


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2017







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LATIN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTERS

9 years working for peace



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TRAINING FOR PEACE OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

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THE AGENDA FOR PEACE

How to reach Peace in a context that, in the last 40 years, there have been about 22 internal conflicts and 22 conflicts of an international character? How to guarantee international security when these confrontations, for the most part, are originated in ethnic differences; claims of territory or economic issues. Some are less intense than others, but confrontations break out; in which many of its victims are civilians. How to protect and guarantee Human Rights in full, especially the most vulnerable, when in World War I, civilians represented 7% of the victims and today they are 70%?

Today, 43% of people live in fragile situations and it is expected that by 2030, that percentage will rise to 62%. Of the people who were killed or injured by explosive weapons in urban areas, 90% were civilians.

The United Nations, the International Organization which is the depository of the obligation to maintain international peace and security and safeguard human rights, is not indifferent to this reality and is taking action in the matter, in order to respond concretely to threats presented to mankind.



The following lines reflect on the role of Training Centers for peace operations taking into account the following documents: the lessons learned MINUSTAH left us; The Sustainable Development Goals and the Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Peace Operations. In view of this, there is a need to strengthen the pre-deployment training for peace operations, with a special focus on Humanitarian Assistance; Civilian-Military Coordination and Protection of Civilians. Such training should be comprehensive and cross-cutting with other areas, in order to give answers that are aligned with the challenges presented today in the missions. The experience and lessons learned that the Training Center for Peace Operations in Argentina is able to transmit through these subjects can be used as best practices to the international community.

Understanding this "spirit of the United Nations", and serving as a background, in the report "Humanity: Shared Responsibility" (February 2016), former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon highlighted the need to restore confidence in the international community and its institutions to face the most pressing challenges to peace that affect the planet. This report sets the agenda for what was the First Humanitarian Summit of the Organization (May 2016). As the name of the report itself infers, it is called to recognize that the urgent humanitarian challenges facing humanity (125 million people need humanitarian aid, 60 million have been forced to leave their homes, 37 countries have been severely affected, 20 billion dollars are needed to meet these needs), require the urgent commitment of the international community, stating as a top priority to put an end to armed conflicts and build international trust. The urgency of this is very clear: if demographic trends and ongoing conflicts continue, the disparity between needs and their response will increase (Ban Ki-Moon 2016).

The humanitarian summit in May 2016 was the first time in 70 years that the United Nations has highlighted the pillars on which the humanitarian agenda of the organization is based. It was called upon



by the urgent need to generate awareness and solidarity of member countries, in search of better solutions for millions of people who have been devastated by conflicts and violence. It also calls for the exploration and implementation of mechanisms through which each country will operationalize its recommendations.

At the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2015, UN member states approved the new Global Agenda for Sustainable Development consisting of 17 Objectives and 169 targets to be met by 2030. The commitment is on five vital areas for sustainable development. Organization: People, Prosperity, Planet, Peace and alliances. They mean the intense effort to eradicate hunger; ensuring a healthy life and quality education; achieving gender equality; ensuring access to water and sustainable energy; promoting sustained economic growth; taking urgent action against climate change; promoting peace; facilitating access to justice and strengthening a global partnership for sustainable development.

In short, this Agenda for Sustainable Development, with its 17 objectives, is an action plan for people, the planet and prosperity.

Due to this scenario, we must ask ourselves about the responsibility of UN Peace Operations, facing the objectives and the multiple and asymmetric threats to international peace and security.

The United Nations Special Committee on Peace Operations (known as C34 and hereafter the Special Committee) emphasizes the intrinsic values of peace operations. This special committee reaffirms that peace operations are the main instrument of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. It recommends generating cooperation at the regional level on peace operations issues, in order to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in deployments. The Committee also stresses the importance of proper pre-deployment preparation for the contribution to peace and the success of the mission, as well as the prestige and legitimacy of the United Nations itself.



Considering the above mentioned Humanitarian Objectives and Agenda and the recommendations of the Special Committee on United Nations peace operations, it is necessary to highlight the role of the Training Centers in view of these challenges. The focus, thought from a regional cooperation perspective and an accepted mechanism of lessons learned and best practices, will have to be on strengthening training in those critical areas raised by such reports. Concrete and operational tools for pre-deployment training based primarily on the understanding of a renewed peace operation model evolved from a traditional dynamic to a robust, integrated and multidisciplinary situation. Thus, it could correspond to the recommendations of the Special Committee for Peace Operations and the organization's 17 Sustainable Development Goals.

OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

The Argentine Training Center for Peace Operations (CAECOPAZ) was created around 1995, responding to the need for training that would strategically tackle the demands of the international system (increasingly unpredictable operational areas; civilians, institutionalized violence etc.).

This Center was created with the mission of teaching courses that train both military and civilian personnel in the knowledge and skills required by the United Nations to deploy troops to a peace operation. This training is divided into three levels of leadership: tactical, implementing procedures, operational, which explains how policies should be implemented, and strategic, which sets out the fundamental principles for the maintenance of peace by the United Nations.

The academic planning of CAECOPAZ accompanies the evolution and historical participation of Argentina in peace operations, requiring constant updating through lessons learned from each of those missions.



The complex and changing characteristics of the current and future mission scenarios and the new roles defined for the task forces demanded the troops, a fundamental component of any military organization, to have strategies to deal with unexpected situations. Consequently, the training processes requires the updating of the curriculum project, regarding the lessons learned from each mission.

Building on the complexity of increasing numbers and changing nature of conflicts, prior preparation for a PKO requires an increasing degree of sophistication, versatility and inclusiveness.

In this regard, one of the strategic objectives of Argentina is to program, execute and supervise the activities related to training and joint training and combined set, to promote the achievement of an efficient military and operational strategic aptitude, in order to contribute to the fulfillment of plans issued in the National Strategic Level.

The pre-deployment training in peace operations is directly related to the success of the mission and to international peace. Noting the context in which these operations are deployed, the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peace Operations (C34) and the agenda for sustainable development 2030, it is important to highlight the 17 objectives that could directly relate to training centers, according to their fields of work.

In addition to the important contribution of peace training centers, individual troops contributing countries such as police and others have the responsibility of training and deploying trained personnel, according to the requirements of the United Nations, in order to face these international challenges. Such training should be addressed not only from a strategic point of view, but also as an operational tool. As previously mentioned, incorporating in their curricula concrete tools to face contingencies and face the complex elements of current conflicts and scenarios.



In this regard, climate change is having a deep impact: very intense storms; floods and other disasters, affecting more and more people. Paradoxically these disasters arise in areas of conflict or where peace operations are present. Early warning, planning and preparation turn out to be meaningful words to give the most accurate answers.

In response to this scenario, peace operations have not only grown in number, but have also incorporated increasingly broad and robust mandates, with a larger deployment of military personnel per mission.

With 106,000 uniformed personnel from 121 troop-contributing countries deployed in the field, training should be a key priority for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. However, the resources allocated to training (from the United Nations) are strikingly insufficient.

A High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was formed on 31 October 2014 to undertake a comprehensive review of current United Nations peace operations and future emerging needs. The High-level Group raised a report to General Assembly A / 70/95-S / 2015/446 entitled "Comprehensive review of the whole issue of peacekeeping operations in all aspects", as a result of the questioning of the effectiveness and efficiency of these operations in response to new international challenges. The Working Group considered as a challenge to United Nations Peace Operations, to comprehensively explore to contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflicts. The report promotes the adaptation of these operations, allocating more budgets, not only to the pre-deployment training, but also to its planning and equipment.

With particular emphasis on training prior to the deployment of Peace Operations, the Group argues that the United Nations should serve as a focal point for a stronger global partnership for training. It also notes that a number of key components have been established, such as the Integrated Training Service of the Department of Peacekeeping



Operations and groups led by Member States, such as the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC), which are important in sharing lessons learned. A new training structure for peace operations has been proposed by the United Nations Secretary-General. This seeks to further strengthen collaboration among Member States with greater coordination from their centers.

We must remember, however, that the United Nations training system depends on Member States developing their own training activities, but the ability to do so varies greatly from one to another. Responsibility for training continues to depend on each contributing country. This requires an exhaustive awareness of the context in which the troops are to be deployed; the nature of the conflict; it must, in turn, anticipate what kind of crisis the mission may experience. These aspects will be substantial when preparing the troops.

In a nutshell, from the United Nations and its number of reports, they call on the international community to take direct action, analyzing the types of conflicts, recognizing that climate change and issues of protection of civilians (inter alia) are vital and that the member states of the organization have a great responsibility in this whole process. On the other hand, the Report of the Study Group on Challenges to Peace Operations, together with the Report of the Special Committee on Peace Operations, designates predeployment training as a key role in enabling them to respond to peace and security. In this regard, training centers can take a leading role towards this commitment. They only have to plan their instruction to continue with this orientation and be prepared for the reality of the mission.

From the analysis made to the current international system, it can be inferred that neither the planning nor the conduct of a current United Nations peace operation can be executed under the parameters that guided the traditional model of operations of previous years. The very nature of the operating environment has demanded a more modern model of mission and according to the times that we are living.



One of the challenges currently facing contributing countries with peacekeeping troops is to provide pre-deployment training that is responsive to the needs of the mission and capable of providing soldiers with the necessary tools to achieve success in the mission.

The Training Centers, more specifically the Argentine Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CAECOPAZ), are training personnel to deal with these new scenarios, updating their training on the "new basic concepts" required for peacekeeping personnel to work in difficult environments.

As mentioned, preparation in Civil-Military Coordination with a focus on Humanitarian Assistance is vital to face this new type of missions, where natural disasters are present and where it is necessary to coordinate and cooperate with other actors in the mission. CAECOPAZ has dedicated and hired human resources, especially, to study these scenarios; elaborate, process and dispose of doctrinal and procedural elements specific to peace operations. Not only are concepts developed intellectually, but they generate procedures, promoting the cultural and operational understanding of the mission.

Because of this, CAECOPAZ gives special attention to civil-military coordination and humanitarian assistance, along with its component elements (leadership training, negotiation, human rights and gender awareness, among others). As mentioned earlier, the complex feature that describes the societies in which a peace operation is being dispatched increasingly requires different components to work in coordination, driven by a later goal. Clearly, it is an integral and cross-cutting training. It is understood that when military action is taken to assist a natural disaster or emergency that creates humanitarian needs, this action should be carried out in a way that does not interfere with the civilian space in humanitarian assistance.



In a disaster, there is not much time to think, for that reason, to know the specific policies for the deployment context, with clear international guidelines, to know civil and military coordination structures (from a humanitarian perspective) ensures that all personnel feel That their work is coordinated and useful for humanitarian purposes. The study material used is initially based on the following documents: On the one hand, the Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Resources in Disaster Cases (Oslo Guidelines) and on the other hand, the use of military and civil defense resources in support of United Nations humanitarian activities in complex emergencies (MCDA Guidelines).

The integrated missions are provided with a working framework for United Nations peacekeeping contingents and humanitarian workers to work together. Effective civil-military humanitarian coordination in complex emergencies ensures that humanitarian action is seen as something different, while identifying areas where that interaction is possible.

Gender and human rights are integrated in a cross-cutting way in training; each year, the courses given in this area are updated according to the priorities determined by the commanders of the forces and the realities of the terrain.

MINUSTAH AND NATURAL DISASTERS

The Haitian issue speaks for itself when one thinks of the new scenarios caused by global climate change or humanitarian emergencies. MINUSTAH presents dynamic challenges in terms of regional relations, where through real and concrete action it outlines a rapprochement and eventual leadership for the region. The experience has marked us strongly in the earthquake of Haiti in the year 2010, where a natural disaster has put the whole mission in check. The resources; facilities; the command authority and the morale itself, were compromised.



Following the pre-deployment training, it is essential to have real case studies to exemplify the instruction.

One lesson learned from the earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010 was having been properly trained; Being prepared emotionally and militarily to respond to emergency crisis. Adequate leadership, fellowship and, above all, cooperation were necessary to face the disaster and the subsequent consequences. An example of this was the delay in the return of the contingent, having to stay in the mission a few more months. Thinking about maintaining the morale of this group takes us back to the correct leadership that is required in difficult times.

Haiti, MINUSTAH, should not be forgotten. Not only the vulnerable groups that are still suffering from the consequences of conflict and climate change, but also the teaching and experience of a case, from which most of the variables analyzed above can be observed (intra-state conflict, underdeveloped country, natural disaster and peace operations). Could the Haitian case be used to assess whether peace operations are the best tools to respond to conflicts?

THE CHALLENGE FOR THE REGION

An essential framework for the exchange of doctrine, lessons learned and forums for the analysis of the various United Nations aforementioned reports is the Latin American region and its training centers. While the motivation to participate in a peace operation is extremely varied within troop-contributing countries, a common yardstick in the region is that everyone longs for the success of operations. Due to the scenario of threats and challenges, many nations have realized that regional partnership and cooperation are much more feasible than isolation. Basically it is beneficial to find a forum for discussion and feedback from the experience of our neighbors, to join forces and make the system effective. In this regard, ALCOPAZ is a very favorable instance of thought and reflection for regional cooperation in defense and security.



The challenge for the region in this matter stems from a joint work of sharing and cooperating lessons learned materialized in concrete experiences translated into orders and doctrine for the operational environment. In some cases, ad hoc areas of specialization should be developed because, as in the case of climate change, adequate studies would make it possible to anticipate future requirements for humanitarian assistance; thus, being able to exercise the initiative of offerings and obtain a level of pre-most immediate response.

To unify interests, visions and combined doctrine to merge and achieve synergy, is essential not to get lost in the sea of individualistic interests.

Undoubtedly, the regional response is a positive sign of thinking together to achieve success and contribute to international peace.

CONCLUSIONS

The humanitarian emergency and renewed conflicts are presented as the main threats to the security of States, to the international system and to peace operations, as it was in MINUSTAH. (Haiti 2010).

This scenario predicts that both the humanitarian aid requirements and the conflicts that usually emerge in these cases will increase.

Contemporary peace operations are facing major challenges: ambitious mandates, problematic scenarios in the political and operational, and difficult conflicts to be solved. There are great expectations of solution, since they are considered the main tool to guarantee the international peace and security (Special Committee of peace operations C34). At a time when most of today's conflicts are rife with rival armed factions with opposing political and cultural ideologies, renewed peace operations should be ruled by a clear mandate that will enable them to secure the support of the international community and reach a peace agreement for the settlement of disputes.



Peacekeeping training centers cannot ignore these aspects. The responsibility is to continue to better prepare its troops to face these challenges in an uncertain future.

The fundamental message underlying the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations; the objectives of sustainable development and the Special Committee on Peace Operations is the conviction of combining advantages (politically, associative and human) to meet these challenges. This implies that, where deployed, United Nations peace operations should be prepared; the mandate and the necessary powers to support the solution to threats to international peace and security. That is our shared responsibility.

The conduct of these Operations, by their very nature, requires an adequate, credible and flexible command to adapt to the contingencies of the mission, and to the different environments in which they operate.

The idea is to strengthen training based on risk criteria. Humanitarian coordination is essential in the new scenarios where operations are developed. For this reason, devoting efforts in this direction will be successful.

While pre-deployment training remains a national responsibility, exchange of doctrine and experiences at the regional level, such as within the scope of ALCOPAZ, is very rich in nurturing training and attaining educational excellence.

Out of the 17 sustainable development objectives, the following are proposed to work from the perspective of peace operations and predeployment training: Goal 17 proposes to focus on regional alliances. Work groups; Team and cooperation, among other aspects to develop teamwork strategies to achieve these objectives. From the Latin American Association of Peace Operations Training Centers (ALCOPAZ) could think about how to contribute (from training in peace operations)





to that goal. For its part, Objective 16 (related to peace) basically refers to promoting peace in the international community and to be the agents of change by raising awareness about the generation of a more just and peaceful society and training them. Goal 5 (gender): Women and girls make up half of the world's population and, therefore, half of its solution. However, gender inequality persists today throughout the world and causes stagnation of social progress.

As a final reflection, it is worth thinking about the benefits of counting in our Nation, not only with trained personnel, but also with the capacity to train those who will mitigate our own emergencies, and we will be undeniably exposed.

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FROM HAITI TO AFRICA: A CHALLENGE FOR LATIN AMERICAN PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTERS

LT COL Gerson Velasques Junior (Brazilian Military Cooperation in Paraguay)

INTRODUCTION

The lessons learned by the Forces and the Peacekeeping training Centers from Latin America, after thirteen years of mission in Haiti, were of extreme importance regarding the structure and procedures of an efficient national preparation. This preparation ensured an appropriate performance of military personnel in combat, construction, logistics, humanitarian aid and the like. It also allowed the stabilization of the host country - objective of the mission.

MINUSTAH ended out being a complex mission due to political, cultural, physiographical and operating aspects offered by the environment in Haiti to Peacekeeping Forces (PKF). Combat, mainly in the initial phases, was urban and in humanized areas. As time went by, roles and tasks were gaining and losing relevance as per the changes in the mission profile. The Latin American training centers knew how to realize those changes as they happened and adapt their work to provide MINUSTAH Force Commander with an adequate and trained "product" to respond to each operational phase in the Caribbean country.

As for the upcoming end of MINUSTAH, the Latin American peacekeeping training centers will have to change and adapt their



training to new environments, realities and challenges coming from other peace missions in order to keep contributing towards world peace. Out of the fifteen UN missions all over the world, eight of them are in the African continent, presenting a very different reality if compared to the situation in Haiti.

HISTORY AND THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

Africa is a continent of big proportions and huge distances, encompassing a large number of ethnic groups and more than fifty countries - all of them with different territorial issues, population, resources, history, development and the like.

In that continent, countries hosting UN missions are the following: Western Sahara (MINURSO), Mali (MINUSMA), C.A.R (MINUSCA), D.R. of the Congo (MONUSCO), Liberia (UNMIL), South Sudan (UNMISS) and Sudan - missions in Darfur (UNAMID) and Abyei (UNISFA). In spite of the specificities and unique characteristics of each mission, those countries have a History and African geography in common, from which we can bring observations that might allow the training centers to adapt their trainings.

For instance, all African countries were affected by the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), which sought to harmonize the interests of thirteen European countries, the US and Turkey, setting a neocolonialism in the African territories. By means of an arbitrary division, not taking into account ethnic factors and establishing artificial boundaries, up until today conflicts and hostilities can be attributed to that event. Many of the conflicts for which peace missions were set keep a strong connection to that conference, even in a indirect manner.

Population density in countries hosting peace missions is another aspect which deserves further study. After Asia, Africa is the second most populated continent of the world and countries as the D.R. of the Congo



(77.27 million inhabitants), Sudan (40.23) and Mali (17.60) represent greater obstacle than Haiti (10.71 million inhabitants), whereas South Sudan presents a more balanced scenario (12.34 million inhabitants), and Western Sahara (513,000 inhabitants), Liberia (4.5 millions) and the C.A.R. (4.9 millions) presenting challenges of greater complexity in relation to that item.

Even though the population density in those countries are very different, the existing ethnic groups are another aspect which cannot be taken for granted. In Sudan, before the creation of South Sudan, for instance, 600 ethnic groups shared the same country, many of them fighting against each other, speaking more than 400 languages and dialects. At the light of ethnicity, languages and dialects in Africa, it is correct to state that each patrol of blue helmets might have to leave the base with two or more language assistants, i.e., hired locals who will take part in the patrol and for that, they will have to be advised, trained, transported, protected and, many times, fed.

Another item which cannot be taken for granted when analyzing the African people is religion, no matter what that is. In the same territory there are animists, Christians, Muslims and people with other beliefs, not usually in a pacific way. Besides, religious extremism and each region's beliefs might become a complicated obstacle for Latin people. For example, the Murle people, in South Sudan, believe that all the cattle of the world belong to them. For that, what is seen as theft for many, to this tribal group they are only taking what they are destined to have by their god or gods, animists, ancestors or some opportunists that have come up with this idea.

Far beyond those beliefs and religious convictions, in some African countries, terrorism is a reality that cannot be discarded. Still, we cannot take the events originated from the Arab Spring as completed, either in the Middle East or in the African continent; the existence of an unstable



region worsened by terror is undeniable. In Mali, jihadist groups coming from other countries, local extremists, Tuareg people (inhabitants of the desert) and the Peuls (traditionally shepherds) make the work of the French-led Force much more complicated due to the possibility of terrorist attacks as those in 2015, at the Radisson Blu Hotel, in Bamako, the capital of the country. Against blue helmets, they usually make use of ambushes on the roads through the fields.

Historical factors as the artificial division of the territory, the conflicts and the subsequent peace missions, the human aspect of the countries hosting UN missions such as the population, ethnicity, languages, beliefs and terrorism already point in some directions, which South American Peacekeeping Training Centers will have to study in order to better the psychosocial preparation of peacekeepers to be deployed to potential missions in the African continent.

GEOGRAPHY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

Geography of African countries is another field which must be deeply analyzed by Peacekeeping Training Centers to benefit from the lessons learned in Haiti. The Caribbean island is divided into two countries, but the African continent is a whole new ball game. The land boundaries facilitate the displacement of armed groups from one country or territory into another - usually not included in the mandate of the mission, as well as the logistic support to those illegal forces, sheltering lawbreakers out of the conflict zone and the trafficking of goods and human beings, besides other sorts of crimes in very large and inhospitable regions.

Countries hosting peace missions, but holding shorter land boundaries are Liberia and Western Sahara, each of them neighboring three other countries; also, Abyei is a disputed territory between Sudan and South Sudan. On the other hand, C.A R. and South Sudan (6), Sudan and Mali (7) and the D.R. of the Congo (9) provide greater



possibilities to those forces working against peace, to crimes and to other grave misconducts, even though peace mission mandates do not account for all the territory of the host country. Those characteristics move the members of PKF towards a meticulous geographical study and analysis of the territorial limits set by each mandate in order not to go beyond the established limits.



Taking into consideration the surroundings of the countries hosting UN missions, it is possible to say that the missions in Africa are divided into three blocks - one is isolated in the North, under MINURSO, in Western Sahara. The other block is located in the macroregion of West Africa,

encompassing Liberia and Mali; therefore, closer to America. The third block goes from the macroregion of Central Africa to East Africa, encompassing D.R. of the Congo, C.A.R., South Sudan, Abyei and the west of Sudan, where Darfur (UNAMID) is located. In a brief analysis of the map of Africa, it is possible to see that the first and second blocks of missions are closer to the Latin American profile, just having to cross the Atlantic.

This so-called proximity brings obvious logistical implications such as the "entrance" of the mission being at a West African coast port, as the ones in El Marsa (Western Sahara), Monrovia (Liberia) and a bit more limited in Matadi (D. R. of the Congo). The other countries depend on land transportation through other territories, aerial transportation, expensive and limited, or on ports on the east coast, as Port Sudan. These characteristics directly interfere in the transportation of



troops, vehicles, materiel and supplies; it can strongly influence the strategic movement, becoming another aspect to be considered for the preparation of assets from the Navy or Air Force to cover regular logistical tasks for long distances.

Africa's Mineral Resources

The African inland logistics also presents challenges to be analyzed, once the roads are, in general, not kept in good conditions. The vast majority is not paved and was built with the sole purpose to transport the large African mineral production to the ports (exportation). This way, a great number of roads for transportation comes from mines

and is used by heavy cargo trucks, worsening road conditions. So, the training of Military Engineering, which has accomplished several tasks in Haiti, should be kept and enlarged, focusing on road maintenance and bridges that allow troops, population and goods/services without losses or lateness.

The characteristics of land, the bad conditions of roads and the big distances imply that the preparation of troops should focus a bit more on off road driving skills, in order to avoid accidents and make the troops be able to solve simple car problems, not just depending on maintenance experts. On the other hand, logistics center, where repairs and specific verifications are carried out, shall have very well qualified and a greater number of personnel to work on vehicle maintenance.

In the field of operations, troops shall be able adapted to and able to operate in extremely high temperatures during the day, and very low temperatures at night, with shortage of water, mountain chains, road and



off road navigation, know what to do in case of Haboob - sand storms, or sudden downpours - very common in that continent, raise awareness of landmines, some of which are in Africa since World War II.

The adverse forces in Africa are also different from the ones found in Haiti. The Haitian political chaos and public instability facilitated the appearance of gangs controlling urban areas. That put the population and the peacebuilding process at risk. In the African countries, adverse forces have access to military assets, organization and *modus operandi* similar to the ones used by military forces, paramilitaries; they also have combat experience in the field or in urban environments. In Africa, there are some "mini armies" on the hands of rebel leaders, not to mention terrorism, which represents more violence in the scope of modern conflicts.



Apart from all the issues exploited for the preparation of troops to Haiti, the training for blue helmets to operate in Africa shall cover, in a deeply manner, traditional war operations. For a peace operation in Africa, it would be ideal to have troops able to change their attitude, ranging from squad routine patrol to the deployment of a company or battalion, with a defined military objective, in a short period of time. In the African continent, there are many examples of sudden changes of situation such as the siege of peace forces in Jadotville, in Congo, in September of 1961; also, the battle of Mogadishu, in October of 1993, or even the massacre of extremist Hutus over the Tutsis, in Rwanda, from April to June of 1994. Let us then analyze another example closer to the reality and complexity of the African continent.



On 22 August 2013, due to a great offensive operation coordinated by the Congolese Army against the rebels from the M23 which was threatening to attack and take the city of Goma over, artillery pieces were launched by irregular forces and fell into the city, killing five people. UN Forces, led by the Brazilian General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, fortified that location; the Force Commander stated that they would not intervene if UN troops or the population were not threatened. At that time, there were some doubts if the projectiles reached the neighboring country of Rwanda.

On the following day, because of the attack to the population and making use of the measures stated in the mandate for that mission, UN Forces started the first offensive operation in large scale, using attack helicopters to bomb the rebel positions near Goma. That action was coordinated with the Congolese Army, attacking the rebels by means of a combined operation. In November of the same year, after regular war operations, M23 declared their total surrender and escaped to Uganda, waiting for negotiations of disarmament. Even though M23 was the greater rebel group, in the D. R. of the Congo, there were still nearly 200 armed groups in 2014.

This way, the study of geography, navigation, territorial limits of mandates and of the procedures to be adopted according to the situation become important for the preparation of peace force members. As logistics, either tactical or strategical, especially regarding transportation and maintenance shall be part of a detailed preparation in order to minimize related problems. Military Engineering, tested in Haiti, shall be prepared for other challenges in order to support movement of troops by working on roads in bad conditions, and, at the same, time having their working sites secured from potential rebel attacks.

The regular force must be in conditions to change attitude, ranging from unstable peace situations to crisis, or even, engaging in war



operations in a very short period of time, due to the accelerated collapse of relations encompassing rebel forces, governments, irregular forces and the population; a very common situation in African conflict areas, making the deployment of peace forces become imminent.

CONCLUSION

For the Latin American Peacekeeping Training Centers, the lessons coming from thirteen years of mission in Haiti are very important for the preparation of forces to be deployed to new UN missions.

All the history and cultural heritage from the African people, accounting for all their complexity and fragmentation, shall deserve special attention for the preparation of contingents so that each peacekeeper understands the operational environment he is operating and thus interact, in a more productive manner, in this complex human scenario.

Likewise, the preparation of fractions of troops as contingent members shall be readjusted, highlighting the possibility of war operations, as well as non-war operations, in the operational, logistical and engineering components. If troops in Haiti had to be flexible enough, in Africa, flexibility is 100% mandatory.

Comparatively speaking, the mission in Africa represents one more step in the large spectrum of current conflicts; which is a great possibility for the evolution of Land Military Doctrine and the transformation of Latin American Armies towards modern military operations.





WHAT NEXT? MALI: AN OVERVIEW FOR BRAZILIAN PEACEKEEPING

Karla Pinhel Ribeiro¹

ABSTRACT

This article aims at better understanding, with references about the history of peacekeeping missions which Brazil participated in, the relevance of a possible option for the future of Brazilian peacekeeping within the framework of the UN, specially regarding the Republic of Mali. The first part presents a table of Brazilian historical background in peacekeeping operations. In the second part, a study and risk assessment about Mali is presented, as well as details about the country's stability, the current United Nation's mission (MINUSMA) and its requirements for enhancing its efficiency in the future.

"It remains critical that MINUSMA urgently address outstanding gaps in force requirements, enhance its capabilities, including intelligence and use of technologies and continue to adjust its posture to be responsive to the deteriorating security situation." Ban Ki-moon, Former UN Secretary General, 2006-2017

Policies for future peacekeeping missions are being addressed and examined with care by Brazil's national security and international relations authorities², and the history of Brazilian peacekeeping

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² Public Audience with Brazilian Minister of Defense, Mr. Raul Jungmann. at Federal Chamber of Deputy, Commission of Foreign Affairs and National Defense, with members of Armed Forces, civil society and academics for discussion of the future of Brazil's accountability, capability and performance in peacekeeping, and other issues. 22/11/2016.



operations has a paramount influence to measure the country's capacity for such undertakings. While humanitarian missions and peacekeeping operations can effectively address violations of human rights in zones of conflict, poverty and general crisis, they concede international recognition to the contributing countries involved.

Considering the history of the past humanitarian and peacekeeping operations that Brazil has participated in, this article intents to present a relevant option for the Brazilian peacekeeping in the future, focusing on the African country of Mali in Western Sahel.

TABLE OF BRAZILIAN PEACEKEEPING IN HISTORY

Brazil is a member of the United Nations since its foundation in 1945. The Brazilian military participated for the first time in a peacekeeping mission under the United Nations in 1947, when military observers were sent to the Balkans, specially in Croatia. Later, between the 50s and 60s, the Brazilian military had a more effective presence by integrating international peacekeeping forces under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) in the Middle East and under the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Caribbean.

The country's first deployment of troops into a foreign country took place with Brazil's participation in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) with the Suez Battalion, in the Middle East, designed to avoid confrontation between Egyptians and Israelis, and was the longest of these missions, lasting ten years (from 1957 to 1967), with the approximate participation of 600 soldiers who took turns (20 contingents) being replaced every six months.

During the subsequent decades, the role of the Brazilian armed forces in the UN peacekeeping missions was greatly reduced. In 1994, troops were sent, amounting to an infantry company of about 100 soldiers, engaged in assisting the peacekeeping operation in Mozambique.



In September 1995, Brazil deployed personnel for a peacekeeping mission in Angola, a contingent of over a thousand men, with one infantry battalion, one engineering company, and a health center. In recent years, the Brazilian military has been providing services to the United Nations, sending military observers and participating in operations in Africa (Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Uganda, Sudan), Central America and the Caribbean (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti), Asia (Camboja, East Timor) and Europe (Cyprus, Croatia), as well as cooperating towards a peaceful settlement of the border disputes between Ecuador and Peru.

Since the Brazilian army has demonstrated an exemplary performance, it is recognized for the aptitude displayed by its troops and observers engaged in the field. The increase of national visibility on the world stage through participation in peacekeeping missions has brought growing prestige to Brazil's army and the country's foreign policy.

The Brazilian experience in peace operations, either by sending unarmed military observers, or by inserting armed troops in areas of conflicts, contributed to the efforts of the international peace organizations, to maintain peace and to monitor the ceasefire between parties in zones of conflict.

Brazilian vision about peace operations consists in the projection of its international policy and could be explained using the words of Minister Norberto Moretti, former head of the Itamaraty Peace and Security Division:

"From the Brazilian perspective, peace operations are an instrument of international action that is especially valuable because its own conception fits well with our diplomatic identity and tradition. The missions are a genuinely multilateral instrument serving the peaceful settlement of disputes—although it may use force in defending the mandate conferred by the Security Council—and should be used in an impartial and non-intrusive manner." (CCOPAB, 2016)



Moretti's remarks indicate that a position in a chair at the UN's Security Council depends greatly on the level of participation that Brazil is willing to have in peacekeeping missions:

"The success of our forces and peacekeepers in the field reinforce Brazil's capacity for interlocution in peacekeeping operations with other countries and the UN secretariat, as well as our influence in multilateral negotiations. It also strengthens Brazil's role in the UNSC and our participation in the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), which sets out the main guidelines for peacekeeping." (CCOPAB, 2016)

The following table presents a summary overview of Brazil's most significant peacekeeping involvements, with the year, mission designation, country and the respective contribution of Brazil in each case³:

COUNTRY	YEAR	MISSION	CONTRIBUTION
Egypt	1957 - 1967	UNEF	Infantry Battalion.
Congo	1960 - 1961	ONUC	Air Force Unit.
Mozambique	1994	ONUMOZ	Infantry Company, Military Observers and Police Platoons.
Angola	1991 - 1998	UNAVEM I, II, II e MONUA	Infantry Battalion, Engineering Company, Hospital, Higher State Officials, Military Observers and Police Forces.
East Timor	1999 - 2000	UNTAET- UNMISET	Higher State Officials, Military Observers and Police Forces.
Haiti	2004 - Today	MINUSTAH	Infantry Battalion, Engineering Company, Higher State Officials and Police Officers.
Lebanon	2012 - Today	UNIFIL	One Frigate with Military Personnel and Higher State Officials.

³ Data information: CCOPAB, Department of Doctrine and Research, Rio de Janeiro, 2016, thanks to Colonel Carlos Cavalcanti.



Taking the stabilization mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as an example, Brazil, according to the troop and police contributors archive of the United Nations, was deploying 986 personnel — troops and police — in the latest report — that of 31 of August 2016. The number has been decreasing as the stabilization of Haiti progresses, but the manpower sent by Brazil was considerable throughout the whole mission, such as, for example, in August of 2011 with the deployment of 2,189 personnel or in September of 2010 with a total of 2,192. According to the UN's Contributors Archives, in August of 2016 Brazil had a number of 1,303 total personnel deployed — less than what the country contributed to Haiti alone in previous years — in all its participating operations: namely MINURSO in Western Sahara, MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and MINUSTAH in Haiti.

For a better comprehension of Brazil's capability in personnel deployment for peacekeeping missions, a table is presented, showing the number of contributions of police, military experts and troops made by the country to the United Nations in the month which presented the highest total number of every year from 2010 to 2016:

Year	Police	MEM	Troops	Total
2016	5	27	1,273	1,305
2015	18	24	1,651	1,693
2014	23	23	1,718	1,764
2013	12	21	2,172	2,205
2012	17	27	2,444	2,488
2011	20	27	2,451	2,498
2010	12	46	2,316	2,374

With MINUSTAH in Haiti coming to an end, Brazil becomes interested again in joining new peace missions. Among current UN needs, the MINUSMA Mission in Mali is presenting characteristics in terms of military and humanitarian purposes which shall be evaluated in comparison with the traditional political objectives of Brazil.



UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED STABILIZATION MISSION IN MALI (MINUSMA)

In the beginning of the 21th century, the Republic of Mali found itself immersed in a dire context of looming crisis due to the growing presence of terrorist groups in the North of the country, bringing a major threat for national and regional stability, with severe human rights violations. An urgent military intervention was authorized by the UN and successfully conducted by France with the support of African countries, which enabled the liberation of the North and restoration of the Malian control over its territory. Stability and human security remained threatened and the UN decided to establish the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)⁴. The UN's Security Council report of the Secretary-General⁵ summarized as well the humanitarian situation in Mali, on the 26 of March 2013, prior to the adoption of the Security Council's Resolution 2100:

"More than 4.3 million Malians were in need of assistance in 2012 because of the food and nutrition crisis. [...] Approximately 747,000 people were in need of immediate food assistance and an additional 1.3 million were at risk of food insecurity. As access to commodities has been dramatically curtailed in northern Mali, humanitarian partners are scaling up to meet protection needs,

⁴ MINUSMA was established by the UN's Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013, after a letter was received in 25 of February 2013 by the Security Council's Secretary-General from Dioncounda Traoré, then interim President of Mali, requesting that the "presence of the international community in Mali be designed to support first the restoration of territorial integrity, peace, and then the country's stabilization [...] in order to restore the authority and sovereignty of the Malian State throughout its territory."

⁵ For all the reports of the United Nations Secretary-General on Mali since the start of the peacekeeping mission, as well as all the UN Security Council's resolutions for MINUSMA and other documents, consult the UN official web page on MINUSMA at minusma.unmissions.org and for the UN's background information on Mali see un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma as well.



such as prevention and support to victims of sexual and genderbased violence and exploitation, as well as assistance to children who had been recruited into armed groups. [...] The human rights situation in Mali remains a major cause for concern, with reports of serious human rights violations in northern Mali, including summary executions, illegal arrests and forced disappearances, the use of children by armed groups, rape, forced marriages, destruction and looting of property."

The security situation generally improved in the last three years, but remained critical in the area around Kidal, traditional stronghold of the Tuareg opposition movement MNLA⁶. The 2013 diagnosis of the humanitarian crisis still persists, as stated in the recent Secretary-General's report on Mali, dated of 29 September 2016:

"In the lean season (June to September), more than 3 million people, or 16 per cent of the Malian population, were food insecure, including approximately 420,000 who needed immediate food assistance. [...] In June, 296 out of 2,380 schools remained closed in the crisis-affected regions of Gao, Kidal, Mopti, Ségou and Timbuktu. [...] The delivery of humanitarian assistance in Northern and central Mali was constrained during the reporting period, compared to the previous one, owing to the

⁶ According to the UN, in January of 2012, the secessionist *Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad* (MNLA), assisted by Islamist militant groups — including *Ansar al-Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM) and the *Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest* (MUJAO) — initiated attacks in the north of Mali. On March, a mutiny by disaffected malian soldiers from the units defeated in the north resulted in a military coup. The coup contributed in weakening the already fragile government presence in the north, allowing MNLA to overrun government forces and proclaim an independent State of Azawad in the region on 6 of April. Intensive mediation efforts led by the Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) returned power to a civilian administration when the military junta and ECOWAS signed a framework agreement, leading to the appointment of the Speaker of the National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, as interim President on 12 of April. The agreement provided for the establishment of a transitional government.



impact of the rainy season on roads, an increase in criminal assaults against humanitarian workers and the deterioration of the security situation. [...] On 6 June, a warehouse containing a one-month supply of food rations pre-positioned by humanitarian actors for 11,000 people was looted in Kidal. Furthermore, contamination by explosive hazards, including explosive remnants of war, improvised explosive devices and mines, in the northern and central regions continued to restrict humanitarian and civilian access. [...] Fighting in the Kidal region in July and August led to the forced displacement of civilians. [...] In July, seasonal flooding caused 13 deaths, destroyed 1,500 houses and affected approximately 10,000 people."

Aside from the political crisis fomented by the warring factions within Mali, the humanitarian situation yearns for international aid, and is best explained by the United Nations' Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs⁷ (OCHA) and its Global Humanitarian Overview for 2017:

"In Mali, an estimated 3.7 million people will need humanitarian assistance in 2017. Three million people will be food insecure and of that number, 495,000 will be severely food insecure. Forecasts indicate that as many as 850,000 people will need nutrition assistance of whom 142,000 children under 5 years of age will suffer from severe acute malnutrition. Around 33,000 people are likely to remain internally displaced. Approximately 18,000 Malian refugees are expected to return in 2017. Insecurity is likely to persist in northern and central parts of the country and to hinder humanitarian access. Explosive hazards threaten the lives of thousands of people in Gao, Kidal, Mopti, Menaka and Timbuktu. [...] Low funding undermined humanitarian partners' ability to respond. The 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan was poorly funded, with the protection sector receiving

⁷OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. See unocha.org for further information.



a meagre 6 per cent of requirements. [...] Failure to provide adequate assistance in 2017 will threaten vulnerable people's safety and dignity and expose these people to food insecurity, malnutrition and mortality."

The OCHA's funding overview for the Humanitarian Response Plan in Mali claims that of the \$293 million needed, only 33% - \$130.8 million — is currently funded. According to the report, so far, 1.4 million people in Mali will receive assistance of the 3.7 million in need.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees⁸ (UNHCR), with its operational update on the displacement and refugee situation in Mali — of the month of October 2016 —, gives the following context:

"UNHCR continues to operate in a volatile security environment with threat of terrorism, criminality and intercommunity violence affecting humanitarian access in northern and central Mali. In the north, violations of basic human rights are reported and certain local populations continue to lack access to public services, documentation, water, education and food security. Some 134,814 Malian refugees remain in neighbouring countries and 36,690 internally displaced persons in Mali are waiting to see whether conditions in their area of origin improve to enable them to return in safety and dignity. The volatile security environment continues to destabilize local communities, jeopardize the protection of civilians, and prevent forcibly displaced persons from returning to their homes, while further threatening their access to already limited basic social services. [...] The threat of terrorism remains elevated with recent complex attacks demonstrating that terrorist groups have improved their tactics and have accurate information."

⁸ The UNHCR provides critical emergency assistance, during times of displacement, in the form of clean water, sanitation and healthcare, as well as shelter, household goods and food. It also arranges transport and assistance packages for people who return home, and income-generating projects for those who resettle. See unhcr.org for more information.



The peacekeeping mission intends to support the democratic process of Mali, as well as to carry out security-related stabilization tasks on major population centres, protecting civilians and engaging in human rights monitoring.

MINUSMA aims for the provision of humanitarian assistance, the return of displaced persons, the extension of state authority in unstable areas, the institution of peace and the preparation of free, inclusive and orderly elections.

Resolution 2295 was adopted by the Security Council at its 7727th meeting on 29 of June of 2016 to extend the mission, recalling its previous resolutions — in particular 2227 (2015) and 2100 (2013), as well as the Presidential Statement of 6 of February of 2015 and the press statements, including that of 12 of January of 2016, concerning the situation in Mali — to reaffirm a strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Mali.

MINUSMA understands that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability and security throughout the territory of Mali, and emphasizes the importance of achieving national ownership of peace and security-related initiatives. Also, Resolution 2295 reaffirms the basic principles of peacekeeping, including the consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defense and defense of the mandate specific to the need and situation of the country concerned.

According to Resolution 2295, MINUSMA's mandate shall include, among others, the following priority tasks:

Protection of civilians and stabilization, including against
asymmetric threats. For the purpose of protecting civilians, in
key population centres and areas where people are at risk, under
threat of physical violence, enhance early warning, anticipate



and counter threats, including asymmetric threats, through active patrolling, and prevent the return of dangerous armed elements to those areas, providing specific aid for women and children affected by armed conflict;

- Countering asymmetric attacks in active defense of MINUSMA's mandate. Take steps to counter asymmetric attacks against civilians or United Nations personnel, ensuring prompt and effective responses to threats of violence against civilians and engaging in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible threats;
- Protection, safety and security of United Nations personnel.
 Protect the United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of the United Nations and associated personnel;
- Promotion and protection of human rights. Promote and protect human rights, in particular in the areas of justice and reconciliation, including to support, as feasible as possible, the efforts of the Malian authorities to bring to justice those responsible for violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, in particular war crimes and crimes against humanity; and
- Humanitarian assistance. Contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary, safe and dignified return or local integration or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees.

MINUSMA also demands capacities to assist in implementing the following objectives:



- a. Projects for stabilization; In support of the Malian authorities, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for projects aimed at stabilizing the North of Mali, including quick impact projects;
- Weapons and ammunition management; To assist the Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition management; and
- c. Support for cultural preservation; To assist the Malian authorities, as necessary and feasible, in protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration with UNESCO. (UNSC, Resolution 2295, 2016).

The UN's mandate, in Resolution 2295, stipulates that MINUSMA will remain fully authorized until the date of 30 of June 2017, being encompassed by the authorization, aside from civilian components, have 15,209 personnel, including 13,289 military personnel and 1,920 police.

It can be observed that, when compared with Resolution 2100 - 62013

Furthermore, the report of the Secretary-General, dated of September 2016, details the status of the current manpower employed:

"As at 20 September, the strength of the military component of MINUSMA stood at 10,635 personnel, or 80 per cent of the authorized strength of 13,289. [...] MINUSMA remained underresourced in terms of armoured personnel carriers. Even with the deployment to the Mission of 27 additional armoured personnel carriers, MINUSMA would be 38 armoured personnel



carriers short. [...] In addition, the new mandate included a requirement for an additional 77 armoured personnel carriers. [...] The strength of the police component of MINUSMA stood at 1,274 personnel, or 66 per cent of its authorized strength of 1,920. [...] MINUSMA continued to require four formed police units, 11 additional armoured personnel carriers to meet the required standards, a small section of riverine police capacity and additional specialized police personnel. [...] 85 per cent of all MINUSMA civilian staff had been deployed, including 85 per cent of international staff, 86 per cent of United Nations volunteers and 80 per cent of national staff. [...] MINUSMA should strengthen its mission support capacity, refocus its civilian capacity towards the implementation of the peace agreement and the support to national institutions as they redeploy to the north."

The incompletion of the prescribed number of personnel by the 2016 mandate does not constitute a peculiarity of the 29 of September report, but is a reality throughout MINUSMA's operation. Despite the crescent necessity for more troops, MINUSMA — from resolution 2100 of April 2013 to the September's report of 2016 — never reached the initial goal of 11,200 troops and 1,440 police, albeit the number is increasing every year. Having in mind the goal of 15,209 personnel, data from the UN's Peacekeeping Fact Sheet⁹ archive shows how far the number of troops in September of each year since the start of MINUSMA is from the operation's mandates:

Year	Police	Troops	Total
2016	1,274	10,635	11,909
2015	1,029	10,443	11,472
2014	1,014	8,204	9,218
2013	791	5,219	6,010

 $^{^{\}rm o}$ See this and other information available at un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources in Statistics.



In 2016, for example, Burkina Faso contributed with 1672 troops, Bangladesh with 1531 troops and Togo with 972 troops. But countries as Germany contributed with 245 troops and Netherlands with 397 troops.

An effective ingression of Brazil in MINUSMA would make a good, if not decisive, impact. It is attested that the mission is currently not only undermanned, but underfunded: according to the report previously mentioned, as of September 2016, only \$101 million of the total of \$354 million for the 2016's Mali Humanitarian Response Plan had been financed.

In the case of MINUSMA, the approved budget 10 — for July of 2016 to June of 2017 — amounts to \$933,411,000 and is further detailed (using US dollars) in the following table:

Category	MINUSMA	Category	MINUSMA
Military and police personnel of	osts 369 148 600	Naval transportation	325 900
Civilian personnel costs	142 288 600	Communications	38 294 800
Consultants	650 400	Information technology	13 342 000
Official travel	4 746 500	Medical	5 073 700
Facilities and infrastructure	95 339 000	Other supplies, services and equipment	82 643 100
Ground transportation	12 115 500	Quick-impact projects	4 000 000
Air transportation	165 442 900	Staff assessment income	12 336 000
1	otal requirements	933 411 000	

- Considering Brazil's potential, based on its unprecedented manpower contribution to Haiti's crisis due to the devastating earthquake of 12 of January 2010;
- Acknowledging the fact that Brazil chose most of its peacekeeping involvements where its assistance was most needed:

 $^{^{10}}$ See item 148 of the United Nations General Assembly's 70th session of the Fifth Committee, available at un.org/en/ga/fifth/70/agenda70 in the UN's official web page.



- Considering as well that MINUSTAH is culminating in the fruition of its goals and is therefore militarily less demanding;
- Considering finally that MINUSMA is calling for more personnel
 than in previous years, and that the contributions to Mali's
 Humanitarian Response Plan are not reaching the prescribed
 quotas, it is possible to affirm that the stabilization of Mali
 presents itself as a considerable opportunity for Brazil not only to
 materialize a positive result for peace and security in the Republic
 of Mali, but also to build more influence on the world stage and
 gain increased respect among the international community,
 especially with the countries involved in MINUSMA.

MALI RISK ASSESSMENTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The United Nations Programme Human Development Reports¹¹ in the last available issue of 2015 evaluated Mali as being a low human development country, ranked 179 in the world, with the 10th worst development of all the 188 analyzed countries:



The United Nations Programme also publishes a Multidimensional Poverty Index, which shows that a considerable part of Mali's population


¹¹ The Human Development Index is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. It is provided by the UN's Human Development Reports.



is below the international poverty line of one dollar and twenty-five cents per day:

	Population near multidimensional poverty ^e	Population in severe multidimensional poverty*	Contribution of deprivation to overall poverty			Population living below income poverty line (%)	
			(%)			National poverty line	PPP \$1.25 a day
Country			Education	Health	Living standards	2004- 2014 ^a	2002- 2012*
Mali	10.8	55.9	37.9	22.4	39.7	43.6	50.6

It is also pertinent to bring forward the statistics of the Index for Risk Management (INFORM)¹², which grants Mali a very high score of potential risk. INFORM ranks the Republic of Mali in the nineteenth place in the global risk index, demonstrating the delicate position in which the country stands.



It is also interesting to provide here the results of the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators¹³ for Mali, in order to have a general idea of the degradation of governance effectiveness in the country:

 ¹² A collaboration of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Team for Preparedness and Resilience and the European Commission, INFORM provides a country risk profile which consists of a value between zero — no risk — and ten — very high risk — for a number of categories. Updated as of 2017, the global INFORM model covers 191 countries. The risk index is extracted from three categories: *Hazard & Exposure* — covering events that could occur and the people or assets potentially affected by them —, *Vulnerability* — the susceptibility of communities to those hazards — and *Lack of Capacity* — the lack of resources available that can help absorb the shock.
 ¹³ A project which reports governance indicators for over 200 countries. These indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. They are based on over 30 individual data sources. See worldbank.org/governance/wgi for more detail.





Everything points out to the fact that Mali, even without considering its internal violent conflicts, would necessitate of international aid for its widespread humanitarian crisis. Various entities are working under the United Nations to ensure human dignity in Mali, as well as to restore peace and stability in the region.

CONCLUSION

Mali finds itself in a complicated period of post-conflict stabilization and currently needs increased international support, with a looming persistent terrorist threat at regional level in Sahel, at the Northern boundaries of the country, and an urgent need for military and civilian peace-keeping support on its national territory. This latter requirement is fulfilled by the UN mission MINUSMA, which already maintains peace and security as well as provides utterly needed humanitarian aid, but is still lacking and calling for additional national contributions.

Brazilian Peacekeeping history demonstrates the Nation's potential for peace operations. By the successful experiences, lessons learned in the field and peacekeeping training, Brazil could be very helpful to the International community by supporting MINUSMA, both militarily and financially, as it did with previous stabilization missions in the past.

Even if a political decision by the Brazilian government might still need some time to be taken, the Armed forces need to be prepared for their next challenge. Given the complexity of the current situation in Mali, it would be wise to anticipate such a possible option by rapidly initiating the first steps of troop preparation for deployment, starting with context analysis, enhanced knowledge of the African realities and increased contacts with the UN about Mali and with most probable future partner Nations within MINUSMA.



This would facilitate recruitment, training and deployment of units to fulfill the military part of the mandate and of experts to meet the UN demand for professionals in areas such as mediation, human rights, disarmament and prison system.

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ALCOPAZ AND POST-CONFLICT CIVILIAN CAPACITY: THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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The complexity of the activities related with peacekeeping and security result, consequently, in the necessity of the implementation of a system aimed to diversify tasks and efforts of the international system members

In order to do so, the United Nations has three departments specifically designed to manage peace and security, as well as a set of subsidiary entities that aid in this task.

They provide a suitable response in each one of the phases related to the aforementioned context, through their different but coherent and complementary scopes.

However, as the benefits of such approach clearly contribute to the management of these kind of scenarios, the United Nations and the international community have become aware of their restrictions, such as political and budgetary issues.

Consequently, several organizations and entities have gotten involved in the management of international peace and security, in one, several or all phases, such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement or peace building processes.

According to the Security Council's Resolution N° 229, such participation has significantly increased in the last few years, being no longer the exception but the rule.



Pursuant with the above-mentioned, the present article seeks to deepen the scope of the civilian capacities in post conflict scenarios and the role of regional alliances or organizations in this context.

The "peacebuilding" stage is directly related with expressions like "building a State" or "building a Nation", acknowledging that it is a process tailored to reinstate governability or improve government and administration structures, following certain models as democracy, economy and core values, such as respect for the rule of law, human rights, social integration, and population policies, amongst others.

A significant part of this process' frame is the ever-changing nature of conflicts, which demands permanent assessment and renewal of a fit-for-purpose toolset, in order to mitigate human suffering.

Thus, since February 22nd, 2011, the United Nations' General Assembly has published reports and examinations on post-conflict civilian capacity, under the responsibility of several Under Secretary Generals for Peacekeeping Operations, including the participation of experts from Member States and the civilian society.

As a part of the commitment to strengthen international support for countries withdrawing from conflict, the decision was made to carry out these assessments and evaluations in order to provide recommendations, to reinforce national involvement, broaden and deepen the international available civilian capacity and ensure a more suitable, effective and ontime support. Some of those recommendations were:

 The process that leads from war to sustainable peace is no possible without a stronger civilian capacity. If it is not available, the struggle may be put on hold, but the institutions will not be strong enough and the threat of violence escalation and recurrence of hostilities will always be there.



- International response to conflicts is often based on available capacity and international actors tend to focus on what they can provide at that moment, instead of taking care of the actual needs and requirements.
- United Nations must increase its response capacity and be more flexible and efficient regarding resources. The entities, funds and programs outperform the Secretariat in several ways, however, there are still great possibilities for improvement.

Therefore, considering the necessity to increase the participation and preparation of civilian personnel, the advisory group encourages the United Nations to use not only its own personnel, but also use for its own benefit the countries' capacities collaborating with Member States and regional organizations, such as the Latin American Association of Peace Operations Training Centers (ALCOPAZ).

The statements above mentioned, owe to the fact that when countries withdraw from conflict, they usually lack of self-criticism towards the necessary capacities to ensure long lasting sustainable peace: the vital functions to maintain a government, reestablish the institutions of justice, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, reactivate the economy and restore basic public services, amongst others.

Nowadays, considering the broadening of civilian mandates in an increasing number of international conflicts, the United Nations finds difficulties to quickly deploy all necessary experts. Moreover, owing to the fact that sometimes the severity of conflict escalates, the advisory group indicates that in some cases, the capacities are not available.

As a result, all emerging regional organizations in Africa, Latin America and Asia, tailored to cooperate with the peacekeeping community, present themselves as a splendid opportunity to deploy experienced civilians or develop reserves of this kind of personnel



or specialized multidisciplinary groups; which could be seen, by regional organizations, as an opportunity to increase their cooperation mechanisms.

As a way to develop and enable this idea, States may start to identify their technical capacities through the selection of professionals and manage programs aimed to support the international community, and afterwards, offer them to the United Nations, European Union, African Union or others.

According to the reports from the advisory group, the post-conflict international support requests focus on five topics: basic security, political processes, basic social services, governmental functions and economy reactivation.

Hence, critical deficit in civilian personnel capacity relate to the following points:

- Regarding basic security, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; police forces; reform and direction of the security sector;
- Concerning justice, penitentiaries, penal justice; judiciary and legislative reform;
- About political processes, creation and development of parties and public information;
- Regarding essential governmental functions, assistance coordination, legislative power and public finances management; and
- Concerning economic reactivation, creation of new job posts, natural resources management and private sector development.

In order to obtain the best possible results out of the existent international capacities, the United Nations needs to develop coupling mechanisms to connect with external partners. This would be coherent with the on-the-field support global strategy.



About this issue, it has been recommended that Peace Operations Centres should provide better training programs for civilians, thus permitting to enable competent and qualified personnel; acknowledging the fact that conflict-affected countries need efficient political, economic and social processes to build enduring peace.

Concerning civilian capacities, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute states that United Nations Peacekeeping Operations require multidisciplinary participation, not just military contingents, but also police and civilian personnel, permitting the consolidation of peace at all levels.

Pursuant with this, the tasks to be performed by civilian personnel on the field will be – amongst others – the following:

- Perform as mediators and negotiators with the involved parties in order to achieve and fulfil peace agreements;
- Assist refugees and displaced people when returning to their original allocations;
- Supervise the respect for human rights;
- Train personnel in charge of elections;
- Support rebuild and economic development tasks;
- Reintegrate and train ex-combatants to be reinserted in civilian life and eventually, grant them terrains;
- Management of jails and penitentiary system;
- Rebuild and build hospitals and schools;
- Train the new civilian police force;
- Reduce and redistribute the national Army forces;
- · Create mechanisms for judicial complaints; and
- Provide tools to fight sexual exploitation and abuse.



In this sense, and acknowledging the relevance that regional organizations have gained as partners of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, ALCOPAZ raises as a successful regional institution, which natural characteristics project and prompt participation, professionalism and doctrine of all deployed personnel under the standards of this association.

ALCOPAZ has adopted the modality to generate cooperation agreements between Centres, as students, instructors or teachers, thusly providing the regional expertise in each of the courses developed by the Centres of the region.

The aforementioned accomplishments of the organization, represent the outcome of a well-defined structure, based on its presidency and respective committees (executive, military, police and civilian) that one way or another, facilitate the work of Member States, thus permitting to generate future guidelines for the organization, such as the preparation of civilians to take active part in peace operations.

This experience has not passed by overlooked by other international organizations, which have asked to become a part of this association as guests, contributing partners or observers, envisaging how positive this may result.

For instance, Germany – observer country at ALCOPAZ – has committed to support and aid in the solution of international conflicts and building up civilian societies.

Germany makes – both nationally and multilaterally – several efforts towards the improvement of crisis prevention instruments such as peace operations, support programs for democratization and sending civilian personnel.

Accordingly, ALCOPAZ has the opportunity to project and spread cooperation mechanisms even further, with countries that have already



initiated the process and have the experience of deploying civilians in State-consolidation centred programs and even integrate – as observers – relevant contributing partners, as is the case of Finland.

In this sense, if the participation in peacekeeping operations projects military and police capabilities to aid conflict-affected States, the participation of civilians in such operations will also project new tools for international cooperation.

Concerning this topic, some States have started to develop instruments and mechanisms of a civilian nature to cooperate in peace operations, which include coordination, analysis and advisory entities, expert teams, as well as specific institutions or programs to train civilian personnel to be deployed in this kind of operations.

States should - according to the new international challenges and their commitment with peace and security - diversify their efforts to guarantee coordination and integration within the international response. In like manner, the creation of civilian assets represents an increase in States' capacity to take action in the international scenario.

Thus, the dispatch of civilians is mainly carried out in small teams, to be integrated into international peace operations structures, enabling a relevant participation in the conflict solution process. Consequently, the government has the possibility to measure its involvement in such conflict, without necessarily committing to send troops.

Under this perspective, the Chilean government and the European Union subscribed an agreement for the participation of Chile in crisis management operations on January 30th, 2014. Afterwards, it was broadened in September of 2015, strengthening cooperation and enhancing good relations between both parties.

However, in order to understand the scope of this agreement, it is important to clarify that "crisis management" is a concept used by the



European Union to tackle crisis and conflict situations in fragile States outside its territory.

In order to fulfil this task, crisis management is deeply related with the integral focus concept; aimed to the idea of managing the crisis through a "working method, a set of concrete measures and processes tailored to develop and deliver policies, guidelines and actions, through tools and instruments within the organization".

Consequently, the agreement represents for both parties, a unique opportunity within the peacekeeping and security cooperation community, under a multilateral and updated perspective.

This agreement seeks to strengthen the Chilean capacity to carry out humanitarian assistance abroad and enhance the development of a civilian component in future peacebuilding operations. At the same time, it benefits the deepening of the cooperation between both parties concerning strategic interests and security, highlighting gender and peace operations.

Nowadays, gender and human rights are topics included in the curricula of the Armed Forces and Police Academies, as well as Peace Operations pre deployment courses.

Nevertheless, it has become vital to transform these topics into transversal training objectives, enabling the generation of skills, attitude and awareness on gender equality and human rights respect. It implies to include them as part of the whole formation processes and not just specific courses.

In like manner, understanding the necessity to include these topics in the planning, executions and assessment processes for peace operations, would greatly aid to realize the disproportioned and excessive impact



of conflict over women. Thusly, it will permit all deployed personnel to respond in a suitable manner, guaranteeing the protection of the rights of the different groups present in the area of mission.

Under this framework, CECOPAC is projecting national capabilities, by performing an assessment along with European countries, specifically Finland, achieving relevant cooperation in topics like civilian crisis management, though the implementation of two courses for civilians in peace operations.

At the same time, a seminar was held jointly between the Chilean Ministry of Defence and the Finnish Embassy, aimed to present the process by which civilian and military European formation programs included gender equality and human rights and the inclusion of a gender perspective in crisis management and peace operations where European countries take part.

In this context of constant updating regarding international cooperation and training, CECOPAC developed a system to obtain lessons learned, which is currently available for ALCOPAZ, in order to strengthen cooperation bonds with this regional organization.





MILITARY FORCES FROM COLOMBIA READY TO PEACE

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During the history of Colombia, many political conflicts have caused a great deal of turmoil in different phases of democratic consolidation, and even more when terrorism and drug trafficking have been mixed in, devastating entire populations; putting an end to the will of a people. They have destroyed hundreds of families, who, due to fear, decide to leave their homelands and, many times, cannot be together again for the sake of survival.

At the begining, the main actors involved were the Colombian State, at the head of the Military and Police Forces, as a security and protection entity of sovereignty and internal security, fighting against left-wing guerrillas, and, later on, against right-wing paramilitary groups, drug cartels and criminal gangs. It has gone through several phases of recrudescence, especially since the 1980s, when some of the actors were funded by drug smuggling.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The political conflict in Colombia dates back to the nineteenth century when rivalries between traditional political parties began to grow. That became stronger during the War of the Thousand Days, igniting a long period of violence in Colombia. As for the current political conflict, it began in the 1960s with the emergence of guerrillas (mainly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army), as the result of social and political exclusion, unequal distribution of land, and social injustice. In Colombia, there are approximately 140 groups, whose majority are being financed by drug trafficking.



From 1948 to 1965, there was such a bloody war that this period is known as the "time of violence". In 1958, the power was distributed between the two most powerful traditional parties. The other political pressure groups were then unable to participate in political processes. That resulted in the formation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, acronym in Spanish) and the National Liberation Army (ELN, acronym in Spanish) in the mid-1960s. (1)

The causes for the development of the Colombian armed conflict are centered around a large number of events and elements, including the weakness of the State, the conflict over land ownership, the existence of economic differences, or the polarization and persecution of the civilian population due to its political orientation. It also highlights the permanence of communist-oriented guerrillas and the existence of a drug-smuggling industry that has penetrated all sectors of society and of the State.

During the 1980s, the armed conflict was rapidly escalating, due to guerrillas widespread intimidation in many regions of the country, to selective murders of left-wing civilians carried out by emerging paramilitary groups, as well as to drug smugglers clashing with guerrillas during their criminal activities (in particular, when guerrillas kidnapped relatives of drug smugglers). In that decade, the country experienced economic transformations that focused on the transition of Colombia from a coffee production country to a mining and cocalero country, with the dynamism of new sectors of agribusiness, as well as coal mining, oil and gold sectors. The south-east of the country also presented new poles of economic development, from which the illegal coca industry grew. (2)

The period in which the greatest recrudescence occurred was between 1988 and 2003; however, it was in the second half of the 1990s that the greatest degradation of the conflict occurred due to the widespread use of armed violence against the population, forced disappearances,



indiscriminate massacres of civilians, massive forced displacement and collective kidnappings of civilians, military personnel and politicians. The peak of that recrudescence occurred during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana and the government of Álvaro Uribe, when the actions of the State, guerrillas, drug-smuggler groups and paramilitaries converged.(2)

As of the demobilization of paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006, together with the weakening of the guerrilla movement, there has been a decrease in the intensity of the conflict. However, the paramilitary structures did not cease their actions but continued to behave as drug cartels with great military capacity (now called Organized Armed Groups (GAO, acronym in Spanish), while the guerrilla still retains the capacity for action and confrontation in certain areas of the country. (2)

In 2013, a study estimated that the conflict has caused over 220,000 deaths since 1958. Yet, if we take into account the number of people who have suffered other war crimes, the total exceeds 6 million victims. In those categories, we can include people who disappeared, were threatened, abducted, victims of acts of terrorism, anti-personnel mines, torture, child recruitment, sexual violence, as well as those whose beloved family members were murdered. (2)

INTEGRAL ACTION AS PEACEKEEPING

During the different governments that have been part of our history, peace agreements with terrorist and criminal groups have been either achieved or failed, in the attempt to incorporate into our path, what we might today call peacekeeping.

Within these activities carried out by the State, at the head of its Military and Police Forces, adequate approaching programs were created in order to avoid having exclusively repressive actions in different rural areas. That turned out to be necessary for lawbreaker groups as guerrillas, paramilitaries or common criminals used the population as a shield for



their misdeeds, once the population feared the groups and so kept silent to preserve their integrity.

At the beginning, the program was called Psychological Operations, whose primary purpose was to create in neutral (friendly or hostile) groups a change in the emotions, attitudes or behavior in order to support the achievement of national goals . (OPSIC FF.MM., acronym in Spanish). So, what was that primary and vital goal? To rebuild peace in different populations and communities. (3)

Thanks to that program, great channels of communication were created with personnel trained and able to do this work. They turned out to be essential for the success of military operations, since they opened a way into the community, broke the enemy combat morale and strengthened the will of the armed forces of Colombia.

But the insertion of drug smuggling in the national field as a source of terrorist funding and the acquisition of easy money made those communication channels vulnerable, since the coerced community sold locations and the presence of troops and police patrols for money caused large operation failures. Nevertheless, our heroes' will to fight never completely collapsed.

At this phase of the conflict, the terrorists had a great influential structure in the national and international communities, which lowered the State credibility and the support to the security forces. This phase was called PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR. As the military forces were willing to contribute to the achievement of peace, different political, technological, ideological, juridical and diplomatic elements were integrated in their constitutional role, based on that level of war, so that they had 70% of psychological and 30% of military pressure. Raising the standards of preparation of men and women from the forces, as well as something fundamental, the strengthening of their security in war zones. (4)



"Generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage (direct approach) and use the extraordinary to win (indirect/ non-military approach)." Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Throughout its internal struggle, Colombia has developed unique strategies and capacities that can now serve as an example to other countries with similar conflicts. Their goals include bringing a solid state presence to rural regions which have been governed by the presence of Illegal armed groups, and promote development in those areas.

Integral Action is to plan and lead the operatioal groups that support the military operations, through the use and application of the doctrine of integral action, with the purpose of maintaining and strengthening the legitimacy and thus facilitate the fulfillment of the Constitutional Mission. (5)

The Integral Action opened the doors to a total advance towards the moral destruction of the enemy and the strengthening of its presence in the communities as a conciliatory element and of social contribution for the prosperity of the regions with projects of road infrastructure, reconstruction of towns, medical clinics, legal offices, education, media coverage with the network of military TV stations; the Navy, Army or Police dedicated to strengthen the minds of people so that their behavior could change in favor of their communities and they themselves could become true Peace managers.

UN PEACE MISSIONS

As peace agreements were signed, more elements should be added to the operational scenario, allowing the stabilization in areas where armed groups historically were present. Since the reduction of the intensity of the conflict makes it imperative to achieve a social and developmental character as a way to change the Colombian conflict.

Thus, the Colombian Military Forces have demonstrated, even in the highest peaks of conflict escalation, respect and humanity, denoting a high



degree of integrality of its men, who, in the conflict zones, have suffered the cruelty of war. All that experience can be exploited for the different peace missions under the aegis of the UN, which is enhanced through key skills such as flexibility, projection, interoperability, sustainability, versatility and the comprehensiveness of our military forces which are capable of adapting to different operational environments to fulfill a large range of missions. They have also been able to operate remotely from its bases in an effective and sustainable way, inside or outside the country, independently or in the framework of an international coalition. Our Military Forces are prepared to operate, in a harmonic and effective way among different military branches, with other Forces and with the military security equipment of friendly nations, with their suitably trained members coming from other Peacekeeping Centres like CENCOPAZ. They can make use of their multiple capacities to perform different tasks and contribute to the fulfillment of a a broad range of missions, such as those required by the UN. In short, those Forces have demonstrated a joint, coordinated, interagency and combined tactical, operational and strategic level in times of peace, crisis or conflict.

MILITARY FORCES IN HUMANITARIAN AID

In the area of humanitarian aid, the Armed Forces and Police mainly rely on Black Hawk Arpía IV, Angel, Huey II and C-295 aircraft, which carry out humanitarian aid missions and special operations, such as personnel rescue, fire extinguishing, and the like. All that is possible due to the technology and equipment they have on board, as well as the experience of the crew. Aircrafts that can exponentially multiply their reaching limit through Landing Ship Tanks (LST), new elements of river operations, landing and taking of beachheads, river defense as well as the attention to humanitarian emergencies, strengthening the operational coverage, increasing safety, thus resulting in the awareness of joint operations in recent years; they can incorporate in their activities exercises of joint and special operations on the seas, rivers and high-



value objectives, which have allowed, not only the improvement of binational relations for security and defense, but has also brought health, well-being and trading opportunities with neighboring countries.

Nowadays, the Military Forces have their capacities incorporated to their different terrestrial, fluvial and aerial units, allowing them to overcome geographical obstacles that previously hampered fluvial and terrestrial control, thus enlarging the operational scope and giving experience in several fields of combat.

The current challenge is to contribute through the experience forged by more than half a century of conflict, intervention in conflicts to recover the global navigation where required, and navigability over disputed airspace, through special units of recognition, aerial insertions, airborne operations, becoming a fundamental axis of the economic growth engine for the Commonwealth of Nations and World Peace.

Within the range of possibilities, there are the surveillance and reconnaissance missions through their electro-optical systems which serve, in addition to the typical interests of the mission, as an early warning system for risk management and analysis of natural disasters, volcanic activity, floods and forest fires.

Colombian Military Forces are ready to develop an efficient role as security force by means of presence and effective control in the maritime, fluvial and terrestrial areas; and, if required by the International Community, in the aerial field, due to geographical formation.

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CONTRIBUTION DE L'OIF AU RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITÉS FRANCOPHONES DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX

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Au cours des dernières années, l'Organisation internationale de la francophonie (OIF) a intégré dans ses objectifs le soutien au renforcement des capacités des États francophones à participer aux opérations de maintien de la paix. Compte tenu de ses spécificités et de ses savoir-faire, l'OIF développe des partenariats avec les grands acteurs du maintien de la paix, en vue de contribuer à renforcer et à accroître la participation francophone aux opérations de paix.

Concertations francophones

Face au déficit patent et chronique du personnel francophone dans les opérations de maintien de la paix déployées par les Nations unies, alors même que la plupart de ces opérations se déroulent dans l'espace francophone, l'ancien secrétaire général de l'ONU, Kofi Annan a, dès 2004, lancé un appel à l'accroissement de la participation francophone à ces missions. Cet appel a été relayé par le secrétaire général de la Francophonie, SEM Abdou Diouf, qui a dès lors multiplié les concertations avec les pays membres de l'OIF en les sensibilisant sur l'importance de leurs contributions. Lors de la conférence ministérielle d'Antananarivo de 2005, les ministres francophones des Affaires étrangères ont entre autres convié l'OIF, en coopération avec d'autres partenaires bilatéraux



et multilatéraux, à développer des programmes visant à renforcer la capacité des pays francophones à participer aux opérations de paix.

En 2006, la déclaration de Saint-Boniface sur la prévention des conflits et la sécurité humaine a décliné plus précisément les volets de la participation collective des francophones et de la francophonie dans ces domaines. En 2008 et en 2010, par les déclarations de Québec et de Montreux, les chefs d'État et de gouvernement se sont engagés à fournir à l'ONU et aux organisations régionales compétentes, dans la mesure de leurs moyens, des contingents francophones (militaires, policiers et civils) afin d'accompagner les transitions et de consolider la paix.

Sensibilisation au maintien de la paix

En 2009, l'OIF, en collaboration avec l'ONU, a organisé deux forums régionaux, l'un à Bamako, l'autre à Yaoundé, afin d'inciter les responsables africains à apporter une contribution plus significative aux opérations de paix et de leur permettre de saisir toute la mesure des opportunités stratégiques, tactiques et opérationnelles offertes par ces missions.

Par ailleurs, l'OIF a défini une stratégie opérationnelle qu'elle met en œuvre au travers d'initiatives concrètes, inscrites dans le cadre de sa programmation quadriennale.

L'OIF a ainsi soutenu l'organisation de sessions de formation, au sein de l'École de maintien de la paix Alioune-Blondin-Beyede Bamako, visant à favoriser la connaissance et la compréhension des procédures administratives, financières et logistiques en vigueur au sein du système des Nations unies.

L'OIF a également appuyé la formation au sein de l'EIFORCES (Cameroun) d'unitésde police constituées et apporté son soutien aux échanges de stagiaires et d'instructeurs entre les centres francophones de formation





au maintien de la paix, notamment entre l'EMP/Bamako, le NPMEC, Centre national de gestion des forces de maintien de la paix, de déminage et d'élimination des déchets de guerre d'Oudong (Cambodge) et le Cours supérieur international de l'école de gendarmerie de Rosu (Roumanie). Elle a aussi soutenu la tenue de séminaires régionaux portant sur la méthode d'analyse stratégique des situations, en lien avec le ministère belge de la Défense et le Réseau francophone des opérations de paix (ROP).

De l'importance de la promotion du français

En collaboration avec le ministère français des Affaires étrangères, l'OIF apporte actuellement une contribution à l'élaboration de la méthode d'enseignement du français à destination des forces de défense et de sécurité. L'Organisation a aussi impulsé, en lien avec l'UNITAR (UN Institute for Training and Research) et le réseau FRANCOPOL (réseau international francophone de formation policière), l'élaboration de cours en ligne et en français.

Par ailleurs, des activités de plaidoyer ont été menées afin de promouvoir l'usage du français au sein du système onusien et de faire valoir la nécessité de garantir le respect du principe d'égalité et d'équilibre dans l'utilisation des deux langues de travail de l'ONU – le français et l'anglais – au niveau du recrutement, de la formation et de l'accès à la documentation.

Pour des liens renforcés entre acteurs francophones

L'OIF travaille aujourd'hui à la mise en réseau des centres francophones de formation au maintien de la paix. Conformément aux recommandations adoptées lors de la réunion technique ayant réuni, en juillet 2011, les responsables de onze centres francophones de formation au maintien de la paix, l'OIF a initié un programme visant la mise en place d'une plate-forme d'information et d'échanges en ligne, qui permet



de développer les synergies et de mieux faire connaître les ressources francophones de formation aux opérations de paix (cours et modules, vivier d'instructeurs, méthodes spécifiques d'enseignement du français, doctrines, stratégies).

Enfin, l'OIF accorde une importance particulière au renforcement des relations avec les acteurs africains du maintien de la paix, notamment l'Union africaine et les communautés économiques régionales: c'est ainsi qu'en partenariat avec l'organisation panafricaine et avec la Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense du MAEDI, l'OIF a apporté son soutien à la tenue, en octobre 2012, d'un séminaire de haut niveau portant sur «les défis techniques et opérationnels du maintien de la paix en Afrique».

Ces différentes interventions de l'OIF ont participéà l'infléchissement observé: la proportion de Casques bleus locuteurs francophones déployés dans l'ensemble des missions de paix est en effet aujourd'hui de plus de 19% tandis que sur 16 opérations de maintien de la paix, 7 se déroulent en pays francophones. Afin que ces premiers progrès soient amplifiés dans les prochaines années, l'OIF entend poursuivre son action en faveur du renforcement des capacités francophones de maintien de la paix.

UN ENSEIGNEMENT DU FRANÇAIS LIÉ AUX OMP

Ces dernières années, la DCSD a consenti un effort particulier pour l'enseignement du français en milieu militaire, notamment au profit des pays anglophones et hispanophones dans le but de faciliter leur capacité à servir au sein d'opérations de maintien de la paix. En 2016, le continent africain a accueilli plus de 81.000 militaires et policiers déployés dans 9 OMP. Quatre d'entre elles se déroulaient en pays francophones qui absorbaient plus de 45% de cet effectif déployé en Afrique. Cependant, seulement 32,7% des contingents qui y sont intervenus maîtrisaient la langue française (17% en 2012).





Un projet novateur

Dans toute opération de maintien de la paix, la création de liens de confiance entre le personnel déployé (militaires, policiers, civils) et la population passe par une bonne maîtrise de la langue locale, notamment pour l'exécution des missions de proximité. Avec prèsd'une OMP sur deux en zone francophone, la maîtrise du français devient donc une vraie priorité pour de nombreux contingents. De plus, elle permet d'assurer une meilleure communication au sein des états-majors multinationaux.

Face à ce besoin grandissant des pays non francophones souhaitant engager des contingents dans les OMP en milieu francophone, il a paru pertinent d'élaborer une méthode de français adaptée et surtout contextualisée, afin de susciter une adhésion spontanée des élèves. C'est dans cette optique, et grâce à un partenariat original entre le ministère des Affaires étrangères (DCSD et DGM) et l'Organisation internationale de la francophonie (OIF), qu'une équipe pluridisciplinaire coordonnée par la DCSD a élaboréun outil permettant aux stagiaires d'atteindre un niveau de français qui les rende autonomes.

La méthode de français

Cette méthode d'enseignement du français « militaire », a pour objectif de préparer les futurs acteurs des opérations de maintien de la paix à remplir leurs missions, mais aussi d'ouvrir l'accès à des formations en français (réseau des écoles nationales à vocation régionale, scolarités en France) et de former les étudiants aux examens de DELF (diplômes d'études en langue française) délivrés par l'Education nationale française et correspondant au niveau commun de référence pour les langues de l'UE.

Le projet repose sur l'élaboration d'une méthode comprenant trois tomes correspondant chacun à un niveau d'acquisition linguistique. Le premier tome est destiné aux débutants et prépare au DELF de niveau A1 dit de « découverte ». Le deuxième prépare au DELF de niveau A2



qui valide la compétence d'un utilisateur élémentaire. Ces deux tomes visent un public militaire principalement constitué de jeunes officiers (lieutenant à capitaine). Le troisième tome prépare au niveau B1 et permet à l'utilisateur de devenir indépendant. Il est plutôt destiné aux officiers supérieurs puisque le contexte d'apprentissage est celui d'un état-major agissant dans les opérations de maintien de la paix.

Chaque tome est accompagné de pistes audio et d'un guide pédagogique destiné aux enseignants (civils ou vacataires). Le guide est ainsi fait qu'il permet à un enseignant civil de donner des cours à des militaires, puisqu'il y trouve les éléments de culture et de compréhension de l'environnement très spécifique du métier de soldat. Il peut ainsi guider pas à pas ses étudiants durant les 120 heures de formation nécessaires pour chaque niveau.

Mise en application et diffusion

Le premier tome de la méthode a été expérimenté entre septembre 2011 et avril 2012 dans quatre pays d'Afrique (Éthiopie, Ghana, Mozambique, Guinée équatoriale) permettant la validation finale de l'ouvrage. Dèsla rentrée de septembre 2012, 3 300 exemplaires étaient en place dans des pays du continent africain au profit de 21 projets d'enseignement.

Mais la DCSD a aussi conscience que la demande va croissante dans certains pays d'Afrique du Nord, d'Asie ou d'Amérique latine, et l'adaptation de la méthode aux zones géographiques concernées est déjà prévue.

La DCSD et la promotion du français

Le programme international d'enseignement du français proposé par la DCSD a aussi pour objectif de permettre la création et le maintien à niveau





d'un vivier d'officiers francophones capables de suivre des formations longues en France ou à l'étranger. Sa mise en œuvre est assurée par des étudiants en Master de FLE (français langue étrangère), par des intervenants de l'association AGIR (Association générale des intervenants retraités), ou encore par des vacations de professeurs locaux. Dans bon nombre de pays, cette formation s'appuie aussi sur le réseau des alliances et instituts français. La DCSD s'efforce par ailleurs de développer la capacité d'appropriation de l'apprentissage linguistique de ses partenaires. Pour y parvenir, elle finance la formation de professeurs de français « locaux » au cours international de français de Rochefort (CIFR).

La DCSD joue ainsi un rôle important dans la promotion du français et de plus en plus de stagiaires peuvent bénéficier d'un enseignement du françaiset de plus en plus de stagiaires peuvent ainsi bénéficier d'un enseignement en langue française.





CHRONOLOGY OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE URUGUAYAN NATIONAL POLICE IN THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE MISSIONS

1st Part: Women in the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

Assistant Chief of Police Laura Labarnois

This paper is the outcome of the experience acquired by a female officer of the Uruguayan National Police, who was deployed in the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor in 2007 and Liberia in 2009 and 2012, serving as a member of the United Nations Police (UNPOL), Focal Point for the Humanitarian Agencies, Chief of the Assessment Team Unit and Gender Advisor, respectively.

This study serves as a support for the Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Operations Training Centers (ALCOPAZ) in order to contribute for the sharing of this point in question and to facilitate to a certain extent educational tasks and training, which are the ultimate goal of the aforementioned Association.

"Women and men experience conflict in different ways. Therefore, they comprehend peace differently..." 1

 $^{^1\} http://www.un.org/es/peacekeeping/issues/women/$



"Women who take part in peacekeeping activities are role models since they inspire other women and girls in societies solely dominated by men in order to fight for their rights and be part of peace processes." ²

The growing number of female participation in peace processes is significantly important in order to:

- Empower women in the host community;
- Help female former combatants with medical examinations;
- Help female former combatants during the processes of demobilization and reintegration into civilian life;
- Help female former combatants during the processes of demobilization, reintegration and reiteration into civilian life;
- Broaden information network;
- Carry out cordons in women search operations;
- Interview victims of sexual and gender based violence;
- Serve as instructors of female cadets in military and police academies; and
- Contact women in societies where they are forbidden to speak to men.

Also, it allows:

- To help mitigate conflicts;
- To improve the access and support for local women;
- To empower women in the community;

² Las mujeres en las actividades del mantenimiento de la paz. http://www.un.org/es/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml



- To encourage a broader sense of security in the local population, particularly in women and children;
- To promote more security for the local population, particularly women and children;
- To expand knowledge regarding peacekeeping missions; and
- To raise awareness.

PERCEPTION ON NOTIONS OF "GENDER"

Gender Equality implies:

- Equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women, men, boys and girls;
- Taking into account the interests, needs and priorities of women and men alike;
- Understanding this idea is not only a "women related topic" and must be equally important and engage both women and men; and
- Gender equality is based on promoting the idea that women and men are equal.

GENDER TRANSVERSALIZATION

• It is a strategy to make the interests and experiences of women and men become a whole planning, implementation, monitoring and assessment of the policies and programs in all political, economic and social areas so that men and women have equal benefits.

ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL REGARDING WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY

When it comes to this topic, the United Nations body that has the
primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security
worldwide has issued a series of resolutions, which should be
highlighted:



- SCR 1325 (2000);
- SCR 1820 (2008);
- SCR 1888 (2009);
- SCR 1889 (2009):
- SCR 1960 (2010);
- SCR 2106 (2013); and
- SCR 2122 (2013).

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325, ADOPTED ON 31 OCTOBER 2000

- Becomes the milestone concerning Women, Peace and Security;
- Promotes the idea that all components must have a gender perspective throughout the peacekeeping process;
- Acknowledges that women play an important role in the
 prevention and mitigation of conflicts and, therefore, it is vital
 they equally participate in the international maintenance of
 peace and security. Moreover, it confirms the need to adopt a
 gender perspective in peace operations and to train personnel
 regarding women's rights issues;
- Encourages the adoption of a gender perspective which comprises the peculiar needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement, rehabilitation and in post-conflict reconstruction;
- Urges the parts of the conflict to respect women's rights and to support their participation in peace negotiations and in postconflict reconstruction;
- Encourages all countries to allow a larger representation of women in all levels. Furthermore, it requests an increase of the participation of women in the decision-making activity in all



levels of conflict resolutions and in the peace process as well as to appoint more females as Special Representatives and broaden their roles in peacekeeping missions, particularly as military observers, police, human rights and humanitarian personnel; and

• Urges all parts engaged in negotiations and implementation of peace agreements to take into account the peculiar needs of women and girls in armed conflicts and to support activities aimed at promoting peace and human rights of women and girls. It is also important to adopt protective measures for women and girls against gender-based violence, as violation and other forms of sexual abuse and to respect the humanitarian approach of refugee camps, bearing in mind the specific needs of women and girls. Furthermore, the Secretary General urged that a study on the impact of armed conflicts on women and girls be carried out and that a gender perspective be adopted in all peacekeeping missions.

Gender Perspectives are integrated in the planning, training and implementation and in the respect of all efforts regarding the maintenance of peace. Five pillars are the base for the implementation:

- · Participation;
- Protection;
- Prevention;
- Relief and recovery; and
- Gender Transversalization.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1888, ADOPTED ON 30 SEPTEMBER 2009

 Decides that actual efforts regarding the protection of women and children to prevent sexual violence must be made in all mandates



of peacekeeping operations and requests the Secretary General to name a person as his Special Representative regarding sexual violence in armed conflicts (Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Sexual Violence in Conflict).

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1820, ADOPTED ON 19 JUNE 2008

It covers the following concepts:

- Sexual violence is used as a war tactic in order to humiliate, overpower and evict communities and ethnic groups of their own land:
- Civilians, mainly women and girls, must be protected from all sorts of sexual violence:
- Violation and other kinds of sexual violence might be regarded as international crimes, such as war crime, crime against humanity or genocide;
- The actors of UN peacekeeping operations must develop effective ways to prevent, protect and respond to sexual and gender based violence, which may include the augment of peacekeeping forces or police personnel; and
- In 2010, resolution 1960 was adopted and it is based on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda concerning sexual violence and it deepens the knowledge on this issue.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2106, ADOPTED ON 24 JUNE 2013

• Restates that Member States and UN bodies must increase efforts in order to implement previous mandates and fight



impunity related to sexual violence in conflicts. It highlights the importance of gender equality and political, social and economic empowerment of women regarding the actions targeting the prevention of sexual violence in armed conflicts and in post-conflict issues.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2122, ADOPTED ON 18 OCTOBER 2013

• Emphasizes the rendering accounts on the implementation of Resolution 1325 and the importance of female participation in all phases of prevention of conflicts, mitigation and recovery.

"GLOBAL EFFORT"

 In August 2009, the United Nations launched the "Global Effort" and, since then, it has worked along with Member States and national police forces to engage more female police officers in UN police operations all over the world.

The Global Effort invokes UN Member States the following actions:

- Set a policy that fixes the percentage that Police Contributing Countries must contribute with female police officers, proportionally equal to the gender rate of the national police;
- Review recruitment requirements and procedures for the international deployment in order to ensure female candidates are not restricted from applying; and
- Take into account granting benefits for officers who serve in peacekeeping missions.

The United Nations Police Division came up with the training of the Selection Assistance and Assessment Team of all women (SAAT).



Since 2014, the training has capacitated female police officers with assessment procedures they need prior to deployment as a United Nations police officer. The trainings were held in Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Nigeria, Rwanda and Togo. From August 2016 on, 333 female officers were approved in UN examinations and are eligible for deployment and 210 female officers have already deployed to United Nations Police in peacekeeping operations as the outcome of the training provided. Member States have worked to increase the number of female police officers in order to meet the needs in peacekeeping operations. For instance, India, Bangladesh and Rwanda have deployed Formed Police Units (FPU) composed by approximately 140 police officers. The FPUs, trained and ready to work as a unit, have served in the United Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL), in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

Picture 1: Integration between UN female Police Officers during the International Women's Day March - March 2010 - Liberia





MANDATE OF UNITED NATIONS POLICE UNMIL

UNMIL mandate had to be adjusted in many occasions regarding security situation. According to Resolution 2215 adopted by the Security Council on 2 April 2015, the mandate related to UNMIL covered:

- Protection of Civilians regarding physical violence threats, within its capabilities and deployment zones;
- Support humanitarian aid in close cooperation with Liberia Government and those who also contribute with this matter, helping to provide the necessary security conditions;
- An overhaul of the justice and security institutions. Assist Liberia
 Government with the draft and implementation of those matters,
 as soon as possible and in close coordination with bilateral and
 multilateral partners, within its national strategy concerning the
 necessary changes in the security sector.
- Assist Liberia Government with the overhaul of the security sector, with the organization of the Liberia National Police and with the Office for Immigration and Naturalization in order to provide technical assistance, joint housing programme and guidance, with special regard to the development of the internal management systems of Liberia National Police, of the Office for Immigration and Naturalization, as well as to the justice sector and prison system;
- Assist Liberia Government in order to expand the national legal and security services all over the country following the development of its capacity and training; and
- Assist Liberia Government in order to coordinate this task along with all partners, including bilateral and multilateral donors.



- Promote and protect rights, with special regard to the vulnerabilities and abuse practiced against children and women, especially when it comes to sexual and gender based violence;
- Support the strengthening of efforts promoted by Liberia Government in order to fight gender based sexual violence, including the fight against the impunity of the perpetrators; and
- Protection of UN personnel, facilities and equipment, ensuring safe and security as well as free of movement of UN personnel and partners.

EXAMPLES OF INTERVENTIONS BY UNPOL/UNMIL.

- Police Academy gender perspective recruitment;
- Gender Policy Implementation regarding police career;
- Female recruitment campaign;
- Gender balanced monitoring;
- Support community police;
- · Campaign against gender based violence; and
- Coordination and cooperation between other National Police
 Units, such as Management, Personnel affairs Office, police
 academy, women and children protection sector of Liberia police,
 promotion of police officers in the districts.

GOALS FOR 2020

• From 2009 on, based on the effort made by the United Nations to increase the rate of female police officers deployed in peacekeeping missions, the number of female officers increased from approximately 900 (seven percent out of 12000 police members) to 1300 officers (ten percent out of 13000) in 2016;



- The goal was restated by means of Resolution 2242 (2015) of the Security Council, which forces the United Nations to double its female representation in police for 2020; and
- Resolution 2185 (2014) of the Security Council over the police role in peacekeeping matters, emphasized the promotion of gender equality as part of a whole approach concerning conflict prevention and sustainable peace.

CONCLUSION

- Rule of Law, democracy and human rights are parts of a triangulation, which means that one cannot stand without the two others. When equality levels are not reached concerning educational and job opportunities, legal access, participation in governmental decision-making process, productivity benefits and development, Rule of Law, democracy and peace are at risk;
- Discrimination and gender based violence must have a prompt response in order to eradicate impunity and get justice for the victims. However, prevention measures are needed as well. The starting points are raising awareness, questioning patterns, making issues visible and thinking them over;
- The efforts must be permanent and of the concern of all governmental sectors and levels, institutions and communities.
 Girls, boys, young people, women and men must all be part of this process;
- There must be a follow-up of strategies and actions, from the training way through the economic empowerment and decision-making of the vulnerable parts; and
- The action of the peacekeeping forces, the monitoring and assessment must be a joint and lasting measure along with



Picture 2: International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers - 29 May 2010 -Liberia



the government and other institutions in order to reach peace and a sustainable and steady security pattern from the moment the United Nations withdraws on.

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