

Civil-Military Coordination in the Transitional Phase of Multidimensional Peace Operations: BRABAT 18 experience in Haiti¹

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Almost ten years after the creation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), its Transitional Phase started, having a gradual transference of the responsibilities, until then carried out by MINUSTAH, to the Haitian Government. As a consequence, kinetic operations aimed at maintaining a secure and stable environment, carried out by the military component, decreased slowly. This created the opportunity, why not say, the necessity, to increase nonkinetic operations, to facilitate the transition and empower the Haitian population so they can go on developing without the presence of a peace mission. In this context and within nonkinetic operations' scope, the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) actions have grown in figures and importance.

This article intends to present the CIMIC actions carried out the Brazilian Battalion (BRABAT 18) while the contingent was active in Haiti, as well as to show the contribution and importance of CIMIC to the transitional phase of peace operations.


Therefore, to start, there will be a brief explanation of what a Transitional Phase of a peace operation is. Afterwards, the doctrinal framework that guided and limited BRABAT actions, more specifically its CIMIC actions, will be presented. Later, there will be a brief address on MINUSTAH and on BRABAT, to finally reach the explanation of the CIMIC activities carried out, as well as their objectives and results achieved. During the conclusion, CIMIC contributions to the Transitional Phase of MINUSTAH and the possibilities of this form of nonkinetic operation for the Transitional Phase of peace operations in a broader spectrum will be presented.

THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The deployment of UN Peace Missions goes through 3 different phases¹, which can sometimes overlap, as seen in the picture below. These phases are:

- a) Rapid Deployment and Mission Start-Up;
- b) Mandate Implementation, and
- c) Transition/Hand-over and withdrawal/liquidation.

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
Deployment Phases of the Peace Missions²

The Transitional Phase itself must be planned during the initial planning of the mission, with the definition of specific references and benchmarks which mark out the beginning, so that the Transitional Phase do not jeopardize the ongoing efforts to consolidate peace, conquered during the Implementation Phase. There are no general benchmarks that can be used by all the missions; therefore, the participation of the UN System and of local actors in its definition is of great relevance.

In MINUSTAH's case, the planning that marked the beginning of the Transitional Phase was called "Consolidation Plan", and was published as an annex of the Secretary-General's report of 08 March 2013³. This Consolidation Plan, added in the beginning of the MINUSTAH military and police components' downsizing, marked the beginning of the Transitional Phase of the Mission.

DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK

The Civil-Military Coordination, in a broader sense, is guided by different legislations, publications and doctrines. As an example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has its own doctrine. The countries that make up this alliance also have their own national doctrines, which mirror NATO's doctrine. Many Humanitarian Organizations also have their own publication on the subject, and the UN does not have only one, but two doctrines which guide the coordination between civilian and military actors. They are all different according to the type of operations in which the organizations, or the countries, usually take part.



CIMIC Course at the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB), mandatory for military personnel to be deployed in certain functions in Peace Missions.

Specifically under the UN's scope in Haiti, the relations between these actors are guided by UN-CIMIC⁴ and UN-CMCoord⁵ doctrines. Besides these, two other publications provide the formal base for the execution of the Civil-Military Coordination activities in the country: Operations Order 001-12, of MINUSTAH – *Operation Demen Miyò* (A Better Tomorrow, in Creole); and the Directives for Civil-Military Coordination in Haiti, of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The first guides the military component in the execution of CIMIC activities and the second presents specific procedures, structures and mechanisms of UN-CMCoord for Haiti.

The Guidelines for the Civil-Military Coordination in Haiti, updated by OCHA and confirmed by the leaders of MINUSTAH civil, police and military components, besides the UN Country Team⁶(UNCT), and the Haitian Interior Ministry, bring important evolutions before its previous edition. The main evolution was the fact of having the participation and the consent of the Haitian Government. These specific guidelines for Haiti are based in the pre-existing international structure expressed in the Oslo Guidelines⁷, but with the necessary adaptations to the singularities of an "unique operational environment of natural disasters in times of peace, in an environment occasionally insecure⁸" which characterizes Haiti. Besides what is in the Oslo Guidelines, the specific guidelines for Haiti detail the existing mechanisms

at MINUSTAH to request Military Resources and Civil Defense (MCDA⁹) and the platforms of Civil-Military Coordination used by MINUSTAH.

However the UN-CIMIC doctrine, which addresses the Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peace Operations¹⁰, aims at the coordination of the military component activities with the civil component of the mission, and also with civilian actors present in the mission area and which are not in the peace operation, such as the UNCT, the local government at all levels, international organizations, non-government organizations and the population. CIMIC policy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations¹¹ specifies as CIMIC key activities: Civil-Military liaison and Information Sharing; and Civil Assistance. The first supports the efforts of the Force Commander¹² to implement the mission mandate, while the second is a support function that:

- provides support to guarantee a coordinated response of the mission to the assistance requests from humanitarian and development actors, and
- facilitates the interaction between the mission, the population and civil authorities, in relation to the community assistance projects carried out by the military component.

The same policy establishes two reasons to conduct CIMIC activities: support the management of interactions, at operational and tactical levels, between civil and military actors in all the mission's phases; support the creation of a favorable environment to implement the mission mandate, by maximizing the comparative advantages of all the actors operating in the mission area.

Therefore, the aforementioned policy provides the concepts and principles to carry out CIMIC activities in Peace Operations, having been used as the guiding principle of CIMIC activities of BRABAT. However, since it is a very concise document, NATO CIMIC doctrine¹³ and CIMIC Field Manual¹⁴ published by NATO's CIMIC Center of Excellence were also used, always taking into consideration that the information present in these documents should be interpreted and adapted to the reality of Peace Operations, which is very different from the operations usually carried out by that Alliance.

Besides these doctrines, as mentioned before, MINUSTAH Military Component was also led by Operations Order 001-12. This Operations Order is a comprehensive document which determined the maintenance of security in critical areas in our AOR, such as *Cité Soleil, Bel-Air, Bois-Neuf, Drouillard, Delmas, La Saline* and Fort National, as one of the BRABAT's specific tasks. The use of CIMIC activities in these areas, to support BRABAT's mission, will be addressed later. Operations Order 001-12 also put as the focus to the military component the perception of the value of MINUSTAH to the Haitian population.

Specifically for CIMIC, this Operations Order correctly identified CIMIC operations as "the most visible side of MINUSTAH", and a facilitator so that the Military Component could conquer the help and the trust of the population.

The understanding of the doctrinal framework that led and regulated BRABAT activities is fundamental to understand the direction given to CIMIC activities in the beginning of MINUSTAH's Transitional Phase.

MINUSTAH

There were several relevant changes in MINUSTAH immediately before and during the period when the 18th Contingent was deployed in Haiti, such as the issuing of the new mission mandate - which once again downsized its strength - the upcoming of elections and BRABAT's change of the Area of Responsibility (AOR).

The UN Secretary-General's report, of 31 August 2012, outlined the so-called "MINUSTAH's consolidation plan¹⁵", which intended to reduce the strength that had been increased after the earthquake in 2010. The goal of the plan was to reduce MINUSTAH's activities into a core set of mandatory tasks within a period of 4 to 5 years, according to the conditions of stability in the country. These evolutions in the stability of Haiti, still according to the referred plan, would show that "the presence of a big peace operation would not be necessary anymore¹⁶". That is, MINUSTAH's consolidation plan was in fact the landmark to the end of the implementation phase of the mission mandate and the beginning of the Transitional Phase, which had, in a certain way, started after the Resolution 2012 of the UN Security Council, October 2011, which decreased, for the first time, the strength of MINUSTAH since the earthquake in 2010. One of the clearest signs to the military component, that MINUSTAH was entering its transitional phase, was the definition of the end state¹⁷ foreseen by the Force Commander, which was "the transference of security responsibilities to the Haitian Government... allowing the downsizing and the withdrawal of the Military Component¹⁸".

On 12 October 2012, Resolution 2070 recognized the relative improvement of the security situation in Haiti, which allowed the continuity of MINUSTAH's downsizing. Due to this downsizing, two Engineering Companies - Japan and the Republic of Korea - and one Argentinean Infantry Company had already been withdrawn from MINUSTAH, and the withdrawal of 2 Infantry Companies from BRABAT 2 in July 2013 was already predicted. This fact led to the liquidation of BRABAT 2 and the expansion of BRABAT 1, which received the remaining company from that battalion, in addition to their 03 Companies and 01 Squadron. All these modifications in strength and the change from the implementation phase of the mandate to the transitional phase of the mission had as a consequence the change of the areas of responsibility of MINUSTAH's battalions, which created consequences to the CIMIC activities, as it will be seen later.

As to the political situation, besides the usual changes of strategic functions, such as the presidency of the Parliament (Deputies and Senators), maybe the fact of higher relevance has been the evolution of the electoral process which was already very delayed, and

threatened the stability and even the functioning of the political structure in Haiti, since the Legislative would be without quorum to work properly, with only one-third of its strength with valid mandates. The uncertainty towards the election dates and the struggle of the politicians to control the votes in certain areas inside the new BRABAT's AOR created negative consequences to the Battalion's activities, including CIMIC activities.

As to the security situation, one of the main consequences of the Consolidation Plan was the adoption of a more selective security posture, which focused the security activities of MINUSTAH on the support to the Haitian National Police (HNP), making it responsible for the rapid response to security incidents. The second level of intervention would be the UN Police's (UNPOL) responsibility and only the third level of intervention would be the military contingents' responsibility.

As to the humanitarian situation, there were still around 347,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) living in 450 camps in Haiti. These camps were mainly located in Port-au-Prince, in BRABAT's AOR. However, although it is still a high number, it represents the reduction of 77% in the number of IDPs since the earthquake in 2010. Haiti was also going through a cholera epidemic and a severe food insecurity which hit the population.

As MINUSTAH, the UNCT and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)¹⁹ were also starting the transitional phase of leadership of the coordination mechanisms to the Haitian authorities, as several publications from members of these teams prove.

During 2012, different political goals were achieved, which highlighted the progression of the stabilization process in Haiti. And the Transitional Phase, or consolidation, as called by MINUSTAH, went on.

BRABAT

Based on the facts presented and the documents which led BRABAT's participation in MINUSTAH, the guidelines of the 18th Brazilian Contingent command for CIMIC activities were issued. BRABAT should not start projects that would not realistically meet the deadline during BRABAT's deployment, that is, in a maximum period of 6 months. Moreover, only the UN contracts in which BRABAT was part of the deal, as a unit belonging to MINUSTAH military component, and not the present contingent, could be signed. This determination aimed at reducing the juridical insecurity to which BRABAT 18 and their members would be exposed even after the end of the contingent.

With the downsizing of MINUSTAH, the Brazilian contingent was not composed of 2 battalions anymore. From now on, it would be composed of only 1, having around 1,200 military personnel divided into 4 Infantry Companies, 1 Squadron, only 01 Support Company, supporting a doubled strength, besides the Staff. Thereat, General Bacellar Base where we were stationed, which had already many years of use, had its infrastructure overloaded, for

receiving a quantity of military personnel much higher than the previous contingents, as a consequence of the end of BRABAT 2, which made the Brazilian contingent be composed of only one Battalion with a strength of almost 2 battalions. That encumbered the engineering platoon of the Support Company. Therefore, there was not enough availability of qualified personnel and of engineering equipment, inside BRABAT, to support bigger CIMIC activities.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION AND CIMIC ACTIONS CARRIED OUT

The Civil Affairs Section (G9) of BRABAT 18 was made up of 3 officers, two Brazilians and one Canadian, one warrant officer and two assistant sergeants. There were also a Brazilian Navy Lieutenant Commander and a Canadian Army Lieutenant directly responsible for G9 finances.

From the analysis of the local situation in Haiti and of the phase in which the mission was, from the observance of the doctrinal framework and of BRABAT Commander's guidelines, which led G9 performance, the following goals for our deployment period were defined:


1. Change the culture of the Brazilian Army military personnel that CIMIC and ACISO are synonyms;
2. Develop a data base of the Human Terrain of our AOR, trying to facilitate future operations;
3. Decrease the quantity of ACISO activities carried out for the population and increase the quantity of projects that would involve the transference of knowledge and capacities to the Haitian people;
4. Increase liaison and information sharing between BRABAT and civil actors, specially UN agencies, international organizations, Haitian government agencies and NGOs present in our AOR, and
5. Empower the subunits' (SU) command and transfer the leadership of CIMIC activities to these commands.

The change in the culture that the Brazilian Army had on CIMIC started in the preparation phase in Cuiabá and the main point that would define or not the success of the other objectives. In the Brazilian Army, CIMIC is usually interpreted as being the same thing as a Civic-social Action²⁰, which is not correct. This change in culture would increase and put in the right direction the necessary support of BRABAT's command to execute G9 activities. As mentioned, during the preparation phase, a campaign to revise the concepts of the military personnel in the contingent was initiated. First, by CCOPAB, during the Civil-Military Coordination Course for military personnel assigned to carry out functions directly linked to

CIMIC activities in Haiti. From then on, an informal campaign through personal dialogues with military personnel involved directly or indirectly in CIMIC activities was done, which lasted during the whole deployment of the contingent. Even making all this effort, it was noticed during the whole mission that, despite the correct knowledge on the purpose and UN-CIMIC doctrine, many military personnel still had difficulties to translate this knowledge into CIMIC practical actions. They were still stuck to the types of activities used in ACISO. However, in general, this effort for change in culture had a considerable success. By the end of the mission, basically all BRABAT Staff military personnel already showed the correct conceptual and purpose knowledge of CIMIC.

During the preparation phase, the difficulty to execute plannings for future G9 activities, when we were deployed in Haiti, was also noticed. This difficulty was due to the lack of the centralization of the updated information on the situation of the country and, mainly, on the "human terrain" where we would perform. The information on our AOR were related to kinetic or intelligence operational activities, and not specific to the performance of CIMIC activities. There was not a single document having all the information we would need to base our planning on. The documents previously produced specifically for CIMIC activities, due to the constant change of BRABAT's Area of Responsibility (AOR) and to the different challenges faced by previous contingents, needed this updating. Therefore, still in Cuiabá, a new Area Strategic Study (LEA, acronym in Portuguese) to our new AOR was started.

The format, the content and the execution of LEA were based on 2 main documents: The CIMIC Field Manual²¹ of NATO's CIMIC Center of Excellence and the Doctrinal Coordination Note nr 02/2012, of the Brazilian Army Doctrine Center²². The study was organized in 6 main fields: Political, Security, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information. The data of each of these fields were collected and analyzed through the process known as ASCOPE (Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events). The necessary information was collected by BRABAT subunits (SUs) and analyzed and compiled by G9. LEA also includes information on the mission mandate, Haiti's History, its geography and climate, as well as the humanitarian situation and the main humanitarian agencies and their performance in the country. As annexes, data as an analysis of stakeholders, mechanisms and platforms of MINUSTAH civil-military coordination, ways to finance CIMIC activities and best practices were included. After knowing BRABAT's LEA, the Civil Affairs Section of the Military Component of MINUSTAH (U9), determined the whole military component carried out the strategic study of their AORs, using BRABAT's study as a model. The execution of a broad and standardized LEA grows more in importance due to the changes in the AOR of the MINUSTAH military component battalions. This must continue happening at each downsizing of the mission, until its end, facilitating the adaptation of the military contingents to their new AORs.



G9 military personnel follow patrols as part of their efforts to the Area Strategic Study of the new BRABAT's AOR.

As to the type of activities carried out, despite the necessity to decrease activities of ACISO in favor of an increase in CIMIC activities, per se, their extinction was not recommended. ACISO is characterized by activities of short duration, usually of one day, that are very simple to be planned and executed. This allows BRABAT to quickly act, or react, to any military necessity, besides providing direct contact of the soldier with the population in a less formal or stressing situation, as during the patrols. It also allows the battalion to carry out an immediate support to community leaders, always in consonance with a military goal. Besides, they give visibility to MINUSTAH and to BRABAT and increase the perception, by the Haitian population, of MINUSTAH's values, increasing the support of the population towards the mission. These ACISO activities have immediate impact, since the population takes advantage of the donation of food and potable water, of medical and dental treatment etc. However, it has a short term result, since on the next day, the population will need food and water again, and there are not enough means to give this support on a daily basis.



G9 Military Personnel Talk to Community Leaders

However, with the beginning of the transitional phase and with the mission coming to an end, it was necessary to intensify the execution of projects that would transfer knowledge and capabilities to the Haitian people, so that it could follow its social and economic evolution without the presence of a UN peace mission. Differently from ACISO activities, these projects are of more complex planning and execution, involving several sections of the battalion's staff and, many times, even civil organizations. Moreover, its impact is not immediate, but has long term effects. Many of these ideas for these projects were created by the population itself. Many times, community leaders who expressed the population's interest for professionalizing courses to facilitate entering the labor market looked for the command of the subunits. Therefore, several courses were carried out, prioritizing areas where the violence rate was higher, as well as the areas prioritized by Operations Order 001-12 of MINUSTAH, previously mentioned. The students of the courses were selected by the community leaders or by the Haitian authorities since many of the students came from the Haitian National Police (HNP). Before coming back to Brazil, we realized that some students of our courses were already working, some were even hired by international organizations.



Opening Ceremony of Community First Responder Course, organized by BRABAT at the Base of the 2nd Company.

As to the increase of liaison and information sharing between BRABAT and civilian actors, still at the preparation in Cuiabá, we established contact with the official of Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) from OCHA, with whom I had already worked with. Due to that, our interaction with humanitarian organizations in Haiti was easier, since she was our main - and in terms of doctrine, the correct²³ - liaison source with these organizations. From the establishment of this direct relation between BRABAT and OCHA, our liaison and information sharing with civil organizations, especially with UN agencies and humanitarian agencies, was broadened and strengthened. We immediately started the planning to carry out a project together with OCHA, UNICEF and CVR²⁴, to distribute water filters in *Cité Soleil*, in support to international effort of combat against cholera in Haiti. The project - which evolved later, including several other partners and serving as a model for distributions of water filters all over Haiti - allowed us to interact and share information with UN agencies, national and international humanitarian NGOs and Haitian government agencies. These interactions were crucial so we could access and use resources that we did not have or could not acquire, and allowed the humanitarian actors to have access to areas where they did not usually develop projects due to fears towards security of their employees. It was an experience where all the participants had benefits, especially, the Haitian population.

We also established partnership with a Brazilian religious humanitarian organization that had already been in Haiti for some time. We supported a project led by them, but carried

out in coordination with the leading organization of the CCCM (Camp Coordination and Camp Management) Cluster²⁵, for the total relocation of an IDP camp which included the construction of houses and taking professionalizing courses and educational lectures. The purpose of this partnership was to support the international community in the efforts to decrease the population that still lived in IDP camps. They were characterized by lack of sanitation, hygiene and by criminality. The military objective was to decrease the quantity of IDP camps inside BRABAT's AOR, thus, decreasing the possibility of breakout of diseases and the violence rate.

As to the empowerment of SUs command, requests for support done by community leaderships straight to G9, via phone calls or non scheduled visits to General Bacellar Base, were eliminated. We noticed that these facts brought up too much confusion and got in the way of coordination and the prioritization of CIMIC activities. They also made that the SU responsible for the AOR became only an executing team of CIMIC activities, which made difficult the coordination itself of the SU's activities and alienated them from the decisive process to prioritize these activities. The solution came through the decentralization and the empowerment of the SU in all matters related to CIMIC. All community leaders who tried to make requests directly to G9 were not attended, but they were directed to the command of the SU responsible. Therefore, we created a straight liaison and encouraged the establishment of trust relations between the leaders and the SU command. Moreover, the prioritization of activities and its planning were the SU command's responsibility. G9 members were facilitators, coordinators and mentors of the activities carried out by the SUs. During the 18th Contingent, few activities were imposed to the SUs by the Civil Affairs Section, which was done only in case there were projects executed directly by the Section or in case of broader activities, carried out in coordination with kinetic operations. Even the professionalizing courses carried out by BRABAT had a high degree of decentralization, especially in the choice of the beneficiaries, which was done by the SU in coordination with community leaderships. The main results reached were: the increase in the interaction between the SU command and the community leaderships, enhancing the trust of these leaderships towards the SU commander; the simplification of the coordination and prioritization of activities; and the empowerment of the SU, which increased the speed with which the demands of the population were met, in accordance with military interests of BRABAT.



A G9 military person (R) and the SU deputy commander responsible for the AOR (L) observe the beginning of the blockade of a street in protest against the conditions of hygiene in the area, and get ready for negotiation.

One of the biggest, or maybe the greatest difficulties we face in Haiti, was the lack of resources for CIMIC activities. In direct military interventions in foreign countries, as the interventions of coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a total political commitment of the countries with the military operation and with the situation of the population. This commitment comes, in part, from the obligations related to the situation of occupation of countries and territories, regulated by Articles 42 to 56 of Hague Conventions²⁶ and by Articles 27 to 34 and 47 to 78 of the Fourth Convention of Geneva, but also from the interest of the occupying forces in "conquering hearts and minds" of the population, aiming at facilitating the operation and increasing the security of the troops. However, in peace missions there is not this total political commitment from the countries who contribute with their troops to the UN. Although international laws can be applied in Peace Operations, the organization responsible and representative of troop contributing countries is the UN itself. The contributing countries, then, do not see themselves as responsible for activities which aim at guaranteeing enough patterns of hygiene and public health, as well as the provision of food and health care to the population. It is not the case going into details as to the validity and applicability of international law in Peace Operations, since there are different opinions and interpretations of the subject, and this is not the object of this article. What interests is that there is not, necessarily, the interest and the commitment of the governments of the troop contributing countries with activities aiming at supporting the local population and at

conquering "hearts and minds", since they will not be the direct beneficiaries of these conquests.

Not having resources from the Brazilian government, through BRABAT, for CIMIC activities, we had to look for other ways of financing. The possibilities we found were through the establishment of partnerships with international civil organizations, which had resources, and through the request of financial resources through the presentation of projects to MINUSTAH. Between them, two types of projects were possible: Quick Impact Projects (QIP)²⁷, financed by MINUSTAH's Civil Affairs Section, which had the capacity to finance projects of up to 100 thousand dollars; and Sensitization Projects²⁸, financed by CVR²⁹, which had the capacity to finance projects of up to 2,500 dollars. We could not execute QIPs, since the cycle of these projects varies from 04 to 10 months, and we were not supposed to hand over any project to the next contingent. We were, then, limited to the release of small amount of money to carry out sensitization projects. This was basically our only source of financial resources for CIMIC activities.

Still, although they were a trustful source of resources, the sensitization projects added another factor that made our work difficult: bureaucracy. A study done during the contingent by the Canadian first lieutenant, responsible for G9 finances, revealed that in these projects, which lasted between 08 and 14 weeks, only 15% of the time was related to the primary activities that would benefit directly the Haitian population. The rest of the time was used in bureaucratic activities related to the project. In summary, much time was used in relation to the benefits delivered to the population.

Another difficulty met was the lack of functional experts and of female military personnel in G9. The functional experts provided great knowledge and due advisory and guidance in their respective fields. Specifically in Haiti, it would be of great importance to have functional experts in the areas of water, sanitation and hygiene, civil engineering and child education, which were the areas we acted the most. And the importance of having a female military person in G9 is due to the necessity of the opportunity to interact with Haitian women, since they are either community leaders or only people in need. There was some fear, from Haitian women, to go to Brazilian bases or even to talk with our military personnel in public. The presence of a female military person would facilitate this approach and a bigger inclusion of women in BRABAT's CIMIC activities.

However, other aspects made our performance easier. First, we did not inherit any projects from the previous contingent, which ended them before the rotation of the contingents. That gave us great freedom to develop our own projects, with no restrictions. However, maybe the most important part was the work developed by all the previous contingents, not only in CIMIC, but in the broadest possible sense. We could enjoy total trust and sympathy from the Haitian population. All our initiatives were seen in a positive way and were well received by the population. This facilitated the approach of our soldiers towards the Haitians and established a mutual relation of trust and respect. We were always the first, and many times the only military contingent searched by the population for requests related to civil affairs not related to security. When we could not help because the requesting institution

was outside our AOR, the community leaders would simply give up, instead of looking for support from the one responsible for the AOR, due to the trust they had on BRABAT. In summary, their hearts and minds had already been conquered by the continuous effort of 17 contingents which came before us.

CONCLUSION

From the above, we can conclude that the nonkinetic operations, especially Civil-Military Coordination, grow in importance in the Transitional Phase of Peace Operations. That happens due to the fact that, with the downsizing of military personnel and the progressive transition of the responsibilities of security to the local government, the work of the military component to carry out large scale operations is decreased in its capacity and progressively withdrawn. Bigger and bigger areas of responsibility to smaller and smaller contingents demand the adoption of passive measures of security maintenance, as a complement to the active measures. Among these passive measures, we can include the economic and social local development, which can, in small scale and locally, be encouraged by the military contingent. Conquering the support of the population also increases security of the troop involved directly in activities of patrolling.

In the Transitional Phase, the focus of CIMIC operations must be the transference of knowledge and abilities to the population, so they can carry on their social and economic development without the presence of the peace mission. The transference of leadership of the projects and activities to the local population, or to governmental institutions, such as city halls and specialized agencies, must also be a priority. They do have the long term obligation to care for their people and their community, and must be committed towards the interests and necessities of local communities. Only this transference of leadership and responsibility will enable the military component to be withdrawn from the mission with tranquility and security, and decrease the possibility of the reappearance of conflict and local dependency of the peace mission.

So this happens in a smooth and controlled way, it is necessary, first, to know the terrain where you are operating in detail, especially the "human terrain". It is also necessary that there is coordination with the other components of the peace mission and with civilian actors in general, since all the ones involved somehow with the transition of the mission, and many are planning and carrying out their own strategies to leave the country. With the increase of liaison and information sharing, it is possible to integrate and coordinate the activities of the actors present in the AOR, aiming at facilitating and potentializing the activities of each one.

In the case of Haiti, BRABAT's contribution to the transitional phase of the mission, through CIMIC activities, were:

- The creation, or the updating, of mechanisms, processes and documents to develop knowledge of the "human terrain" by MINUSTAH;
- The increase and encouragement of liaisons and information sharing with civilian actors, which enabled the coordination of activities and the correct and efficient execution of supporting projects towards the population, and
- The transference of knowledge and abilities to the Haitian population, aiming at their economic and social development, and the decrease of its dependency towards MINUSTAH.

Moreover, CIMIC activities contributed to the maintenance of the image of the troop before the Haitians, which was sometimes tarnished due to restrictions imposed to our performance, which could only happen after the intervention of HNP and UNPOL. To the population, it was difficult to understand why our troops did not intervene immediately in certain situations. This could create misunderstandings and mistrust. But this was all mitigated through CIMIC actions and through the increasing trust and interaction between the community leaders, the population in general, and the Brazilian contingent.



Photo taken of one of the Community First Responder Course carried out by BRABAT

Despite the difficulties, we were always motivated by the conquests we inherited from previous contingents and constantly motivated by the will and the dedication to the stabilization cause in Haiti. The possibility of taking part in international efforts to improve

the life conditions of the Haitian population, and the deep feeling of accomplishment, gave us the energy whenever weariness fell upon us.

At the end of the mission, the objectives proposed had been met, within the possibilities and limitations - especially time - which marked out our performance. Much was done by few in little time. By the end of our deployment, we had modified and increased the knowledge on CIMIC by BRABAT 18 military personnel, ended our new Area Strategic Study, decreased the quantity of ACISO activities and increased the number of CIMIC activities, increased and encouraged liaison and information sharing with civilian actors, and empowered and transferred leadership of CIMIC activities to the SUs command. That is, we had accomplished all the G9 defined objectives before the mission.

¹ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Department of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), 2008, p.61.

² United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Department of Field Support 2008, Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, New York.

³ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (S/2013/139*).

⁴ UN-CIMIC definition: "... a military function that contributes to facilitate the interface of the military component and the civil component of an integrated mission, as well as humanitarian and development actors in the mission area to support UN Mission goals". (Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC), Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010).

⁵ UN-CMCoord definition: "The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals". Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines), Revision 1.1, November 2007.

⁶ UNCT is composed of all UN agencies (plus the International Organization for Migration - IOM) present and operating in a certain country.

⁷ Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines), Revision 1.1, November 2007.

⁸ Guidelines for Civil-Military Coordination in Haiti, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, July 2013.

⁹ MCDA (Military and Civil Defense Assets).

¹⁰ Characterizes a UN Integrated Mission when in the country or region, a UN Multidimensional peace mission (made up by a military component, a police component (UNPOL) and one or more civil components), besides a United Nations Country Team (which is made up of UN agencies that are not part of the peace mission).

¹¹ "Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions", October 2010.

¹² Head of Military Component-HOMC.

¹³ Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation (AJP-3.4.9), Edition A Version 1, February 2013.

¹⁴ CIMIC Field Handbook, Civil Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence, 3rd Edition.

¹⁵ The plan established key-goals in the following areas: HNP development, Construction of Electoral Capacity, Rule of Law and Human Rights, and Governance.

¹⁶ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (S/2012/678), August 2012.

¹⁷ End State.

¹⁸ Operations Order 001-12, Operation *Demen Miyò* (Operation Better Tomorrow), May 2013.

¹⁹ Humanitarian Country Team. Made up by relevant UN agencies and by humanitarian organizations operating in the country, which submit themselves to a coordination by the UN.

²⁰ "Set of activities of temporary, episodic or programmed character of assistance and support to communities promoting the civic and community spirit of the citizens, in the country or abroad, developed by the military organizations of the Armed Forces, in the different levels of command, making the most of the resources in personnel, materiel and techniques available to solve immediate and urgent problems. Besides the assistance character, it is also inserted as civil affairs and collaborates in psychological operations". *Manual de Campanha, Operações em Ambiente Interagências* (EB20-MC-10.201). Brazilian Army.

²¹ CIMIC Field Handbook, Civil Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence, 3rd Edition.

²² Civilian Considerations in the Situational Study of the Tactical Commander, 20 December 2012.

²³ OCHA has the mandate to coordinate the efforts of the humanitarian community all over the world, including the humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination.

²⁴ Community Violence Reduction, MINUSTAH's section for the Reduction of Violence in the Communities, considered the 2nd generation of DDR.

²⁵ Cluster is the representative term for a group of humanitarian organizations linked by a common activity. They are volunteers to take part in a centralized coordination. Eg.: All the organizations that work with water, sanitation and hygiene are grouped (if voluntary) in the Water, sanitation and Hygiene Cluster, also known as WASH Cluster..

²⁶ Annex to the Hague Convention (IV), Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907.

²⁷ Quick Impact Project.

²⁸ *Proposition de Sensibilisation*, in MINUSTAH's official term in French.

²⁹ Same as 21.

BIO

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