

# TALLER MINUSTAH 10 AÑOS

## 2004–2014



11 a 15 / Agosto  
Itaipava – Rio de Janeiro



**CCOPAB**  
Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Brasil  
CENTRO SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO  
RIO DE JANEIRO



## FINAL REPORT

### **1. OUTREACH**

The Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB) carried out a workshop on the 10 successful years of MINUSTAH, in which military personnel from countries that take part in the mission in Haiti participated. CCOPAB arranged all the necessary training and administrative agreements for the meeting which took place from 11 to 15 of August, 2014, in General Ernani Ayrosa Center (CGEA) in Itaipava, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

### **2. PURPOSES**

- Present to the guest countries how the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was important over the last 10 years.
- Emphasize the best training practices and lessons learned during this last decade.
- Have specialists share their field experience.
- Discuss relevant contemporary issues on MINUSTAH, as well as its development over the last 10 years.
- Emphasize the training needs, especially, the pre-deployment one.
- Share experiences, related to MINUSTAH, gathered by the guest countries.

### **3. BACKGROUNG**

MINUSTAH was established on 01 June 2014 by Resolution S/RES/1542 (2004) of the Security Council. This UN mission succeeded a Provisional Multinational Force (PMF) authorized by the Security Council in February 2004, after BERTRAND ARISTIDE went to exile. At that time, the armed conflict was already spread in several cities around the country.

The devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010, in which more than 220,000 people (according to data of the Haitian government) died, including 96 UN soldiers, was a hard blow to the country's economy and infrastructure, which were already unstable. The Security Council, in its Resolution 1908 of 19 January 2010, attested the Secretary General's recommendation for increasing MINUSTAH's general allocation to support the immediate work for recovery, reconstruction and stability of the country.

Since the presidential elections in 2011, MINUSTAH works in the country to accomplish its mandate to establish a stable and secure environment in which it can develop a political process, strengthen the institutions of the Haitian government, support the constitution of a rule of law and promote and protect human rights.

### **4. PRELIMINARY LECTURES**

#### a. Brazil and the UN Peace Operations

##### 1) Lecturer

Mr. BRUNO NUNES BRANT.

##### 2) Position

Chief of the Department Director's Office and Brazilian Representative in the United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

3) Mr. Bruno Brant presented a brief historical review of the Brazilian participation in UN Peace Operations. He stressed the performance of the Brazilian missions such as MINUSTAH, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and highlighted the work done by Brazilian employees in UN departments. He also mentioned different matters related to the theme, as follows:

- The evolution of the peace missions' paradigm: from the traditional missions to the multidimensional ones; and the increasing complexity of the mandates.

- The budgetary questions: the imposed restrictions by the financial difficulties; and the creative arrangements to keep peace despite the budgetary restrictions (hybrid missions with the international regional organisms).

- The withdrawal of MINUSTAH military component and the possible end of the mission: the evolving possibilities of the mission in relation to the downsizing of the Military Component up to its total extinction; and Special Political Missions vs. Peacekeeping Missions: Brazil's position in this theme.

- The world context and the United Nations relations in this theme. He emphasized the current context in the North of Africa, considered by him as "very hard".

- One of the greatest difficulties of the UN, and that also challenges it, would be the decision making of the problems in the world and its real contribution to peace.

- The UN deploys in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) a small fraction in relation to military operations around the world.

- There is a great difficulty in obtaining the financial support from permanent member states.

- The Special Political Missions (SPM), a new modality, are being used with greater frequency since they require less financial support from permanent members. There is a considerable "reserve" in the use of this new method which does not require the presence of the troops. Besides, the SPMs curtail the participation of Latin America for being very political. Going on with the theme, he mentioned that in the Department of Political Affairs, there is a "certain difficulty" in obtaining contacts since it is basically composed of civilians.

#### 4) Remarks

The presentation has shown itself as essential as a reference to future discussions in relation to the possible scenarios that will show up due to the gradual downsizing of the Military Component until its total extinction.

##### b. The Implementation of the Mandate

###### 1) Lecturer

General Augusto HELENO Ribeiro Pereira

###### 2) Position

First MINUSTAH Force Commander (FC).

3) General HELENO stressed the period while commanding MINUSTAH, as follows:

- The transition between the Multinational Force and MINUSTAH: the difficulties in the beginning of the mission, above all the generation and availability of the force in the Area of Responsibility (AOR), from "scratch"; and the importance of the command handover between the Commander of the Interim Force and the FC of the Mission.

- The development of the FC's activities: the difficulties imposed by the lack of uniformity in the operational performance among the several subordinated contingents; the importance of respect for cultural diversity and gender issues; the necessity to have the adequate capacity to manage civil affairs.

- The UN made a serious mistake which is lack of development projects for Haiti.

- The checkpoints were very vulnerable, exposed and with little protection to the military personnel. This situation "got better later".

- One of the most relevant topics is the knowledge of English, French and Spanish. The first two are essential since they are UN official languages and Spanish due to the fact that many Latin American military personnel are in the mission, which strengthened even more the friendly bonds and promoted contacts during the mission.

- Brazilians are very touched by the reality of the Haitians as they experience the same situations in several parts of Brazil ("Familiarity with the problems").

- The key idea "Conquering minds and hearts" is extremely important to the mission.

- Women and children are used as "human shields" by members of gangs in Haiti.

- The first contingents used Chapter VI. Afterwards, it was altered to Chapter VII. The first contingents suffered intense pressures from the Government and the media against the presence of Brazilian troops in Haiti.

#### 4) Remarks

The presentation emphasized to all participants the perspective of the first FC of the mission in relation to the challenges of beginning the Military Component's (MC) mission and the implementation of the mandate. Therefore, it was possible to recognize the points to which the contingents must pay special attention in order to contribute to the accomplishment of the mandate (operational training and procedures; and conduct issues).

##### c. The role of MINUSTAH Military Component during the 2010 Earthquake

###### 1) Lecturer

Lieutenant General FLORIANO PEIXOTO Vieira Neto

###### 2) Position

MINUSTAH Force Commander from April 2009 until April 2010.

3) General Floriano Peixoto made remarks about his command in the MINUSTAH which was marked by the earthquake in 2010, and here are the ideas presented:

- The earthquake:

\* Total collapse of the Haitian Governmental institutions and MINUSTAH Civil Component;

\* The operational readiness of the MC and its capacity not only to substitute the civil component but also to support national authorities: the importance of maintaining high operational, logistics and leadership standards;

\* The importance to centralize the coordination of efforts in attention to emergency events or of great commotion: the creation of a Joint Operations Tasking Center;

\* The complexity to coordinate Humanitarian Assistance coming from different sources, including extra-mission military forces;

\* The importance to keep, under FC's control, security activities inside the AOR, even with the presence of Humanitarian Assistance military forces inside it; and

\* The quick development of capabilities not previously planned to deploy in the mission (search and rescue, for example).

- The general pointed out the excellent work carried out by the Uruguayan Maritime Component.

- All the structure of the Haitian Government was destroyed during the earthquake. Several MINUSTAH's employees, during the earthquake, were appointed to act as government representatives. The Military Component had an important and crucial participation to trigger these roles during post-earthquake activities. The

“coordination” factor was the most important at that moment. It was possible to develop a “Response Plan”.

- The capacity to operate in different roles by the peace forces was highlighted as positive. Several military members performed different roles in which most of them were different from their actual formation/capacity.

4) Remarks

The presentation showed all the participants the importance of the right coordination of efforts towards emergency events, of the maintenance of the command unit in such situations and of the maintenance of operational and logistical readiness of the contingents.

d. Current Situation and Mission Perspectives

1) Lecturer

Major General Anisio DAVID Junior Oliveira

2) Position

BRABAT Commander from December 2013 to June 2014.

3) General David, BRABAT 19 Commander, addressed the present situation in Haiti and the possibilities for the future, in which he highlighted:

- The profile change of the mission:

\* The importance to understand, as quick as possible, the change in the scenario and translate it into operational changes in the tactical level;

\* The necessity to not interfere in the role of civilian actors (NGOs, governmental organizations etc.); stressing the relevance of CIMIC operations; and

\* The follow-up of the possible destinies of the mission.

- The formation of the Haitian National Police (HNP) will continue.

4) Remarks

The presentation, besides addressing the present phase of the mission, with special attention to the relations between the MC and the civilian organizations (especially the NGOs), also addressed the evolution of the mission up to its possible end in a very detailed way. It allowed the participants to do a precise analysis of the reflexes, of the deployment and training of troops of contributing countries and of each possibility of the destiny of the mission already visualized.

## 5. PRESENTATION OF THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES ON MINUSTAH

a. Guatemala

Topic: GUAMPCOY training during the ten years of the mission

- GUAMPCOY training during the ten years of the mission;

- Background;

\* Guatemala starts its participation in peacekeeping operations after 36 years of internal armed conflict. From October 28, 2004 to June 20, 2005, it deploys its first military police contingent.

- MINUSTAH Pre-deployment process (Drafting, Selecting, Integrating, Equipping, Training and Deploying).

- PKO Training - to reach the training standards according to the modules established by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

b. Argentina

Topic: Battalion, Hospital and Aviation Training at CAECOPAZ

- Phases of the pre-deployment training;

- IMARA – HMR Training; and

- Aspects to be considered in the training.
- \* Disciplines "Zero Tolerance" (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse - SEA, Conduct, Gender), Rules of Engagement - ROE, Security Measures, Handling and Cultural Diversity.
- \* Updating the contents (experiences).
- \* Lessons learned and data base.
- \* Conclusions
  - planning flexibility (consider new topics);
  - the training is not adjustable;
  - importance of the mobile teams in reorienting;
  - that aspects may not fail;
  - evaluation standards and the importance of internal evaluation; and
  - updating and lessons learned.

c. Uruguay

Topic: The Training of the Uruguayan Battalion for MINUSTAH and its Employment

- PKO National System;
  - \* Assets on the terrain: Military Observers, Staff Officers, Police Observers and Military Component (02 Infantry Battalions, 01 Engineering Company, 01 Maritime Patrol Unit, 01 Aviation Support Unit, 01 Helicopter Unit, 08 Medical Units Level 1 and 10 Water Treatment Plants).
  - Characteristics of the forces;
  - Evolution of the national contingent;
  - Force generation and training process;
  - Aspects to be considered when giving instructions; and
  - \* Weather, Cultural Aspects, Humanitarian Assistance, Civic Actions, Public Relations and Negotiation and Quick Impact Projects
  - Training/operations evolution.
  - \* Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT), Combined Operations, Operations with United Nations Police (UNPOL)/Formed Police Unit (FPU), Election Support, Riot Control, Border Control.

d. Brazil

Topic: BRABAT training for MINUSTAH

- Introduction
- \* Historic participation and MINUSTAH; and
- \* Brazilian participation in UN Peacekeeping operations;
- Training system
- \* Training contingents is guided by semiannual guidelines;
- \* A Regional Military Command is designated as responsible to support the training;
  - \* Training program (individual and collective skills, training based on the general UN content, specific training for peace missions, exercises in the field and deployment/accomplishment of the UN peace mission);
  - BRABAT Preparation Cycle;
  - \* Training Phases; and
  - \* Training Standard Program

e. Ecuador

**Topic:** The interoperability of CHIECUENGOY in MINUSTAH

- Constitutional backup and organization
- Brief historical summary of peace missions in Ecuador.
- International partnerships
- Selection program for MINUSTAH
- Capacity-building of the personnel at UEMPE
- Operability of CHIECUENGOY.

\* The timely and efficient intervention in the rescue of survivors shown during the crisis of the 2010 earthquake put into the spotlight the necessity to count on Contingent Plans.

\* In the technical part, Ecuador has great advantage which contributes a lot to the organization of the company. Ecuadorian officers (majors and captains) are civil engineers and are in charge of the technical part of all the work carried out by the company.

\* There have always been personnel from Chile and Ecuador in all the works carried out, trying to balance responsibility and obligations. Therefore, there will be a connection and a sense of comradeship at work between both countries.

\* The needs of the population in coordination with Health and Transport Ministries, through U8 (constructions), have increased.

\* It has been six months since the company was downsized. It has been working with few people to carry out its tasks.

\* A lot is demanded from the machinery to give support to MINUSTAH military units, to the population and to other Haitian government organizations.

\* Preparation of the terrains to build foundations for vertical constructions, such as pre-fabricated camps.

\* Material is taken from the river with a bulldozer and a dump truck to obtain rock and gravels to be used on the construction of roads and foundations.

\* Moving containers with forklifts, cranes and transport using flatbed trucks, dump trucks etc.

\* Concerning logistics, each country is responsible for the maintenance of machinery, vehicles and equipment they use in the area of the mission. Each country has funds to repair their machines.

\* Most of the machines are from Chile; however, Ecuador contributed with machines (roller, bulldozer and tractor) and dump trucks (10 units) which is the greatest fortress of the company.

\* According to MINUSTAH Department of Environment's regulations, each contingent must have a composting center to better handle its reusable organic waste.

- Lessons learned.

\* MINUSTAH's work has taught us to operate as part of a UN contingent

\* This experience has allowed us to venture into Humanitarian Assistance operations.

\* It has allowed us to develop the joint work with Chile in Peace and Engineering Operations.

\* Great experience in reconstruction operations and engineering works, in general.

\* Capacity-building, training and professional experience of the Armed Forces personnel.

\* Upgrade of the country's image in the international context as peace country and in compliance with international agreements.

\* Improvement of the deployment and reinsertion processes.

\* We try to project ourselves into the future in order to take part in peace and humanitarian assistance operations.

## 6. DEBATES / GROUP WORK / GROUP PRESENTATIONS

### a. Best Practices for Training in the 03 Phases of MINUSTAH

1) Group 1 (COL Luis Rogerio **Cid** Duarte, LCDR Alvaro **Tadeu** Ribeiro, LCDR Rogerio de Mello **Francesconi**, LTC Luiz Fabiano Mafra **Negreiros**, LTC **Charles Roberto** Martins da Silva, COL **N Montoya Flores**, CPT Jens **Rosenkranz**)

#### Issues for Discussion

What were the main challenges the Latin American countries faced in Haiti in the last ten years in relation to the training in each of the three phases of the mission?

#### Answer:

| Phases                 | Training Challenges  | Training Changes   | Remarks  |
|------------------------|--|--|--|
| I Phase<br>Combat Ops  | There was no preparation of the troops in SOPs               | Adaptation of procedures of Green and Blue Helmets                   | <i>Cordon And Search<br/>Checkpoint<br/>CASEVAC/MEDEVAC<br/>Negotiation</i>                  |
|                        | There were no Peace Operations Training Centers              | Training according to United Nations Standards                       | The quality of the United Nations soldier is improved  |
|                        | Ignorance of the Mandate and Haiti's situation               | Training in Chapter VI instead of VII                                | Soldier gets to know ROE and how to apply force gradually                                    |
|                        | Lack of Peace Operations doctrine                            | Training according to the new Peace Operations doctrine              | Legislative changes in several countries   |
|                        | No equipment for training                                    | Training with the new equipment increases capacities                 | Purchase of RIOT equipment (tactical vests, bullet proof plates etc)                         |
|                        | Use of non-lethal force                                      | Training with equipment and special techniques                       | Pepper spray, tear gas, rubber bullets etc   |
|                        | Lack of volunteers for missions                              | Increase of volunteers after the deployment of the first contingents | In some countries, the experience of people who have more than one mission is explored       |
| II Phase<br>Police Ops | Little time for initial preparation                          | Establishment of a training schedule                                 | Quality of the United Nations soldier improves for having more time to prepare               |
|                        | Change from combat into police operations                    | Increase training of police techniques                               | Increase in the work with HNP and UNPOL  |
|                        | Prepare the soldier to work with UNPOL and HNP               | Creation of UNPOL courses in the different training centers          | Experience exchange and integrated work with HNP   |
| III Phase<br>CIMIC Ops | Knowing the national legislation of the contributing country | Not all the countries can carry out police tasks                     | Some countries can only carry out cordon   |
|                        | Tackle a Humanitarian Crisis                                 | Create specific training for Humanitarian Assistance                 | Creation of CIMIC and Humanitarian Assistance Courses  |
|                        | Coordinated and/or joint work with civilians                 | Creation of CIMIC courses with the presence of civilians             | Previous work with civilians while training makes the work in the area of the mission easier |

How will the training centers make the most of the knowledge gathered in MINUSTAH after the withdrawal of the troops from the mission?

#### Answer:

- Keep a data base of lessons learned to be used in a future mission.
- Keep the training of the units which are offered to the United Nations through UNSAS system.
  - Elaboration of doctrine (Troop Pre-Deployment Manual) and other topics.
  - Keep CIMIC, Humanitarian Assistance, Protection of Civilians and UNPOL courses, among others;
  - Keep the interchange of instructors and students. Knowledge acquired and experience in missions that can be used nationally and internationally.

2) Group 2 (CDR **Adauto** Bunheirão, COL Paulo Luís da **Silva Paula**, COL Fábio de **Oliveira** Pereira, COL João Maurício da **Rocha Silva**, COL Jorge **Haboosh** and LTC **Lenin** Vladimir Lopez Salazar)

Issues for Discussion

How has Haiti helped in the development of the doctrines of the troops deployed in peacekeeping mission all over the world?

Answer:

Personnel

- Improvement in the mobilization and demobilization processes.
- Health, Psychological and Social Aspects.

Intelligence

- The value of knowledge of the situation in the area of operations.

Operations

- Interoperability (joint and combined)
- Operations in urban areas (Joint Operations with UNPOL and HNP, riot control, use of weapons and less lethal ammo, use of armored vehicles)
- Support to elections.
- Leadership: importance at platoon level of officers and warrant officers.
- Preparation and effective application of the Contingent Plans to help the population in disaster situations as in the 2010 earthquake.

Logistics:

- Material and equipment to deploy, especially, with the first contingent.
- Improvement of the logistics system in the implementation of bases.

Civil Affairs:

- Carrying out CIMIC activities to facilitate the operations, which also benefit in the acquisition of information.
- Strengthening of relations with local authorities.

Engineering:

- The works carried out by the Engineer are the most visible and of positive impact to the affected population.
- Positive experience that allowed the successful deployment in other missions.

Miscellaneous:

- Creation of a Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) to manage the crisis such as the one during the 2010 earthquake.

How will the training centers make the most of the knowledge gathered in MINUSTAH after the withdrawal of the troops from the mission?

Answer:

- With the experience of commanders, staff officers and commanders at all tactical levels; through lessons learned; in the deployment of personnel in future peace operations, among others.
- Having seminars, courses and other activities that make use of the experience obtained in MINUSTAH.

3) Group 3 (COL José **Díaz**, COL **Márcio** Aurélio Xavier, LCDR **Adler** Cardoso Ferreira, LTC Marcelo de **Oliveira**, LCDR Fabio **Rodrigues** Cavalcante and CPT José **Díaz**)

Issues for Discussion

How has the training of the troops changed as the mission evolved?

Answer:

Transition from Phase I (Combat) to Phase II (Police Operations):

Facts observed: in the beginning, there was no meaningful change in the tactical training of the combat fractions. However, some aspects, which affected, but not so intensely, the change in the tactical training, were observed: the increase in the consumption of non-lethal ammo against the decrease of lethal ammo consumption; the adoption of the so-called “*soft posture*” (patrolling without helmets, vest or rifles); prohibition of the use of armored vehicles during the day etc.

Change produced: Intensification of training to control riots, including the use of less lethal weapons. The need to increase the trust of the troops in the security evaluation done by higher echelons (leadership exercise at all levels).

Phase II (police operations):

Facts observed: besides the threat represented by tropical storms, the 2010 January earthquake increased the need to prepare the troops to face natural disasters. It was observed that, after the earthquake, the Military Component was the only one in conditions to support the host country in the execution of tasks of humanitarian assistance, coordination etc.

Phase II (police operations), after the earthquake:

Change produced: Intensification of the training in relation to the execution of search and rescue tasks (Ecuador tried to implement higher capacity of its personnel towards this issue; Brazil sent another battalion to the mission, increasing its response capacity, due to the earthquake; Uruguay, the same way, also intensified its training towards this issue).

Phase II (police operations) and Phase III (CIMIC operations):

Facts observed: the decrease of violence levels created, to the troops, a feeling of security and a higher closeness to the civilian population, which could ease, somehow, the increase of cases of misconduct and indiscipline, as well as the cases of sexual exploitation and abuse. While violence made the military personnel look for security in their bases and avoid contact with civilians, the pacified environment would produce a contrary effect.

How will the training centers make the most of the knowledge gathered in MINUSTAH after the withdrawal of the troops from the mission?

Answer:

- The creation and use of tools to register and disseminate knowledge are essential so the training centers can accomplish their missions. Therefore, it is important to observe the ***REPORT ON SUGGESTED MECHANISMS FOR DPKO TO CONTINUOUSLY ADOPT BEST PRACTICES TO BECOME A LEARNING ORGANIZATION (From lessons learned to learning lessons)***, 2002, and the ***Knowledge Sharing Policy of DPKO/DFS, 2009***.

- Although each peace operation is unique, the experience gathered throughout the participation in MINUSTAH can contribute to the success in future missions, in topics, such as:

- \* Long-distance logistics support (maintenance, health, supplies etc.);
- \* Communications;
- \* Conduct and discipline subjects;
- \* Gender, sexual exploitation and abuse issues;
- \* Humanitarian operations;
- \* Engineering; etc.

b. Lessons Learned from the Deployment of Troops in the 03 Phases of MINUSTAH

1) Group 1 (COL Luis Rogerio **Cid** Duarte, LCDR Alvaro **Tadeu** Ribeiro, LCDR Rogerio de Mello **Francesconi**, LTC Luiz Fabiano Mafra **Negreiros**, LTC **Charles Roberto** Martins da Silva, COL **N Montoya Flores**, CPT Jens **Rosenkranz**)

Issues for Discussion

How can the knowledge acquired in MINUSTAH be disseminated and applied in other peacekeeping missions?

Answer:

- Creation of seminars of experience exchange in international forums such as ALCOPAZ.

- Creation of a *Joint Combined Doctrine* based on the great presence of Latin American countries in MINUSTAH, taking advantage of linguistic similarities (Brazil).

- Development of a pre-deployment training material to be used during any kind of training.

- Keep the training of the Units that are offered to the United Nations through the UNSAS system.

- Since MINUSTAH is a multidimensional mission, the experience can be used with great probability in future missions related to operational tasks carried out on the terrain (coordinated and integrated work with police, civilians and military personnel).

How has MINUSTAH contributed to demonstrate the military forces of the Latin American countries to the world?

Answer:

- Through its operational capacity (deployment capacity, logistics base, accomplishment of complex operational tasks).

- Versatility to change from operational to humanitarian assistance tasks (crisis management with a “Latin American touch”).

How do the Latin American Armed Forces use the knowledge obtained in MINUSTAH in their countries?

Answer:

- Operational tasks similar to the ones of MINUSTAH are applied in these countries in order to accomplish missions of law and maintenance (“pacification in communities”), humanitarian assistance in case of natural disaster, joint operations etc.

- The logistics aspects for each operation are planned the best possible way (experience in long distance logistics base).

- The training acquired in the area of the mission can be used to their own benefit.

2) Group 2 (CDR **Adauto** Bunheirão, COL Paulo Luís da **Silva Paula**, COL Fábio de **Oliveira** Pereira, COL João Maurício da **Rocha Silva**, COL Jorge **Haboosh** and LTC **Lenin** Vladimir Lopez Salazar)

Issues for Discussion

How can the knowledge acquired in MINUSTAH be disseminated and applied in other peacekeeping missions?

Answer:

- Establish a system to disseminate lessons learned through seminars, courses, workshops etc, by the participant countries and, especially, the Latin American countries.

- Active participation of DPKO, through the dissemination and the establishment of doctrine with the issue of rules and leaflets of this mission.

How has MINUSTAH contributed to demonstrate military force in Latin American countries to the world?

Answer:

- The image of the Armed Forces of Latin American countries increased positively in the international context as professional troops.
- Integration, collaboration, coordination among the Latin American countries have strengthened, through their experience in MINUSTAH, due to the creation of training centers and due to living as friendly countries.

How will the withdrawal of the MINUSTAH military contingent happen?

Answer:

- First, it must happen in a progressive way.
- The economic aspect cannot be considered in the operational level by the military component.
- Establishing who will receive the military facilities, through the negotiation between MINUSTAH and the Haitian Government.
- Delivering the areas of responsibility of the military units to the security forces of Haiti or, occasionally, the UNPOL.
- The withdrawal of troops must start from the safest places, ending at the most complicated places in term of security.
- Establishing which material, machinery and equipment will be repatriated and which will be donated to the country.

3) Group 3 (COL José **Díaz**, COL **Márcio** Aurélio Xavier, LCDR **Adler** Cardoso Ferreira, LTC Marcelo de **Oliveira**, LCDR Fabio **Rodrigues** Cavalcante and CPT José **Díaz**)

Issues for Discussion

How can the knowledge acquired in MINUSTAH be disseminated and applied in other peacekeeping missions?

Answer:

- Elaborating documents that improve the dissemination of this knowledge considering the **REPORT ON SUGGESTED MECHANISMS FOR DPKO TO CONTINUOUSLY ADOPT BEST PRACTICES TO BECOME A LEARNING ORGANIZATION (From lessons learned to learning lessons), 2002**, and the **Knowledge Sharing Policy of DPKO/DFS, 2009**.

- Having seminars and workshops once the mission ends by the competent organisms (Ministry of Defense, training centers, Armed Force Commanders etc.)
- Revising and updating the UN manuals and doctrine in accordance with the experience acquired, validated and registered.
- Establishing partnerships and agreements to develop projects and programs with universities and organisms that work with International Relations to disseminate this topic in the academia.

How has MINUSTAH contributed to demonstrate the military forces of the Latin American countries to the world?

Answer:

- It contributed to show the world the capacities of the Armed Forces of Latin American countries that, not having lots of resources and with limited logistics and finances in the beginning, considering significant distance to deploy their troops, accomplished their missions efficiently.

- It was a practical validation that the military tactical doctrine, as well as the organization and structure of our Armed Forces, is applicable.

- The ability of the officers to integrate a multinational Staff.

-The capacity of Latin American generals to be *Force Commanders* and command a peace mission efficiently, opening the possibility to carry out this post in any other mission in the world.

How will the country behave after the withdrawal of the military component?

Answer:

- With the withdrawal of MINUSTAH contingent, the contributing country will be ready to deploy its contingents in other missions with the knowledge acquired in the mission in Haiti.

- By continuing training its personnel, and trying to maintain the Peace Operations Training Centers.

- By using this knowledge and experience learned in internal activities in the country, for example, in humanitarian assistance, in case of natural disasters and riot controls, as well as in civil affairs (CIMIC).

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

The training on MINUSTAH - 10 YEARS OF SUCCESS was a great opportunity to discuss the lessons obtained with the mission in Haiti.

After three days of lecture, presentations (individual and group) and group work, many subjects related to MINUSTAH were discussed by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala and Uruguay and the following points can be highlighted:

- the training centers will make the most of the knowledge obtained in MINUSTAH after the withdrawal of the troops from the mission since they can keep a data base of lessons learned to be used in future missions, keep the training of units made available to the United Nations through UNSAS system, keep CIMIC, Humanitarian Assistance, Protection of Civilians and UNPOL courses and keep the exchange programs of instructors and students.

- the mission in Haiti helped in the development of doctrines of the troops deployed in peacekeeping missions all over the world since there was an improvement of the mobilization and demobilization processes; in relation to the Intelligence activities, it is each time more important the value of the knowledge of the situation in the area of operations; in relation to Operations, the interoperability (joint and combined) is being searched by all; leadership was developed at officers and warrant officers' levels; preparation and effective application of Contingent Plans are very important for situations of disasters such as the 2010 earthquake. Moreover, in Logistics, there was improvement in the logistics system in the implementation of bases. In Civil Affairs, there must be more emphasis in the execution of CIMIC activities/operations to facilitate military operations.

- the change in troops training in accordance with the evolution of the mission can allow: increase in non-lethal ammo consumption against the decrease of lethal ammo consumption; the adoption of the so-called "*soft posture*" (patrolling without helmets, vest or rifles); prohibition of the use of armored vehicles during the day; intensification

of training to control riots, including the use of less-lethal weapons; and the need to increase the trust of the troops in the security evaluation done by higher echelons (leadership exercise at all levels).

- the creation and use of tools to register and disseminate knowledge are essential so that the training centers can accomplish their missions. Therefore, it is important to observe the **REPORT ON SUGGESTED MECHANISMS FOR DPKO TO CONTINUOUSLY ADOPT BEST PRACTICES TO BECOME A LEARNING ORGANIZATION (From lessons learned to learning lessons)**, 2002, and the **Knowledge Sharing Policy of DPKO/DFS, 2009**.

- MINUSTAH contributed to the demonstration of the military forces in Latin American countries to the world since it has enabled the versatility to change from operational to humanitarian assistance tasks (crisis management with a “Latin American touch”).

- the Armed Forces of Latin American countries use the knowledge obtained in MINUSTAH in their countries since each time logistics aspects in each operation are better planned, such as the experience with the long distance logistic base. Moreover, integration, collaboration, coordination among the Latin American countries have strengthened, through their experience in MINUSTAH, training centers and living as friendly countries.

- the knowledge acquired in MINUSTAH can be disseminated and applied in other peacekeeping missions by establishing partnerships and agreements to develop projects and programs with universities and organisms that work with International Relations to disseminate this topic in the academia.

## 8. PARTICIPANTS

### CCOPAB DIRECTOR

Colonel JOSÉ RICARDO VENDRAMIN NUNES

### WORKSHOP COORDINATOR

Commander (Navy) SÉRVIO CORRÊA DA ROCHA JÚNIOR

### ARGENTINEAN DELEGATION

Lieutenant Colonel GONZALO JAVIER VILLAGRÁN

### BRAZILIAN DELEGATION

Colonel LUIS ROGERIO CID DUARTE

Colonel FABIO DE OLIVEIRA PEREIRA

Colonel JOÃO MAURICIO DA ROCHA SILVA

Colonel MARCIO AURELIO XAVIER

Colonel (AF) PAULO LUIS DA SILVA PAULA

Lieutenant Colonel LUIZ FABIANO MAFRA NEGREIROS

Lieutenant Colonel CHARLES ROBERTO MARTINS DA SILVA

Lieutenant Colonel (AF) MARCELO DE OLIVEIRA

Commander (Navy) ADAUTO BUNHEIRÃO

Lieutenant Commander (Navy) ADLER CARDOSO FERREIRA

Lieutenant Commander (Navy) ROGERIO DE MELLO FRANCESCONI

Lieutenant Commander (Navy) ALVARO TADEU RIBEIRO

Lieutenant Commander (Navy) FABIO RODRIGUES CAVALCANTI

CHILEAN DELEGATION  
Captain JENS ROSENKRANZ

ECUADORIAN DELEGATION  
Lieutenant Colonel LENIN VLADIMIR LOPEZ SALAZAR  
Captain MARCO ANTONIO AGUILAR CUENCA

GUATEMALLEAN DELEGATION  
Colonel JUAN ANTONIO MONTOYA FLORES

URUGUAYAN DELEGATION  
Colonel JORGE HABOOSH  
Colonel JOSÉ DÍAZ

REPORT WRITTEN BY  
Major ROGÉRIO DE OLIVEIRA BOLZAN

GRAMMAR AND LANGUAGE (PORTUGUESE) REVISION  
Captain CHRISTIANE ALVES DE LIMA

TRANSLATION INTO ENGLISH  
Captain ANA PAULA DE ALMEIDA CARDOSO  
Captain ISRAEL ALVES DE SOUZA JÚNIOR