish these tasks.

In Humanitarian Demining activities, safety of personnel is strict and full of restrictions. These activities aim to clear a dangerous area by defining, identifying, removing or destroying all the danger coming from mines and ERW from a specified area to a specified depth (IMAS 09.20). Therefore, all the mines in a determined area shall be mandatorily destroyed, for restituting clear land to the population so that it can be safely used is the final product of the activity.

Some actions and procedures shall be previously carried out, aiming to improve future action plans, setting deadlines and periods of action, as well as specifying the area of operations. From the procedures, we can cite the impact survey, the non-technical and technical surveys.

The impact survey is an assessment of the social-economic impact caused by the actual or perceived presence of mines/ERW, in order to assist the planning and prioritization of mine action programs and projects, defined by the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA).

The non-technical survey refers to the collection and analysis of data about the presence of mine/ERW contamination. It aims to determine where mine/ERW contamination is present, defining its perimeter, without the use of technical intervention, i.e., without the use of clearance methods. This last aspect is essential regarding the



technical study. There is an intervention with verification/clearance elements in all the mined area (or in part of it) by making use of metal detectors or mine detection dogs (MDD).

The technical survey aims to define where mine contamination is present in one or more areas, and where it is not, to allow land release (IMAS 04.10).

The procedures previously mentioned are part of Quality Management (QM) which is divided into the humanitarian demining organization accreditation, monitoring of the clearance activities and land post-clearance inspection (IMAS 07.40). QM is present in all the process aiming to assure that the procedures adopted and approved by the National Mine Action Authority be appropriate, efficient and effective, making all the participants of the process feel confident. Consequently, making land users better trust the works carried out and also feel safe to make use of areas previously defined as a life threat.

The accreditation is a significant phase and it means that the organization which will carry out the Humanitarian Demining was formally authorized by the NMAA to clear dangerous areas. To do that, the organization has to undergo several verification processes to check its capacity to plan, manage, clear mine contaminated areas, and provide technically trained professionals, adequate equipment, support, operational procedures as per the established national and international norms. The accreditation is signed by the NMAA as a provisional agreement, which is subjected to revisions and changes whenever needed, due to situations that might occur during the works.

Monitoring of the activities, another component of QM, refers to the authorized observation of areas, activities or processes, done



by qualified staff, without being responsible for what they see. The Brazilian military are part of this activity due to those several Humanitarian Demining Missions Brazil has been taking part, checking if the organizations are doing the activities according to the norms established in the accreditation agreement.

The land inspection after clearance complements the accreditation and monitoring activities, making sure the objectives were reached (IMAS 07.40). It consists of measuring, examining and comparing a sample of a clear piece of land to preset parameters as quantity of existing metal, within the established depth level for clearance; it all comes before land restitution.

In Humanitarian Demining operations, usually, the most internationally used techniques for the detection of mines or ERW are the Manual Demining Technique, the Dog Demining technique and the Mechanical Demining Technique.

### **Brazilian participation in humanitarian demining operations**

Brazil sets its international relations based on article 4 of the 1988 Federal Constitution, by the principles of defense of peace, pacific settlements of disputes, cooperation among nations for the progress of mankind, promoting cooperation in several levels of power and seeking an economic, political, social and cultural integration of the peoples in Latin America.

For such, the Brazilian diplomacy has been attempting to actively take part in pacific settlements of disputes as well as for the reduction of conflicts inside and outside the American continent, by means of a raising participation in PKOs and Humanitarian Aid, from both the UN and regional organizations.





Within peace missions, Humanitarian Demining performs a crucial role in detecting and destroying mines, supporting victims and sensitizing people in the affected areas (UNITED NATIONS, 2013). Brazil is based on Resolution 53/26 of the 1998 UN GA which encourages Member States, regional, intergovernmental, non-governmental organizations and foundations to keep providing assistance and cooperation in mine contaminated countries , where Humanitarian Demining is present.

Brazil, still, has stated that Peacekeeping Operations shall be supported by four pillars: security, institutional strengthening, national reconciliation and development. The balance between these elements is a priority, both in the conceptual debate resulting in the elaboration of UN guidance on the theme and in the work of Brazilian forces in those missions.

Since 1999, Brazil has been a signatory country of the Convention that prohibits the use, stockpiling, production or transfer of anti-personnel landmines, mostly known as the Ottawa Treaty. The Brazilian Government ratified the Convention by means of a national Decree Nr 3.128, of 05 August 1999. Understanding its obligations when ratifying the Treaty, the Brazilian State has actively taken part in demining programs under the aegis of international organizations, making use of its Armed Forces. The country supports mine action by monitoring the activities of humanitarian demining organizations and also by providing capacity-building.

The Brazilian participation in Humanitarian Demining operations is part of peace missions, strengthening the process of national reconciliation by means of institutional restructuring projects, helping rebuild the infrastructure and support the comeback of the economic



activity. Thus, contributing to strengthen the bonds between the National Defense Policy (NDP) and the Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP).

In the ambit of multilateral organizations, Brazil has stood out in the Comprehensive Action Against Anti-personnel Mines (AICMA, initials in Spanish) from the Organization of the American States (OAS) with the participation in the Mission of Assistance to Remove Mines in Central America (MARMINCA), Mission of Assistance to Remove Mines in South America (MARMINAS), and at present moment, in the Inter-American Monitoring Group in Colombia (GMI-CO), providing military experts for those Inter-American Defense Board (IDB) related programs. In these missions, we can see the participation of military personnel from other American countries; yet, the Brazilian participation is constant and often outnumbered the others.

Since 2015, Brazil has sent military personnel to take part in the Inter-American Group of Technical Assessment (GATI) from IDB in Colombia, aiming to provide capacity-building to Colombian military personnel; therefore, supporting the country to have greater military capacity to work in humanitarian demining operations.

Brazil has also supported Humanitarian Demining processes in Angola, 1995-1997, under the aegis of the UN, during the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III).

When it comes to bilateral agreements, the country has sent Armed Forces officers to Mozambique and Western Sahara to guarantee the quality of demining works. Besides, Brazil has also sent instructors to the *Centre de Formation au Déminage Humanitaire (Centre de Perfectionnement aux Actions post conflictuelles de Déminage et Dépollution*, Center for Humanitarian Demining Training) (CPADD) in Benin, in order to deliver classes on Quality Assurance Control

Inspector for Portuguese speaking countries in Africa as well as a Mobile Training Team from CCOPAB to Angola, in order to contribute to Humanitarian Demining capacity-building.

In Colombia, Brazil still keeps military experts at *Base de Entrenamiento de Infantería de Marina* in the city of Coveñas, at *Escuela de Ingenieros (EsIng)* and at *Centro Nacional de Artefactos Explosivos y Minas* (CENAM), both of them in Bogota. The advisory at the first two is focused on military personnel technical capacity-building for they are to take part in Humanitarian Demining Operations, and the last one focuses on planning and execution of the operations.

Picture 4 - Mobile Training Team in Angola



Source: CCOPAB



## Humanitarian Demining Course at CCOPAB

The preparation of human resources from the Brazilian Armed Forces fostered the transformation, in 2010, of the Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Training Center (COPAB, acronym in Portuguese) into CCOPAB. COPAB only had Brazilian Army personnel as its members, whereas CCOPAB has personnel from the three Armed Forces, from the state Police and Firefighter Corps. This integration has greatly been favoring the synergy of efforts of those professionals working towards the preparation of human resources to work in multidimensional peace missions, and so in Humanitarian Demining.

Picture 5 - Capacity-building of the Colombian Armed Forces



Source: Personal records

The Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center's main mission is to support the preparation of military, civilian and police



personnel from Brazil and friendly nations for peace missions and humanitarian demining.

Working towards CCOPAB's mission, the Humanitarian Demining course was created by means of Ordinances Nr 172 and 173, of the Brazilian Army Staff Cabinet, of 25 October 2011, for both officers and NCOs. The course prepares the military to work as an International monitor and supervisor in Humanitarian Demining missions under the aegis of international organizations; advise the command and the upper echelon in the decision-making process of Humanitarian Demining related issues; technically support several UN bodies, OAS organs, host country governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) acting in PKO or Humanitarian Demining environments.

Since the creation of the course in 2011, CCOPAB has prepared 58 soldiers to work in Humanitarian Demining, from which 06 were from friendly nations as Chile, Peru and Uruguay.

The course is the only one delivered in Spanish at CCOPAB. It is offered once a year and it lasts for three weeks. The target audience is officers and NCOs from the Brazilian Armed Forces and from friendly nations; the course covers the following: General aspects regarding missions under the aegis of international organizations; general concepts and regulations for Humanitarian Demining, besides all the necessary theory and practice to carry out Humanitarian Demining works. This last module lasts for longer, once the monitor needs to learn Humanitarian Demining techniques and Operational Management.

The first week consists of understanding Mine Action world scenario and core subjects regarding the participation in Mine Action programs under the aegis of international organizations; then,

Picture 6 - First Aid class



The third week consists of planning and accreditation activities regarding a Humanitarian Demining organization. This week, the military under training is in charge of evaluating the operational capacity of an organization that has to work as per national and international mine action regulations. After that, there is a practical test for the military under training, taking planning, execution and the conduct of the monitors into account.



Picture 6 - Practical class - 2015 Humanitarian Demining Course



Source: CCOPAB

Picture 7 and 8 - Operational Evaluation of a Humanitarian Demining Organization



Source: CCOPAB

Aiming to contextualize the course and improve the educational process, the student takes part, from the very beginning, in a fictitious scenario, based on the Brazilian experience in Humanitarian Demining missions; thus developing and stimulating the internalization of real situations, concepts and techniques. The scenario allows the acceleration of the educational process by means of a systemic environment, compatible to the reality in which the soldier is to work.



Being part of this scenario, the learning activity is facilitated by Case Studies, creating possibilities as:

- illustrate different points of view, topics and principles of Humanitarian Demining;
- develop the capacity to analyze and summarize; develop self-evaluation, behavior, confidence and responsibility;
- set a neutral environment in which students can freely tackle the problem;
- relate theory and practice; understand the complexity of a specific situation;
- develop personal skills, communication and comprehension; and, at last, develop decision-making and knowledge, besides stimulating the learning process.

Picture 9 - Students who completed the Humanitarian Demining course in 2015



Source: CCOPAB

At the end of the course, the soldier is prepared to accomplish his mission under the auspices of international organizations or bilateral agreements between Brazil and friendly nations. This way, CCOPAB aims to be a global leader in the excellence of the preparation of human resources for peace operations and humanitarian demining.





## Final Considerations

Mine Action is an important tool for treaties that ban the use of landmines, and also for the removal of ERW. The program counts on the participation of several state actors, from civil and military society; all of them aiming to clear an ERW and mine contaminated area, making it possible the return of the population and the social and economic development of the region. The indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines at the end of the century, potentialized by ERW, made them a world threat affecting men, women and children, besides making the population fear the return to their homes. All this scenario guided the creation of international treaties as the Mine Ban Treaty and the creation of mine action programs in mine contaminated countries.

In a nutshell, we can say that mine action encompasses Humanitarian Demining activity, which is the removal of mine threats and ERW from an affected area. All the work is guided by international norms known as IMAS, which encompasses all the basic concepts and procedures necessary for the activities to be planned and developed.

Humanitarian Demining starts by the process of accreditation of an organization, then impact study, technical and non-technical surveys, mine and ERW removals, and finally land restitution to the local population. UN has supported international works by acting in mine contaminated countries through UNMAS. All the work is encompassed by quality management (QM) which consists of the accreditation of the Humanitarian Demining organization, monitoring activities and post clearance land inspection. Brazil has a greater participation in the monitoring of the activities carried out in MARMINCA and MARMINAS, supporting the Mine and ERW affected countries by



providing military experts to train local professionals. The Brazilian support is provided by means of international organizations as IDB or bilateral agreements as those with the government of Colombia.

In order to send military experts to work in mine action programs, Brazil has based this support on its Federal Constitution and International Treaties. We can highlight the participation of military experts in the OAS program, AICMA, as well as the training of Humanitarian Demining organizations in the African and American continents as Angola and Colombia, respectively. Both of them demonstrate the concern of the Brazilian foreign policy with its strategic surroundings, as well as the south-to-south cooperation with the African continent, amplifying the projection of power in the international scenario.

It is highlighted that the Brazilian participation in those missions is of great political and strategic importance for Brazil, being a key element for the support of integration processes developed in the American and African continents, by fostering dialogue, confidence and military cooperation for mutual defense. In the military field, it allows the enhancement of the military capacity, providing a better training of the troops, technical-military improvement, intellectual and technological specializations, and the exchange programs between military from other armed forces. It contributes to the production of doctrine, to the organization, training, material education, personnel and infrastructure in the field of defense, as well as to the integration of structures for joint actions, thus favoring the synergy of efforts and the improvement of operational efficiency.

CCOPAB, in turn, has stood out as an organization of excellence in the preparation of military personnel to perform activities regarding Humanitarian Demining, by means of its Humanitarian Demining



Course; it has also increased its participation in Mine Action by sending mobile training teams to the African continent, as well as instructors to provide capacity-building in mine contaminated countries. The course offered by CCOPAB shows the concern to provide the students with the best, connecting theory to practice; therefore, allowing the soldier to be prepared for difficulties that might be faced during the mission.

At last, even though Brazil is not affected by landmines, it has been present in Humanitarian Demining missions in the American continent, having representatives in MARMINCA, MARMINAS, and currently in Colombia; this way, following its constitutional principles. Due to the experience in mine clearance operations in the American continent, the Brazilian Military developed the necessary expertise for the training and deployment of personnel, being able to take part in Mine Action worldwide, either by means of south-to-south cooperation or by the participation in international summits on this theme. Brazil has a reference center (CCOPAB), when it comes to the preparation of human resources, being able to take part in subject matter exchange programs with other countries. Currently, the Center disseminates knowledge regarding the training of military personnel to be deployed in Humanitarian Demining missions.

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# The Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center and its Mobile Training Teams: an exquisite Brazilian tool for alignment with the United Nations in South-South Cooperation Activities

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**ABSTRACT:** The sustainable development of nations is a goal relentlessly pursued by the United Nations. Among the various measures adopted for a significant change in the power game, the decrease in the dependency relation of the developing nations on those developed ones can be highlighted. In this context, cooperation among Global South States, composed of developing countries, is increasingly diverse and frequent, and comprises cultural, social, economic, and defense exchanges, among others.



These activities were named South-South cooperation, and Brazil became one of the main cooperators, providing and receiving support from member States of the Global South and perfectly aligned with the United Nations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (BCA), coordinates with other Ministries various actions of international technical cooperation. In the face of a range of possibilities for the Brazilian participation in the South-South Cooperation activities, an effective tool emerges from the Ministry of Defense: the Mobile Training Teams (MTT). These Mobile Training Teams have been deployed by the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB, acronym in Portuguese) since 2014, under the guidance of the Ministry of Defense, sharing knowledge on Peace Operations and Humanitarian Demining with excellence.

**KEYWORDS:** Aligning, development, and exchange.

## Introduction

The new world order follows the demands of globalization, and nations must understand that bilateral and multilateral relations are necessary for the survival of a sovereign state. Therefore, the formation of groups of countries with diverse objectives such as economic, social, cultural, among others, is made visible in order to cope with other groups or powerful countries.

Among the many ways for nations to come together, there is one in which mutual cooperation projects developing countries to high levels in the global context, giving them opportunities for competition, negotiation and integration with developed countries. This set of activities that unites the global south is called South-South Cooperation.



Brazil is an important country in the arrangement of this international technical cooperation, since it coordinates, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with other Ministries, the various exchanges, in which important issues are shared with various developing countries.

The UN sees the benefits of such cooperation as essential for the sustainable development of nations. Aware of this importance, Brazil has been looking forward to improving itself more and more as a knowledge supplier and receiver.

This work aims to partially analyze the potential of the Mobile Training Teams deployed by CCOPAB and guided by the Ministry of Defense in order to share knowledge regarding Peace Operations. The studies on South-South Cooperation, the performance evaluations and the outcome results obtained with the MTT in the different countries where they were carried out will be used, in order to demonstrate the positive impact on the image of Brazil abroad.

Next, a brief study will be carried out on the intention of the UN, on the Brazilian alignment with the United Nations, and on the contribution of CCOPAB to the activities included in South-South Cooperation.

## **The South-South Cooperation**

The expression “South-South Cooperation” covers all exchange processes in various areas such as culture, technology, economics, science, among others, as well as political articulations among developing countries. These countries were known as Third World nations until the 1990s, and nowadays they are part of the so-called Global South.





Nonetheless, the word “South” is terminologically inaccurate when defining the Global South as the set of all developing countries. This is true since the term does not take Mexico into consideration as it is situated in the Northern hemisphere, in spite of being a Latin American country; Russia, another emerging country, is situated just north of the equatorial line; Australia and New Zealand are countries located in the southern hemisphere but they are considered Northern countries. These examples show how difficult it is to understand North and South by their actual meanings which, in this article, must assume their figurative senses, since they are synonyms of developed and developing countries, respectively (CAIXETA, 2014).

Basically, South-South cooperation includes countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as small countries from the Caribbean and Oceania.

According to different criteria, South-South cooperation may or may not include exchanges between the so-called emerging countries, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa). It can also happen globally (as in the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77) or regionally (as in Mercosul and ECOWAS).

South-South's first landmark was the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. In that occasion, the principles of the diplomatic ideology of non-alignment were defined, which soon gave rise to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. This movement brought together most of the countries of the world and represented the interests of underdeveloped nations in multilateral forums (such as the UN). At the same time, it promoted cooperation between the countries and it was the start point of the South-South cooperation.



## **UN and the South-South Cooperation**

In 1978, UN created the South-South Cooperation Unit in order to promote South-South trade and collaboration within its agencies. However, the idea of South-South cooperation only began to truly influence the field of development in the late 1990s. South-South cooperation has successfully reduced the dependence on developed countries' aid programs and changed the international power game.

The end of the Cold War, between 1989 and 1991, brought a major challenge for South-South cooperation, which for decades had been split between the two superpowers.

Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc as well, the developing countries lost both the aid of the socialist cooperation and the US interest in promoting international assistance to keep them away from the influence of the Soviets. This situation happened to countries in Africa, which ceased to be a geopolitical concern for the United States and the USSR at the same time. In this vacuum of power and economic exchange, China is a nation that has been gradually occupying more space, and Brazil is also carrying out an excellent work on international technical cooperation.

## **Brazil and the South-South Cooperation**

Since the 1950s, Brazilian foreign policy has been working with cooperative initiatives, but it was only by the end of the 1980s that the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, BCA, was created.

At that moment, the Ministry of Planning transferred the responsibility for the international technical cooperation portfolio to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since then, the latter has been managing this agenda.



Initially, BCA's role was mainly focused on the coordination of the aid Brazil used to receive from other countries. Nevertheless, over the time, it became increasingly focused on international development, becoming an important tool of Brazilian foreign policy.

Although technical cooperation does not cover the whole SSC (South-South Cooperation) provided by Brazil, it represents the focus of the international debates on the cooperation carried out by this country. According to BCA, international technical cooperation is an important development tool, which helps a country to promote structural changes in its productive systems in order to overcome restrictions that hinder its natural growth. The programs implemented by BCA allow knowledge transfer, successful experiences and sophisticated equipment. Thus, they contribute to the training of human resources and strengthen the institutions of the recipient country, enabling it to a qualitative leap in quality of life.

The Brazilian technical cooperation operates in areas such as health, agriculture, professional education, water resources, public administration and energy, among others. As BCA receives requests from developing countries for cooperation with Brazil, it establishes a partnership with technical institutions that will be responsible for the management and execution of the cooperation program or project. Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz, acronym in Portuguese), Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa, acronym in Portuguese) and the National Industrial Training Service (SENAI, acronym in Portuguese) are some of the institutions that play important roles as executing agencies.

In addition to the technical cooperation, the granting of scholarships is an expressive modality in the Brazilian CSS. Among the various actors and institutions involved in this activity, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTIC, acronym in Portuguese)



concentrates most of the resources destined for scholarships for foreigners, which are managed by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq, acronym in Portuguese); on the other hand, the Coordination and Improvement of Higher Level or Education Personnel (CAPES, acronym in Portuguese) comprises a large percentage of the resources from the Ministry of Education (MEC, acronym in Portuguese) destined for this activity.

This type of international cooperation focuses on Latin America and Africa, especially Argentina and the Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP, acronym in Portuguese). There are also bilateral initiatives with Cuba, Uruguay and East Timor, as well as projects with country bloc, such as MERCOSUR.

Since this is a recent phenomenon, there are still few studies about the Brazilian performance in SSC. Although there are many challenges to be faced, the changes have occurred quickly, and the Brazilian institutions such as Fiocruz and Embrapa have shown great adaptability and flexibility in technical cooperation.

As shown above, it is observed that Brazil, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continues to align itself with the United Nations objectives in favor of the success of South-South Cooperation activities. Despite the several challenges to be overcome, the country has stood out in the international technical cooperation with the commitment of several national Ministries, Foundations and Companies.

### **The Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center and the Mobile Training Teams**

Due to the fact that the member States need to organize themselves in order to establish training programs for military



personnel and civilians, regarding their employment in peace operations, there has been an increasing international mobilization of the member countries to create structures to enable the practice and dissemination of current procedures and norms in peacekeeping missions.

Bearing this in mind, the Brazilian Army created the Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Training Center (CIOPaz, acronym in Portuguese), based on directive no. 090, issued by the Commander of the Army on 23 February 2005. The establishment of CIOPaz comes from the United Nations General Assembly issued Resolution 44/49 - ASNU from 08 of December 1989, focusing on “thorough review of the matters concerning peacekeeping operations in all their aspects” and from the meeting held by the Committee of ASNU IV on 04 October 2005 in New York.



On June 15 2010, directive no. 952-MD (Ministry of Defense) appointed the Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Training Center (CI Op Paz), a unit of the Brazilian Army, in charge of preparing military and civilian personnel from Brazil and friendly nations to be deployed in peacekeeping missions. Some years later, it had its name changed to Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Joint Center (CCOPAB, acronym in Portuguese).

CCOPAB's team work is composed of military personnel from the three Armed Forces, and this Center, whose mission is to support the preparation of Brazilian military, police and civilians and friendly nations for peacekeeping and humanitarian demining, also offers courses for Military Firefighters and Military Police Officers.

Throughout these years, CCOPAB proved to be an excellent teaching establishment, for the concrete results observed in the activities to which its courses are designed.

The Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center offers several courses. Most of them are focused on peace operations and some are certified by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The United Nations Department for Peace Operations (DPKO) is responsible for planning, preparing, managing and handling United Nations peace operations.

## **5.1 Courses**

### **5.1.1 Preparatory Course for Peacekeeping Missions**

The Preparatory Course for Peacekeeping Missions (EPMP, acronym in Portuguese) is a course designed to prepare military personnel for the role of Military Observers Staff Officers and UN Police officers.



This Course aims to enable students to analyze the structure of the United Nations (UN) in Peacekeeping Missions and to practice their English language skills for the various tasks.

Another great feature is the adaptation to work in a multicultural environment, where students begin to understand the difficulties that come from the specificities of cultural diversity in Peacekeeping Operations.

### 5.1.2 Humanitarian Demining Course

This course aims to expand the professional training of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Sergeants of the Engineering Branch to be Monitors or International Supervisors in Humanitarian Demining missions under the auspices of international organizations; to advise the command or the Staff in the decision-making in matters related to Humanitarian Demining; to technically support, as appropriate, the many agencies of the United Nations, the institutions of the Organization of American States, host governmental institutions, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) operating in the environment of Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian Demining.

### 5.1.3 UN Pre-Deployment Advanced Field Exercise

EAOP (acronym in Portuguese) is an exercise applied at the end of the preparation period in which the Battalion or Engineering Company receives an Area of Responsibility and are faced with several situations that simulate the reality in the operating environment of the Mission.

From numerous situations and events to which contingents are subjected during the instructions, the relationship with NGOs,



International Organizations, Civil-Military Operations (CIMIC), relationships with local leaders can be highlighted. These situations are imperative to train the various cells and operational systems of an Infantry Battalion or Peace Corps Engineering Company assigned to the missions.

#### 5.1.4 Logistics and Reimbursement of Peacekeeping Operations Course

The Course on Logistics and Reimbursement of Peacekeeping Operations aims to prepare officers and NCOs of the Brazilian Armed Forces and friendly nations to work in functions related to the Administration and Logistics of Peacekeeping Operations.

#### 5.1.5 Unit Commanders and Joint Staff Course

Considered a landmark of the beginning of the technical preparation, which is necessary for the development of activities related to the employment of a troop contingent in a mission of the United Nations, the Unit Commanders and Joint Staff Course (EPCOEM, acronym in Portuguese) takes 01 (one) week. The course aims to prepare military personnel of the Command and Staff of the Military Peace Forces. In order to achieve this objective, the course is composed of instructions that include both matters related to UN operations as well as specific subjects for the mission where the contingent will be employed.

#### 5.1.6 Civil-Military Coordination Course

The course aims to prepare military personnel who will carry out activities related to the Civil-Military Coordination of the Brazilian contingent in the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of





Haiti (MINUSTAH, acronym in French). Also, officers from friendly nations who will take part in peacekeeping missions and members of civil partner institutions.

### 5.1.7 Media Advisor And Journalist In Conflict Areas Course

The course aims to prepare media professionals to perform their duties in harsh environments where their journalistic coverage lacks personnel and material safety procedures. They also learn the importance of a correct relationship with the Armed Forces and with the several organizations operating in a conflict zone.

### 5.1.8 Military Translators and Interpreters Course

This course is designed to evaluate volunteer military personnel who will perform the duties of a translator and an interpreter in a peacekeeping mission.

The course is divided into two phases: online and face-to-face; and its objectives are to improve linguistic ability in the language and to train the military to act as translators and military interpreters in peacekeeping operations within a multicultural environment.



## 5.2 Mobile Training Teams

The DPKO, in its global training analysis reports, makes it clear that there is a general shortcoming in the preparation of a number of countries under its management, notably regarding the UN basic knowledge package, Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM). Member States with experience in peacekeeping missions and whose capabilities are confirmed are encouraged by the DPKO to support contributing countries and those with potential and interest in becoming contributors.

Brazil has fair credibility and legitimacy, and can be recognized as an active promoter of the doctrine of UN peacekeeping operations, due to its international projection. Mobile Training Teams (EMT, acronym in Portuguese) are effective ways to disseminate a competent and positive image of the country and a key element for a number of friendly nations in training and preparation for peacekeeping missions headed by the DPKO.

The Mobile Training Teams which have been deployed by the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center since 2014 on, have presented excellent results that prove what was shown above.

The positive feedback of this activity is based on the conception of each MTT, which is formed according to the characteristics of the recipient Nations, the courses to be administered and the target public. MTTs are composed of instructors and high-level monitors with experience in peacekeeping operations.

Since the period mentioned above, CCOPAB has already sent Mobile Training Teams to many places. Once to Angola, twice to Colombia, once to Mozambique, and once to Namibia. These teams brought knowledge in peacekeeping operations by giving the following courses: Unit Commanders and Staff Officers (EPCOEM); Preparatory



Course for Peacekeeping Missions (EPMP); Humanitarian Demining Course; and Subunit Commanders and Platoon Leaders Course (EPCOSUPEL).

The Mobile Training Teams' successful background is certified by technical assessments where the Team's performance in sharing knowledge, the training achieved by the instructors, the satisfaction of the recipient Nation and the cost-benefit of international technical cooperation, among other aspects, are verified.

## **Conclusion**

For the United Nations, it is necessary to take new opportunities to boost cooperation among developing countries. These activities are so important that the UN celebrates the international day of South-South Cooperation.

Brazil is an important country taking part of the Global South, playing a significant role and is very respected among the international community. Thus, it is one of the main actors in the promotion of activities aimed to achieve the objectives of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development. An agenda that is focused on making billions of people's lives better in the Global South, bringing more dignity to developing countries.

In order to achieve this goal, SSC is essential and the countries involved are increasingly seeking ways, methods and actions to better collaborate with common goals. Thereby, Brazil by means of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates, along with other Ministries, the several international technical cooperation.

In light of the above, the aforementioned intentions of the UN and Brazil, focused on the actions of South-South Cooperation, show



the great potential of the Mobile Training Teams deployed by the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Center in becoming a capable actor of Brazilian cooperation under the guidance of the Ministry of Defense.

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# BRAENGCOY's Peacekeeping Operations Basic Course in the context of the preparation cycle

*Major Eric Monios<sup>1</sup>*

**ABSTRACT:** This article aims to show the importance of the UN Pre-deployment Basic Field Exercise (EBOP, acronym in Portuguese) in the organization and preparation of the Brazilian Engineering Company (BRAENGCOY) to be deployed to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), highlighting the participation of the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB, acronym in Portuguese) in this process.

**KEYWORDS:** EBOP, Preparation, MINUSTAH, CCOPAB.

## Introduction

The Preparation Cycle comprises various phases, such as the Initial Meeting, carried out by the Land Operations Command (COTER, acronym in Portuguese) in the Regional Military Commands. Also, there are the Pre-selection, Physical Fitness Test, Laboratory Tests, Production of DNA bank, Physical Examination, Psychological Evaluation, Army Intelligence Center check, Joint Staff meeting in the Ministry of Defense (Brasília - DF), the opening of the Command Post (CP) and the beginning of the Committee of Troop Training for

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Peacekeeping Operations (CPTMP, acronym in Portuguese), among the initial activities. Then, there is a phase of specific preparation comprising courses in School Support Units as CCOPAB and others like, reconnaissance in Haiti, the final preparation in EBOP and the UN Pre-deployment Advanced Field Exercise (EAOP, acronym in Portuguese), and readjustments before the new contingent's departure.

Of all these mentioned phases, EBOP is the last opportunity the Commander has with the troops, still in Brazil, to approve or amend the essential instruction for the deployment of any fraction in a Peacekeeping Operation under the aegis of the UN, the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM).

EBOP is organized by the military personnel who undertook specific courses at CCOPAB, and it takes place in the week before EAOP. Both EBOP and EAOP are carried out in the Military Unit which is assigned to host the training.

As the Brazilian Contingent has great visibility in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), it demands a huge mobilization of means and personnel. Therefore, detailed planning, accuracy and endeavor are very important in all the instructions of this period.

The aim of this work is to address the importance of EBOP within the Preparation Cycle of the Brazilian Contingent for the accomplishment of Peacekeeping Operations under the aegis of the UN.

## **Development**

Before 1990, the preparation of the military personnel deployed to Peacekeeping Operations was delivered individually by appointed officers and enlisted personnel. Due to the need of specific training



focused on the duties performed by the members of the Ground Force in operations abroad under the UN mandate, COTER created the Brazilian Peacekeeping Training Center (CIOpPaz, acronym in Portuguese) in 2005. The Brazilian demand for this kind of employment of military personnel has increased, mainly because of the participation of the contingents that have been deployed to Haiti since 2004. Therefore, in 2010, CCOPAB was created as a means to upgrade the Preparation Cycle progressively until it reached the current format.

The Preparation Cycle of the troops (comprising the Battalion, the Marines and the Engineering Company) is made of mobilization, preparation (with instructions at CCOPAB), operations and demobilization, and takes about six months.

The primary role of the UN Military Engineering Unit is to enable the deployment of the UN Mission under conditions that allow the Mission to fulfil its mandate in an efficient and safe manner. The UN Military Engineering Unit is part of the Mission's overall integrated effort to improve the operating environment by building facilities and providing engineering services throughout the Mission area of operations. (United Nations Peacekeeping Missions – Military Engineering Unit Manual, September 2015).

“Due to the geographic diversity of Brazil, there are regions with particular operational characteristics, which will reflect on the need of soldiers who are ready to act in such regional diversity (Army Bulletin No. 29, 22 July 2016).”

Such reality of distinct operational specificities is greatly noticeable in the centralized preparation of the Brazilian Engineering Company.





Picture 1 - Well drilling instruction  
in multidimensional environment  
during EBOP



In the Engineering Unit, various experts from the Corps of Engineers and other Military Units are brought together to carry out the required demands for the development of the Engineering duties, in compliance with documents of MINUSTAH/UN, as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions - Military Engineering Unit Manual, September 2015. For instance, the Construction Engineering (vertical and horizontal constructions) and the Combat Engineering (patrols, navigation, and specialized reconnaissance) require a properly trained team to perform abroad.

The members of the Ground Force must be able to legitimately carry out land operations and gradually use controlled force, anywhere of the conflict area, be it at stable peace or at armed conflict/war. They must contribute decisively to the prevention of threats or management of crisis and/or solving conflicts of any nature and intensity, national or international (Army Bulletin No. 29, 22 July 2016).

To this end, according to COTER's Guidelines of Specific Troop Preparation for Peacekeeping Operations, the Training Coordinator (Engineering and Construction Department) has to carry out the planning, assembly and execution of EBOP, under general guidance of COTER, technical orientation from CCOPAB and supported by the Army Training Assessment Center (CAAdEx, acronym in Portuguese). CCOPAB adopts the gradual and constant increase of complexity of the content taught at the courses as a guideline (Integração Magazine, No. 1, year 2013). That can be observed in courses such as Unit Commanders and Joint Staff Course (EPCOEM, acronym in Portuguese) and Subunit Commanders and Platoon Leaders Course (EPCOSUPEL, acronym in Portuguese). Also in other specific courses as the Logistics and Reimbursement Course, which prepares officers

and enlisted personnel of the Brazilian Armed Forces and friendly nations to perform functions related to Logistics and Administration in Peacekeeping Operations. There is also the Military Translators and Interpreters Course, which prepares military personnel to perform as translators and interpreters throughout the mission. All these courses are based on UN documents and the experiences of Observers, Controllers and Assessors (OCA) who have recently been to the Brazilian Contingent. They contribute with quality and knowledge to the students who have taken courses at CCOPAB. Thus, the students can be fully prepared to guide the whole troops in compliance with guidelines and specific rules of the preparation phase and spread knowledge.

Picture 2 - Logistic instruction at CCOPAB







During EBOP, CCOPAB supports the Training Coordinator with personnel for the instructions taught by BRAENGCOY. They give technical support in issues related to the UN doctrine and operations aiming to apply the specific knowledge of Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM) and Specialized Training Materials (STM) correctly. Thus, CCOPAB assists the standardization of procedures which will be evaluated in the following phase of the preparation, EAOP. They are as it follows: working with mission partners, protection of civilians, respect for diversity and knowledge of the local culture of the area of operations, which are addressed in practical and simple instructions, including Staff activities, platoon readiness and decentralized missions including





simulations of BRAENGCOY's routine activities. According to the Army Bulletin No. 29, 22 July 2016, the members of BRAENGCOY must be able to legitimately carry out land operations and gradually use force under control, anywhere of the conflict area, be it at stable peace or at armed conflict/war. They must contribute decisively to the prevention of threats or management of crisis and/or solving conflicts of any nature and intensity, national or international. EBOP aims to enable BRAENGCOY to contribute to the establishment of a safe and stable environment in Haiti, which is the basic premise of MINUSTAH's mandate.

As BRAENGCOY is heterogeneous, EBOP is an effective tool for preparation, spreading of knowledge and troop cohesion. It is needed to make a team of experts in different areas, from Engineering Equipment operators to personnel of the Military Engineers Team (QEM, acronym in Portuguese). During the centralized period, there are instructions that contribute to the troops' morale as the Physical Training sessions (TFM, acronym in Portuguese); simulations of routine activities carried out in Haiti, such as rescuing multiple victims in a contingency planning (CONPLAN); Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI), carried out by the Mission Integrated Support Section of MINUSTAH. There are also foot drills and leisure activities such as cultural tours in the town where the military unit of the preparation is taking place.

## Conclusion

EBOP, within the cycle of preparation, is the end of the centralized period of specific instructions for the deployment of the Brazilian troops to a UN Peacekeeping Operation. It precedes the last phase of the preparation. Officers, warrant officers and sergeants who undertook



the courses at CCOPAB, transmit knowledge to the personnel in the unit of the preparation, based on MOU, CPTM and STM.

It may be concluded that, during the phase of centralized preparation, BRAENGCOY has EBOP as a tool to achieve its full capacity to accomplish the Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti. Due to the knowledge that has been shared, the company reaches the phase of centralized preparation and is then able to be certified as a unit capable of accomplishing missions in operational environments abroad. Thus, the Engineering branch, the Army and Brazil are well represented, leaving their mark on the works they build.

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# High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)

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**ABSTRACT:** UN PKOs have proved great adaptability and significantly contributed to the successful settlement of disputes and their decline along two recent decades. Today, however, there is evidence of an uncomfortable reversion of some trends and a generalized concern for the changes that might affect PKOs capability to respond to conflicts. The spread of extreme violence between regional conflicts and the growing demands for changes from the populations have been pressing Governments and the international system to respond to these new challenges. UN PKOs make an effort to reach their objectives; changes are needed to adapt them to the new circumstances and to ensure the raising efficiency and the appropriate use in the future. It is true that if UN keeps its current status quo, it has its credibility and efficiency affected, mainly in terms of providing peace and security, conflict prevention and settlements of disputes, overexposure of personnel in risky areas and management capabilities, among others. From that viewpoint, UN Secretary-General established the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, in order to focus on issues confronting Peace Operations and Special Political Missions such as: change of nature of conflicts, evolution of mandates, challenges to the good offices and to Peacebuilding, managerial and administrative arrangements, planning, partnerships, HR, POC, operational capabilities of uniformed personnel, performance and others. The Panel was based on many sources to support the analysis and recommendations, on previous studies with similar objectives, visits to capitals and specific areas, deployed mission areas in the field and several contributions from Member States and international institutions. By means of great accuracy, this research made the establishment of a sequential





coherence possible, providing meaning to the information presented in the final report. The implementation of the Panel recommendations greatly depends on the decision and will from various actors. Nevertheless, the decision of the Secretary-General for the realization of the study indicates a strong goodwill from the authority to support the implementation. It is expected that the recommendations come into effect in nearly two decades.

**KEYWORDS:** peace operations; changes in conflicts; credibility; efficiency.

In April 2014, three-year old Nyakhat Pal walked four hours leading her blind father and two dogs to a UNICEF-WFP rapid response distribution center in Pagak, Upper Nile State of South Sudan. When Nyakhat heard the UN was providing vaccines, food, water and sanitation supplies at the center, she hurried.

They walked those four hours through harsh and dangerous terrain. The area has seen serious fighting between opposition forces and the South Sudanese army, and peacekeepers of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) have been deployed to protect the civilian population, and create a zone of safety. At the end of the journey, Nyakhat got what she had been looking for; she received life-saving supplies before heading back to her village, another four hours by foot.

Nyakhat's story is at the heart of what the United Nations was created for, 70 years ago: "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person". And today, Nyakhat's story still represents what the United Nations stands for - as well as for its shortfalls.



The Organization will remain relevant to the extent that it responds effectively to the expectations of people experiencing great hardship, sometimes in remote and inaccessible places, and who yet demonstrate enormous resilience, pride and bravery.

The Organization will remain legitimate to the extent that it acts as a voice for the unheard, seeking their views and ensuring their full participation.

The Organization will remain credible to the extent it is served by leaders and staff who demonstrate courage, integrity, compassion and humility, and who act upon the norms, principles, and values upon which the Organization was founded.

For many, peace operations are not simply something the United Nations does but what the United Nations is.

Picture 1 - Nyakhat and her father





The work of the Panel over the past six months has been driven by the desire to take a dispassionate look at UN peace operations to ascertain their relevance and effectiveness for today and tomorrow's world.

We hope that the analysis and recommendations contained here will live up to the spirit and the letter of the mandate entrusted to the Panel by the Secretary-General and to the expectations of Nyakhat and others: that the Organization will be there with them, for them.

## **1. Initial considerations**

### **a) Reasons for a new study on Peace Operations:**

HIPPO was established by the UN Secretary-General on 31 October 2014. Amid the reasons which triggered this new study, the ones to be highlighted are:

#### **1) Words by the Secretary-General:**

“The world is changing and United Nations peace operations must change with it if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security.

As we approach the 15-year anniversary of the Brahimi report, we must acknowledge that peace missions today are increasingly called on to confront politically complex and challenging conflicts, often in volatile security environments where operations are directly targeted.

We must take stock of evolving expectations and consider how the Organization can most effectively advance peace, assist countries caught in conflict and ensure that our peacekeeping operations and special political missions remain strong and effective in a changing global context.” (31OUT14)



## 2) Words by the Panel's Chair:

“Since then (31 oct 14), the Panel has considered a broad range of issues facing peacekeeping and special political missions, including the changing nature of conflict, evolving mandates, good offices and peacebuilding challenges, managerial and administrative arrangements, planning, partnerships, human rights and protection of civilians, operational capabilities for the uniformed personnel and performance.” (16JUN15).

## 3) Terms of Reference (TR) of the Panel:

“Both peacekeeping operations and Special Political Missions (SPMs) are impacted by the changing global context for peace and security. More often than not, the United Nations today is confronted with cycles of repeated violence, weak governance and recurring instability.

Peacekeeping Operations were once deployed primarily into post-conflict situations with peace agreements in place. Today, they are increasingly mandated to operate where there is no peace to keep. The majority of *field personnel* (civilians and military personnel) work in countries where fighting is ongoing, and are increasingly the target of attacks.

SPMs have often been deployed to similar contexts, trying to broker agreements with parties that are frequently fragmented and unwilling to engage in a meaningful negotiation.

Both the changing nature of conflict and the changing role of peace operations have required the UN to adapt and respond.”

## 4) Executive Summary of the Report:

“UN peace operations have proven highly adaptable and contributed significantly to the successful resolution of conflicts and to a declining number of conflicts over two decades. Today, however,



there is evidence of a worrisome reversal of some of this trend and a widely shared concern that changes in conflict may be outpacing the ability of UN peace operations to respond. The spread of violent extremism, overlaid onto longsimmering local or regional conflicts and the growing aspirations of populations for change, is placing pressure on governments and the international system to respond. As UN peace operations struggle to achieve their objectives, change is required to adapt them to new circumstances and to ensure their increased effectiveness and appropriate use in future.

A number of peace operations today are deployed in an environment where there is little or no peace to keep. In many settings today, the strain on their operational capabilities and support systems is showing, and political support is often stretched thin. There is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is being asked of UN peace operations today and what they are able to deliver. This gap can be – must be – narrowed to ensure that the Organization’s peace operations are able to respond effectively and appropriately to the challenges to come.”

Besides these points, many other inputs can be considered to characterize the need of change of the Organization in relation to Peace Operations, such as the voices coming from the following sources: C-34 (Special Committee on Peace Operations), Member States, Regional Organizations, Government and related Institutes, featuring a harmony concerning the composition of the Panel. The fact is that the UN, keeping the present status quo, has its credibility and efficiency committed, especially in providing peace and security, conflict prevention and solution, excessive exposure of its personnel in risky areas and managerial capacity, among other aspects.



### b) Referentials for changes:

The Panel based itself on many sources to substantiate its analyses and recommendations. However, it referred to many previous studies related to similar purposes, identifying their constitutive arguments, successes and difficulties. This research enabled, in a certain way, the possibility to establish a sequential coherence which would give meaning to what is being offered in the present report of HIPPO.

Therefore, the analyses and conclusions expressed in the following documents were of great importance:

- 1) Brahimi Report, 2000;
- 2) the publication “UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines” (*Capstone*), 2008; and
- 3) DPKO-DFS joint study “A New Partnership Agenda” (“New Horizon”), 2010.

The approach of these documents will be done in this text, since they are considered to be in the domain of those who tackle Peace Operations.

Picture 2 - Members of the High-Level Panel with the SG and the Chief of DPKO





### c) Pragmatic Aspects:

In order to facilitate the implementation of its recommendations, the Panel has consensually decided:

- 1) that the analyses and recommendations (mainly) should have a specific address, such as: Secretary-General, Security Council, Member States, General Assembly, Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), Police Contributing Countries (PCCs), etc. Therefore, the recommendations were not “launched” without the respective addressee;
- 2) create feasible recommendations, always considering low cost (or “zero cost”) in its implementation; and
- 3) propose the engagement of more robust actors in the employment options of military capacities, besides the prerogative of participation in the decision-making process.

## The Independent Panel

### a) Composition:

The choice of the panel members was a personal prerogative of the UN Secretary-General, taking into account the geographical distribution and previous experience of the candidates. Having that in mind, the group formed was very heterogeneous in its personal qualifications, but with great homogeneity in terms of having experience either in the UN environment or in other international organizations. The group, during the functioning of the Panel, worked in a harmonic and respectful way, which highly influenced the results, since the decisions were consensual, consistent and with great concern in relation to the impact on what it was intended to reach.

The following personnel were part of the HIPPO:

- 1) JOSÉ RAMOS-HORTA (East Timor) – Chair of the Panel;
- 2) AMEERAH HAQ (Bangladesh) – Vice-chair;
- 3) ABHIJIT GUHA (India) – Lt Gen (Ret.);
- 4) ALEXANDER ILLITCHEV (Russia);
- 5) ANDREW HUGHES (Australia);
- 6) B. LYNN PASCOE (USA);
- 7) FLORIANO PEIXOTO VIEIRA NETO (Brazil) - Lt Gen (Ret.)
- 8) HENRIETTA JOY ABENA NYARKO MENSA-BONSU (Gana);
- 9) HILDE F. JONSON (Holland);
- 10) IAN MARTIN (United Kingdom);
- 11) JEAN ARNAULD (France);
- 12) MARIE-LOUSIE BARICAKO (Burundi);
- 13) RADHIKA COOMARASWAMY (Sri Lanka);
- 14) RIMA SALAH (Jordan);
- 15) YOUSSEF MAHMOUD (Tunisia); and
- 16) IWANG XUEXIAN (China).

It is fair to highlight that the high performance of the group and the outstanding working environment amongst its members were maximized by the exceptional performance of the Chair, who with a great deal of wisdom, experience and engagement, conducted it towards the results achieved in consensus. His reputation and acceptance in all visited places and authorities with whom the Panel connected were obvious and contributed to strengthen the consistence of the group as a whole.





## b) Dynamics of the works:

### 1) Integration: discussions and methodology

The Panel was initially divided into five groups, according to the areas of specific expertise and personal interest of the members, aiming towards deepening the research and initial writing of the report texts. This composition was undone after the first draft. From then on, the subjects were distributed among the groups for research and a more refined design of the texts.

The themes were discussed in person, by videoconference or by e-mail. A e-library in the UN site was created to gather all the material researched, received from external sources or ordered from experts.

The working environment during the discussions were of camaraderie, respect and professionalism, in which there was not a situation that could tarnish the integration of the group. The definition of the texts, during all the phases of the Panel, was reached in a consensual manner.

### 2) Travels

HIPPO established, from the beginning of its works, a travel agenda to contact authorities, different organizations, academia, think tanks, civilian society, non-governmental organizations, etc. This option had the deliberate intention to listen to the voices of people and entities from different regions, reaching out for a better integration with whom, in practice, dedicates themselves to Peace Operations.

The Panel, in its totality or partially, carried out four types of travels, as follows:


- a) meeting of the Panel in New York, USA, in the UN HQ or in the Greentree Estate (private property used by the UN for work



meetings), in a total of six meetings to discuss the themes and write the corresponding texts;

- b) regional consultations in all continents: Africa (Ethiopia), Asia (Bangladesh), Latin America (Brazil) and Europe (Geneva);
- c) visit to the capitals of the following countries: China, United States, Finland, France, India, Japan, Holland, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Turkey; and
- d) missions in the field: MONUSCO (DR Congo), MINUSMA (Mali), UN Logistics Base (Brindisi/Italy) and UNOWA (Daka).

Picture 3 - Places visited by the Panel



The dynamics presented, at the end, allowed the Panel to reach to findings aligned with questions that affect most peace missions. These findings were included in the analyses of the report and, especially, in its recommendations.



## The report

### a) Research mechanisms

The harmony observed in the travels was also extended to several consultations carried out by HIPPO, in the following modalities:

- 1) surveys with Permanent Missions (PM): the Chair of the Panel issued correspondence to all PMs, on 11 Nov 14, requesting suggestions to the ongoing work up to the end of January of that year. In total, HIPPO received 60 (sixty) proposals of present tendencies of conflicts, mandates, challenge to good office, administrative arrangements, partnerships, human rights, protection of civilians, capacities and performance;
- 2) contributions from institutes, regional organizations, civil society and think tanks, as follows: Ministry of Defense/Brazil, Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Brazil, CCOPAB/Brazil, Pandiá Calógeras Institute, Igarapé Institute, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), International Peace Institute (IPI), Stimson Center, United Nations University, Center of International Cooperation, Group of Friends of Mediation, Interpol, CLINGENDAEL (Netherlands Institute of International Relations), Brill Nijhoff, The Danish Institute for International Studies, Global Protection Cluster, SIPRI, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), No Violent Peace Force, Princeton University;
- 3) workshops: Protection of Civilians (London and Amsterdam), Use of Force (Amsterdam and NY), Revision of Case Studies (Bangladesh), WPS/Woman, Peace and Security (NY);
- 4) UN organs: DPKO, DFS, DPA, Secretariat, Security Council (SC), 4<sup>th</sup> Committee (Special Political and Decolonization), 5<sup>th</sup> Committee (Administrative and Budgetary), C-34



(Peacekeeping Operations), Specialists (OSAGI) of Resolution 1325 (WPS), Advisory Group of Experts to Review the Peacebuilding Architecture, Group of Force Commanders (FC), Group of Chiefs of Missions (HoM/SRSG);

- 5) travel reports generated by the Panel's Secretariat, comprising the several regional tendencies;
- 6) studies requested from several organizations on specific themes which may interest the Panel; and
- 7) specific bibliography (UN/EIDMS Virtual Library), gathering all documents produced by the members of the Panel and other received from external sources.

HIPPO believes that the consultation mechanisms used and the criteria established for the travels contributed to assure better legitimacy, representativity and credibility in the analyses carried out in the report, and, therefore, to the recommendations given.

#### b) Evolution of the works:

The following steps, which were part of the whole work of the Panel will be presented. This makes it possible to observe the logical sequencing that allowed, by the end of seven months, the conclusion of the work, having the formal delivery of the Report to the Secretary-General on 16 June 15.

##### 1) 1<sup>st</sup> Step (Nov 14): initial definition of the research field

In this phase, the Panel dedicated itself to the definition of the parameters that would define the future themes of the Report and, therefore, it used as initial base the own Terms of Reference for the constitution and guidelines issued by the SG who, at several



opportunities, requested the group to be “bold and creative” in its analyses and recommendations. As already mentioned, the Panel looked close into previous documents which served for the same purpose, cementing the position in the maintenance of consolidated references; however, it tried to give value to essential fundamentals, such as coherence, pragmatism, permanence in time (two decades), economic viability, representativity and approach level (strategic), among others that the reading of the Panel implies.

The Terms of Reference included the following topics for HIPPO’s consideration:

- a) mandates (doctrine and adaptation to the needs of the terrain);
- b) political frameworks (including the participation of women and good offices;
- c) operations in volatile environments;
- d) peacebuilding, stabilization, restauration and extension of the State authority;
- e) authority and responsibility;
- f) mission planning;
- g) partnerships;
- h) Special Political Missions (SPM);
- i) promotion of human rights and protection of civilians;
- j) required capacities for the military personnel; and
- k) uniformed personnel performance, accountability, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and caveats.

It is important to emphasize that the Report went further than it was defined in the Terms of its constitution, incorporating contributions collected in travels and in the different consultation

mechanisms used.

- 1) 2<sup>nd</sup> Step (DEC 14): definition of the Work Groups.
- 2) The constitution of the five groups to design the initial draft followed the criteria of proximity of the members to the themes, but also taking into account the personal interest. This phase concentrated on research, analyses of present trends, UN reports and of other organizations, personal contacts and internal discussions.
- 3) 3<sup>rd</sup> Step (JAN 15): definition of the themes of the initial draft and beginning of the text designing.
- 4) 4<sup>th</sup> Step (APR 15): conclusion of the 1<sup>st</sup> draft having the discussions of the Panel and external inputs as its base .
- 5) 5<sup>th</sup> Step (up to JUN 15): improvement of the drafts (6 versions).
- 6) Delivery of the Report: 16 JUN 15.

#### c. Areas of Study (essential changes):

The Panel decided to design the Report taking into consideration four principal pillars, from where the document was expanded in its analyses and recommendations, as summarized below:

- 1) reestablishment of the precedence of the political aspect: HIPPO tried to make clear that peace is neither reached nor sustained only by military or technological engagement, but through political solutions. In this regard, Peace Operations must be deployed as part of a more enhancing political process, within which the UN takes a leading role;
- 2) Peace Operations as a more flexible tool, shaped for each situation: the Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions must not be differentiated, but adjusted to the terrain



needs, under a single name “Peace Operations”;

- 3) strengthening of partnerships: studies and discussions led the panel to understand that the future of Peace Operations is in the establishment of well-structured and adequately supported partnerships, in material and financial resources, especially regionally, with the African Union and Economic Committees. The partnerships must be expanded in the areas of development, human rights, peace and security, in the attempt to prevent conflicts and in their solutions, when it is the case;
- 4) Peace Operations more centered on the area of the mission and on the people: such redirectioning will demand more engagement from the UN HQ to make operations deployed for each context possible. In summary, Peace Operations must serve and protect people more.

#### d) Main recommendations:

Regarding this topic, the recommendations which are more relevant, within the effort to summarize what is meant when writing this text, will be listed. Therefore, its highlight is far from being a more dedicated reading to the body of the Report, with focus on the analyses that are part of these and of the other recommendations. As seen before, it is relevant to point out that, in the Report, all the recommendations are addressed to specific UN sectors, in order to make its implementation easier, as decided.

#### 1) Conflict Prevention and peace mediation:

- a) must be redeemed as a priority. The Panel proposes the SG to hold international forums with the involvement of governments, regional organizations, civil society and the global economic community to exchange experiences and



- agree upon approaches which integrate conflict prevention, governance, development and human rights; and
- b) the SC must engage earlier when considering threats, including in partnerships, and be open to analyses and recommendations of the SG when in situations that may threaten international peace and security.

## 2) Protection of Civilians:

Picture 4 - Reunião do CS na ONU



Picture 5 - Troop action in Protection of Civilians

- a) this activity must engage all the members of the mission, local government and humanitarian agencies, maintaining the primary responsibility under the host country;
- b) in relation to contributions of unarmed actors in the





protection of civilians, the missions must work closer to local communities and NGOs (national and international), in the building of environments of protection;

- c) recommendations to the Secretariat:
  - present clear and open evaluations, options and necessary resources to the SC;
  - alert the SC when resources and capacities are not adequate to the terms of the mandate;
  - ensure TCCs/PCCs that all the uniformed component be adequately trained, equipped and commanded to the responsibilities of protection of civilians; and
  - update initial evaluations and present to the SC proposals to modify plans, mandates and resources;
- d) all the national caveats, besides the restrictions accepted by the Secretariat in the mission planning, must be considered as disobedience to the command; and
- e) when the SC authorizes the deployment of forces which do not belong to the UN, the conditions for the performance report and responsibility for the actions must be established.

### 3) Use of Force:

Presently, the use of Force is related to three contexts:

- a) ceasefire monitoring in hostile environments;
- b) implementation of peace in difficult operations environments and exposed to collapse;

- c) “management of conflicts” where there is no viable peace process or where the process has failed.

As it can be seen during the reading of the Report, for each context there is a special approach.

The recommendations related to the Use of Force can be summarized as the following:

- a) Member States must ensure that the contingents are adequately equipped, trained and capacitated to respond to threats, supporting them with the use of force in a preventive manner in self-defense and protection of civilians;
- b) when UN troops are deployed where there is no viable peace process, the SC, the Secretariat, regional actors and Member States must work to promote the political process and regularly revise the viability of the mission;
- c) UN troops should not engage in counter-terrorism operations (CT) due to its composition and nature. This type of operation must be directed to regional forces or *ad hoc* alliances;
- d) the exceptional deployment in partnerships for CT must be carefully defined by the mandate (work division);
- e) the UN must establish a “vanguard” capability and an integrated HQ structure for rapid deployment in new missions;
- f) the UN must develop a “modest” rapid response capacity to crises, as well as a list of regional quick response forces (*bridging forces*) or of State Members; and
- g) so the operations can be more consistent, the Panel recommends the strengthening of the analyses, strategy and



planning processes, through the establishment of a small group of analysis and planning directly connected to the SG.

#### 4) Peace Sustainment:

- a) this primary activity demands engagement of the international community to avoid the return of the conflict; the peace process does not end with ceasefire, peace agreement or elections. The Panel listed seven weaknesses in the international approach that need to be improved;

Picture 6 - General Assembly



- b) the SG with the support of Member States must make an effort to concentrate all parts of the UN system, ensuring a joint answer to the necessities of countries in conflict; and
- c) there are many other additional recommendations on support to UN authorities involved in the process and evaluation of collective efficiency; financing; local cooperation between the mission and UNCT (UN Country Team); independent reviews about the results accomplished; national reconciliation, justice and human rights; and security sector reform.



### 5) Development of the National Police:

a) the Secretariat must develop guidelines and training aiming at developing and reforming the local police, based on the national capacities, including support from specialized teams and use of civilian experts;

b) PCCs which support the national effort in the development and reform must extend their rotation cycles for 12 months;

Picture 7 - National Police in action



c) to promote the availability and efficiency of Formed Police Units (FPU), the Secretariat must expand the list of contributions and partnerships and support PCCs in the pre-deployment preparation and improvement in performance; and

d) the UN Police Division organizational structure must be restructured to better support the national polices.

### 6) Peace Operations Planning:

a) the Secretariat must strengthen its capacity to analyze the dynamics of conflicts in local, regional and national levels to make the designing of strategic policies possible. Therefore, the Secretariat

Picture 8 - Troops in Operations



must immediately establish a strategic capacity of analysis and planning, reporting directly to the SG;

b) the Secretariat must ensure that the analysis and the planning of the mission



include detailed assessments, not only in relation to politics and dynamics of conflicts and threats to civilians, but also to the operational challenges related to climate, terrain and infrastructure, ensuring a real integration between the Office of Military Advisory (OMA) and the Department of Field Support (DFS);

- c) the Secretariat must ensure that the system of analysis and planning start as soon as possible, having a severe assessment of the situation and analysis of the conflict as the basis; and
- d) other related recommendations to the conduct of the planning process by skilled leaderships; initial deployment to provide a capacity of analysis in the mission area; dialogue among all the actors involved; strengthening of the capacity of analysis of the missions; and independent evaluation of results.

#### 7) Mandates:

- a) The SC must authorize mandates with basis on a clear analysis of the situation and on the political strategy, taking the assessments of necessities and viability of their implementation into consideration;

Picture 9 - General Assembly



- b) the mandates must be sequenced and prioritized as a regular practice for an initial period of six months. This format reduces expenses and ensures that the missions are adjusted to the necessities of the terrain;
- c) to delineate the mandates that adjust necessities and capacities, the establishment of “triangular discussions”



(Security Council, Troop/Police Contributing Countries and Secretariat) is proposed; and

- d) during the renewal of the mandates, the consultation must be open to the missions so that the terms can be adjusted to the reality in the area.

#### 8) Rapid Deployment:

- a) the Secretariat must propose to the Member States the adoption of “vanguard capability” and integrated HQ for quick deployment in new missions; and

Picture 10 - Air support to Operations



- b) the Secretariat must consult the Member States and regional organizations about the options for a capacity of regional and global rapid deployment, including as “*bridging forces*”.

#### 9) Quickness in the mobilization and better capabilities:

Picture 11 - Troops in Operations



- a) the Secretariat must present options to the SG and to the General Assembly (GA), highlighting the reduction in the generation of forces and time to deploy can be reached with different measures or resources;

- b) the SC must provide political support to the process of UN force generation;



- c) SC's members, especially the permanent, as well as other Member States with the capacities needed, are stimulated to offer their troops to UN Peace Operations and provide the missions with essential resources, signaling their support in particular to the mandates of protection of civilians;
- d) the Secretariat and the GA must search for the evolution of the reform of TCC/PCC reimbursement system and, in particular, develop options of reimbursement to Member States for a capacity beyond only the equipment used nowadays and troops. The Secretariat must implement the awarding reimbursement system immediately; and
- e) the Secretariat must develop an strategy to generate troops and police officers based on gender, stimulating TCCs/PCCs to implement Resolution 1325.

#### 10) Development of capacities and performance:

Picture 12 - Troops in Operations




- a) the Secretariat and the Member States must integrate the existing initiatives in a singular framework of development of capacities and performance;
- b) in relation to command and control, the selection of troops for Peace Operations must take national caveats into consideration when deciding if these troops must or not be accepted as contingents;
- c) any restriction beyond what has been accepted by the Secretariat in the beginning of the mission should not be tolerated, but immediately reported to the Secretariat; and



- d) Force Commanders and Police Commissioners must report situations when orders are not accomplished and report them to the General Headquarters;
- e) when the situation changes quickly and a new level of preparation is necessary, the Secretariat must clearly explain the new demands to the TCCs/PCCs and the mission command must do the same in relation to the contingents; and
- f) the Secretariat must review the processes of the report and information of the missions to make them timely, of high quality and accessible.

#### 11) More agility in the mission support:

Picture 12 - Troops in Operations



- a) Member States must work with the Secretariat to develop a future model of logistic support for the mission which operates in environments of high risk of uncertainty of occurrences to ensure higher tactical mobility and military control over the available means; and
- b) Secretariat and Member States must review the accommodation standards and remove limitations related to military aviation to allow higher tactical mobility.

#### 12) Global training architecture:

- a) global architecture of partnerships must be better established, strengthening the system of training certification to help identify certain limitations within the Member States; and
- b) the training in environments of higher operational engagement (assymetrical) must be intensified, including the deployment of Mobile Training Teams.



Picture 13 - CCOPAB



### 13) Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda:

- a) the missions must integrate experts in gender within all the functional components which need knowledge on the subject. The Mission Gender Advisor must be in the Office of the Head of the mission, to whom he/she should report directly;

Picture 14 - Women in Peace Operations



- b) the missions must have complete access to Resolution 1325 and to others which tackle the same theme, with support received from DPA and DPKO on the subject; and
- c) the Secretariat must ensure that the meetings between the SG and heads of mission address indicators of performance related to gender.



Picture 15 - Gen Heleno  
(Brazil) 1<sup>st</sup> MINUSTAH  
Force Commander



#### 14) Leadership:

- a) the selection of senior leaders must be based on merit, taking competencies and skills necessary to the job into account;
- b) the participation of women in UN high level positions must be enhanced, including in the terrain;
- c) the geographical representation of UN senior leaders must keep regional representativity; and
- d) new leaders (senior and junior) must go under induction programs, as a complement to the performance follow-up.

#### 15) Security and crises management:

Picture 16 - Flooding in  
Operational Area



- a) the Secretariat must review the implementation of the UN security administration system to ensure its adjustment to contemporary threats;
- b) when necessary, the missions without the military component must be provided with small units of military or police guard;
- c) the Secretariat must establish a medical performance framework for Peace Operations, including well defined standards for the civilian and military capabilities; and
- d) the Secretariat must develop a doctrine of crises management for Peace Operations; the UNCT must have plans and procedures, including mass loss and several incidents plans, frequently reviewed and exercised.



## 16) General Headquarters:

Picture 17

UN HQ in New York



a) the recommendation is based on the convenience of adjusting to UN HQ in search for higher efficiency, integration and efficacy of the inter departmental arrangements, with zero cost. Thus, the Panel presented a proposal of joining DPA, DPKO, DFS and PBSO in a structure of

“peace and security” with the creation of opening of Under Secretary-General responsible for these areas (UNDSGPS); and

b) permanence of the present USG for the “economic and development” sectors.

## 17) Other recommendations:

a) the UN must provide better logistic and financial support to the African Union to cover expenses with deployment of personnel from that region;

b) the UN must reinforce the “zero tolerance” policy for cases of sexual exploitation and abuse. Immunity should not be taken as impunity. In the Report, there are numerous recommendations on the waive of immunity, responsibility, system of victims aid, human rights, etc;

c) creation of a specific account for Special Political Missions, as soon as possible;

d) removal of imposed limitations to military aviation, with authority given to the FC for its use for the benefit of mobility (operational and logistical);



- e) use of technology related to the needs of missions, with special emphasis on: security, immediate alarm and capacities related to Protection of civilians, health and welfare; and troops' accommodation;
- f) evaluation of the environmental impact as part of the planning of new missions;
- g) emphasis on the constitution of strategies to plan, recruit and finance of communication teams to ensure better contact with local communities, using modern technology.



Picture 18 - Other areas of approach



## Final considerations

### a) Implementation:

The implementation of the recommendations of HIPPO depends on the decision and willingness of several actors, such as: the Secretary-General, Security Council and State Members. However, the decision of the Secretary-General to have this study carried out shows a strong good will that this authority has to support this execution. As highlighted before, the expectation is that these recommendations come into effect in approximately two decades.

In order to offer concrete options of implementation, DPKO created a working group under the responsibility of the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET), with ongoing studies to support the decision process.

The Panel understands that the pragmatism, the consistence and the direction of the recommendations are features which will help the implementation of the Report.

### b) Last words-gathering efforts:

The following words, transcribed from the final parts of the Report, summarize much of what has been exposed on its pages, of better capacitation of the Organism, strengthening partnerships and of the importance to be given to the peoples:

“Ambitious mandates, difficult political and operational landscapes, intractable conflicts and high expectations are intimidating hurdles for contemporary peace operations. The recommendations contained in this report aim to better prepare UN peace operations to meet these and other challenges in an uncertain



future. These recommendations reflect the collective wisdom of the broad range of partners and stakeholders of UN peace operations with whom the Panel has consulted over the course of the past [seven] months. They aim to reflect the voices of people who are deployed to serve and protect; the experience and aspirations of regional partners with whom the UN must seek to work even more closely to collectively manage and respond to today and tomorrow's threats; and the commitment of the broader community of nations to the maintenance of international peace and security. (JRH - Panel's Chair)."

In a village in South Sudan, once again wracked by violence and a collapsed peace, a young girl still has high expectations. She expects that those blue helmets and the people who sent them will help her people find peace so that she can have a future. She is right to do so. And she is not alone. For Nyakhat Pal, and for the millions affected by conflict, United Nations peace operations – the United Nations – must unite its strengths and move forward to meet this challenge together.







# The Brazilian military performance in MINUSTAH: strategies to confront gangs in Haiti

*Juliana Sandi Pinheiro<sup>1</sup>*



**ABSTRACT:** This article consists of a synthesis of part of the author's doctoral thesis. It aims at analyzing the practices adopted by the Brazilian contingents of MINUSTAH to confront the Haitian gangs. The analysis was based on the concept of anomie and the description of the operational experience of the Brazilian Contingents of MINUSTAH. Interviews with mobilized military personnel were used as reference, as well as articles of military men and .....

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classified reports from the Ministry of Defense describing the employment of the Brazilian troops. The question lies on whether the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian troops when confronting the gangs in Haiti is innovating or not. A parameter for innovation may be the employment of the troops in both confronting routines and humanitarian aid activities without deviation from military function. MINUSTAH comprises the first Brazilian experience of use of force in tactical level in a mission of stabilization of the United Nations mainly guided by Chapter VII of the Charter. The Brazilian State wishes to be more than a mere contributor of troops to the United Nations peacekeeping missions. Reaching the main proponent status in efficient working methodologies employed in situations of high complexity in the peacekeeping missions context is a strategic achievement that places the country closer to the international decision-making process scenario.

**KEYWORDS:** MINUSTAH; Brazilian Army; Use of force; Strategy; Haitian gangs.

## Introduction

The action of gangs in the urban areas of Port-au-Prince, capital of Haiti, used to contribute to the political instability and polarization of the Haitian society<sup>2</sup>. Both the criminalization and the politicization of the gangs are symbols of the complexity of the Haitian scenario. The socioeconomic inequalities together with the

<sup>2</sup> For example, see the remarks made by General João Carlos Vilela Morgero, Commander of the Brazilian Brigade, in the Final Report of Employment of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Contingent. The report will be explored in more details in Chapter 6 of this thesis. When describing the reasons for the operational acting, General Morgero describes the complex Haitian scenario and how many actors (former military men, political leaders, criminal groups) associated to gangs as a way to pressure the institutions of the Haitian Government. Moreover, the UN Secretary General mentioned the role of gangs in the promotion of instability and political polarization in Haiti in his report of 16 April 2004 (S/2004/300) (page 7).



absence of government authorities have deprived a great part of the population of minimum living conditions to ensure security, food, education, health, among others.

This situation of crisis has been mediated by actions of the international community. However, there has not been a consensus on the approach to be used, especially concerning the gangs' issue. This article proposes an analytical approach to describe and analyze the practices of the Brazilian Army in confronting the gangs in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Such approach presents actions primarily devoted to the area of security, but with elements that promote the presence of civilian organizations, civic-social actions and quick impact projects to improve the living conditions of the Haitian population.

The question lies on whether the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian troops when confronting the gangs in Haiti is whether innovating or not. A parameter for innovation may be the employment of the troops in both confronting routines and humanitarian aid activities without deviation from military function. To answer these questions, Employment Final Reports of Brazilian Contingents of MINUSTAH were analyzed.

When considered as a whole, the doctrines used by the Brazilian Army in Haiti have been contributing to the creation of conditions, within the Haitian society, that enable changes in attitude and mentality in order to facilitate the introduction of development and security solutions. Certain circumstances regarding Psychological Operations, which were employed to bring the Brazilian soldier closer to the Haitian population, were found in Employment Final Reports, as well as ways to put an end to the Haitian people's support for the



gang leaders (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, Final Report of Employment, 6<sup>th</sup> Contingent, 2007, p. 37).

Poverty and conflict are typical components of societies in crisis which tend to gather dissatisfactions among political leaderships and the population, leading to the spread of protests of national and international order. However, the criminal cooptation of people done by gangs or political groups that make use of this resource, hinders the opposition social actions putting their independence and legitimacy at risk. Thus, there is a hard-to-solve paradox. Although the actions exclusively directed to the security field reduce the immediate impacts of the conflict violence, they tend to be innocuous or not very effective to solve the structural dilemmas that contribute to poverty and inequality.

Therefore, strategies of confronting gangs that contain elements of humanitarian support and the promotion of development to combat those criminal groups can be an effective way of achieving a balance zone between the UN peacekeepers and the civilian population. In this context, a positive Brazilian Army approach when confronting the gangs in Haiti may lie on the fact that the functions to be carried out by the contingents, which are typically military, include humanitarian support works along with robust combat operations. Few States are able to provide innovative methodologies that are successful when dealing with diffuse problems as seen in the Haitian society. This article offers an analytical approach directed to the critical exposition of the practices of the Brazilian Army in Haiti, especially concerning the confrontation of gangs.



## Methodological considerations

This thesis is based on a research that was accomplished in two phases. The first phase was a bibliographical review with theoretical and conceptual focus, which supports each chapter of the thesis. The second phase comprises the research done in Brasília and in Rio de Janeiro with the Ministry of Defense, the Land Operations Command of the Brazilian Army, the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff College, and the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center. Throughout this phase, the “Brazilian Battalion Employment Final Reports” of each Brazilian Contingent that operated in Haiti were obtained and analyzed. There were only a few exceptions that will be mentioned later, applying content analysis. Moreover, interviews with Brazilian generals that commanded the military component of MINUSTAH, along with articles and studies of Brazilian officers who served in the mission, complement the analysis of the Final Reports.

The thesis that underlies this article aims to analyze the practices of confronting Haitian gangs consolidated in the ‘strategies’ of employment of the Brazilian Contingents in MINUSTAH. To this end, the Brazilian Battalion Employment Final Reports of the Brazilian Contingents that operated in Haiti for 10 years (from 1 June 2004 to 4 December 2014, in a total of 20 contingents) were obtained. It is important to highlight that the Final Reports of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, and 13<sup>th</sup> to 16<sup>th</sup> Contingents were not made available by the Ministry of Defense (The reports of BRABAT 2 - *Brazilian Battalion 2* - of the 14<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> Contingents are included in the researcher’s material). Thus, a total of ten reports could not be seen, which did not invalidate this analysis, since 16 others were checked. It is important to remark that after the earthquake in January 2010, from the 12<sup>th</sup> to the 17<sup>th</sup> Contingents, MINUSTAH started to have two Brazilian Battalions, with one Final Report each.

Table 1 - List of Employment Final Reports

CONTINGENT	REPORTED PERIOD	AUTHOR
2 <sup>nd</sup>	December 2004 - June 2005	General João Carlos Vilela Morgero
4 <sup>th</sup>	December 2005 - June 2006	Colonel Luiz Augusto de Oliveira Santiago
5 <sup>th</sup>	June 2006 - December 2006	Colonel Paulo Humberto Cesar de Oliveira
6 <sup>th</sup>	December 2006 - June 2007	Unavailable
7 <sup>th</sup>	June 2007 - December 2007	Colonel Julio Cesar de Sales
8 <sup>th</sup>	December 2007 - June 2008	Colonel Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz
9 <sup>th</sup>	June 2008 - December 2008	Colonel Pedro Antônio Fioravante Silvestre Neto
10 <sup>th</sup>	December 2008 - June 2009	Colonel Fernando Sampaio Costa
11 <sup>th</sup>	July 2009 - January 2010	Colonel João Batista Carvalho Bernardes
12 <sup>th</sup> - BRABAT 1	January 2010 - July 2010	Colonel Otavio Santana do Rêgo Barros
12 <sup>th</sup> - BRABAT 2	January 2010 - July 2010	Colonel Luciano Puchalski
14 <sup>th</sup> - BRABAT 2	February 2011 - September 2011	Colonel Henrique Martins Nolasco Sobrinho
17 <sup>th</sup> - BRABAT 2	December 2012 - April 2013	Colonel Sinval dos Reis Leite
18 <sup>th</sup>	June 2013 - November 2013	Colonel Zenedir da Mota Fontoura
19 <sup>th</sup>	December 2013 - June 2014	Colonel Anísio David de Oliveira Junior
20 <sup>th</sup>	June 2014 - December 2014	Colonel Vinicius Ferreira Martinelli

Source: elaborated by the author, based on the Employment Final Reports



These reports are confidential and have restricted circulation. Its availability was granted by the Brazilian Army High Command after one and a half year of negotiations and requests made by the author to the military units in charge (Ministry of Defense, Army High Command, Land Operations Command). On 30 April 2015, the author received the first part of the reports. The choice of the documents was done as the successive contacts with the military organizations were made, mainly the Land Operations Command (COTER, acronym in Portuguese), Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB, acronym in Portuguese) and the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff College (ECEME, acronym in Portuguese). Such units enabled a better understanding of the military practice, especially regarding the operational environment of missions and the way the military personnel report their activities.

In this context, the “Brazilian Battalion Employment Final Report” holds the most complete description of the events and the circumstances which involve the employment of Brazilian troops in Haiti. These documents comprise the *corpus* of the analysis, i. e., the set to be subjected to analytical procedures based on rules of comprehensiveness (it includes all field reports available so far), homogeneity (it refer to the object of this study) and relevance (the documents are suitable as source of information in order to match the goal that raises the analysis) (Bardin, 2011, p. 126-128).

Having as a reference the practices or activities of confronting the Haitian gangs by the Brazilian troops, one can outline as an index of the content analysis of the reports the “citation of opposing forces” (for example, gangs and former military personnel). The work of the military forces in MINUSTAH comprises the confronting of opposing forces. However, it is possible to soften its emphasis with the citations



in the report of “humanitarian support work” mentioning, for instance, “Social Civic Actions” (ACISO), “civil-military coordination” (CIMIC), “quick impact project” (QIP), “humanitarian aid”, “humanitarian action”, among others. In this context, the frequency that the words “gang” and “former military personnel” are softened by the terms that relate to “humanitarian support work” in the Employment Final Reports, serves as an indicator for the analysis of the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian troops and of the security situation, since the Reports describe the main operational activities of each contingent. The more references to the confronting of opposing forces are made, the more sensitive the security situation is. The more the humanitarian support work is emphasized, the more the military function will be deviated from its original one. Nevertheless, the better the security situation will be, as it may be the reason for the positive results of the confrontation of the opposing forces by MINUSTAH troops, including the Brazilian Contingents. The content analysis of these reports allows these hypotheses to be verified.

The theoretical and conceptual framework is divided into four sets of approaches and each one is presented in a specific chapter of this thesis. These chapters deal with conceptual aspects of the gangs issue in the Haitian society (Chapter 2), of the theoretical concepts of the UN peacekeeping missions (Chapter 3), of the strategic contemporary complex (Chapter 4) and of the institutional aspects of the involvement of Brazil with MINUSTAH (Chapter 5). These chapters contribute to the analysis made in chapters 6 and 7 which focus on the description of the operational experience of the Brazilian Contingents of MINUSTAH.

This article synthetically covers part of the discussion done in chapters 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the thesis. The analysis of the employment



final reports of the Brazilian Contingents enabled the identification of the Brazilian *modus operandi* that gathers actions of confronting opposite forces with the execution of humanitarian works. Moreover, the position of the Brazilian military personnel towards the critical Haitian scenario and the operational difficulties experienced by the MINUSTAH troops can be seen in the reports. The hypothesis of the Brazilian troops' operational versatility guides the analysis work whose result is discussed in the conclusion.

### **Haitian gangs: anomie and deviant behaviour**

The History of Haiti and the origin of the socio-structural crisis the country has been going through since its unsuccessful democratic transition are described in two important references: *The Prophet and Power* by Alex Dupuy (2007) and *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History* by Laurent Dubois (2012). The sociopolitical experience, the dilemmas of economy and the cooperation and intervention of the international community are elements which are usually attributed to the historical process that, in general, resulted in the chronic Haitian crisis. However, there are few published references that have built data on Haitian gangs. This article is based on the studies of Athena Kolbe (2013), David Becker (2011) and Robert Muggah (2010), and Dziedzic and Perito (2008).

The present data of Haiti show a convulsed society in its economic, political and social problems. According to Merton (1938), this poor cultural integration relates to the constant social convulsions and crime. The basic perspective of individual progress that boosts life in society is almost non-existent in the Haitian society due to the lack of institutional opportunities. As a result, there is social instability and pathological and antisocial behavior tendencies of many people and their representative bodies.





According to Merton (1938, p. 680-681), there is a correlation between crime and poverty. A consequence of poverty is the limitation of opportunities. Although there is not a clear cause that links poverty and social exclusion to armed violence in the great urban centers, in Haiti, as well as in Brazil, one can notice the association of these three factors (poverty, social exclusion and violence) that reinforce one another so as to constitute a hard-to-solve vicious circle. While each form of violence has its local impact, there are also national and global factors of the Haitian society that allow the use of the concept of anomie as a macrosociological explanation for the problem of gangs.

In Haiti, the democratic transition process which started in the late 1980's did not consolidate the state structures of support to the needs and expectations of the people. On the contrary, anomie, in this context, is the resulting instability of the breach of the regulatory order that ensures coexistence rules in society. Since the fall of Duvalier's dictatorship, various factions of the local elites have competed for the primacy in the State management, without guaranteeing, however, that this structure offers people legal and social support.

On one hand, Haiti lacks institutions that offer people equal opportunities for social mobility or the simple guarantee of rights, as seen in Merton (1938). On the other hand, as seen in Durkheim (1999, 2000), the lack of "normal" interactions between the Haitian State institutions and the population over time does not permit coexistence rules to be built, resulting in deregulation and the consequent state of anomie. Breaking this dysfunctional paradigm is a complex task which depends on the cooperation among the Government and Haitian institutions and the international community.

According to Kolbe (2013, p. 3), although the international community defines gangs as urban armed groups, for the Haitian



population they are “political associations”, “community groups” or simply “*bases*”. However, the specialized unit of the Haitian policy to deal with these groups is called “anti-gang unit”. According to Becker (2011, p. 141), the gangs usually take advantage of the people’s support, since they are considered guardians from an abusive government in terms of security. In this context, the gangs are self-sufficient units that grow when not confronted, mainly in a lenient environment of a weak State.

According to Becker (2011, p. 139-140), the Haitian gangs operate within a basic set of rules. They work as “entrepreneurs of violence” using the political instability to obtain money and power, thus recruit more supporters. These members may even include political benefactors who see in the gangs their ability to mobilize votes or to obstruct the electoral process. The evolutionary path of the gangs in Haiti followed a relatively linear progression. The gangs act to defend their space so that they can act with impunity. Once established in a zone, they form a base to expand their activities, especially kidnappings. These groups have easily consolidated their authority because since very early they have recognized the needs of the Haitian people. Therefore, they have built a network of social support for its members. In addition, there are few alternatives for unemployed young Haitians who are in those groups as a means of subsistence.

Anomie is a social dysfunction that needs to be addressed by, for example, encouraging the establishment of well-ordered social relations which over time can serve as a foundation or build institutions that meet the aspirations of ascension and social progress. Therefore, the desired stability needs initiatives which are able to promote attitudes prone to the sociopolitical and economic development of the nation.



The activities carried out by the Brazilian troops within MINUSTAH have encouraged changes of the population's attitudes towards the gangs, supporting and strengthening the Haitian institutions. It is a pioneer action in the United Nations peacekeeping operations which is seen in details in the next section.

## **The operational experience of the Brazilian contingents of MINUSTAH**

The mobilization of the “Brazilian Brigade”, 2<sup>nd</sup> Contingent, was from December 2004 to June 2005. The 1<sup>st</sup> Contingent had been prepared to act according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter. However, the worsening of the security situation, as described by the UN Secretary General<sup>3</sup> demanded the revision of the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian brigade. Then, they began to operate based on Chapter VII of the Charter from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Contingent on.

It is not possible to determine precisely if the posture of the operational troops of MINUSTAH, including Brazilian contingents, has any relation with the worsening of the situation in the field. Though, it is important to highlight that the operational force of the mission only reached the desired level assigned by the UN mandate after a year of mobilization. The Employment Final Report of the 1<sup>st</sup> Contingent was not made available for this analysis. However, the reduced personnel plus the wide area of responsibility of the Brazilian

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<sup>3</sup> In the 18 November 2004 report (S/2004/908), Kofi Annan claims that the security situation had worsened, mainly in Port-au-Prince (p.2). The main threat came from armed groups that defied and confronted the Transition Government. Violence was heavily present in the action of former military personnel that tried to assume HNP positions. There were mainly demonstrations for the ex-president Aristide with shootings and ways blocked in Port-au-Prince, especially in the slums of Bel-Air and Cité Soleil, considered strongholds of the ex-president's sympathizers.



Brigade brought operational consequences for the troops that needed to prioritize actions among the set of possible operations (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, Employment Final Report, 2<sup>nd</sup> Contingent, 2005, p. 26). It can be noted that since the beginning of the mobilization, the Brazilian troops needed to adapt their *modus operandi* to handle their area of responsibility.

According to General Augusto Heleno, interviewed by the author on 17 March 2011, the greatest doctrinaire contribution of the Brazilian Command in MINUSTAH to all the United Nations peacekeeping operations based on Chapter VII of the Charter, are humanitarian actions carried out by the military personnel, which contribute to obtain people's trust and solidarity actions with the local population. He admits that these assignments are not traditional tasks of the military forces. However, he points out that these measures, considering the absence or impossibility of others to operate in situations of crisis, would be an efficient way to balance the peacekeeping mission and the local population<sup>4</sup>.

The Employment Final Reports of the Brazilian Contingents of MINUSTAH show that this attitude of the Brazilian troops follows the operational guidance of the Force Commander and that humanitarian actions were conducted by the Brazilian Contingents even without support from the civilian command of MINUSTAH.

The employment of the troops was simultaneous in confronting actions and in humanitarian support works. It even happened in operations related to combating gangs. In previous UN peacekeeping

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<sup>4</sup> General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira in the lecture entitled "Peacekeeping Operation in Haiti". It was promoted by the Secretariat of Monitoring and Institutional Studies (SAEI, acronym in Portuguese) of the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Presidency of Republic (GSI/PR) that took place in Palácio do Planalto on 14 October 2005.



missions in Haiti, the troops did not have to deal with the gangs issue the way MINUSTAH had been performing. The knowledge that the opposing forces that the UN troops would fight were mostly composed of gangs was only learned when the troops were in the field and by means of their action. Thus, the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian Contingents needed to be adapted.

The Employment Final Report of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Contingent has not been made available for analysis. Such period can be considered a sort of *turning point* for MINUSTAH military operations. The risk of losing control in vital areas of Port-au-Prince imposed a more aggressive operational posture from the troops.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Contingent had to deal with the worsening of the security situation. Captain Marco Aurélio Gaspar Lessa (2007, p. 87), who could access the Employment Final Report of this period, claims that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Contingent of the Brazilian Battalion went to the operations area with the hard mission of substituting the Brigade during the electoral period in times of increasing violence in Port-au-Prince. The environment was unstable, authorities of MINUSTAH and of the United Nations, in New York, were uncertain in relation to the security conditions to hold the elections in 2005 and the Security Council was not confident about the extension of the mandate.

Quoting General Augusto Heleno, Major Rafael Novaes da Conceição (2014, p.6) says that the situation was so critical that the UN considered re-deploying its Multinational Interim Force (MIF), as in 2004, which would represent an enormous political-military failure for Brazil. The doctrines of employment of the Brazilian troops (that is, the know-how in operational terms) were crucial for the resumption of control and normalization of the Haitian governance. According



to Lieutenant-colonel Marcelo Chelminski Barreto (2007, p.63), there was not a specific doctrine for peace enforcement missions. Therefore, the actions were planned and carried out based on the doctrine of operations against irregular forces in urban environments. The maintenance of security was carried out by police-like operations with massive presence in the areas and implementations of civic-social actions (ACISO, acronym in Portuguese).

According to the Commander of the Brazilian Battalion,

the Brazilian experience in working humanitarian support activities along with military operations was a plus of this battalion in comparison with the other contingents. It was a visible fact that allowed the battalion to be treated differently in relation to the other forces (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, Employment Final Report, 4<sup>th</sup> Contingent, 2006, p. 28).

The Brazilian approach to the Haitian case may have “Brazilianized” the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC). The convergence of functions that are typical of civilians, but carried out by the military personnel, is added to the strategic design of the mission. It also includes protection of civilians and the military goal of acquiring people’s support to military operations. Therefore, the level of protection is likely to improve, related either to the civilian and military components or to the population itself. The practice of the civic-social actions and other services of humanitarian support done by the Brazilian troops in the UN-CIMIC context moves from an individual application of their own resources to be integrated to the broad range of the mission. This process does not occur without resistance from both parts. The military actors are conditioned to perform tasks that are exclusively military, whereas



the civilian components that act in peace missions tend to preserve their functions that originally would not be associated to strategic military objectives. Thus, the initiatives of the Brazilian Battalion in coordinating and searching for support in its actions with the civilian offices of MINUSTAH unveil the Brazilian practice.

The action of the Brazilian contingents aims to break the systemic domain of power the gangs have on the population. Therefore, the relevance of the humanitarian support works of the troops as there is “reluctance or resistance of some UN civilian agencies to work in pacified or stabilized areas, claiming lack of security” (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, Employment Final Report, 5<sup>th</sup> contingent, 2006, p.47).

As a consequence of the level of security achieved, the Brazilian troops intensified the CIMIC actions **“to accomplish the strategy of attracting the ‘hearts and minds’** of the people aiming to gain their trust and support the local leaders who were committed to the Haitians socioeconomic development” (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, Employment Final Report, 6<sup>th</sup> Contingent, 2007, p. 24, emphasis added in bold).

The operational success of the Brazilian troops in Haiti can be attributed to the work of the “Psychological Operations Section”, whose activities not only covered the internal public but also the Haitian people inside the Battalion’s operations area. Regarding the internal public, this Section monitored the operational activities of the subunits. They made motivational films and posters that had an important role in preserving the morale of the troops. Regarding the Haitian people, an opinion survey was done to have a precise view of the Haitians’ acceptance towards the work carried out by the Brazilian Battalion in all the operational areas. It also served as basis



for future operations. (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, Employment Final Report, 9<sup>th</sup> Contingent, 2008, p. 3)

The Brazilian propaganda not only guaranteed security to the operational area, but also contributed to the construction of an international image of the country as “*peacekeeper*”. According to Colonel José Ricardo Vendramin Nunes (2015, p. 6) Commander of the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB),

Brazil was decisively committed in Haiti. Since the beginning, the country has done more than just making the biggest military contribution or assuming leadership responsibilities of the Military Component. Brazil proposed projects of development, led political efforts, emphasized the requests for humanitarian donations, carried out diplomatic initiatives with the UN and acted firmly being a non-permanent member of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council). The Brazilian reputation as a benevolent country and committed to international peace was fairly reinforced in more than ten years of MINUSTAH.

The building of partnerships favors the distribution of efforts and humanitarian aid, thus making them more efficient. As the humanitarian support works started to take great part of the efforts of the Brazilian troops, this operational posture gained space and was consolidated after the earthquake. The coordination efforts in CIMIC go beyond the reach of civic-social actions, which have more limited implications, but which worked very well concerning the *modus operandi* of the Brazilian troops. The change in the scenario, instead of imposing a revision of the practices, was followed by the consolidation of the Brazilian humanitarian approach. As they were close to the people and the Haitian reality, the troops could be efficient in both the security and in humanitarian support.





From the analysis of Employment Final Reports, it can be inferred that MINUSTAH's forces, including the Brazilian contingents, have been successful in the stabilization of Haiti, despite the critical periods of the early years of mobilization, mainly from 2004 to 2007. The content analysis of the Employment Final Report of the 20<sup>th</sup> Contingent shows that a great part of the activities conducted by Brazilian troops in Haiti have humanitarian approach, although the Brazilian view of employment of humanitarian support works by the troops are done for strategic-military objectives.

The analysis of the Final Reports evidences the consolidation of two dynamics in terms of employment of the Brazilian troops in Haiti. On one hand, the pacification doctrines and the guarantee of law and order of the Brazilian Army adopted by the first Brazilian contingents proved to be effective for their use in UN peacekeeping missions. In case there was clear conformity between the operational environment and the reality for which the troops had been prepared. They lacked an appropriate doctrine to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Therefore, the use of domestic doctrine, even facing similarities and differences in the Haitian scenario if compared to the Brazilian reality, proved to be a right decision.

On the other hand, there was an improvement of the employment techniques. With a process of military instruction in the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center, they had to comply to the doctrinaire reality of the United Nations and their peacekeeping missions. This evolution is clear in the way each Employment Final Report describes many operational situations, mainly in relation to the approach to civil affairs and to the performance of the CIMIC activities.



In summary, the employment ‘strategies’ developed by the Brazilian military personnel in Haiti contributed to the triumph of MINUSTAH mission. It has been confirmed by the discussions about its reconfiguration to a possible mission of political nature. Concomitantly to the employment in Haiti, the Brazilian Government created a joint training center, CCOPAB, to debate and improve the experiences gained in the field. The approach and working methodologies of the Brazilian military personnel are internationally recognized nowadays. Thanks to the effort of qualified professionals, the Brazilian Government has means to promote itself now as a relevant actor to solve crisis and international conflicts that involve the employment of troops in areas plagued by poverty and in fragile States.

## **Conclusion**

This article analyzed the practices of confronting the Haitian gangs by the Brazilian contingents of MINUSTAH. To this end, the problem of gangs in the Haitian society was briefly checked based on the concept of anomie and the description of the operational experience of the Brazilian Contingents of MINUSTAH.

Since the second deposition of former President Aristide in 2004, the Haitian gangs have become centers for political disputes exerting strong pressure on the population through illicit means such as kidnapping, rape, arson, theft and trafficking, among other crimes. The instability caused by Haitian gangs represents an essentially structural problem of the Haitian society. Such problem has implications that do not relate to the context of security solely, but also to the profile of development of this society.



On one hand, the social practices of the Haitian citizens were not able to make rules that assured peace and social justice. Therefore, the state of anomie that contributes to a systemic instability of the Haitian Government remained. On the other hand, this lack of rules culminates with the constitution of dysfunctional institutions that do not provide tools for social mobility among Haitian citizens. Thus, it contributes to occurrences of behavioral pathologies that defy the existing standards even by means of delinquency. This perspective shows how the problem of gangs in the Haitian society is mostly structural. In the absence of official bodies, anomalously, these groups gain support from people when promoting means for social mobility among their members and social services for the unassisted citizens.

The Employment Final Reports of the Brazilian Contingents show how the troops tried to break the dysfunctional links that connected the gangs to the Haitian society through actions that combined coercive means to impose power and social and humanitarian impact activities. While coercive actions fought the dominance of the terror of the gangs, the social impact activities promoted means for emergency and humanitarian assistance in areas unassisted by the Haitian State. The UN operational doctrine clearly separates military actions from those to be carried out by the civilian component, which include humanitarian actions. However, the Brazilian confronting strategies added humanitarian and assistance functions to the military actions performed by the troops. The relevance of the action of the Brazilian troops to the positive results of the pacification of regions plunged in turmoil could only be noticed after the analysis of the Employment Final Reports of the Brazilian Contingents.

The UN official documents, as well as the Secretary General's reports, describe the implementation of humanitarian actions by the



troops, but do not point how this Brazilian practice was decisive for the mission success. It can be seen that, even though the strategic and doctrinaire conception of the UN in relation to the troops in Haiti prevails, in real practice, the Brazilian troops developed operations based on their own *modus operandi* with positive results for the mission as a whole. That does not mean that the Brazilian Contingents of MINUSTAH do not respond to the chain of command. It only shows that the operations in UN peacekeeping missions are sensitive to cultural and doctrinaire tendencies of the troop-contributing countries. The *Force Commander* of MINUSTAH is always a Brazilian general. Besides, the proactive posture of the Brazilian troops in operational terms is due to the fact that the country has the biggest military contingent deployed to Haiti and the Brazilian battalions are responsible for the most sensitive areas of the Haitian capital, among other reasons.

The content analysis of the Employment Final Reports show that the references of confronting the opposing forces had been decreasing over time. It reflects a significant improvement of the security in the field. Moreover, the content analysis shows a sharp increase of references to humanitarian support works carried out by the Brazilian troops, even before the earthquake in January 2010, which testifies the security improvement. In theory, acting in humanitarian support works can be a deviation of the original military function of the troops. However, in the case of Brazilian troops, the military aims to be achieved with this type of practice evidence that there is no deviation from the original military function, but the systematic employment of troops aiming to achieve positive results in terms of obtaining the so-called “human terrain” (the conquest of hearts and minds). The employment of psychological operations, in this context,



is a strong indicator that the use of force by the Brazilian troops in MINUSTAH incorporates more subtle elements of the motivational field. It aims to promote changes in people's attitude towards gangs and the UN forces acceptance by the Haitian society.

When the Final Reports mention the conquest of hearts and minds as a strategy of gaining the population's support to the activities of the Brazilian troops, it is clear how much the contingents worked to cause the change of attitude among the involved parts. The development of psychological operations was a natural consequence of the interpretation the Brazilian commanders had of the Haitian scenario. It is an efficient strategy to break the power of the gangs and to promote MINUSTAH and the institutions of the Haitian State.

As the troops lacked a specific doctrine to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in stabilization missions, the practices of confrontation of the Haitian gangs by the Brazilian troops were innovating. They proposed humanitarian actions to be developed by the military personnel, an operational posture supported by the Brazilian doctrines of guarantee of law and order and pacification.

Based on the doctrine of guarantee of law and order, the strategy of static points was applied to take back the control of regions affected in the Haitian slums. The doctrine of pacification, by the principle of people's support, envisions that the conquest of hearts and minds is essential to the success of the operations that aim to promote a safe environment, an increase of essential and infrastructure services, the right attitude and the good communication among the members of the military component and the local inhabitants where the actions happen.

It is the first Brazilian experience with use of force at the tactical level in a stabilization mission of the United Nations mainly governed



by Chapter VII of the Chart. The Brazilian participation is not only contributing with troops and the *Force Commander*, it comprises a great cooperation effort in many sectors such as agriculture, education and health. The approach adopted by the Brazilian troops in relation to the Haitian scenario of chronic instability presents characteristics that enable the country as provider of development and security solutions for crises in fragile States as Haiti.

It was the first time in the civilian academic environment that a research could access important reports of the Ministry of Defense that describe operational activities of troops that are still mobilized. Future studies can analyze the implications of the employment of psychological operations in United Nations peacekeeping missions to gain the locals' support, or how the civil-military coordination (CIMIC) is conducted in the Brazilian doctrine, as there is little literature on the subject.

Therefore, the Brazilian strategy for international integration has been successful in consolidating the reputation of regional leader and trustworthy partner because of its performance in MINUSTAH. Besides, the mobilization of contingents has contributed to the modernization of the Brazilian Armed Forces, ensuring that their personnel have a real combat experience. Brazil has a history of involvement with UN peacekeeping operations mainly guided by Chapter VI of the Chart. The participation in MINUSTAH marks an evolution of the Brazilian approach in relation to peace missions. Loyal to the tradition of moderate use of force based on the national doctrines of employment, the Brazilian troops demonstrated a high level of impartiality and reluctance to resort to violence in Haiti, what experts as Robert Muggah (2015, p. 14) call "*Brazilian way of peacekeeping*".



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